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THE NEW ADMINISTRATION AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

By

H. G. NICHOLAS

THROUGHOUT most of 1956, the world kept one eye focused on the electoral stage of the United States, conscious that what happened in the minds of American voters would eventually determine the foreign policy of the American Government. It is no less true now than it was in Lord Bryce's time that public opinion is the ultimate sovereign in the United States however that sovereignty may be delegated, whatever disguises it may from time to time assume. And though that public opinion operates within certain channels, and although in an election year those channels are now fairly sharp and limiting, yet the rest of the world knows that personalities and parties do affect policies. A White House occupied by a Stevenson will behave differently from one occupied by an Eisenhower, just as a Congress dominated by Democrats will be different from one dominated by Republicans. In a sense, of course, the United States in 1956 was in that condition of national good health which manifests itself in an acceptance by both the leading parties of certain basic principles of foreign policy; at the same time Democrats and Republicans looked with different vision both on the Free World they were both determined to defend, and on the Communist Alliance they both would like to defeat. Agreement perhaps existed on strategy; on tactics, however, there were clear-cut divergences.

However, the events of November 7 put an end to whatever anxieties and expectations foreign offices and foreign publics may have indulged in. There was nothing ambiguous about

the voters' verdict, for all the paradox involved in it. President Eisenhower was returned as the nation's chief executive by an overwhelming majority, drawn from all over the Union. At the same time the Democratic control of both Houses of the legislature was reaffirmed by a margin surprisingly close to the one they enjoyed at the dissolution. In effect, the voters asked for the mixture as before.

But, of course, in politics—particularly in foreign politics—the mixture is never quite the same as before. The world will not stand still. You cannot step twice into the same stream of international forces. However identical your objectives, you have to recalculate the pressures, check again your estimates of other people's actions and reactions, work out afresh the recurrent equations of power. Thus while the policies of the old administration and the old Congress provide clues to the behaviour of the new, they are only clues. They are not fixed lines of policy which can be projected without deviation for another four years. This would be true even if the men in control all remained the same—as in a sense the team of Eisenhower, Nixon and Dulles remains unchanged. In fact, however, there are other actors who have changed—in both executive and legislature.

THE REPUBLICAN PROGRAMME STATED

Where so much is fluid, let us take our start at a point in time when the Eisenhower administration and the Republican Party consciously formulated a statement of foreign policy to which they both could publicly subscribe (a situation, as one knows, by no means always to be encountered). Often in American politics a party's platform is a meaningless jumble of uninformative or misleading platitudes. But when a party is in office, its platform is at least a statement of the way it would like its actual policy, as a Government, to appear. When that party is also confident of re-election, as the Republicans properly were, proud professions and lavish promises will be tempered by some awareness that they have to be lived up to after success at the polls. These considerations certainly affected the drafting of the foreign policy

sections of the platform adopted by the Republicans at their convention at San Francisco in August, and it is not without significance that the chairman of the committee which drafted the platform was Senator Bush of Connecticut, a liberal Republican, sometime partner in the international banking firm of Brown Brothers, Harriman & Co., and a consistent supporter of the President's foreign policy. Furthermore, it was known that the foreign policy planks of the platform were written by a team which was headed by Mr. Thurston B. Morton, who, as a former Assistant Secretary of State, had been well informed both about the administration's aspirations and about the sort of world in which the pledges of the platform would have to be carried out.

The platform that emerged from the hands of these draftsmen and was accepted without amendment by the Convention laid especial stress on the themes of peace and freedom, while the continuance of both these desirable conditions was linked to the maintenance of American armed strength and the use of American wealth for raising living standards abroad. The United Nations was repeatedly hailed as a pillar of American policy, and there was a specific endorsement of NATO, with stress being laid on the development of its "political aspects." "Instead of being merely a military alliance NATO will provide a means for co-ordinating the policies of the member States on vital matters, such as the reunification of Germany, the liberation of the satellites, and general policies in relations to the Soviet Union."

The Middle East featured prominently, with stress being laid on the maintenance of "friendly relations with all nations in this vital area," with the United States "seeking to mediate differences among them and encouraging their legitimate national aspirations" . . . "We recognise the existence of a major threat to international peace in the Near East. We support a policy of impartial friendship for the peoples of the Arab States . . . We regard the preservation of Israel as an important tenet of American foreign policy. We are determined that the integrity of an independent Jewish State shall be maintained. We shall support the independence of

Israel against armed aggression. The best hope for peace in the Middle East lies in the United Nations. We pledge our continued efforts to eliminate the obstacles to a lasting peace in this area."

There was a good deal of self-congratulation upon the checks administered to Communist aggression everywhere, but particularly in the Far East. Here there was a specific pledge to "continue to oppose the seating of Communist China in the United Nations, thus upholding international morality." Furthermore, "we are against any trade with the Communist world that would threaten the security of the United States and our allies."

On the economic front, emphasis fell on the encouragement of trade and the employment of foreign aid. "Barriers which impede international trade . . . should be reduced on a gradual, selective, and reciprocal basis, with full recognition of the necessity to safeguard domestic enterprise, agriculture and labour, against unfair import competition." "Technical and economic assistance programmes" were endorsed as "the best way to create the political and social stability essential to lasting peace." And in this connection there was a reaffirmation of "the principle of freedom for all peoples" and a claim to be "looking forward to the eventual end of colonialism."

Finally, there was a great deal of emphasis on national defence, in which discriminating observers detected a compromise wording. They recalled that in 1952 Eisenhower had protested against the use of the term "retaliatory striking power" on the grounds that this would imply exclusive reliance on atomic weapons and implicit abandonment of NATO. In the 1956 platform, it was observed, the word "striking" had crept back even though "retaliatory" was omitted and there were references to the necessity of retaining "vigorous and well-trained manpower." Obviously there was here a certain amount of straddling between the advocates of a large army and a super air force.

The President's acceptance speech at San Francisco basically reaffirmed these themes, laying down three "imperatives of peace." Of these the first two were national strength, military

and economic, and collective security. However, the third went further than the platform. This was the need to try to bridge the chasm between the United States and people under Communist rule. A clear relic of earlier hopes of a *rapprochement* with the "New Look," it laid great stress on the value of exchange visits, travel and mutual understanding. The speech ended by emphasis on "free Americans working together and with friends abroad toward a common ideal in a peaceful world."

In the election campaign itself nothing much occurred to upset these Republican resolutions or to invalidate these promises. Mr. Stevenson did indeed devote a good deal of his time and effort to attacking the administration on its foreign policy, actual and contemplated, but his attacks did not oblige the enemy to give ground, except perhaps—and that to a debatable degree—on the issue of the abolition of hydrogen bomb tests. Nor did Mr. Eisenhower feel obliged, as in 1952, to modify his foreign policy programme as he went along: there was no war front in Korea which he could promise to fly to, nor indeed—what was more important—was there anything that a basically contented electorate wanted him to do which, broadly speaking, he was not doing already.

So as the campaign drew to its October close, the policies advocated by the Republican leaders were essentially what they had been at San Francisco. The only question, it seemed, was what would the voters have to say about them. To this expectation, however, events abroad administered a rude shock. It was in London, Paris, Budapest and Cairo, not at the polls, that the administration's policy received a succession of jolts and jabs. Indeed, in the short-run the impact of the events in Hungary and Suez seems to have been favourable to the Republican cause (or perhaps one should say to the President's cause); in the face of the dangerous and the unexpected the electorate rallied, as so often, to the man in power. But when the first shock wore off, of seeing the "iron curtain" dented, the trans-Atlantic alliance ruptured and the United Nations flouted, people began to take stock of the principles enunciated at San Francisco, and ask how

much of the blame or credit for these events should go to the party and the President who had been in charge both when they occurred and during the four years that had preceded them. This process of reassessment was slow, and indeed was still going on when 1957 brought in the new Congress and launched the Republican Administration upon its second term of office.

THE REPUBLICAN PROGRAMME CRITICISED

Some of the damage done was, however, fairly quickly apparent. If Hungary was a triumph of the human spirit and a refutation of the pessimistic prophecies of 1984, how much of this glorious achievement could be credited to Mr. Dulles and either the policies or the propaganda of his State Department? And if Hungary was also a tragic defeat, a demonstration of the practical impotence of satellite revolt when Russia was really roused, an object lesson in how to defy the United Nations and get away with it, how much of the shame of this counter-revolution could be visited on the same shoulders? Was it not Mr. Dulles who, on the assumption of his present office in 1953, had spoken of the prospects of "liberation"? And if experience had since taught him prudence, did not prudence itself seem a little shameful by the side of the heroism of the Budapest barricades? If so, though this was a shame which all the free world must share—particularly those parts of it which were simultaneously flouting the United Nations on other fronts—the United States as leader of that free society felt a special impotence, frustration, even humiliation at being unable to take any advantage at all of what seemed like the long awaited breakthrough in its anti-Communist offensive.

For Hungary, however, there was always the excuse, "What else could be done?" That poor country was recognised by everyone as that only too familiar figure in the folklore of contemporary America—the female hostage on the running board who enables the gangsters to make their getaway while the impotent police hold their fire for fear of slaughtering

the innocent. The debacle in the Middle East was something very different. Here was a State virtually of America's own creation, Israel, apparently in conspiracy with America's oldest allies, disturbing the peace in an area where the Russians were already poised to jump in and—above all—acting, all three of them, in violation of the international tribunal America regarded as her especial brain-child. Even in the moment of sharpest indignation and reproof there could be detected an implicit admission that the three “wrongdoers” could not be wholly to blame—that somewhere along the line American policy had failed, if only by the sin of omission.

Wherein had this failure consisted? On this the administration and its critics parted company. The administration, when by degrees it came to admit a measure of failure, seemed to find it in its own reluctance to take a firm enough and independent enough lead. “For the first time in history,” said Mr. Nixon after the Assembly vote for a cease-fire in Egypt, “we have shown independence of Anglo-French policies towards Asia and Africa which seemed to us to reflect the colonial tradition.” Implicitly also, the administration blamed Congress for not having given it the necessary economic ammunition. Had not the President's foreign aid demands been whittled down, in the last Congress, from \$4,900 million to \$3,800, despite his deployment of every kind of political pressure? Finally, there was at least one group of policy makers (especially strong in the State Department) who took the view that the United States mistake all along had lain in her support, however qualified, for Israel, a State which could never be more than a source of trouble in the Middle East compared with the indigenous and, above all, oil-producing Arabs.

Outside the administration criticisms were as various as the critics, but on certain points there was a rough agreement. Most critics thought that the United States had “appeased” Nasser, underestimating his willingness to flirt with the Soviet Union, overlooking his aggressive designs simply because they had not ripened into technical aggression against Israel. At the same time, it was argued, Mr. Dulles had needlessly

provoked the sensitive Egyptian dictator by dangling aid for the Aswan Dam before him one minute and withdrawing it the next.

More generally, it was contended, the United States had lacked any properly formulated policy in the Middle East. It was all very well, critics said, to blame Britain and France for "going it alone," but their action was the inevitable consequence of American waverings and shufflings at a time when vital Western, including in that term American, interests were at stake.

In a wider context still criticism was levelled at the administration for producing a situation in which confidence in American leadership had sunk so low that its two principal allies matured their plans in secret and acted alone, a situation which in turn led the United States to be voting in the Security Council with its inveterate enemy against its best friends. Was this a triumph for American diplomacy? Could *all* the blame be visited on London and Paris?

THE NEW ADMINISTRATION

Naturally enough disposition was strong to place the blame for whatever lapse the critic most deplored upon the man especially charged with foreign affairs throughout the entire period, Mr. Dulles. (The same immunity which so remarkably protected the President from blame for the failures, while according him credit for the successes of his administration, continued in large measure to protect him throughout the Suez inquest.) His self-contradictions, his seeming disposition to say different things to different audiences, even his restless globe-trotting with its consequent neglect of the State Department itself¹—all this came under fire. There were rumours that the President, forced by Mr. Dulles's sudden illness to act as his own Secretary of State for a few weeks, had been

¹ A forecast that 1967 would show no change in Mr. Dulles's devotion to mobility appeared in a Washington correspondent's "Old Moore's Almanac" for the New Year: "Dec. 20. Pres. Eisenhower, lighting White House Xmas tree, expresses regret that Sec. of State Dulles, grounded by bad weather in Kuala Lumpur, will be unable to make his semi-annual stopover in town." *New York Times Magazine*, January 6, 1957.

shocked by what he found out about the operation of the Department. However, rumours of this sort are part of the stock-in-trade of Washington columnists and no positive evidence was produced to substantiate them—rather the contrary.

The President certainly saw no need for making sweeping changes. Of his official Cabinet of ten, only three had been replaced in the whole of his first four years, and Mr. Eisenhower firmly ignored the opportunity provided by the commencement of his second term to replace any more. Indeed, on January 30 when Mr. Dulles came under such heavy fire in the new Congress that the Democrats were suspected of a plot to force him to resign, Mr. Eisenhower came out with a resounding reaffirmation of confidence in him. He described him as "an outstanding, dedicated man, doing a terrific job under handicaps," who had trained himself for his task from his earliest years and who had "acquired wisdom and a knowledge of foreign affairs greater than anybody else in the world." There is no reason to suppose that this tribute was in any way forced or that it represents anything but the President's real opinion. It will take a lot of pressure to get the President to part with his Secretary of State, even if he becomes a political liability in Congress. Mr. Eisenhower can be every bit as stubbornly loyal as Mr. Truman was, when Mr. Acheson became the target of even more sustained hostility from the Republicans.

It might well happen, however, that the delegation of authority to Mr. Dulles will be a little less lavish in the future than it has generally been in the past. If the practice formed in the Suez crisis of the President having foreign policy questions brought to the White House for his personal decision were to develop into a habit this would certainly mean a tighter rein for Mr. Dulles. But Mr. Eisenhower will be an older man in his second term than in his first, with proportionately less energy for expanding his official duties; the visits to the Augusta golf course are likely, other things being equal, to become more rather than less frequent, and in the normal way of things it is the man on the spot who

will take the day-to-day decisions that add up to policy. At the moment, however, there is every indication that the President is maintaining his own active direction. This is reflected, if in nothing else, in the stream of heads of State who are coming to Washington to be exposed to the formidable charm of the President's personality; instead of Mr. Dulles girdling the globe and dictating *aide-mémoires* in a Skymaster, the world is beating a path to the White House portico and the Gettysburg Farm paddock.

There is a further possibility—indeed, in many people's thinking, a probability. This is that Mr. Nixon, without making any change in his formal position as Vice-President, might be encouraged to play a continuously larger role in foreign policy-making. The President's confidence in him is obvious, the possibility that he may at any moment be called upon to step into the President's place is present to everyone's mind, and Mr. Nixon's own interest in foreign affairs is transparent. Many people saw significance in his being selected for the crucial policy-making speech of December 6, which was the signal for healing the rupture between Washington and London and reaffirming American solidarity with its anti-Communist allies.

At a lower, but still important level in policy-making, there has occurred the appointment of Mr. Christian Herter as Under-Secretary of State in place of Mr. Herbert Hoover Jr. The immediate significance of this was obvious; Mr. Hoover personified those elements in the Department which were most suspicious of the policies of Britain and France, and most anxious to use the oil shortage as a salutary lesson in the follies of "going-it-alone." But the long-term implications were perhaps more important. If Mr. Hoover was essentially a carry-over from the days of Taftian neo-isolationism (or perhaps one should say the "garrison America" school), Mr. Herter represents Republican liberal internationalism in its purest form. Born in Paris in 1895, the grandson of one of those talented German liberals who took refuge in the United States after the collapse of the 1848 revolution, Herter grew up in a Boston family which knew Europe well.

Entering the foreign service in the First World War, he served as an attaché in Berlin in 1916 and 1917 and afterwards acted as secretary to the American delegation at the Paris Peace Conference. Disappointed at the American failure to join the League, he left diplomacy for the Department of Commerce, and that in turn for journalism and a lectureship in government at Harvard. Entering Massachusetts politics in 1931, he served for twelve years in the State legislature and then in 1942 won election to the House of Representatives. There he was associated with a group of liberal and internationalist Republicans, winning distinction by his service on the Foreign Affairs Committee, particularly for his leadership of a congressional delegation which toured Europe in 1947, and whose report paved the way for legislative acceptance of the Marshall Plan. From 1952 to 1956 he was Governor of Massachusetts but was already regarded by many as ripe for a larger role on the national stage. One of those who sought to promote him was Mr. Harold Stassen, who saw in him the candidate who might block Mr. Nixon's re-nomination as Vice-President. (Mr. Stassen's motives remain at some points obscure, but distrust of Mr. Nixon's statesmanship and respect for Mr. Herter's views on foreign policy were certainly present in them.) Mr. Herter, however, declined to play and indeed himself agreed to place Mr. Nixon's name in nomination. This does not mean, however, that his State Department appointment is to be interpreted as reward for services rendered. Mr. Herter's is not that kind of appointment; the promotion is justified by Mr. Herter's own record. He is an excellent administrator and will be particularly helpful in strengthening the Department on a side which has become sadly weak, the recruitment and morale of the Foreign Service officers. Not only has he been one himself, but he also played the principal role in getting the School of Advanced International Studies established in Washington. Thus, if he is given the power, he may well improve the operational efficiency of the Department at an important level. (One indication that he will be given the power is provided by his appointment as Chairman of the Operations Coordinating Board, the agency charged with

making sure that all Government Departments carry out the recommendations of the National Security Council. This was a post reputed to be coveted by Mr. Nixon. Its assumption by an Under-Secretary is perhaps a sign that he will be an Under-Secretary who enjoys that invaluable asset, White House favour.) Certainly, as an ex-Congressman, Mr. Herter has at least one strong card; he knows what *not* to do in handling congressional relations—and is in fact, by temperament as well as by training, a very acceptable figure on the Hill.

What might one expect if Mr. Dulles were to cease to be Secretary and Mr. Herter to succeed him? It is never easy to dogmatise about a Number Two's behaviour when he becomes Number One, but a few prophecies seem safe. Mr. Herter would remain loyal to collective security and foreign aid. He would be diplomatic, in the best sense of the word, towards foreign Powers and domestic politicians alike. He would bring considerable experience and a cultivated intelligence to his office. It is less certain whether he has it in him to be an imaginative initiator of new policies, whether he has the strength and toughness to overcome really formidable opposition, whether he can fully hold his own in the guerilla warfare which is Washington politics. But he is sound, humane, liberal and persuasive.

Overseas, the Administration has made one major change. It has replaced Mr. Winthrop Aldrich by Mr. John Hay Whitney as Ambassador at the Court of St. James. It would be hard to conceive of a better friend to this country than Mr. Aldrich, to whose forbearance and understanding during the difficult days of November and December 1956 Britain undoubtedly owes a great deal. Nevertheless, he lacked two essential qualities for his post; his personality did not make any considerable impression on the public at large, and he was unable to function as a forceful interpreter between State Department and Foreign Office. It will be surprising if Mr. Whitney does not improve on his predecessor in both these respects. A much younger man, fifty-two years of age to Mr. Aldrich's seventy-one, Mr. Whitney not only comes of good diplomatic stock (his grandfather was Secretary of State

to McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt), he has also served in advisory capacities on various commissions dealing with foreign economic policy and State Department organisation. A man of friendly, but also forceful personality, he is likely to catch the imagination of the British public (is he not a celebrated figure on the turf?) and to make his weight felt in official circles. A friend and frequent companion of the President (he is, amongst other things, a fellow member of the Augusta National Golf Club), he comes as close as anyone can to reproducing the spontaneous, direct friendliness of his chief.

THE ATTITUDE OF CONGRESS

However, it is not only in the executive branch that personalities can affect foreign policy; Congress too has a part to play and here several new faces have appeared in positions of control. The President's failure to carry his party "on his coat-tails" leaves the Democrats still in a minority in both Houses, but age has caused certain significant changes. In supreme command, so to say, in each house, are still the same Texas team of Lyndon Johnson, majority leader in the Senate, and Sam Rayburn, Speaker of the House of Representatives. They will continue in general to "go along" with the fundamental policies of the White House and State Department, supposing them to be in the future what they have been in the past. They will also continue to exercise great influence among their colleagues in support of those policies. But each of them is in "supreme command" only in a titular sense. Below them are satraps whose allegiance is by no means to be taken for granted. One such figure is the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In the last Congress he was Senator George who carried his loyalty to the President's policies to the point where he endangered his own support in his home State of Georgia, and retired rather than risk defeat in a strenuous contest. In his place comes the oldest senator ever, Mr. Theodore Green of Rhode Island, a hale eighty-nine years of age. No one expects this elderly incumbent to strike a strong line of his own, still less

to oppose the White House off his own bat. But the very lack of strong leadership seems likely to deliver the Committee into the hands of the group of highly independent liberal Democrats, Senators Fulbright, Mansfield (the Democratic whip), Humphrey and Morse, who have abundantly shown by their behaviour during the hearings on the "Eisenhower doctrine" that they are sharply critical of the administration. In the House Foreign Affairs Committee an obscure and colourless figure has been brought to the chairmanship by the escalator of seniority. He is Thomas Sylvy Gordon who, despite his name, is of predominantly Polish ancestry and represents a safe Democratic district in Chicago, largely inhabited by Polish immigrants. Mr. Gordon makes no pretence of being an expert in foreign affairs and there is every likelihood that in fact his chairmanship will be marked by that hyper-caution and timid orthodoxy which so frequently characterise the foreign politics of immigrant groups in America. Certainly, if he has strong views he has kept them to himself; to his colleagues he is mainly familiar as an ardent amateur photographer who, when he occupied a less central position on his committee, amused himself by taking snapshots of witnesses and developing them in the darkroom which is a part of his congressional suite. In short, whatever complications may occur in the Senate, House Democrats are likely to take a united Party line on most questions of foreign policy.

That line, for reasons given above, is likely to continue to be basically a White House line. But this does not mean that all will be plain sailing. Despite the fundamentally identical "world-view" of the President and Democratic Party, the Party, as such, is in a much less friendly mood than it was when Mr. Eisenhower first took office four years ago. It resents, in the first place, what it regards as the administration's failure to reward its previous fidelity in appropriate terms. Democratic votes, it claims, saved many a presidential policy from shipwreck at the hands of "Taftite" Republicans, yet in the 1956 election campaign "bipartisanship" was forgotten and the President and other Republican

candidates took exclusive credit for the "peace" and "halting" of Communism, to which the Democrats so largely contributed. Besides did not the administration win the election by one policy, only to discard it for another after the poll? Did they not cry "peace" where there was no peace? Did they not promise to keep American boys out of foreign wars and now seek to send them to the Middle East? Thus ran the party grumbles. Of course this sentiment may wear off in time, especially if the familiar Eisenhower emollients are applied in characteristically generous measure. Presidential charm will, however, be in considerable demand for some time to come because there can be no doubt that the other presidential assets will be found to be waning ones in this, his second term. The prestige of the presidential office, the fear of his influence with the voters—these will steadily decline to a virtual vanishing point in 1960.

There is more than this to Democratic querulousness. Though, over and above politics, they still "like Ike," there are a great many of them who have lost what affection and confidence they may have had for his Secretary of State. The drive to force Mr. Dulles's resignation was sparked by many factors besides a disinterested assessment of his abilities. His congressional foes regard him as having on more than one occasion, either by design or inadvertence, played less than fair with the Congress. They visit on him, many of them, a long-standing resentment at what was done to his predecessor, Mr. Acheson, with Mr. Dulles's acquiescence, if not at his instigation. The grand inquest on the administration's Middle East policy is, amongst other things, the lit-for-tat for the inquisition on "the loss of China" which the Republicans conducted in the days when Mr. Truman and Mr. Acheson were in the dock. To the extent to which Mr. Nixon intervenes in the foreign field he will find himself no less a marked man. Here too, there are old scores to be paid off. And if of course Mr. Nixon should succeed to the White House he would inherit among the Democrats none of that "above party" respect which is Mr. Eisenhower's.

Nor are these attitudes to be regarded as merely post-election tantrums. They existed in embryo already in the previous Congress when, despite an ultimate endorsement of most White House policies, there was a strong disposition to cavil, to assert the celebrated congressional power of negation. This was shown very clearly in the resistance to the administration's foreign aid demands. In part, of course, this was the natural reluctance to spend constituents' money on non-constituents which every congressman feels in an election year. But it was something more. It was a feeling amongst men who had hitherto been pretty generous supporters of foreign aid that aid was now being used less as a policy than as a substitute for a policy. There was a loss of confidence in the direction of affairs, a feeling that the Congress was being asked to give a blank cheque either for a policy which was not being disclosed to them or, worse still, which might not exist in any clearly definable sense at all.

THE NEW POLICY STATED

What policy is Congress offered by the administration now? In most years the State of the Union message would have answered that. Every four years (of which 1957 is one) the President's Inaugural, so to say, orchestrates the reply. This year the January 10 State of the Union message came as a kind of afterthought to the January 5 message on the Middle East. Brief (thirty-three minutes) almost to the point of curtness, it hardly pretended to take a world-wide view, to present a complete conspectus of White House plans. Like the Republican platform of the previous August, it stressed collective security, ("America, alone and isolated, cannot assure even its own security"), efficient defence and economic aid. It reasserted American willingness to enter "any reliable agreement which would reverse the trend towards ever more devastating nuclear weapons; reciprocally provide against the possibility of surprise attack; mutually control the outer space missile and satellite development; and make possible a lower level of armament and armed forces and an easier burden of military expenditures." It was silent on the theme

of "exchanges" with the Soviet *bloc*, which had bulked so large in the President's acceptance speech at San Francisco. In the foreign economic field it urged once again United States membership in the proposed Organisation for Trade Cooperation (which Congress refused to authorise in 1956), welcomed the European common market and atomic energy authority, and asked for United States participation in the International Atomic Energy Agency. It laid a new stress on the work (and budget) of the United States Information Agency (to which Mr. Eisenhower had just appointed his brains-truster and speech-writer, the gifted Mr. Larson). After briefly reasserting the "Eisenhower Doctrine" it emphasised the dependence of Western Europe on "free and uninterrupted movement of oil from the Middle East." Finally an affirmation of the United States "interdependence" on other free peoples led up to a reminder that American policy was yoked to the United Nations.

The swelling periods of the President's Second Inaugural on January 21 represent something of a contrast. It did not so much orchestrate the State of the Union speech as provide the President's personal cadenza on it. If the earlier message represented the composite thinking of all departments of the administration, the Inaugural was the expression of Mr. Eisenhower's own mood and hopes—American policy as he would like to see it were he given a free hand. As such it fairly represented the world view of a leader whom a shrewd Washington correspondent well described as "pragmatic, optimistic, idealistic and episodic."

The speech was, above all else, an outward looking address. Little or nothing was said in it about home affairs—even its initial depiction of the United States as a land of plenty and peace served only to introduce a contrast with the rest of the world sunk in "want, discord and danger." To the divisive, global influence of Communism it opposed the universal love of freedom and the American dedication to peace under law. Then came the passages which many hailed as the proclamation of a New Deal in world affairs. "We are called to meet the price of this peace . . .

We must use our skills and knowledge and, at times, our substance, to help others rise from misery . . . The economic need of all nations—in mutual dependence—makes isolation an impossibility . . . The American story of material progress has helped excite the longing of all needy peoples for some satisfaction of their human wants. These hopes that we have helped to inspire, we can help to fulfil. In this confidence we speak plainly to all peoples . . . When in time of want or peril they ask our help, they may honorably receive it, for we no more seek to bury their sovereignty than we would sell our own.” Truly no American President has gone further in dedicating his country to a generous internationalism than this. It was an offer of help to all the needy and endangered everywhere, with no strings attached and with no shadow of turning back to the old isolationism, diplomatic or economic.

THE NEW POLICY EXAMINED

Concretely, what does this signify for future American policy? The disposition will be strong, amongst the gullible to think that this means universal handouts of dollars, arms and alliances, and amongst the cynical to assume that it amounts to no more than the irresponsible eloquence of a speech-writer hired from the Luce magazines. Either conclusion would be false. A country which has poured out its wealth in such measure from the earliest days of Lend-Lease, through the Marshall Plan and Point Four, is not to be under-estimated as a continuing philanthropist, albeit a practical and at times hard-headed one. A President who came to his office by way of SHAEF and SHAPE, who decisively threw his weight on the side of peace and negotiation in Korea, Formosa, Indo-China and Geneva, is not a merely part-time devotee of the principle of committing American strength to the maintenance of world peace. At the same time, and despite his thunderous personal triumph at the polls last November, the President is no dictator. Even in his own executive branch he must take into account such sentiments as those expressed by his own Secretary of the Treasury. Mr. Humphrey, when he openly protested at the size of the federal budget estimates, said that he thinks

Europe's need for dollars has been "greatly exaggerated," and would openly welcome any cut in the foreign aid programme. If the President feels that his personal mandate entitles him to override such opposition in his own household will he still be able to convert Congress to his point of view? Rumour has it that the massive weight of the President's majority has made him disposed to take a tougher line with congressional critics; if so he will find that the Democratic members of both houses feel that they too have a mandate, and a very discriminating one, from the public which denied to the President's party the endorsement they gave to him. Much, obviously, will depend upon the national economy; if that remains buoyant it will be surprising if the President does not get a considerable amount of backing for his schemes, though it will be a good deal less than the language of his Inaugural involved.

Looking at more specific areas of policy, it is, of course, the Middle East that dominates current American thinking. The "Eisenhower Doctrine" is, as its best friends admit, an improvisation, a hurried attempt to plug a leak. Basically it is not Middle Eastern, but anti-Soviet. It completes the containment of Soviet dynamism by bolstering the defences of the area which otherwise, with Britain and France withdrawn, would collapse. The bolstering is military and economic, and the "Doctrine's" friends point, not without some justification, to the seeds of a more permanent Middle Eastern settlement which may germinate out of the economic aid which the "Doctrine" envisages. (Congress will look hard at this one, but will probably provide substantial funds.) What cannot be denied, however, is the lack of a political and diplomatic solution to the problems of the area. The negativism of "impartiality" between Jew and Arab has collapsed under the strain of the Israel-Egypt war. The policy of working through the United Nations remains, but grave difficulties will develop when the United Nations passes, as it must, from the role of truce-maker to that of settlement-maker. Will the United States then still be able to secure its two-thirds majorities in the Assembly? Here the unexpected

and the illogical can hit the best-laid plans for six. India, for example, was a carefully cultivated ally for this operation, and all went well up to and including Mr. Nehru's visit to Mr. Eisenhower. But how if Kashmir sours Mr. Nehru on the United Nations as a world tribunal? If his defection led to a substantial element of the Afro-Asian *bloc* deserting the United States on this issue, it might be necessary to seek action outside the United Nations, with all the embarrassment and opprobrium that that would entail.

If rethinking about the Middle East is still confused, reappraisal of the other 1956 "problem area," the satellite States of Eastern Europe, is even less advanced. While Hungary still fought, something like panic swept some official circles in Washington lest the infection of freedom spreading to Eastern Germany would rouse Russia to action that could only end in a third world war. The danger passed, but the concern remains. Mr. Dulles, on December 18, went so far as to say that if the satellites became "genuinely independent nations such a development would warrant a general review of American policies regarding NATO and the presence of United States forces in Western Europe." Powerful pressures are operating in this direction—Mr. Stassen and his long-maturing disarmament plans, the State Department's fears of what will happen at Bonn when Dr. Adenauer goes, the fact that every year the desire to cut the number of American troops overseas grows amongst congressmen and the electorate. This does not mean that NATO will be jettisoned; Mr. Eisenhower is as committed to its central conception as much as any man alive. But before the next four years are out something somewhere along the line has got to give, whether the result is a neutralised *cordon* of satellites, a de-militarised and united Germany, or a Western defence system relying almost exclusively on the "ultimate" weapon, or a combination of all three.

And where in this does Britain fit in to the present pattern of administration thinking? For most practical purposes the sores of 1956 may be regarded as healed. (They were never as painful in the public mind as they were in the

official. A recent public opinion poll revealed that fewer Americans blamed Britain over Suez (29 per cent.) than Egypt (32 per cent.); although criticism of our action was real and widespread, Mr. Aldrich was probably right in saying it has left no resentment behind.) What has happened—as much owing to the revealed facts of power as to any American intention—is that we have been demoted in American eyes. Still the first ally, we now count for less; the attempt and the failure to stand alone has brought the inescapable consequence that we have lost some even of that limited weight in council which we had before. Washington has for some time past been somewhat loth to accord us that claim to exclusive and prior consultation which we advance; after the events of October–November such a claim will be harder to re-establish than ever. Much—most perhaps—will depend upon our own wisdom and endeavours, but there are, one may suggest, certain predictable, fixed elements in American policy. First there will be a disposition wherever possible to treat with us not directly but through collective organisations to which we belong, *e.g.*, NATO, OEEC (for this purpose the Commonwealth is not an organisation). Secondly, the preservation of the strategic imperial bastions will remain a matter of considerable American, as of British, concern, but American determination to avoid contamination with the colonialist brush is also real and likely to prove persistent. Thirdly, understanding of our economic needs will grow, particularly of our needs as a trading nation. It will continue, however, to be tempered by a concern for the American producer. Mr. Eisenhower believes in freer trade, but has no intention of becoming a martyr to it. Congress barely believes in it.

Prophecy, as George Eliot very properly remarked, is the most gratuitous form of error, and any one of these forecasts may be falsified even before they get into print. The most one can say is that something like the foregoing is inherent in present trends and present leadership; also that nothing, short of that total convulsion which it is in everyone's interest to avert, can eliminate certain of these fixed elements in the shaping of American policy.

EASTERN EUROPE SINCE STALIN

By

HUGH SETON-WATSON

THE last two years of Stalin's life were the period of the most ruthless oppression in the East European satellites. The war in Korea caused still greater emphasis on the priority of heavy industry than normal Communist dogma would require. This led to an upward "revision" of output targets in 1951 for the Czechoslovak and Hungarian Five-Year and the Polish Six-Year plans. The standard of living of the working class declined from an already low level, whereas everyone had previously expected a substantial rise. Pressure on the peasants was increased. In Czechoslovakia and Hungary collectivisation was pushed ahead, in East Germany it was begun. In Poland and Rumania there was still little collectivisation, but the demands of the State for farm produce, and the various forms of persecution of alleged "kulaks" became more severe. In Hungary in 1951-1952 many thousands of families were deported from Budapest, their homes given to party officials, policemen and in some cases skilled workers, while they were set to forced labour in camps or to unskilled agricultural labour in villages. Sometimes parents and children were left together, sometimes families were broken up and scattered. The victims were persons of former "bourgeois" (land-owning, professional or business) origin: not any offence, not even a political offence, but mere accident of birth, was the justification of this cruelty. The manner in which it was carried out offered rich opportunities for corruption, personal revenge and physical brutality.

These years were also a period of intensified terror within the Communist Parties. In Hungary the purge of alleged

"nationalist deviationists" continued after the execution of the main victim, László Rajk, in September 1949. During 1951 many prominent Communists who had had no love for Rajk, and who had shown themselves to be anything but nationalists, were imprisoned and tortured. The Hungarian Party became more and more a one-man show, the private empire of its autocrat Mátyás Rákosi, who could dispose of the life and liberty of its members as he chose. In Czechoslovakia a purge began of nationalist deviationists among the Slovak Communists in 1949. Nationalism, at any rate against the Soviet Union, was something of which Czech Communists seemed incapable. On the other hand several leading Czech Communists were Jews, and as the anti-Semitic campaign gathered momentum in the Soviet Union in 1951, it was extended to Czechoslovakia. In November the General Secretary of the Party, Rudolf Slánský, a Jew, was arrested. A year later he was the chief figure in a treason trial which incongruously grouped together a number of Czech Jewish Communists and the Slovak "nationalist" Communist Vladimir Clementis. It seems clear that the Slánský trial was connected with the "Jewish Doctors' Plot," which was announced in the Soviet Union at the beginning of 1953, and bore all the marks of a new Great Purge, like that of 1937-1938 associated with the name of the former police boss Yezhov. In Rumania in 1952 the main victims were persons who had certainly never been "nationalists"—Anna Pauker (who was merely removed from her posts) and Vasile Luca, who was imprisoned. In Poland, the "nationalist" leader Wladyslaw Gomulka, who had been removed from his posts in 1949, was arrested in 1951, but he was not brought to "trial." Though the police terror claimed many victims in Poland, and the same methods of inhuman torture were used as elsewhere, the Communist leaders made rather more effort to resist Soviet pressure for a wholesale purge, anti-Semitic campaigns and the public condemnation of major political figures. In Bulgaria alone of the satellite countries there was no major purge in these years.

Some impression of the effect of these purges on the leadership of the Communist Parties is obtained from a comparison of the number of members of the Central Committees who were removed from their posts during these years. The Central Committees, which number about sixty persons, are nominally the directing body of the parties, and certainly include their whole élites. In Czechoslovakia between 1949 and 1954 the turnover was 58 per cent., in Hungary between 1948 and 1954 it was 50 per cent. In the Hungarian case the turnover was fairly evenly spread between the two periods 1948-1951 and 1951-1954. In Poland the turnover between 1948 and 1954 was only 22 per cent. and in Bulgaria for the substantially longer period 1945-1954 it was 28 per cent. It is interesting to note that the countries of highest turnover had long-established industries and working classes. Of the two countries of low turnover, Bulgaria was the least industrialised in Eastern Europe. Poland is a special case. It is a comparatively industrialised country. But the circumstances in which Communist rule was imposed, and the national attitude of Poles to Russia, were such that it was exceptionally hard to find any Communist leadership at all, and what there was could afford wastage of personnel even less than the other parties.

AFTER STALIN

The death of Stalin was followed by the discrediting of the "doctors' plot" and a slight relaxation in the Soviet Union itself. This was however not at once followed by a similar tendency in the satellite countries.

The first important event was the death of Klement Gottwald, President of the Republic of Czechoslovakia and unquestioned leader of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. He attended Stalin's funeral in Moscow in March, caught a cold and died from the complications on his return. The official version may well be true. One cannot however avoid a certain scepticism when one compares this death, coinciding with Stalin's death, with the deaths in the Soviet

Union of two other East European Communist leaders of equal authority—Georgi Dimitrov of Bulgaria and Boleslaw Bierut of Poland—which coincided with two other turning-points of Soviet policy, respectively the joint boycott of Tito and the preparation of the purges of “nationalist deviationists” in the summer of 1949 and the discrediting of Stalin at the Soviet Party’s Twentieth Congress in February 1956.

Gottwald’s death was not followed by a change of policy. No one succeeded to the full authority which he had had. His power was in fact divided between Antonín Zápotocký, who became President, Vilem Siroky, who became Premier, and Antonín Novotný, who became First Secretary of the Party. All three are rather colourless personalities. Their ascendancy coincided with the new Soviet doctrine of “collective leadership.” But they kept up the pressure on the workers and peasants. At the end of May they introduced a new currency reform, which deprived them of their savings. Since in the preceding years shortage of consumer goods had greatly reduced the incentive of high money wages to skilled workers, and the only hope had been that savings put aside could be used in the future, this act of robbery was particularly resented. It found sensational expression a few days later in the demonstrations in Pilsen. For some hours the workers took over this large industrial city, occupied the town hall, displayed portraits of Presidents Masaryk and Beneš, and demanded political as well as economic changes. Some soldiers of the local garrison joined them, but troops were quickly sent from Prague and the rising was crushed. It was however a symbolic action of some importance, the first revolt of workers against a Communist dictatorship since the Kronstadt rebellion of 1921.

In Eastern Germany too the repressive policy continued for a time after Stalin’s death. The influx of refugees from the zone into West Berlin continued. In March there were 51,000 and in the first week of June alone 89,000. Among them were many peasants. When thousands of farmers are

so desperate as to abandon their land, things have got to a pretty pass. The German Communist leader Ulbricht was so harsh a fanatic, so contemptuous of his own people, that even this would not worry him. But the Soviet leaders, in their new desire to make a good impression on Western public opinion, had decided to reopen the German problem at an international level, and this was not compatible with continued oppression on the recent scale. It was Moscow which ordered a change, and this was expressed by the decision of the German Politburo of June 9, 1953. Persecution of peasants and of the former bourgeoisie was to be stopped, taxation to be made less severe, and production of consumer goods to be increased. The aim of these measures was explicitly stated as facilitation of German reunification. But the new programme inexplicably omitted measures on behalf of the industrial workers. A decision to increase by 10 per cent. the "labour norms" (the minimum output quotas on which wages were based), taken in May, was still upheld after the announcement of the new concessions to the rest of the population. It was this contrast which led to the disaffection of the Berlin building workers, which started off the demonstrations of June 16-17. Beginning in the Soviet sector of Berlin, these developed into an insurrection of the working class of all the main industrial centres of East Germany. They began with economic grievances, but soon political slogans and demands predominated. It was perfectly clear that the German working class rejected "its" party, the (Communist) Socialist Unity Party. It was also perfectly clear that the East German security police was completely unreliable. After a few hours it gave up all attempt to control the crowds. This was a very much bigger movement than the Pilsen demonstrations. It was the beginning of the end of a Communist régime. Only the intervention of Soviet troops and tanks saved the régime. The German workers did not fight the Soviet army, and the rising came to an end with little bloodshed. It was followed by about two hundred executions and several thousand arrests, of which about one thousand ended

in sentences of imprisonment. The economic concessions however were not withdrawn.

The East German rising was probably the immediate cause of the downfall of the Soviet police chief, Beria, whose forces had proved incapable of keeping order. Beria was of course in any case much hated in the Soviet Union. In the first months after Stalin's death he had in fact stood for concessions and moderation, and he had been the main target of Stalin's new purge. But his name was a symbol of repression, and it was convenient to make him a scapegoat for the worst crimes of the Stalin era, some at least of which the new leaders wished to abandon. Thus the fall of Beria was followed by a "New Course" policy throughout Eastern Europe as well as by economic concessions to the people of the Soviet Union itself.

THE "NEW COURSE"

The new policy was first introduced, and was pushed farthest, in Hungary. On July 4, 1953 Rákosi gave up the Premiership to Imre Nagy, while retaining the office of First Secretary of the party. The new Premier was a veteran Communist who had spent many years in exile in Russia, and in 1945 had been responsible, as Minister of Agriculture, for the land reform. He now announced that the output targets of the "revised" Five-Year Plan were far too high, that Hungarians must "cut our coat according to our cloth." He promised more attention to consumer goods production. Peasants would be allowed to leave collective farms, and where a majority desired it a collective farm might dissolve itself. During the summer and autumn about 10 per cent. of the collective farms made use of this right, despite pressure from local party officials that they should "voluntarily" remain collectivised. Nagy also promised better conditions for intellectuals and a more tolerant attitude to the churches. Many persons were released from prison, internment camps were abolished, and the families deported in 1951-1952 were allowed to reside where they wished (though they did not get their homes back).

In Czechoslovakia there was no noticeable reduction of the political terror, and political prisoners were not released. But economic policy certainly became milder. During the following years the pace of production was lowered, and industry generally became more efficient. By 1956 the standard of living of the urban population in Czechoslovakia was higher than anywhere in the Communist third of the world. The peasants gained less, but they, too, were certainly more prosperous in 1956 than in 1953. The same marked economic improvement also took place during these three years in Eastern Germany. In Poland little economic improvement was noticeable. There was however a definite relaxation of political pressure which had not been part of the original intention. The fall of Beria had caused some alarm among security police officials throughout the region. In December 1953 a leading Polish security policeman, Jozef Swiatlo, decided, during an official visit to Berlin, to defect to the West. His revelations on the cruelties, intrigues and scandals at the highest level of the Polish Party were fully used by American propaganda services, especially by the broadcasts and the balloon-borne leaflets of Radio Free Europe. They became widely known throughout Poland, and had a profound effect. The police was purged, its boss Stanislaw Radkiewicz was demoted, the police as an organisation was deprived of some of its power, and some political prisoners were released. More important still, people began to talk and write more freely, both in the Polish press and at international scientific or literary meetings attended by Polish delegates. In Rumania there were promises of more consumer goods and of more help for agriculture, but it is uncertain how far they were carried out. The treatment of political prisoners is also rather obscure. Vasile Luca, who had been in prison since 1952, was publicly condemned in October 1954, a whole year after the formal introduction of the economic "New Course," and in April 1954 it was announced that Lucretiu Patrascanu, a "nationalist" Communist who had been disgraced as long ago as 1948, had been executed. In Bulgaria there was no "New Course" at all.

During the following years collectivisation of agriculture, which already affected more than half the peasant population, was increased to nearly 80 per cent.

During these years important changes also took place in Yugoslavia, which though excommunicated by the Soviet bloc since 1948 remained a country ruled by Communist Party dictatorship. Foreign trade had to be adjusted to Western markets, and this had effects on the targets and priorities of the Five-Year Plan. In general Yugoslav economic planning became less dogmatic, more flexible. This was especially true of agricultural policy. A decree of March 1953 permitted the liquidation of any collective farm where a majority of members desired it. In the following weeks there was a mass exodus. By 1954 about threequarters of the collective farms had ceased to exist, and probably about 90 per cent. of the arable land was again in private holdings. The desire to escape from Stalinist models led to the introduction in January 1953 of a new Constitution, in which the former Council of Ministers was replaced by a number of Commissions, to which were subordinated State Secretariats which corresponded approximately to the former ministries. It was all extraordinarily complicated on paper, but unity was preserved in practice by the continued dominance of the Party, now renamed League of Communists, which continued to be organised on traditional Communist principles of "democratic centralism." Yet even here there was some change. Greater emphasis was laid on the party's duty to lead and inspire by example rather than by "administrative methods" (*i.e.*, coercion). Attempts were made to carry out the proclaimed intention to decentralise economic planning and to guard against abuses of power by the bureaucracy. One prominent Communist, Milovan Djilas, a hero of the 1941-1945 War of Liberation and since then a member of Tito's most intimate circle, went further than this. After bitterly criticising in his articles—which were the most authoritative expression of Yugoslav Communist political theory—the degeneration of Socialism into bureaucratic State capitalist exploitation in the Soviet Union, Djilas began to suggest that

the political monopoly enjoyed by the League of Communists in Yugoslavia was no longer necessary. His articles aroused much enthusiasm among the younger generation and educated class, but provoked bitter opposition from the full-time officials of the party apparatus. A special meeting of the League's Central Committee, held on January 16-17, 1954, condemned his doctrines, and he was removed from all important posts in the Party and the Government. His disgrace showed the limits beyond which Tito was not prepared to go, but it did not mean a reversion to Stalinist government. There was to be no political freedom, but in non-political matters—in literature, arts and science—there was a good deal of liberty, while the economy remained a mixture of State capitalism and private peasant enterprise.

In February 1955 Malenkov resigned as Premier in the Soviet Union, and the policy of greater emphasis on consumer goods industry was reversed. This gave an opportunity to Rákosi to remove Imre Nagy, whose year and a half in office had been marked by policies similar to those of Malenkov. On April 18 Nagy was not only removed from the Premiership of Hungary but was expelled from the Central Committee of the Party. He was denounced for neglecting the development of heavy industry, and for building up the official mass organisation, the People's Patriotic Front, into a rival to the Party. The new programme announced by Rákosi included a new drive for collectivisation of agriculture.

The victory of Khrushchev over Malenkov did not however lead to the general adoption of a "tough" policy throughout Eastern Europe. The main reason for this was that Khrushchev was determined to come to terms with Tito, and knew that he could only do this if he gave the East European countries greater independence and persuaded their leaders to adopt milder policies. In June 1955 Khrushchev and Bulganin visited Yugoslavia. Tito received them politely, and expressed his desire to restore friendly relations between the Soviet and Yugoslav States, while firmly declining to resume intimate relations between the Soviet and Yugoslav Communist Parties. During the following year however his

attitude evolved. Yugoslavia moved steadily nearer to the Soviet *bloc*. The disintegration of the Balkan Alliance with Greece and Turkey owing to the Cyprus problem, the growing hostility of India to Western policy and the adoption by the Soviet leaders of a policy of flattery of India and of all neutralist governments and groups in place of Stalin's rigid attitude of "He that is not with me is against me"; finally the evidence of a milder régime within the Soviet Union, and especially of the removal of much of the power of the security police—all these factors contributed to convince Tito that Khrushchev was a sincere reformer, and that he could be trusted. When the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union met in Moscow in February 1956, there was no official delegation of the Yugoslav League of Communists, but the Yugoslav Ambassador was present as an observer, and a letter from Tito, on behalf of the League, was read to the Congress.

THE TWENTIETH CONGRESS

The Twentieth Congress was of course a landmark in the development of Eastern Europe. The speech made by Khrushchev to the confidential session, with its bitter attacks on the memory of Stalin, had an explosive effect. It shook the self-confidence of the Stalinists in Eastern Europe, terrified the members of the security police, and emboldened critics within and outside the parties to press for changes.

The Congress was immediately followed by some important changes of personnel. The Polish leader Bierut died while attending the Congress. His death, which as stated earlier resembled in its coincidence with changes in policy the similar deaths of Dimitrov and Gottwald, was followed by the downfall of his closest collaborator Jakub Berman, who was expelled from the Politburo of the Polish United Workers' Party in April. In Bulgaria the leading Communist Viko Chervenkov resigned the Premiership. The Bulgarian Government admitted that the trial in 1949 of Traicho Kostov had involved injustices, and that the charge that Kostov had spied on behalf of Tito and the "Western imperialists" was

false. Soon afterwards Rákosi himself had the effrontery to admit that the trial of Rajk in 1949 had been a miscarriage of justice, and that the similar but still more insulting charges then made against Tito were false. The Czech Communists however defended the justice of the sentences against Slánský and Clementis, though two surviving minor figures from the November 1952 trial were released from prison.

In Poland criticism of the régime had been remarkably outspoken even in 1955. Adam Wazyk had published his "Poem for Adults," and the organ of the official youth movement *Po Prostu* ("Plain speaking") had fearlessly exposed economic misery, unjust social privileges and arbitrary acts by bureaucrats. During 1956 these trends were still more pronounced. The pretence that these abuses and injustices were mere "mistakes" or "excesses" of an essentially sound system was abandoned. The system itself came in for attack. There were even suggestions that Marxist theory itself was inadequate to explain the world of 1956. Bierut's successor as First Secretary, Edward Ochab, whose election was supported by Khrushchev in person, had a reputation for loyalty to Moscow, but he tolerated the criticism. This now extended beyond the intellectuals and students to the factory workers, especially in Warsaw. In June 1956 came the insurrection in Poznan. This was quickly denounced by the Soviet Prime Minister Bulganin as the work of Western imperialist agents, and this assertion was repeated in the Resolution of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party on June 30. The Polish leaders, however, publicly took another view. Both Ochab and the Premier, Jozef Cyrankiewicz, declared that the Poznan rising was caused by internal factors. The Central Committee of the Polish Party met at the end of July (the Seventh Plenum) and adopted a series of economic reforms to meet the workers' needs which were not however published. During the later summer pressure for reform by the workers continued, and they began to demand the return of Wladyslaw Gomulka, who had been released from prison in 1955. This demand obtained increasing support within the party. The trials in

September and early October of persons arrested after the Poznan rising, which were fairly conducted and ended with lenient sentences, showed that the government was not willing to resist popular pressure.

In Hungary, too, it was the writers who led the opposition. At the end of 1955 some Communist writers demanded freedom from interference with their work by Party bureaucrats. This led to a rift in the official writers' union and official rebukes to the rebels. The writers returned to the attack in June, when a stormy meeting took place at the Petöfi Club, a literary discussion circle named after Hungary's revolutionary poet of 1848, which was mainly frequented by students and young people. On this occasion Julia Rajk, the widow of the executed Communist leader, fiercely attacked Rákosi, and other speakers supported her. The agitation against Rákosi in Budapest coincided with pressure by Tito on Khrushchev for the removal of his old enemy. On July 18 it was announced that Rákosi had resigned from the First Secretaryship. But he was replaced by his closest collaborator, Ernő Gerő, a man second only to him in his rigid Stalinism. During the summer the periodical of the Writers' Union, *Irodalmi Ujság* ("Literary Gazette") continued to demand intellectual freedom, in ever bolder terms. In September the Writers' Union held its congress and elected its executive. The chief exponents of the official line lost their places, and among those elected were all the most outspoken critics and several persons who had only recently emerged from prison. The Hungarian movement had a narrower base at this stage than had the Polish, for the workers were less directly involved.

In Czechoslovakia there was some mild criticism of the government at the Writers' Congress held in the early spring, but this was contemptuously brushed aside by President Zápotocký. In May however the Czech and Slovak students, of the universities of both Prague and Bratislava, put forward a list of demands which included not only improved conditions for students, but also political liberty. This time, as in the past, the students showed themselves the most courageous

and far-sighted element in the nation, but, also as in the past, they were not followed by other social groups, and the government ignored them.

The visit of President Tito to the Soviet Union in June marked the height of the new Yugoslav-Soviet friendship. The visit ended with the publication of an agreement, not only between the governments, but also between the Parties of the two countries. The latter agreement included the statement that it was "indispensable that the existing contacts between the two Parties should develop with a view to cooperation in the international workers' movement." However, Soviet suspicion of Yugoslav intentions was not entirely removed, for it became known that the Soviet leaders had circulated a letter to East European Communist Parties warning them against Tito's example. It was probably to counter the bad impression made in Belgrade by knowledge of the letter that Khrushchev flew to Yugoslavia on September 19, and returned with Tito to the Crimea at the end of the month. In the Crimea Tito also met Gerő, who visited him in Belgrade in mid-October. The Soviet Government had earlier given its blessing to contacts of the Yugoslav Party with both the Rumanian and the Bulgarian Parties. Thus by the autumn of 1956, though friction seemed to have been smoothed over for the time being, the state of Soviet-Yugoslav relations, and the Yugoslav Communist attitude to East European affairs, remained uncertain.

THE POLISH CRISIS

By October 1956 the leaders of the Polish party had decided to bring Gomulka back into the Politburo and to make him First Secretary of the Party, that is, to give him the first place in the government of the country. This decision was opposed by a minority of confirmed Stalinists, known as the "Natolin group" from the name of a Warsaw suburb where they used to meet. It included two members of the Politburo, Mazur and Zenon Nowak, the boss of the trade unions Klosiewicz and the head of the political department of the army Witaszewski. These men were determined to maintain the

existing relationship between Poland and the Soviet Union. Klosiewicz and Witaszewski tried to make use of latent anti-Semitic feeling in Poland against the reformers, making much of the fact that several of the régime's intellectual critics were Jews. But their attempts to mobilise the workers against the intelligentsia, the ethnical Poles against the Jews, were unsuccessful. More formidable was their attempt to enlist direct Soviet help. The meeting of the Central Committee of the Polish Party (the "Eighth Plenum") was called for October 19. As the Committee assembled, news was received that a plane was on its way from Moscow bearing Messrs. Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Molotov and Kaganovich. About the same time it became known that there were suspicious movements of Soviet troops from Eastern Germany into Poland, and also of Polish army units (whose commander-in-chief was of course the Soviet Marshal Rokossovski, since 1949 Polish Minister of Defence and a member of the Polish Politburo). The full story of the events of these critical days is not yet known. Two points are however clear. One is the important part played by the uniformed Corps of Internal Security (KBW). This force, which corresponds to the Internal Troops of the MVD in the Soviet Union, is a police army, equipped with the best weapons available. Since the demotion of Radkiewicz in December 1954 and the consequent reorganisation of the police, the KBW had been made more independent of the Security Office (UB), the political police in the narrower sense. In the summer of 1956 the KBW was placed under General Komar, an officer who had been unjustly arrested some years earlier, was released in 1955, and now fully supported Gomulka's policies. In the days of crisis the KBW, under Komar's command, was a thoroughly reliable force. It surrounded Warsaw, and was ready to fight against any Soviet force advancing on the capital. The second point is the devotion of the Warsaw workers to Gomulka. According to one circumstantial account Rokossovski prepared a list of persons to be arrested in connection with the planned *coup d'état* by the Natolin group, backed by Soviet forces. This list was passed by the security

police (UB) to the leaders of the Zeran motor-car workers, who warned the prospective victims, including Gomulka, and took them under their protection. Mass demonstrations of workers were organised in the capital, and there were arms to be distributed if needed. Together, the KBW and the Warsaw workers could have put up a formidable armed resistance, and in this case it is almost certain that the Polish army would have joined them, rather than obey Rokossovski. It would have been a war of the Soviet army against Poland, whose Communist Government controlled the resistance. This the Soviet leaders were not at this moment prepared to undertake. Whether they had hoped, when they landed at Warsaw, to find the Natolin group in command is not known. In fact, they were for a time prisoners of Gomulka. Their exhortations or threats had no effect. The Central Committee elected Gomulka as First Secretary, elected a new Politburo without the Natolin group, and did not re-elect Rokossovski.¹ The Soviet leaders accepted the new situation and returned to Moscow. Some days later Rokossovski resigned as Minister of War and returned to the Soviet Union, where he was appointed Deputy Minister of Defence.

THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION

The Polish crisis precipitated events in Hungary. On October 23 a demonstration of students was held, after the Minister of the Interior had twice changed his mind about permission. The students laid a wreath on the statue of Bem, a Pole who had been one of the outstanding generals of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848. Peter Veres, President of the Writers' Association, a non-Marxist socialist of peasant origin who had been a Minister in the first years after the war, read out a seven-point resolution which demanded national independence, economic and political rights for workers and peasants and the removal of the Rákosi clique from power. The demonstrators then moved on to Parliament Square and waited. Soon after this Gerő, who had just returned from

¹ At this meeting a vote was actually taken which gave Rokossovski twenty-three out of seventy-six, i.e., less than a third of the votes cast.

Belgrade, made an uncompromising radio speech, defending his policies and accusing the demonstrators of "undermining the power of the working class" and trying to "loosen the close and friendly ties between Hungary and the socialist Soviet Union." He roundly asserted that it was "an impudent lie" that Hungary did not already enjoy complete equality and independence in regard to the Soviet Union. This speech infuriated the demonstrators, who then moved to the radio station and asked that the true text of their demands be broadcast. It was in the street outside the radio station that the armed security police (State Defence Department—AVO) first fired on the crowd. The demonstrators fought back, and received arms from soldiers and from workers who arrived with rifles from the factories. During the night it was clear that the government had lost control of the capital. Gerö, however, had no intention of yielding. He ordered the radio to denounce the demonstrators as fascists and counter-revolutionaries, and, fearing that he could not rely on the regular Hungarian army, he appealed for help to the Soviet forces stationed in the country under the anti-Western military alliance known as the Warsaw Pact. In the early morning hours Soviet tanks entered Budapest. Resistance however did not end. From October 24-27 the Soviet forces, together with a dwindling number of AVO troops, fought against the armed workers and a growing proportion of the regular army. The revolution rapidly spread to the provinces. Here Soviet troops took little if any part in the fighting. In some towns the AVO forces put up a stiff resistance, in others the revolutionaries had a bloodless victory. After three days it was clear that the existing Soviet forces were not sufficient to crush the revolution, and a cease-fire was ordered.

Much has been written and talked on the reason why the Polish revolution was bloodless, but the Hungarian turned into a war between Hungary and the Soviet Union. The most frequent Western comment is that the Poles showed themselves politically "more mature," and it is implied that by contrast the Hungarians were reckless. Others point

out that Poland, requiring Soviet support against German irredentism, was unwilling to break with Russia, whereas Hungarians, having no need to fear Germany, were attracted by the neutrality of their neighbour Austria and so more willing to sever the ties with Russia. But the decisive differences are much simpler. In Poland the Communist leaders themselves decided to give power to Gomulka, even though more than threequarters of the Central Committee consisted of men who had voted for his disgrace in 1949. Ochab and his colleagues had a minimum of good sense and patriotism. They were infected by the feelings of the workers and the people of Poland. Not so Gerő. He was the close colleague, and the rest of the Party leaders were the creatures, of the autocrat Rákosi, without whom the Hungarian Party was nothing. Panic-stricken by popular resistance, yet determined not to yield command to his rival Imre Nagy, Gerő could only put his fate in the hands of his Soviet masters. But once Soviet troops had fired on Hungarian workers, patriotism flared up, the army joined in, and it became a war of independence. The Hungarians were not more reckless than the Poles. They were given no opportunity for manoeuvre or for political subtlety. They had only a brutal choice between resistance and surrender, and they chose to fight. If the Poles had faced the same choice, they would have acted in the same way.

Apart from calling in the Russians, Gerő had also issued a broadcast announcement that Imre Nagy had been appointed Prime Minister. But Nagy in fact had no power, and remained a virtual prisoner in the central office of the Party. Gerő himself remained First Secretary of the Party. It was not until October 26 that Mikoyan, who personally flew from Moscow to Budapest, ordered Gerő to resign and replaced him with János Kádár, who had spent some years in prison, was known to have been tortured at Rákosi's orders, and had a reputation as a "Titoist." After the cease-fire Nagy at last took command of the government. But now things had gone too far for "national Communism," on the Gomulka model. Especially the provincial revolutionary committees

demanded full political freedom, free elections and genuine competition between all political parties. It was clear that this would mean an overwhelming defeat for the Communists. But Nagy, forced to choose between the wishes of the Hungarian nation and the wishes of the Soviet Government, between his own patriotism and his own Communist convictions, decided for the former. He promised free elections and democracy.

From October 28 to November 3 the Hungarian Revolution enjoyed a precarious victory. The old political parties reappeared, the Small Farmers under Béla Kovács, whose arrest by Soviet military police in February 1947 had been the death-blow to Hungarian democracy after the war; the Social Democrats under Anna Kéthly, whose expulsion from the Party in the spring of 1948 had been the last act necessary to bring it into the self-liquidation of "fusion" with the Communist Party; the old National Peasant Party of non-Marxist socialist intellectuals, now renamed "Petöfi Party," uniting, as in 1945-1947, some of the best political brains in Hungary. Cardinal Mindszenty was released, and came to Budapest. The Cardinal had been a man of the Right, with narrow nationalistic attitudes to Hungary's neighbours and a fierce dislike of all left-wing politicians. But it must be emphasised that in the October Days of 1956 he behaved with dignity, moderation and statesmanship. At first he withheld his opinions, then on November 8 he made a broadcast in which he asked for friendship with all neighbouring countries, including "the powerful Russian Empire," and for political liberty. He insisted that he himself stood outside and above party, but he stated his political views as follows:

"We want a classless society and a State where law prevails, a country developing democratic achievements, based on private ownership correctly restricted by the interests of society and justice."

These words are, of course, perfectly reconcilable with public ownership of factories or mines. They are typical Catholic social doctrine. They contain no suggestion of "reaction"

or "fascism." There was not a trace of the spirit of revenge in any of the Cardinal's recorded utterances. The assertion of Soviet and Communist propaganda that Nagy had lost all control, and that the original "revolution" against the "mistakes" of the "Rákosi-Gerő clique" had degenerated into a "counter-revolution" must be understood for what it is, a piece of Communist double-talk. In this idiom, everything that is not an exact model of the Soviet system is reactionary and fascist, and every move away from the Soviet model is counter-revolutionary.

It might have been expected that there would have been a violent reaction against individual Communists, that former fascists (who were numerous in Hungary before 1945) would have come to the fore, and that, since so many Communist leaders were Jews, there would have been anti-Semitic outrages. The remarkable truth is that these things did not happen. The only outrages were lynchings of security policemen. These are indeed abhorrent to Western democrats, even though their victims (who amounted to some scores) were persons who for many years had inhumanly tortured and humiliated countless decent Hungarians. But to compare this mob justice with the White Terror of 1919, when Communists and Socialists and persons of left-wing views were systematically persecuted, is absurd. In 1956 the overwhelming majority of Communists and Socialists were in the ranks of the Revolution. The enemies of the Revolution were a mere handful of Muscovite bosses and some hundreds of security policemen. Whereas in Poland the security forces were loyal to Gomulka, in Hungary they fought alone with the Russians against their own people.

The turning-point in the Hungarian tragedy is probably October 30. On this day Soviet troops were reported moving out of Hungary. On the same day the Soviet Government declared its willingness to discuss the conditions for the stationing of Soviet troops in those countries which had accepted their presence under the Warsaw Pact—Poland, Hungary and Rumania. By this it presumably meant that it was willing to discuss, not evacuation but precise terms

in regard to their location, rights and duties, on the lines which were in fact agreed with Poland in December. But later on October 30 it was reported that Soviet troops were moving into Hungary in large numbers. On the same day came the Anglo-French ultimatum to Suez.

That the Suez adventure made Soviet reconquest of Hungary easier cannot be doubted. It diverted the attention of the whole world away from the crumbling of Russia's European Empire to the Middle East. It mobilised the forces of Asian and African racialism, under the leadership of Nehru and Nasser, not only against the Western Powers but also against Hungary. It made action by the United Nations against Soviet aggression impossible. It divided the NATO Powers themselves, and so prevented any united diplomatic action by the West in Moscow. Whether, without the Egyptian crisis, such action could have achieved results, through the parallel channels of the United Nations and diplomacy, remains a subject for speculation: what is certain is that no attempt was made.

It is possible that the Suez adventure not only facilitated Soviet aggression but decided it. The contradictory troop movements and political statements of October 30 might be so explained. The defection of János Kádár, who on the evening of November 1 deserted Nagy, and reappeared on November 4 as "Prime Minister" of a quisling "government," was probably brought about by his conviction that the lynchings of security policemen and the ultimatum to Suez were part of a general offensive by the Western imperialists against the "camp of socialism." It is possible even that the Soviet leaders themselves believed this. That their unsophisticated puppet Kádár, who certainly detested Rákosi and deplored the whole policy of the preceding years, yet remained faithful to the theory of the division of the world into "socialist" and "imperialist" camps, was persuaded by this argument, is suggested by a broadcast speech he made some time on November 1, which went on the air at 9 p.m. At that time he had already deserted, but in the broadcast

he spoke still as a member of the Nagy government. In it occurs the following :

“ Either the uprising secures the basic achievements of democracy . . . or we sink back into the slavery of the world of the gentry . . . and into the service of foreigners. The grave and alarming danger exists that foreign armed intervention may allot to our country the fate of Korea.”

By “ foreign ” of course he means “ Western.” By “ the fate of Korea ” he means that Hungary, with a non-Communist democratic régime under Nagy, would be used as a Western base against the Soviet Union, as South Korea under Syngman Rhee was allegedly used against the “ democratic ” government of North Korea and the “ peace-loving ” Soviet Union and China.

From October 31 onwards the Soviet Government piled up military strength in Hungary. During some of these days it seems that Mikoyan and Suslov were in Budapest. Nagy's declaration of Hungary's neutrality on November 1 was not a cause but a consequence of the Soviet decision to intervene. Nagy realised clearly that the Soviet Government had decided to crush him. To proclaim neutrality was a desperate gesture. His remaining hope was that the United Nations would save him from the rapidly approaching doom.

On November 4 the Soviet army invaded Budapest for the second time. They had previously taken the precaution of inviting to a conference, on evacuation of Soviet troops (!), the newly appointed Hungarian Minister of War, General Malet, the hero of the defence of the Kilian Barracks in Budapest during the first Soviet attack, and then arresting him. This piece of treachery closely recalls the arrest in 1944 of the leaders of the Polish resistance movement. The author of both actions was the same man, General Serov, Chairman of the State Security Committee, the pupil and successor of Beria, and the Soviet Union's greatest expert on mass deportations, kidnapping and genocide. Nevertheless the Soviet troops met with stiff resistance. Tanks are not very effective in street fighting, and the civil population, including

teen-age children, inflicted quite heavy losses with Molotov cocktails and the like. The last strongholds of armed resistance were the two biggest industrial concentrations in Hungary—Csepel island and Dunapentele. When armed resistance was over there was a period of more than a month of almost complete strike, especially effective in the mines and railways, which was followed by passive resistance and go-slow work, which still continues in the spring of 1957.

EASTERN EUROPE AFTER OCTOBER

In the last months of 1956 Gomulka appeared to have consolidated his power in Poland. Half the provincial first secretaries of the Party were replaced. A friend of Gomulka was made chief of the trade unions. Within the Party itself there was a remarkable variety and freedom of opinion. Former Socialists, and even right-wing Socialists, expressed their views without fear, and seemed to be gaining real influence. The old official youth movement was dissolved by its members, and in its place was formed a Union of Socialist Youth (ZMS) led by the young revolutionary students and workers who had been the main driving force behind Gomulka in the October Days. The new parliament was elected on January 20, 1957. It had been intended to give the electors a limited freedom of choice, by including on the ballot papers more names than there were seats, and enabling the voters, by crossing off the names at the top of the list—those with strongest government backing—to express opposition to the Party. But at the last moment, no doubt in fear of Soviet reactions in the event of a strong opposition vote, Gomulka appealed to the electors not to make use of this freedom. The electors responded, and the official list received an overwhelming majority. It should however be stressed that the official list contained a very different set of persons from those who had sat in the previous parliament. It reflected to a large extent, even if not adequately, the new forces that had brought Gomulka to power.

Gomulka's announced policies include far-reaching industrial self-government for the workers, abandonment of

collectivisation of agriculture, and a more human pace of industrial development designed genuinely to improve the conditions of workers and peasants. But Poland faces enormous economic difficulties, especially a shortage of coal for exports. Even to maintain the present miserable standard of living, let alone to raise it—as Gomulka's supporters in the fields and factories expect it to be raised—will be a formidable task. If economic conditions deteriorate, public discontent may express itself in rioting, which would give the Soviet Government an opportunity to intervene by force. Gomulka is obliged to walk a tight rope, to satisfy both his own people and the bully beyond his eastern frontier. Without either economic or diplomatic aid from the West his task appears too great for human powers.

In the other East European countries the events in Poland and Hungary aroused hopes, soon damped down by Soviet butchery in Budapest and by the absolute indifference of the Western Powers. In Rumania it appears that there were some student demonstrations, not only in Transylvanian towns with partly Hungarian populations but also in Bucharest and Iasi. In Czechoslovakia there was complete silence. In Eastern Germany the presence of twenty Soviet divisions, and the exhortations from West Germany that no provocation should be given to the Russians, had their effect. The Yugoslav Government did its best to please the Soviet leaders, by justifying their second intervention and by recognising the Kadar "government." But both President Tito and Edvard Kardelj permitted themselves some mild criticisms of Soviet policy and some references to a recovery of Stalinist influence in Moscow. This provoked strong attacks from the Soviet press, including a denunciation of the principle of "national Communism" which would appear to conflict with the pronouncements of Khrushchev in 1955 and 1956 about "different roads to Socialism." At the beginning of 1957 Yugoslav-Soviet relations were worse than they had been since the original breach with the Cominform.

Most interesting were the echoes of these events in the Soviet Union itself. The three social groups which had made

the Hungarian Revolution—students, workers and army—showed signs of discontent. There were meetings of students in Moscow and Leningrad Universities at which political opposition was expressed. In some Moscow factories there were disputes about wages and critical remarks of a political character. These were in themselves small things, but they would have been quite inconceivable in Stalin's lifetime. In the Soviet army in Hungary there were some cases of desertion and some of refusal to fight against the Hungarians. Probably more important is the abundant evidence of dismay expressed by Soviet soldiers to Russian-speaking Hungarians. Every Soviet soldier has been taught at school of the heroic struggles of the workers against their oppressors, of fights on the barricades against the soldiers sent against them by the tyrants. For the first time Soviet soldiers have seen this with their own eyes, but with themselves cast in the role not of heroes but of oppressors.

The outlook for Poland is uncertain, but so is the outlook for Soviet policy. To grant Hungary independence even now would relieve Moscow of unwelcome burdens, but would be an unacceptable blow to the prestige of international Communism. The same factor makes the abandonment of the much-hated Ulbricht régime in East Germany unacceptable. Even to replace Ulbricht by someone less brutally devoted to Stalinist policies would be dangerous: the removal of Rákosi led to collapse of the régime which was based on his supreme power. Yet without the abandonment of the Ulbricht régime there can be no reunification of Germany, and so no hope of getting American forces out of Europe.

The events of October showed that the East European armies are not an asset to the Soviet Union, but a liability. It might be thought it was wiser to give up the whole area, which is of small positive value to its imperial masters. On the other hand the complete failure of Western policy in the face of East European revolt is probably a source of great encouragement to the Soviet leaders. From an enemy so irresolute and so divided they have nothing to fear. They can afford to hold fast and wait for the collapse of the

decadent West. Conversely, the peoples of Eastern Europe, including the Poles, convinced that they will never receive any help, or even any indication of sympathy other than speeches, are correspondingly depressed.

Yet Europe is not the same place as it was before the Hungarian Revolution. Three things have been clearly shown whose importance will remain when some of the bitterness has passed. First, the working class has shown that it is against Bolshevism, whether Stalinian or Khrushchevian, that this régime is as much an enemy and oppressor of the workers as was that of the Tsars. The resistance of the Budapest workers was the biggest effort ever made by an industrial working class, bigger than that of the Petrograd workers in October 1905 or the Paris Commune of 1871. Secondly, the intellectual youth, children of workers and peasants, fondly trained by the Bierut and Rákosi régimes to be the brains of the totalitarian order, led the resistance. They showed Orwell's 1984 to be a nightmare. Thirdly, the people of Hungary showed that it is possible to overthrow from within a totalitarian régime—not a mere old-fashioned dictatorship but full-blooded modern totalitarianism. Within three days nothing was left of the régime of Gerő, and even the foreign invaders had lost their first battle. It took a further large-scale invasion to crush the movement. This is the most important lesson of October 1956. Totalitarianism is not invincible.

NEUTRALITY AND NEUTRALISM

By

HANS J. MORGENTHAU

THE President of the United States, at his press conference of June 6, 1956, had this to say about neutrality and neutralism—

“ If you are waging peace, you can’t be too particular sometimes about the special attitudes that different countries take. We were a young country once, and our whole policy for the first hundred years was, or more, 150, we were neutral. We constantly asserted we were neutral in the wars of the world and wars in Europe and antagonisms.

“ Now, today there are certain nations that say they are neutral. This doesn’t necessarily mean what it is so often interpreted to mean, neutral as between right and wrong or decency and indecency.

“ They are using the term ‘ neutral ’ with respect to attachment to military alliances. And may I point out that I cannot see that that is always to the disadvantage of such a country as ours. . . .

“ So let us not translate this meaning of the word ‘ neutral ’ as between contending military forces, even though the conflict is latent, and neutral as between right and wrong.” ¹

On June 7 the White House issued the following official statement, intended to clarify the President’s remarks—

“ Questions have been presented to the White House concerning the exact meaning of expressions in the President’s press conference yesterday defending the right of certain nations to a neutral position. He particularly

¹ *The New York Times*, June 7, 1956, p. 10.

referred to neutrality as a refusal to take sides in any military line-up of world powers.

“ It is obvious that in some countries of the world there are certain ideological, geographical or other reasons making military alliances impractical. Such nations may declare themselves to be neutral, hoping thus to secure the support of world opinion against attack from any quarter. Neutrality does not mean either disarmament or immunity from attack. We have had historical examples of this kind of neutrality for many decades.

“ The President believes in the principle of collective security whereby the nations associate themselves together for each other's protection. This is the modern and enlightened way of obtaining security. . . . The President does believe that there are special conditions which justify political neutrality but that no nation has the right to be indifferent to the fate of another, or, as he put it, to be ‘ neutral as between right and wrong or decency and indecency ’.” *

The very same day on which the President of the United States sought to clarify the American attitude toward neutrality and neutralism, the Foreign Minister of France shed light upon the Russian position—

“ When we insisted on the importance of reunification as the symbol of European balance, Monsieur Khrushchev declared that he preferred 20,000,000 Germans with him to 70,000,000 against him, even neutralised. That does not mean he is against a neutral Germany but that he is against a Germany neutralised against him.” *

On June 9, 1956, the Secretary of State of the United States, in the address which the President had heralded as “ a definite attempt to bring this thing down to its realities, to its specifics, so we can all understand it,” defined neutrality as the pretence “ that a nation can best gain safety for itself by being indifferent to the fate of others. This has increasingly become

* *The New York Times*, June 8, 1956, p. 2.

* *Christian Science Monitor*, June 9, 1956, p. 2.

an obsolete conception and, except under very exceptional circumstances, it is an immoral and shortsighted conception.”⁴

Queried at his press conference of June 12, 1956, about the relationship between his statement and that of the President, the Secretary of State affirmed three times “that there is no difference whatever between the President and myself on this subject.” Asked about the “very exceptional circumstances” which would not render neutrality obsolete, he replied—

“Well, the outstanding example of neutrality is, of course, Switzerland. Switzerland has declined to join the United Nations because it recognises that the United Nations Charter is incompatible with strict neutrality.”⁵

On July 4, 1956, the Vice-President of the United States gave an address at Manila, which is reported to have been prepared at the White House for use by the President who could not present it in person by reason of his illness. In this address the Vice-President made the following statement about neutralism—

“We have heard recently a great deal of discussion of the attitude that goes by the name of neutralism. Let us see how it bears on the problem of independence. I would feel that generally a nation that rejects the principles of collective security because it feels its independence will be compromised by association with other powers is not reading rightly the trends of modern history. It has far more to gain by standing together with free nations than by remaining aloof.

“But there may be other reasons for neutralism. Many nations have the same principles which we share in common, and they are prepared to defend them. Yet they feel that their own internal problems compel them to abstain, at least for the moment, from mutual-security pacts and associations. They wish to devote all their energies to building their own political and economic systems. Or they may feel that they are too geographically exposed to risk provoking Communist colonial imperialism.

⁴ *The New York Times*, June 10, 1956, p. 24.

⁵ *The New York Times*, June 18, 1956, p. 4.

"We in the United States can understand the attitudes of such powers. For over a century we tried to avoid being identified with any of the warring powers *blocs* of Europe. But we learned from hard experience that policies which worked well in the nineteenth century were completely inadequate in the twentieth. In 1917, we were forced to enter a terrific world war. Again in 1941, we were plunged into the blood bath of the Second World War.

"Finally we learned our lesson. Together with most of the other nations of the world, we joined in a world organisation designed to promote justice and ensure peace. In addition, we joined regional alliances permitted under the charter of the United Nations. We found that the world is too small today for effective isolation. . . .

"But there is still another brand of neutralism that makes no moral distinction between the Communist world and the free world. With this viewpoint, we have no sympathy. How can we feel toward those who treat alike nations that believe in God and honor, religion and morality, and nations that boast of atheism and the rule of force and terror alone?

"How can anyone treat as equals those who believe in the dignity of man and the basic rights of all men, and those who treat their subjects as mere machines? Is democracy to be equated with dictatorship? Is freedom the same as tyranny? . . .

"I know there are those who feel that friendly neutrality toward the Kremlin and Peiping may spare them. But you know the proverb: He who sups with the devil, must have a long spoon. The Communists have been ruthless toward the people of the nations that they have engulfed. They have no memory of former favors, no kindness toward those who tried to be friendly. They are cold and calculating masters. Those who feel that they can outmanoeuvre them are taking a fearful risk."*

* *The New York Times*, July 4, 1956, p. 2.

The Prime Minister of India took exception to Messrs. Nixon's and Dulles' statements on his press conference of July 7, 1956.

"I submit for consideration that Mr. Nixon and Mr. Dulles are saying something that is opposed to the democratic way of life," Mr. Nehru declared. "The very basis of democracy," he said, "is tolerance for differing points of view. . . ." He made clear his dislike of the term "neutralism" which, he said, connoted war and which in peacetime had no real validity.

"India's policy could better be explained as one of non-involvement in either the Soviet or Western bloc, of eschewing war and seeking peaceful settlements to all international problems and of concentrating mainly on internal Indian development," he said.⁷

The Prime Minister of Laos went one better by declaring—

"Our country has no intention of joining any *bloc*, even the neutralist *bloc* . . . Neutrality is more neutral than neutralism."⁸

Confronted with these contradictory statements which are but recent examples of a veritable Babel of tongues, the layman will be forgiven when he is confused. Yet the professional observer of foreign policy must search for the reasons which are responsible for these contradictions, and he will find them in certain legal and political trends which have come to dominate the international scene since the end of the First World War. Three such trends are relevant for our investigation: the legal commitment to collective security, the helplessness of an ever-increasing number of nations faced with the threat of all-out war within a bipolar system of world politics, and the identification of international conflicts with irreconcilable philosophic and moral positions.

In order to understand the changes brought about by these factors, it is first necessary to visualise the legal and political situation which existed before these factors appeared on the international scene. That legal situation is encompassed by the

⁷ *The New York Times*, July 7, 1956, p. 1.

⁸ *The Economist*, September 22, 1956, p. 968.

status of neutrality as defined by international law. The political situation is determined by the desire of certain nations, for reasons of expediency, to keep out of certain wars.

NEUTRALITY

Neutrality as a status of international law results from the desire of a nation not to be involved in a war waged by other nations. Therefore, neutrality is essentially a negative status depending upon the existence of definite relations between two nations, which the law calls war. Where there is no war in the legal sense of the term there can be no neutrality. Hence, the development of neutrality as a legal status depends upon the possibility of differentiating clearly between peace and war as two distinct situations defined by international law.

But neutrality is also a negative status in that the complex of rights and obligations which constitute the legal status of neutrality is determined less by the neutral, who desires to keep out of war and thereby retain the greatest possible freedom of action, than by the belligerents, who want to prevent the neutral from joining the other side and assure themselves of his support. In the struggle between war and neutrality for the delimitation of their respective spheres, war is the stronger contestant.

Neutrality and war are complementary concepts; the more there is of the one, the less there is of the other. The rights and obligations flowing from the status of neutrality are the result of a balance between the interests of the belligerents and the interests of the neutrals. The former seek to win the war by maximising their advantages and minimising those of the enemy. The latter seek to keep out of the war without renouncing those activities which they regard essential for the pursuit of their national interests. As long as these antagonistic interests are held in balance, international law safeguards the legal status of the neutrals.

Neutrality implies two fundamental obligations on the part of the neutral: abstention from interference with the military activities of the belligerents and impartiality towards them in their position as belligerents. The particular duties these two

fundamental obligations impose on the neutral cannot be deduced from the abstract concepts of "abstention" and "impartiality." They depend exclusively upon the kind of warfare being waged. For the extent to which the neutral has to abstain from interference is determined by the extent of the military activities of the belligerents. If the scope of warfare is limited, the domain in which the neutral may extend its activities without risking to be involved in the war will be vast. For example, because wars were conducted mainly by hired soldiers with the bulk of the population not actively participating in them, it was not regarded until the end of the eighteenth century as a violation of the duties of neutrality to assist belligerents with manpower. When, however, the whole population capable of bearing arms participated actively in the war, that is, with the introduction of universal military service, such assistance became incompatible with the legal status of neutrality.

The same interrelationship between the development of warfare and the rules of neutrality applies to the implements of war the neutral is allowed to supply to the belligerents. As long as but a small fraction of the economic resources of the belligerents was used for military purposes, the neutrals were free to give the belligerents all possible material aid. With the mobilisation of the total material resources of the belligerents, the rules of neutrality were bound to change again. Material aid by non-belligerents now became as decisive an intervention in war as the assistance with manpower had been since the beginning of the nineteenth century, and therefore became incompatible with the status of a neutral.

Not only the content of the rules of neutrality but also the very possibility of remaining neutral depends upon the military-political situation in which the neutral finds himself. The neutral pursues a double aim: to keep out of war and to pursue his national interests with regard to the belligerents and other nations. The interest of the belligerents, on the other hand, is only one: to win the war. In the pursuit of his interests, the neutral may be faced with a dual dilemma: his aim to keep out of war may conflict either with his other aim to pursue his

national interests *vis-à-vis* other nations or with the belligerents' aim to win the war.

The dilemma of the belligerents presents itself in much simpler terms. The belligerents look at the existence, the interests and the "rights" of neutrals only from one angle: in what way are they likely to influence the outcome of the war? The position and interests of the neutrals may be respected as far as the belligerents believe this respect not to affect their mutual position in the war. But should a belligerent come to believe that the violation of the position or interests of the neutral would be detrimental to the enemy or advantageous to himself, he will not hesitate to violate them. He will only refrain from doing so if the disadvantages resulting from such violation are likely to outweigh the advantages. In other words, neutrals owe their status as neutrals to considerations of political expediency on the part of the belligerents, not to the latter's respect for legal principles. And the desire of a nation to remain neutral counts for considerably less than objective conditions over which it has no control and, more particularly, the interests of the belligerents.

Hence, geographic isolation which puts the neutral's territory beyond the reach of military operations has always been—as the history of Great Britain, the Scandinavian countries, and the United States shows—the most reliable protection of neutral status. In the absence of such protection, a nation can eliminate a motive from the belligerents for violating its neutrality by pursuing, with regard to their conflicts, a policy of abstention and impartiality and by making it at the same time too costly for them to gain advantages at the expense of its neutral status. To that end, the neutral must make his armed forces a serious factor in the military calculations of the belligerents. He must secure the support of other powerful neutrals or of one of the belligerents or of both of them in defence of his neutrality against violation by either. There exists, then, an intimate relationship between the politico-legal status of neutrality and the balance of power.

The period between the Treaty of Westphalia and the First World War was the classical period of the balance of power in

Europe. To the relative stability of the State system—the period of the Napoleonic Wars is the main exception—corresponded the relative security of the status of the neutrals. Wars were localised; the economic rights of neutrals were violated only in minor instances, their political status remained by and large intact. The First World War marks, as general wars have always done, the wholesale violation of the economic rights of all neutrals and the destruction of the political status of two of them, Belgium and Greece. The other nations which succeeded in remaining neutral owed the preservation of their neutrality either to the geographic factor—as did the non-European and Scandinavian countries as well as Spain—or to military-political considerations of expediency—as did the Netherlands and Switzerland.*

NEUTRALITY AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY

With the end of the First World War begins a new chapter in the history of neutrality. Collective security challenged neutrality as a legal status. The radical transformation which the State system underwent weakened the political foundations of neutrality.

Neutrality as a legal concept assumes the legality of war as an instrument of national policy as well as the right of any nation to intervene or not to intervene in a war on one side or the other as it sees fit. Collective security, on the contrary, derives logically from the distinction between lawful and unlawful war and stipulates the legal duty for all nations to join the one waging lawful war. Collective security requires partiality leading to intervention; neutrality requires impartiality and abstention. Under collective security, the need for assistance of a victim of aggression determines action; under neutrality, action is determined by the interests of the individual nations.

It is obvious, then, that neutrality and collective security are mutually exclusive. Collective security, implying the universalisation of war by virtue of an abstract legal principle,

* On this point and those immediately following see H. J. Morgenthau, "The Resurrection of Neutrality," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 83 (1988), pp. 478 et seq.

and neutrality, seeking the localisation of war for reasons of expediency, cannot coexist. As it is with war, so it is with collective security in relation to neutrality: the more there is of the one, the less there is bound to be of the other. Had the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Charter of the United Nations established a full-fledged working system of collective security, neutrality would indeed, as has been claimed, have been outlawed and become politically inoperative. In point of fact, neither the Covenant nor the Charter went so far. They embraced the ideal of collective security and left gaping holes in its legal fabric. Conversely, they did not kill neutrality but rather sentenced it to die, staying indefinitely the execution of the sentence.

The loophole through which both legal instruments have allowed neutrality to escape from execution by collective security is the non-automatic nature of enforcement measures. For insofar as a nation has the legal right to decide for itself whether and to what degree it shall participate in measures of collective security, it has also the legal right to substitute for the principle of collective security any other guide for action more consonant with its national interest, such as the principle of neutrality.

First of all, Articles 12 and 15 of the Covenant, by allowing explicitly resort to war under certain circumstances, recognised by implication also the right to remain neutral with regard to such a war. Furthermore, the Covenant explicitly recognised the right to neutrality with regard to collective military measures, Article 16, paragraph 2 making such measures dependent upon a mere recommendation by the Council of the League. This discretionary nature of military measures, explicit in the text of the Covenant, was extended to all collective security measures to be taken under the Covenant through the interpretative resolutions passed by the Assembly of the League in 1921. These interpretative resolutions shifted the locus of decision from the Council to the individual member States and reduced the Council to a coordinating agency for the measures taken by the member States through the exercise of their own discretion.

Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, comprising Articles 39 to 51, is the counterpart of Article 16 of the Covenant. These provisions take a decisive step beyond the Covenant in that they establish the complete authority of the Security Council over measures of collective security. Nothing in this system of collective security seems to be left to the discretion of the member States. And there appears to be no loophole through which the member States could escape from collective security into neutrality. Yet while indeed the Charter of the United Nations leaves no room for neutrality on condition that its system of collective security operates as intended, its very operation is contingent upon two conditions which restore the discretion of the member States and, through it, neutrality as a legal status.

One of these conditions is laid down in Article 43 of the Charter which makes collective military action dependent upon agreements to be concluded between the member States and the Security Council concerning "the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided." While Article 43 provides that these agreements "shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council," none has been negotiated. In the absence of such agreements, the provisions of the Charter concerning collective military measures remain a dead letter and the member States remain free to decide for themselves whether and to what extent they are to participate in such measures. Their discretion in this respect encompasses their right to remain neutral. This discretion is implicitly recognised by Article 106 of the Charter which provides that in the absence of the special agreements envisaged by Article 43 the Great Powers shall consult with each other and other member States about collective military measures to be taken.

The other condition which goes to the very heart of the collective security system of the Charter is Article 27, paragraph 3, stipulating that "decisions of the Security Council . . . shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent

members." This provision for a Great Power veto eliminates from the outset any possibility of applying the collective security measures of the Charter against a permanent member of the Security Council. With the Great Powers thus beyond the reach of such measures, it remains for the individual nations to decide on the basis of expediency whether and to what extent they want to take measures against a Great Power. In other words, they have the right to remain neutral.

The Security Council is then capable of applying collective security measures only against nations of the second or third rank, that is, those which are not among its permanent members. This, however, is not likely to happen as long as the Great Powers are pitted against each other in fierce, interconnected, and world-encompassing competitions for power. Under such circumstances, collective security measures executed against any nation of the second or third rank are bound to affect the respective power positions of some or all of the Great Powers, and those who stand to lose through the application of such measures will use their discretion to interpose a veto against them. The result for the member States is again freedom of action, which includes neutrality.

This interpretation of the Charter is borne out by the legal situation which arose when the United Nations instituted in 1950 collective security measures against North Korea and Communist China. The Security Council was able to discharge its functions only as long as the Soviet Union, because of its temporary absence, was unable to veto the collective security measures the other members had agreed upon. With the return of the Soviet Union to the Security Council, the General Assembly was called upon to carry the burden of organising the collective action of the United Nations. The functions of the General Assembly with regard to measures of collective security are limited by Articles 10 and 18 of the Charter to making recommendations to the member States by a two-thirds majority. Thus again the freedom of action of the member States and, with it, the right to remain neutral are preserved. This legal situation has not been affected by the

"Uniting for Peace" resolution of November, 1950, seeking to strengthen the General Assembly as the principal agency for the coordination of collective measures.

This legal compatibility of neutrality with collective security, as conceived by the Covenant and the Charter, was demonstrated by the manner in which the legal provisions were put to the test of actual performance in terms of military measures. The attack of North Korea against South Korea on June 25, 1950, joined by Communist China in November of the same year, was a clear-cut case of aggression. Collective security would have required that all members of the United Nations come to the aid of South Korea as the victim of that aggression. In view of the nature and the military consequences of the aggression, this aid, to be effective, could only have taken the form of the dispatch of armed forces to the battlefield. Yet of the sixty members of the United Nations, only sixteen sent armed forces of any kind. The others—among them nations with military capabilities, such as Argentina, Brazil, Czechoslovakia, India, Mexico, Poland—remained neutral in that they abstained from active participation in the war on either side.

The survival of neutrality under the aegis of collective security is also attested to by the fact that by no means all wars which have occurred during that period became general wars, as they should have if no nation had remained neutral with regard to it. The very incidence of local wars, such as the Chaco War, the Italo-Ethiopian War, the Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Finnish War, the Israeli-Arab War, demonstrate the incidence of neutrality. In the autumn of 1956 the government of the United States declared that it did not intend to participate in a war which might break out between some users of the Suez Canal and Egypt, that is, it intended to remain neutral. And even during so general a war as the Second World War, some nations remained neutral, and their neutrality was universally respected.¹⁰

¹⁰ Cf. also H. J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 1954, pp. 274 et seq., pp. 388 et seq.

NEUTRALITY TODAY

What has made neutrality problematical in the contemporary world is not so much the new international law of collective security as a novel political and military situation. The rationale of neutrality has always been the desire to keep out of war without having to forsake one's national interests. The realisation of this dual objective has always depended upon the operations of the balance of power. A nation of the second or third rank has a chance to preserve its neutrality *vis-à-vis* the Great Powers only if an approximately equal distribution of power between the latter deters all of them from violating it. The history of Belgian and Swiss neutrality bears out this relationship between neutrality and the balance of power. Switzerland, in particular, owed the preservation of her neutrality in the two World Wars to the fortuitous conditions of the military balance of power, effectively supported, it is true, by the consistent Swiss policy of abstention.¹¹

Neutrality, being a function of the balance of power, partakes of the latter's precarious and unstable nature. Thus when the Covenant of the League seemed to offer an automatic and, hence, reliable alternative to the balance of power, the small nations were among the most fervent supporters of collective security. Yet this support involved them in an insoluble contradiction. Collective security, if it could be made to work, provides the best hope for the avoidance of war. Yet it could not be made to work without the active support of all nations, big and small; in order to make collective security a success, those nations whose survival depends upon remaining neutral in case of war must cease being neutral in order to avoid war. Yet if collective security should fail to deter a prospective aggressor, the commitment to collective security would expose the nations of the second and third rank to the very risks which their support of collective security was intended to avoid.

¹¹ On Swiss neutrality, see H. J. Morgenthau, "The End of Switzerland's Differential Neutrality," *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 32, 1938, pp. 558 *et seq.*

The small nations tried to reconcile these two positions by maximising the protective effects of collective security for themselves and at the same time minimising their own commitments to it. Thus in 1920 and 1921, the Scandinavian countries suggested that certain nations which, by fully participating in the measures provided for by Article 16 of the Covenant, would be exposed to grave dangers on account of their geographic and economic situation, be exempted from the rigorous application of this article. The same countries were in 1935-1936 among the strongest supporters of League of Nations sanctions against Italy, the main burden of which, for military and geographic reasons, would have had to be borne by others.

The failure of these sanctions ended the League experiment in collective security. The collective security of the League was the institutional manifestation of Anglo-French military and political supremacy in Europe. It was under the umbrella of that supremacy that the small European nations sought, and believed to have found, protection. The overwhelming military power with which Great Britain and France emerged from the First World War signified the end of the European balance of power on which the neutrality of the small European nations had rested. Its heritage was taken over by the collective security of the League of Nations. Membership in the League seemed to guarantee those nations military protection superior to that which the balance of power would have afforded them. When Italy succeeded in defying the collective security of the League, she also demonstrated at the very least the unreliability, if not the disappearance, of Anglo-French supremacy in Europe. The small nations found themselves again face to face with a number of Great Powers of comparable strength, competing for power and openly following the counsels of expediency. The restoration of the balance of power called forth the traditional reaction of the small nations: neutrality.

After withdrawal from the League had been seriously discussed in some of the small European nations, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, Spain,

and Switzerland, in a number of joint and several declarations, cancelled for all practical purposes the obligations under Article 16 of the Covenant. While the League of Nations took formal cognisance of the restoration of the neutrality of Switzerland only, there can be no doubt that what the so-called "traditional European neutrals" had declared for themselves held, regardless of legal theories and pretences, equally true for all nations, big and small: they would act in the face of war according to their interests as they saw them, to intervene or to remain neutral as they saw fit.

Thus the small European nations fell back upon the traditional safeguards of neutrality: rearmament and isolation. They tried to buttress the latter by regional understandings, such as the Scandinavian Rules of Neutrality of May 27, 1938, and the Convention of the Baltic States of November 18, 1938. They debated, but did not act upon, the idea of a "Third Europe," an organisation of all nations who wanted to stay out of the approaching Second World War. This idea called for collective action on the part of the members of the organisation for the purpose of preventing the outbreak of such a war and, if it should break out, of protecting their neutrality. The feasibility of this proposal depended upon two non-existent conditions: a community of interests transcending the mere negative desire to stay out of the next general war and a concentration of power comparable to that which might threaten the neutrality of a member nation.

The members of the League, thus returning from the world of collective security to that of the balance of power, did not return to the same world they had left in 1919. The balance of power that existed on the eve of the Second World War was not identical with the one that existed on the eve of the first. It showed three tendencies which decisively impaired the protection which neutrality used to afford.

While in 1919 the distribution of power favoured Great Britain and France, inducing the small European nations to seek their protection within a system of collective security, on the eve of the Second World War military and political power had almost as decisively shifted to the Axis

powers. They had come to occupy a quasi-hegemonial position in Central Europe. Furthermore, the fate of Austria and Czechoslovakia had shown that Great Britain and France could no longer be counted upon, even if they were still able, to take military risks in defence of the neutral status of small nations. Thus each of the three courses of action available to the traditional neutrals appeared equally unsatisfactory. They could follow the shift of power and join the Axis, thereby not only giving up their neutrality but also risking the loss of their national identity; they could join Great Britain and France, thereby running mortal risks without gaining additional protection; they could retreat in the impartial and abstemious isolation befitting a neutral, thereby running the same mortal risks but with the outside chance of being spared destruction and conquest.

Secondly, the technology of warfare had progressed to a point at which the protection of geographic location was largely eliminated. Furthermore, these technological developments greatly widened the gap separating the powers of the first rank from the others. Lacking the industrial basis for a modern war machine, the traditional neutrals had lost the military means with which to deter aggression by great powers.

Finally, the rise of totalitarian imperialism, already foreshadowed in the international policies of the Soviet Union in the Twenties, added a new dimension to international politics, hostile to neutrality. To nations that consider themselves the repositories of universal truths which it is their historic mission to bring to the rest of humanity, the impartial aloofness of the neutrals becomes intolerable indifference, if not treason. In the contest between truth and falsehood, good and evil, neutrality appears to the crusading nations tantamount to passive hostility to be fought by all means fair or foul. What point can there be in the traditional impartiality and abstention of the neutral when subversion becomes one of the foremost weapons in the arsenal of nations, when races, classes, and parties fight on the domestic political plane the battle of nations?

The political and military developments following the Second World War have accentuated these tendencies, destructive of neutrality. The disparity of strength between the Great Powers and the other nations has developed into a bipolar political system in which there are only two nations of the first rank, separated by a gulf of unprecedented dimensions from all the other nations. The increase in the destructiveness of modern weapons needs but to be mentioned in order to show the utter impossibility for any nation not possessing them to deter another nation from their use.

These developments have been aggravated by the political context within which they have occurred: the "cold war." The political relationship called the "cold war" signifies the absence of peace between the two *blocs* in that there has been no moral and legal agreement upon their relationships and, more particularly, upon the boundaries between them. Rather these political relationships are the result of the provisional *de facto* settlement established at the end of the Second World War primarily on military grounds. It is characteristic of the "cold war" that both sides refuse to consider this settlement as either permanent or legitimate and try to change it in their favour by all means short of war. Thus psychological warfare, intervening directly in the domestic affairs of other nations through subversion, propaganda, and foreign aid, has become a major undertaking of the active contenders.

THREE TYPES OF NEUTRALISM

The effects of these developments upon neutrality as a viable legal and political status are of course beyond doubt. General war is bound to wipe out the distinction between belligerents and neutrals. Before the atomic fall-out and bacteriological contamination all men and all nations, big and small, neutrals and belligerents, are equal. The "cold war" has made many nations of the second and third rank the main bone of contention. Under these conditions they have no chance to remain neutral either in a "cold" or "hot" war since it is their fate, decided by others, to belong to one or the other *bloc*.

However, the effects of these developments in terms of policy have been both contradictory and ambivalent. Two periods have followed each other, not dissimilar to those that followed the First World War : one characterised by the virtual disappearance of neutrality as the objective of policy ; the other, by attempts at its revival. Yet during the first period some nations gave the appearance of holding both positions at the same time, wanting simultaneously to be neutral and not to be neutral, to reap the benefits both of neutrality and of association with a Great Power. While both objectives cannot be attained simultaneously, the former is not attainable at all. Out of this conflict between desire and reality rises the first type of neutralism : the impotent striving for neutrality.

This period covers roughly the first decade following the Second World War. It was characterised by the tendency of the bipolar system to transform itself into a two-*bloc* system. That is to say, the two centres of first-rate power remaining in the world exerted an irresistible attraction upon most of the other nations to the point of complete identification with one or the other of these super-powers. The result was what might be called "bipolar collective security." Most nations of the world, instead of banding all together for mutual protection as the ideal of collective security would have required, huddled around one or the other of the super-powers, expecting and receiving their protection. Only a few nations, of which India is the outstanding example, were able during that period to resist that attraction of the two super-powers and decline alignment with either side.

The reason for this development lies in the drastic decline of the viability of all nations except the two super-powers as a result of the Second World War. During that period, none of the European nations found within itself the political, military, and economic resources for survival. Thus the nations of Western Europe had to lean for support upon the United States, while the Eastern European nations fell victim to Russian conquest.

To this universal reason must be added a specific one which applies, in varying degrees, only to the nations outside the

Soviet orbit. These nations found in the atomic monopoly of the United States the main protection against the threat of Soviet imperialism. The intensity of this type of identification with the United States varied with the intensity with which the Soviet threat was experienced by different nations at different times. It reached its peak in the period between the *coup d'état* in Czechoslovakia and the end of the Korean War, having its main impact in Western Europe.

Those were the objective conditions under which most nations had to exist, and their policy of identifying themselves with one or the other of the super-powers followed inevitably from them. Yet these conditions and policies were not accepted enthusiastically or even willingly by most of these nations. Nations who but recently had either been Great Powers or had at least been able to choose their allies could hardly welcome the force of circumstances which left them no choice. Thus, while they had to accept for the time being the dire necessity of identifying themselves with one or the other super-power, they hoped to be again able to pursue an independent foreign policy.

That hope had to remain inarticulate in the members of the Soviet bloc. In the West it was articulated in different rationalisations whose uniform aim was to conceal the fact of dependence and to make it appear as though the nation concerned still had freedom of choice. Thus a nation might insist upon enjoying the prestige of a Great Power in terms of participation in international conferences, a position of eminence in international organisations, and the like. Or a nation might engage in a public debate about alternative foreign policies, asserting its ability and, if need be, resolution to choose one of them. Or a nation might indulge in Anglophobia, Francophobia, or anti-Americanism, thus proving to itself and to others—primarily, however, to itself—its continuing independence.

These manifestations of escapism were politically irrelevant as long as the objective conditions of world politics made it impracticable to follow them up with actual policies. As such, they called for sympathy and understanding rather than for

moral condemnation. They are of immediate political concern only insofar as they find opportunities for political action. For they reveal a state of mind longing for such an opportunity.

It is the characteristic of the second period in which we find ourselves at present that new developments have made it possible at least for some nations to translate into actual policy this desire to escape identification with one or the other of the two super-powers. In other words, neutrality is no longer a daydream expressing itself in neurotic symptoms, but has again become the possible objective of rational policy. Consequently, neutralism has taken on a new significance as a foreign policy seeking avoidance of a consistent alignment with either *bloc*. The trend of the bipolar system to transform itself into a two-*bloc* system has been arrested and reversed. Centrifugal tendencies counteract the magnetic attraction which the two major power centres exerted during the first decade following the Second World War. Nations of the second and third rank tend to move toward the outer confines of the two spheres of influence dominated by the super-powers and not only look longingly beyond these confines but also have started to pursue policies without regard to the preferences of the super-powers. Four factors are in the main responsible for this new trend.

First, many of the nations who had to join one of the super-powers for sheer sake of survival have regained much of their economic strength and political stability. For them to remain within the orbit of one of these powers has again become in good measure a matter of expediency, of choice rather than of necessity. This is true in particular of West Germany and Japan. Only in the Soviet *bloc*, as the experience of Poland and Hungary has shown, necessity still reigns.

Second, the distribution of military power in the world has been drastically altered by the emergence of the Soviet Union as an atomic power comparable to the United States. The American monopoly of atomic weapons has been replaced by an atomic balance of power which amounts to an atomic stalemate. With the American and Russian stockpiles cancelling each other out, American atomic power has lost its

protective function for the allies of the United States. While there is today, as has been pointed out above, no safety from atomic destruction for any nation, the risk is increased almost to the point of certainty for nations which are closely allied with one or the other of the super-powers. Or, to put it the other way around, there may be a somewhat better chance for a nation not so allied to escape atomic destruction than for one that is.

Third, the need for American military protection appears to be further diminished by the "new look" of Russian foreign policy. The Soviet Union, minimising the expansionist tendencies of Communism and stressing instead the mutual benefits to be derived from cultural, economic, and technological exchanges as well as from disarmament, creates an additional incentive for the allies of the United States to minimise their military and political commitments.

Fourth, such commitments may well appear as a positive handicap in view of the Russian promise of such benefits. For insofar as the United States and the Soviet Union are willing to compete in terms of economic assistance, a nation may well expect to maximise such assistance by placing itself uncommitted between the two competitors. What more can such a nation hope for than to have the best of both worlds without belonging to either?

This type of neutralism which, as a matter of policy, seeks, at the very least, to minimise a nation's identification with either *bloc* and may aim at an uncommitted position between both, is in its economic aspects nothing but a matter of calculated self-interest. Its success will depend both upon the bargaining strength of the neutralist nations and the policies of the super-powers. Burma, Egypt, Finland, India, Indonesia, and Yugoslavia have followed this course with different degrees of success; others are likely to follow their example, their success again depending upon the distribution of power and the quality of the policies pursued.

This type of neutralism is similar in its political purpose to the attempt to revive neutrality on the eve of the Second World War. It is born of the recognition that to keep out of

war is for all nations no longer merely a question of expediency but of survival. It is impossible not to be sceptical about its chances of success. Iceland might have increased her chances to escape atomic destruction by embarking upon a neutralist policy. But how many other nations are in a similarly favourable geographic position? And it may well be argued that salvation for all nations, big and small, lies in the prevention of an atomic war, not in staying neutral once it has broken out.

The prevention of such a war, however, depends upon the continuation of the atomic stalemate which, in turn, requires a maximum of military strength on either side. To the extent that a nation shifting from an allied into a neutral position decreases the military strength of one side, without a compensating decrease on the other, the atomic balance of power is altered to the advantage of the latter and the chance for the outbreak of an atomic war is thereby increased. By pursuing such a course, a nation may well in the short run increase its security, while it contributes to the destruction of the very foundations upon which its security ultimately rests.

This argument may not be good for all nations in all circumstances, as Ireland, Sweden, Spain, and Switzerland proved in the Second World War. Yet, as a matter of principle, the futility of neutrality under the conditions of modern warfare seems to be borne out by the fate which befell the small European nations which tried to stay out of the Second World War by pursuing a neutralist policy. Thus the paradox seems to be inescapable that under contemporary conditions a nation serves the purpose of neutrality, which is to stay out of war, by giving up neutrality in order to prevent war from breaking out.

These doubts about the political wisdom of a policy of neutrality apply also to what may be called the grand design of both the escapist and the political type of neutralism: the idea of a "Third Force." Such a "Third Force," composed of all or some European nations or members of the so-called Asian-African bloc, has been visualised as being poised in independence between the two super-powers and forming a bridge

between them, taking Britain's place as the "balancer" in the world balance of power, thereby mitigating international conflict and contributing to the preservation of peace. It was first forcibly and brilliantly expressed in 1946 by General de Gaulle. It has since then been broached time and again by spokesmen for both kinds of neutralism. It partakes, however, of their fatal weakness: it is incapable of realisation in the contemporary world.

For such a third force to be an effective instrument of restraint in the world balance of power, its members must, first of all, have permanent vital interests in common which enable them to act in unison on the political scene. Yet there is nothing but anti-colonialism which unites the members of the so-called Asian-African *bloc*, and the nations of Western Europe are united by their common opposition to Soviet imperialism only. Some of these nations have been able to act in unison with regard to a specific political problem. They have proven incapable of common political action on a permanent basis. Cases in point are the political impotence and military disintegration of NATO, the failure of all attempts at the political unification of Europe, the political emptiness of the Declaration of Bandung of April, 1955, and the political inconclusiveness of the meeting of Nasser, Nehru, and Tito in July, 1956. Yet even if such permanent common interests existed, there would at present be lacking the power necessary for the effective support of a common policy derived from such interests.¹²

The third typical manifestation of neutralism is of an entirely different kind. It is not primarily concerned with the political and military struggle between East and West, but rather with the identification of that struggle with irreconcilably hostile philosophic and moral positions. It refuses to see the East-West struggle in terms of a struggle between right and wrong, good and evil and, hence, to be drawn into a

¹² The best analysis of this and the following type of neutralism is R. A. Scalapino, "Neutralism in Asia," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 48, 1954, pp. 49 et seq.

“crusade” to extirpate evil on either side. In other words, when it comes to passing moral judgments upon either of the hostile political philosophies, social systems, and the policies pursued by them, a nation which is neutralist in this sense at the very least refuses to let its moral judgment influence its political attitudes and decisions.

This type of neutralism can, but does not need to, coincide with the desire, characteristic of the other two types, to keep out of, or leave, a military *bloc*. While a nation which espouses the latter type is likely also to be in sympathy with the former—India is a case in point—the reverse is not necessarily true. Quite to the contrary, the refusal to identify political and military judgments with moral ones, to subordinate the former to the latter, and to transform the political and military struggle into a worldwide crusade is indeed the prevailing governmental and popular attitude on this side of the “iron curtain,” even among the staunchest allies of the United States. This important fact is being obscured only by the vociferous and prominent criticism to which moral neutralism is from time to time exposed.

This criticism revives on the level of practical politics the controversy between utopianism and realism which has been one of the great issues of Western political philosophy since Machiavelli and which some of us thought had been settled once and for all, at least on that level of practical politics. This criticism takes the utopian side in assuming that the actions of nations toward each other must be judged by abstract moral principles, while realism sees in the national interest the standard by which such action must be judged. In the former view, a nation whose foreign policy does not reflect the ideal of international solidarity in terms of collective security is subject to moral reprobation, and so is a nation from whose foreign policy implacable hostility to the Communist philosophy and way of life is absent.

This criticism is untenable both on moral and political grounds. We have dealt with the philosophic merits of this

position elsewhere¹³ and limit ourselves here to four observations specifically relevant to the issue under discussion.

First, nations like to invoke abstract moral principles in justification of their position and in condemnation of those of their adversaries, but they act, as they must, in view of their interests as they see them. No nation has risked its existence or even its interests for the ideal of collective security, but all nations have, as has been shown above, been guided in their support of measures of collective security by their respective interests. Some nations have at times talked as though they were willing to risk everything for the sake of wiping Communism off the face of the earth, but during four decades of Communist rule there has been no nation actually willing to take such a risk for its moral convictions.

The invocation of abstract moral principles in foreign policy, then, performs the typical function of a political ideology, masking with the veil of morality the true nature of the interests and policies pursued. What this criticism of neutralism conceals is an immature approach to foreign policy which some of us hoped we had outgrown. We are impatient and disappointed with other nations who dare look at the world from the vantage point of their interests and not ours. Yet since we like to think that what we stand for is what all good men must stand for and that what we are doing is what the moral law requires of all men, we are shocked and morally outraged at the spectacle of nations who stand for different ideals and act in different ways. In a mature, realistic view of foreign policy which assumes the paramountcy of the national interest, this is as it must be. Given their different positions in the world and their different interests, there is nothing surprising in, say, India's not speaking and acting like the United States. It would indeed be surprising if it were otherwise.

Second, this criticism of moral neutralism is also politically

¹³ Cf. H. J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, pp. 8 *et seq.*; also *American Foreign Policy*, 1952, pp. 8 *et seq.*; "Another 'Great Debate': The National Interest of the United States," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 46, 1952, pp. 961 *et seq.*

immature in its assumption that a nation is necessarily the stronger and the more successful in foreign policy the more nations support it without qualification. This assumption may or may not be correct. It had at least the appearance of correctness as long as the bipolar system of world politics seemed to move inextricably toward a two-*bloc* system. A case could then be made for a policy of maximising membership in one's own *bloc* and minimising that of the other. However, a case could even then be made, and must now be made emphatically when the trend toward a two-*bloc* system is being reversed, in favour of the proposition that uncommitted nations, by virtue of their being uncommitted, are able to perform a vital function for the individual nations as well as for the community of nations as channels of communication, sources of information, and mediators.

Third, the critical approach to moral neutrality is morally and politically unconvincing when it makes foreign policy the test of anti-Communism. How does this test account for the following facts: Communist Yugoslavia has been both neutralist internationally and anti-Stalinist domestically, pro-Russian Egypt and neutralist India have suppressed their Communist parties with unsurpassed fierceness, non-neutralist France and Italy harbour powerful and unmolested Communist parties? Is India to be condemned on moral grounds for combining a neutralist foreign policy with an anti-Communist domestic policy, and is France worthy of moral praise for combining a non-neutralist foreign policy with toleration of domestic Communism? And how is one to fashion a sensible foreign policy guided by such moral judgments? Must one treat all these nations as equally unreliable partners and prospective enemies, since none of them is consistently anti-Communist in its policies? And must one overlook the fact that to be anti-Communist means in terms of foreign policy to be anti-Russian and anti-Chinese, an attitude which, in view of their respective interests, some nations can afford to take without limitation, others only up to a certain point, and others not at all? Must we condemn a nation of the latter type for not being able to do what we think it ought to do, thus doing our part in making

sure that if such a nation should take sides it will not take ours? There must be something essentially wrong with a moral philosophy which finds itself caught in such absurdities.

What is essentially wrong with it—and this is the fourth observation we wish to offer—is the confusion between the sphere of private moral judgment and the realm of public action. Every man has the right and the duty to judge others, as he must himself, by a moral yardstick. Yet for him to act toward others as he judges them would be intellectually impertinent, morally repugnant, and impractical; for such action would leave out of account the limitations of moral judgment, the moral imperfection of human action, and the consequences, liable to be destructive of moral values, of action guided by nothing but an abstract moral judgment.

What is true of individuals applies by the same token to nations. There is something intellectually, morally, and politically preposterous in a nation's meting out with divine assurance moral praise and blame among the nations of the world. Such a nation is oblivious of the corruption to which moral judgment on matters political is particularly prone. It is also oblivious of the narrow limits within which nations, by virtue of the conditions under which they must live, are able to comply with abstract moral standards. Finally, and most importantly, it is oblivious of the responsibility for its own interests and survival, a responsibility which nobody else will discharge if it does not. The moral commitment to anti-Communism as the standard by which to judge the foreign policy of nations is likely to have supremely immoral consequences. For the anti-Communist crusade as an instrument of foreign policy is likely to destroy all nations, Communist and anti-Communist alike.

The philosophic issue which the condemnation of moral neutralism poses was raised before in American history, slavery taking the place of Communism. Should liberation of the slaves be made the ultimate standard of policy even at the risk of destroying the Union, or should the moral principle of universal freedom be subordinated to considerations of the national interest? The answer Abraham Lincoln gave to

Horace Greeley, a spokesman for the utopian moralists, is timeless in its eloquent wisdom. "If there be those," he wrote on August 22, 1862,

"who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is *not* either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing *any* slave, I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing *all* the slaves, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone I would also do that. What I do about slavery, and the coloured race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do *not* believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do *less* whenever I shall believe what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do *more* whenever I shall believe doing more will help the cause. I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors; and I shall adopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true views.

"I have here stated my purpose according to my view of *official* duty; and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed *personal* wish that all men everywhere could be free."

The lesson which this statement of the problem carries for the issue of neutralism is clear. Neutralism must be judged not by the abstract moral standard of anti-Communism, but in terms of the contribution it is likely to make to the interests of the nations concerned and, more particularly, to the overriding interest which all nations of the world have in common: the preservation of peace.

SUEZ AND AFTER

By

SUSAN STRANGE

OF the events of July to December 1956 which surrounded and related to the nationalisation, the blocking and subsequent un-blocking of the Suez Canal, many opinions have been voiced—most of them with unusual intensity of feeling. It is hard to think of a single topic of politics—particularly of foreign affairs—in the last decade which has so aroused and divided people, in Britain at least. Not perhaps since Munich has this country been so gripped by political argument—an argument that often departed significantly from the normal party lines.

In such acute and passionate dissension, it is not easy to find a starting-point for any analysis which can be generally agreed. In the long run, however, it seems probable that, of all these events, the British and French action in November, 1956, will be recognised as more significant and far-reaching in its effects on world political relationships than the Egyptian act of nationalisation in July which preceded it. It is the former, therefore, with which this article is mainly concerned.

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As far as the latter is concerned—the Egyptian nationalisation—there were in fact few lessons for the student of international relations of any very startling novelty to be concluded from it.

The nationalisation, it will be remembered, was announced by President Nasser on July 26, 1956, in a speech at Alexandria. In the speech, President Nasser said that Egypt would use the revenues from the Canal to finance the building of the Aswan High Dam. He further alleged that there had been a

conspiracy between Britain, the United States and the World Bank to induce Egypt to make an independent start on the dam project, so that when they came forward later with capital to finish it, they would be able to impose conditions restricting Egypt's independence. The text of the speech thus made it abundantly clear that the nationalisation was undertaken in retaliation for the decision of the United States announced a week before, on July 19, not to take part, after all, in the financing of the High Dam. Similar statements followed from Britain and the World Bank who had offered respectively contributions of \$15 million and of up to \$200 million in loans to add to the United States' offer of \$55 million. It was widely understood that all three decisions had been made in the realisation that competitive Russian aid was not, after all, going to materialise.

Both British and American diplomatic missions in Cairo were reported afterwards to have been privately critical—even, it was said, astonished—at the brusque lack of finesse with which this decision was made known to Egypt. To talk in this arrogant *du haut en bas* fashion was permissible and justifiable in diplomacy only if it were done with the deliberate intention of provoking national pride, or, conceivably, if the State so spoken to was quite incapable of doing the speaker the least harm or injury. Neither condition obtained in this case. President Nasser had made it very plain for some time that the Aswan Dam was to be the climax of the achievements of the new régime in Egypt, and a practical and striking monument to its concern for the lamentable living standards of the swarming *fellahin*. It was also no secret that, after a few energetic efforts at land reform in the first flush of the national revolution, there had been a lot more talk about social and economic progress in Egypt than there had been deeds. And that therefore, "the Dam" had acquired an almost magic significance. Thus, whatever the technical and political objections (chiefly from the point of view of other Nile River States, especially the Sudan) to this particular power-irrigation project, their importance would have had to

be carefully weighed against the possible political consequences of withdrawing an offer once made.

At the present time, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can afford to forget the old fable of the lion and the mouse—and President Nasser (as all the fuss over the Czech-Egyptian arms deal of September 1955 ought to have shown) was no mouse. Nationalisation of the Suez Canal, moreover, was no new idea,¹ and had clearly been made very much easier by the withdrawal, under the Anglo-Egyptian Canal Zone Agreement of 1954, of British troops from the Suez base earlier in the summer of 1956.

The truth—not new, by any means—was again demonstrated by President Nasser that the governments of poor and under-developed countries are liable to regard American investment aid as a matter of right—and therefore to resent bitterly its denial. Impudent and lawless as it seemed to Western minds, there is little doubt that the nationalisation of July 26 caused much less surprise to Asians, Arabs, Africans and Latin-Americans. The special complications arising from the international shareholding in the Suez Canal Company and from the guarantees surrounding its operation under the Convention of 1888, appeared to them mere details compared with the broad fact that European capital had for a very long time been making substantial profits out of operations conducted on foreign soil. The further fact was considered irrelevant that the years when fat dividends could be paid and comparatively little spent on maintenance were about to end, giving place to a time when the Canal, if it were to keep up with the times, would need modernising, widening and deepening at considerable capital cost. And, of course—and not altogether illogically—there seemed little essential difference between Western exploitation for profit of a natural mineral resource—an oilfield or a lode of copper ore—in a foreign country and exploitation for profit of a geographical peculiarity which was equally accidental in its occurrence. Regarding Panama and the recently revised treaty with the United States which was

¹ See D. C. Watt, *Britain and the Suez Canal*, 1956.

to produce so large and assured an income, there seemed no real distinction between an isthmus as a national asset and the chemical components of the soil.

Yet the potential explosiveness of negotiations over aid to underdeveloped countries, and the impermanence of concessionary treaties were neither of them new developments; of the many existing treaties revised in the course of the past ten years, probably the great majority have concerned the extra-territorial rights or possessions of Western governments or their nationals.

Indeed, what immediately concerned the British and French (and to a lesser extent other interested) Governments was not the act of nationalisation itself so much as its peculiar consequences on the security of the international guarantees governing its operation. Annoying as it was to lose the profits from the Canal, this was clearly much less important than the belief that guarantees of sufficient strength for an internationally-owned company were not sufficient for the Egyptian Government, as the new operator of the Canal. On July 30, in the House of Commons, Sir Anthony Eden said that Britain could not accept any arrangement that left the Suez Canal in the unfettered control of a single Power. The issue then quickly became one of how much international control, how to exercise it and how to maintain it if challenged. The drawing-up of an international régime for the Canal was the declared purpose of the first London conference of interested States called, by Britain, France and the United States, for August 16.

Even before this conference began the impression was strongly given that Britain and France were prepared to force upon Egypt an international régime for the Canal. The royal proclamation for the recall of reservists had been issued on August 3, and the 16th Independent Parachute Brigade Group left England—presumably for the Mediterranean—two days later in the aircraft carrier *Theseus*. More infantry units were to be sent out to Libya by air, but were unable to do so without permission from the Libyan Government for

reinforcements of the British force already based there. Cyprus thus became the focus both of British and French military preparations, although the existing state of besieged tension in the island did much, at a later stage, to conceal the seriousness of the Anglo-French build-up.

Nor did the Government ever deny flatly and explicitly that it intended to use force against President Nasser. "We do not seek a solution by force, but by the broadest possible international agreement,"² was all that Sir Anthony would say—implying that, nevertheless, force might be unavoidable. Earlier he had explained the military measures as necessary "to strengthen our ability to deal with any situation which might arise." Thus, when the conference opened, it was still not quite clear whether the British were prepared to use force if Egypt did not accept internationalisation voluntarily or whether they merely wanted to use the military muscle-flexing as an intimidating bluff inducing maximum compliance from Egypt for whatever proposals emerged from the conference. Nor was it clear, when the State Department said on the eve of the conference that the American view was that the security of the Canal would be more easily guaranteed "if Egypt agrees to the international measures now under consideration" whether this was a broad hint to President Nasser to "come quietly, or else . . .," or whether it meant that the United States in fact disapproved of and was unwilling to support the use of force against Egypt.

The subsequent history of the conference, of the Menzies Mission to Cairo, of the Suez Canal Users' Association and the obvious anxiety of Egypt, from mid-September onwards, to prove that the Canal could be run without the Suez Canal Company's European pilots—all this strongly suggested that the pattern of a negotiated settlement—possibly with an international committee or consortium operating alongside the Egyptian management—would be the probable pattern ultimately followed. It had by then become obvious that the State Department had opposed the Anglo-French use of force;

² Broadcast of August 8, 1956.

the Russians had warned against it; and the British Opposition would refuse to support it. In view of these obstacles on the one hand, and on the other, of the peaceful outcome of the Anglo-Iranian dispute, and of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute over the Canal base and the Sudan, it did not seem unreasonable to suppose that Britain would continue to follow (with a country with whom relations in the past had been quasi-colonial) a policy of gracious retreat similar to that adopted to other colonial territories achieving their full independence.

THE MISCALCULATIONS

That Britain and France did not thereafter follow the course dictated both by precedent and—as it will surely seem in future—by reason was due to a series of grave miscalculations or misinterpretations. Indeed, these miscalculations, these subjective errors of judgment are the outstanding common denominator linking the Suez fiasco with the Munich debacle; in both cases, acute and fundamental argument centred round the analysis of the situation and the likely reactions of those principally involved. In both cases, the action of the British and French Governments were perfectly justifiable *provided* the assumptions on which they were based were correct. Over Munich, the critics perceived that the basic assumption was the reasonableness of Hitler and of the Nazis, and the consequent possibility of negotiating a settlement which would be final. Over Suez, the basic assumption was a dual one: that President Nasser's position and ambitions constituted, in themselves, a menace broadly comparable to those of Hitler twenty years before; and secondly, that a vital interest of Britain and France lay in jeopardy so long as the Nasser régime continued in power in Egypt.

Actually, there were two aspects of the first part of the assumption, concerning the character of President Nasser. One was predominantly a British miscalculation, the other predominantly a French. Each was shared to a certain extent by the other Government, so that it is not strictly correct—though perhaps permissible—to speak of one as the British misconception, and the other as the French misconception.

The British misconception was to identify Nasserism and Hitlerism entirely and to draw the conclusion that what ought to have been the Anglo-French reaction to Hitler in 1935 ought also to be their reaction to Nasser in 1956. The onlooker is struck once again by the tendency of political leaders to re-enact the heroic roles of past dramas in the different new dramas of today. The generals are notorious for preparing to fight tomorrow the battles of yesterday, and the economists are repeatedly worrying over economic problems and dilemmas long displaced by other ones. In this case, it is possible that this natural human tendency was fatally reinforced in Sir Anthony Eden by the personal factor that after a brief hour of drama and glory before the war, he had ever since been waiting in the wings to take the place of a politician whose very name was popularly synonymous with pugnacity.

Rationally, of course, the analogy was quite untenable. The operative fact was that in his time Hitler was demonstrably the greatest and most immediate threat to British security and independence. By no stretch of the imagination could Nasser, in a world dwarfed by the vast power of the Soviet Union and the United States, be so described. Whatever nuisance might be caused by one aggressive nationalism among many in Asia and the Middle East, the facts of geography and of strategy made nonsense out of a reaction based on the lessons of Munich.

The very coining of the word "Nasserism" had suggestive implications, drawing the parallel with "Hitlerism" and "Stalinism." The suffix "ism" is apparently only added to proper names in a tone of disapproval; no one in the West talks of Rooseveltism or Churchillism nor yet Nehruism or Husseinism. "Peronism" was used occasionally in the United States—but other Latin American dictators with equally authoritarian régimes are not dignified by the implied attribution of a doctrine.

In fact, as can fairly easily be demonstrated, the doctrines followed by the Nasser Government are not particularly original nor specifically Egyptian in character, nor are

they exclusively connected with Colonel Nasser himself. Admittedly, through his book, *Egypt's Liberation* (1955), he has shown himself the most articulate of the leaders of recent national revolutions, but the ideas in it are by no means so highly personal as, for instance, the ideas of *Mein Kampf* were personal to Adolf Hitler. Moreover, popular and important as Nasser is, it would be hard to argue that he was as indispensable to the Egyptian national revolution as Atatürk was to that of the new Turkey. The content of what is called Nasserism, too, has changed and may change further in future. Indeed, it is said by some to lack any social or political theory altogether. It has been pointed out³ that in spite of much vague talk of "socialism," and of approval for the theories expressed in Mao Tse-tung's *History of the Revolution*, "Nasserism" bases itself on something called "social solidarity," which, according to the Constitution, is to be, with "the family," "the basis of Egyptian society." It is much more specific on the things which it wishes to eliminate—monopoly, political despotism, foreign influence and social injustice—though, even then, the terms are ill-defined.

In practice, clearly, it is a dynamic and aggressive foreign policy which has characterised the Nasser régime in Egypt, more than an energetic attempt at internal reform and betterment. And so closely associated psychologically is the resentment against inferior status to foreigners—especially Europeans—with the resentment against the unrelenting burden of Egyptian poverty, that it is of little use to explain that an attempt to reverse the one by force, with an expensive arms programme, will proportionately reduce the chances of reversing the other. In as desperate an economic and demographic situation as that of Egypt, it could hardly be expected that any chance of gaining new status and prestige internationally would be lost for the sake of a dim and distant improvement in living standards. In short, any Egyptian government that was not completely supine could be expected to behave in a "nasserist" fashion. And neither the downfall

³ "Nasserism and Communism," *The World Today*, October 1956.

of President Nasser nor even the resignation of an entire government would solve the Egyptian problem for Britain and France. If it is true that Sir Anthony Eden declaimed, as he was said to have done, "Either Nasser goes or I go," then he betrayed, not one but a whole bundle of hopeless misconceptions.

The French misconception was more specifically related to exclusively French problems and interests. It was, broadly, that the difficulties of France in North Africa, and particularly in Algeria, were attributable to Egyptian encouragement and interference. Oversimplified, it suggested that if only the voice of Cairo Radio could be stilled, the tremendous human and financial burden of the war in Algeria could be lifted from French shoulders. And this war in Algeria is the problem which, as M. Mollet admitted in his original declaration of policy, dominates all those that France has to solve. *Ergo*, a defeat for Colonel Nasser would wave a magic wand over the manifold difficulties of the Mollet Government.

Certainly, it was true that the North African broadcasts of Cairo Radio had been highly inflammatory and had undoubtedly given considerable aid and comfort to the Algerian rebels. The position was broadly similar to that of Athens Radio and the Enosis movement in Cyprus—or for that matter to the support given in an earlier age by France to (at different times) Scottish or Irish insurgents against the English. But in the latter case the Irish problem was not created for England by the French; nor was it solved for England when (as in the early twentieth century) there was very little or no French aid and comfort for Irish discontent. Similarly, when the American Revolution succeeded, it was not because of the help and sympathy coming from France; as Lafayette's original commission showed, this was cautious and non-committal. But even if it had been more whole-hearted than it was, it would have been difficult to pretend that Lord North's troubles would have been over but for French interference. It is human and natural to blame the bad manners of one's own children on the subversive influence of the neighbours'

brats; but it is historically proven to be unsafe to base a foreign policy on similar assumptions.

In the French case, the misleading analogy of Indo-China was perhaps partly to blame. There, the French position had been fatally weakened and undermined by the aid given to Viet Minh by Communist China. Arms and men had flowed over the frontier in such quantity that a break-through threatening the Red River delta positions had forced on France a negotiated peace and a humiliating withdrawal. It was easy to forget that Chinese backing and intervention had only become a serious problem after 1950 and the aid agreement with the United States, and to argue that just as China, poor and undeveloped industrially, was able to give aid to Viet Minh through the indirect help of the Soviet Union, so Egyptian support for Algerian nationalism could no longer be ignored once it became clear—after the Czech arms deal—that Egypt too would be able to draw on Russian armaments.

There were other ways in which recent experience quickened the French reaction to Egypt's stirring of Algerian mud. As Darsie Gillie, *Manchester Guardian* correspondent in Paris, has shrewdly observed,

“Apart from other advantages, the dominion system has conveniently concealed the fact in Great Britain that an empire was in process of disbandment. There has been no such comfort for withdrawal within two years from Hanoy, Saigon, Pondicherry . . . Rabat and Tunis. The withdrawal has been the more bitter because of the long-wasted effort in opposing it. It has created a psychosis of frustration which the Suez policy . . . comforted.”

Algeria, moreover, was a good deal nearer home than Indo-China; it was not so much a case of fighting to protect the plantation and trading interests of a small group of Frenchmen, but of preserving the property and livelihood of a whole people—the million or so *colons* who regarded the Mediterranean as making no more difference to their political status than does the Solent to people in the Isle of Wight.

Illogical it may have been, but the dwindling hope of an Algerian settlement ever since M. Mollet's traumatic experiences on his visit early in 1956, made it only too likely that French opinion would seize on Egypt as the culpable source of all the trouble. It is only by remembering this national background of experience and of fear, that the deep gulf between reactions of the British and French Left to the events of early November can be appreciated.

As it happened, these fears for North Africa were fatally magnified at a crucial point in the Suez affair. On October 16, the French authorities intercepted a yacht, ironically named the *Athos*,⁴ and alleged that they had found seventy tons of arms destined for Algeria aboard her; and that the arms had been loaded at Alexandria by Egyptian troops under the command of an Egyptian naval officer. An explanation was demanded from the Egyptian ambassador in Paris and a week later (October 23) the French ambassador was recalled from Cairo.

The implication, for the French, was that Egypt had decided on a major extension of aid to the Algerian rebels, and that moral support was henceforward to be reinforced with more practical help.

This incident immediately followed the moment when a week's debate in the Security Council in New York had ended against the stone-wall of a Russian veto. Mr. Selwyn Lloyd had gone to New York to plead for a general endorsement of the plan for a Suez Canal Users' Association. After several sessions, some in private, the vote was taken and Russia and Yugoslavia voted against the Anglo-French proposal. It was true that Mr. Dulles did not regard the Security Council vote as disastrous, and thought that negotiations with Egypt could continue "just as though there had been no veto." But then the United States, as it was by now obvious, had never been prepared to impose internationalisation on Egypt by force. Whereas if Britain and France, on the other hand, did intend

⁴ "Athos" was one of the Three Musketeers.

to use force,⁵ this was clearly an opportune moment to decide on it from a tactical point of view.

At all events, is so happened that the negative ending to the Security Council debate, the *Athos* discovery and a renewal of border raids and reprisals on the Israeli-Jordan frontier all closely coincided. On October 16, it was suggested afterwards,⁶ the British were informed of certain military arrangements made between France and Israel. This was done at the meeting in Paris between Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, M. Mollet and his Foreign Minister, M. Pineau—talks cryptically described by M. Pineau as of “capital importance.” Three days later, at any rate, the British Government announced the resignation of Sir Walter Monckton, the Minister of Defence, and, it was believed, the Cabinet Minister most deeply opposed to the use of force in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The final piece in the Algerian side of the jig-saw fell into place on October 22 when five Algerian rebel leaders were captured by the French authorities when their aircraft forced-landed at Algiers. The capture, and documents thereby obtained, so it was hinted in Paris, not only confirmed the Government’s worst fears about Egyptian intervention, but it also spelled a crossing of the Rubicon as far as the Mollet Government’s policy in Algeria was concerned. Once the military authorities had been allowed to bring off this coup, there was no further hope of continuing the secret negotiations that had previously been proceeding with the rebels. It was a step as important and irrevocable as the Dutch imprisonment of Indonesian government leaders.

This leads on to the third and major miscalculation of the British and French Governments in their Suez policy—to which the other two were, in a sense, only secondary. This was that the prevention of Egyptian control over the Canal was, in the phrase honoured by diplomatic tradition, a “vital interest,” i.e., that the security of the two countries was

⁵ Mr Selwyn Lloyd, on the eve of the Security Council debate, had said: “In general the position of Her Majesty’s Government is that force will only be used as a last resort; we certainly hope for a settlement by peaceful means acting in the spirit of the Charter.”

⁶ *New York Times* report, also made by the *Manchester Guardian*, *Observer*, etc.

directly threatened by the act of Egyptian nationalisation, and that this must be reversed, or in some way annulled.

A VITAL INTEREST?

This is the basic assumption underlying all the events of November 1956. In other circumstances, the reaction in defence of a vital interest could have been expected more promptly. But in this case, there were both military and political reasons which made it impossible to react at once. The armed services of both countries, to begin with, were tightly stretched to cover NATO commitments in Europe on top of colonial garrison duties overseas. The Czech arms deal had made it imperative to attack in overwhelming force if at all; the slightest hint of military balance or stalemate would be fatal. Time, therefore, was needed to assemble such a force, the more so because it had to operate perforce from a base so far from the Egyptian shore that the Hunter fighters attacking from Cyprus could afford only seven minutes over their target area. A lengthy military build-up was therefore militarily necessary as well as politically advisable. Even Hitler, with no Afro-Asian bloc to bother about, took the trouble to set the international stage before using force to bring down his victims. For Britain and France, the pantomime of the first and second London conferences, the Menzies Mission and the solemn debates at the United Nations had to be endured—if only to enable Sir Pierson Dixon, later, to proclaim, “Our purpose is peaceful, not warlike. Our aim is to re-establish the rule of law, not to violate it; to protect, not to destroy.” But, if the assumption is once granted that the “freedom” of the Canal was an Anglo-French vital interest, then the subsequent reaction, when it did come, was not only explicable but inevitable.

Now, obviously, the definition of a vital interest is neither absolute, nor unchanging. It is a highly subjective and dynamic question. To take only one very obvious example, a free and independent Poland was apparently a vital interest of Britain and France in 1939; yet apparently not in 1945.

The fact therefore, that Britain had evidently regarded—and so had France—the Suez Canal as a vital interest for strategic reasons in their imperial heyday was beside the point. Even as late as 1928, it had been generally understood that this was one of the strategic areas overseas which Britain, in her accession to the Kellogg Pact, held to be, in her case, covered by the right of self-defence. But now those Oriental empires had largely passed away; the “gateway to the East” was no longer the military and naval lifeline that once it had been.

On the other hand, there were new reasons—in some quarters thought to be no less compelling than the old ones—why the certainty that the Suez Canal would not be closed by Egyptian inefficiency or by arbitrary intervention could be regarded as an Anglo-French—indeed a Western European—vital interest.

These reasons were economic and political, not strategic. The post-war industrial expansion of Western Europe, aided by the European Recovery Programme, had suddenly created a vast new demand for fuel for power which Europe's coalfields and hydro-electric capacity were quite unable to meet. The result, summed up by an OEEC report on “Europe's Future Energy Needs” (1956) was that Western Europe's dependence on oil for fuel had grown from 10·2 per cent. of total energy requirements in 1948 to 17·2 per cent. in 1955; and that imports of oil would grow further from 109 million tons of coal equivalent in 1955 to 185 million tons in 1960 and 235 million tons in 1975. Mainly because it was cheaper, but also because the dollar content—thanks to agreements with the American oil companies—was less than that of Western Hemisphere oil, 90 per cent. of Europe's oil supplies in 1956 were coming through the Canal or through the Syrian pipeline. It is hardly any exaggeration to say that Europe's prosperity is built on the oil wells of the Middle East.

Whether this meant that the Canal was consequently, for economic reasons, an Anglo-French vital interest was another question. The case for saying it was would certainly have been stronger could it be shown that there was no other way

of bringing the vital oil to Europe than through the Canal. Demonstrably, there was, since the most important oil-bearing States are on the Persian Gulf and ships could come *via* the Cape. The extra cost could hardly be called prohibitive. Even if it doubled the transport costs per ton of crude oil, these represented, according to the oil companies, a charge of something around 1d per gallon for petrol (compared with a British revenue tax of 2s. 6d. per gallon). All that could be said was that there was no *immediately* available alternative to the Canal if European oil supplies were to be *fully* maintained, since the existing fleet of tankers travelling *via* the Cape would take longer and therefore be able to carry less over a given period—approximately, 40 per cent. less. In the long run, a heavy capital investment programme in very large tankers (whose size would actually make the Cape route as economic as the Canal route in smaller ships) would relieve Western Europe of dependence on whoever controlled the Canal.⁷

How long this would take, however, is difficult to say. Shipbuilding order-books all over the world were already overfull—mainly with orders for tankers—and, in normal circumstances, perhaps four or five years would be needed before an adequate fleet of super-tankers would be completed.⁸ On the other hand, in an emergency such as the Battle of the Atlantic, Governments had shown that desperately needed ships could be built in a fraction of the time normally taken.

Let us say, therefore, that for a short period of between two and six years Anglo-French oil supplies would be liable to partial interruption if the Canal were blocked. How serious this interruption would be would depend on two further questions: whether the missing oil could easily be replaced from alternative sources; and, if not, whether the British and French economies would be able to stand the dislocation, unemployment and other consequences of a sudden power and fuel shortage without serious results.

As to the first question, Mr. Dulles had made it clear in

⁷ See *Economist* supplement February 2, 1957.

⁸ *The Banker* Supplement to the November, 1956, issue.

September that if the Egyptian nationalisation resulted in the Canal being blocked, the United States was prepared to aid with dollars and administrative measures those European countries who would be obliged to look to the Western Hemisphere for substitute supplies of oil.

Normally, it was true, the difference in the dollar-sterling ratio in the cost of Western Hemisphere and Middle East oil was much less than was popularly imagined, thanks mainly to special currency agreements between the leading oil companies and European financial authorities.⁹ But these agreements could hardly be expected to cover the large extra supplies which would be needed if the Canal were blocked. In any case, even if the dollar problem could be overcome, the transatlantic oil would certainly be costlier. Moreover, the American promise might not always hold good, and unforeseen circumstances (of a domestic political nature, for instance) might arise to prevent the American aid being given.

The answer to the first question, therefore, was probably that some but not all of the Middle East oil could be temporarily replaced, but only at the cost of some strain—great or less, depending on American aid—on the British and French economies and balance of payments.

In fact, the second question was much more decisive. The crucial fact was that neither the British nor the French economy in 1956 was strong enough to take the risk of having to bear the strain resulting from a partial interruption of their normal oil supplies, if they could possibly avoid it. Admittedly, these strains might be no more than would be felt from a prolonged strike by miners, dockers or by railwaymen; but it was equally true—as experience had already shown—that a British or a French government would go to almost any lengths to avoid such strikes.

Would it not be correct, therefore, to say that a hypersensitive definition by Britain and France of what constituted a “vital interest” in economic terms was a direct result of their consciousness of internal economic weakness and

⁹ *The Banker*, *ibid.*

vulnerability, and of their apparent inability to find a real remedy for this vulnerability?

There was only one other sense in which the Egyptian nationalisation could be held to imperil Anglo-French vital interests. For wider political reasons, it might be regarded as a gesture fatally undermining their position and authority in the Arab world which could not safely be allowed to pass unpunished and unredressed. For the French, this tied up again with the fears for French prestige in North Africa. For the British, it was a matter more of Britain's military position in the Middle East and, also, of the British investment in Middle East oil operations. (It should be remembered that, through Anglo-Iranian and British Petroleum, the British investment in Iraq, Kuwait and the Persian Gulf was very largely a government investment, as well as one of private shareholders.) In the past ten years, rapid changes had taken place in Britain's relationships with Iraq, with Persia, with Palestine, Israel and Jordan and, not least, with Egypt. The American oil companies had always argued that their British rivals depended too much on the British Government's political influence in the oil States. This seemed to amount at times to a quasi-colonial imperialist status, enabling British oil companies to exclude American rivals from operating in certain Arab States. Thus, as the political position of Britain in the Middle East was made increasingly obsolete by the irresistible tides of history and of nationalism, the adjustment to commercial, competitive conditions by the partially British oil companies was made difficult. And, even if the eventual withering away of British political influence in its old form was inevitable, the process, it may have been argued, might be extended and its end postponed by an effective rearguard action. This had been impossible at Abadan, largely because of Persia's treaty relationship with the Soviet Union. But was it impossible over Suez?

The calculation—as a matter of politics rather than of morals or of law—hinged, like all others, on the question of cost.

If, for the moment, it might be granted that the Egyptian

nationalisation was a threat, actual or potential, to Anglo-French economic interests and prestige, what was the real cost of a forceful reversal of the nationalisation decree? "Cost" in this sense, being used not narrowly in money terms but more in the economists' sense of opportunity-cost, of other things lost or forgone; thus, cost must be measured not only in terms of losses of money and men, but also of losses of diplomatic influence, prestige and position.

For the former, much would depend on the scale and duration of the military operation required. There have been reports that the original military plans envisaged a total military occupation of Egypt; or, alternatively, of the Canal area, plus Cairo and Alexandria, on the grounds that this was the only sure guarantee of control over the Canal itself. If they existed, such plans were later abandoned, presumably because it was thought unnecessary in view of the coincident plans of Israel to cripple and largely destroy Egypt's armed forces. It may also have been thought that this factor reduced the probable duration as well as the extent of the operation. In other words, that the Israeli campaign in Sinai made it necessary for Britain and France only to execute a swift commando-type raid, occupying the Canal area temporarily until such time as Egypt and the rest of international society were ready to accept a substantial reversal of the nationalisation.

This assumption, indeed, still seemed to underlie a good deal of opinion in Britain and France (and among American Democrats) many months after their withdrawal. This opinion holds that the Eden-Mollet governments were unlucky (or foolish) not to carry through their purpose: that, had they done so and pressed on regardless of the United States, Russia and the United Nations, a salutary lesson would have been taught President Nasser and Anglo-French interests and prestige safeguarded. The argument, in my opinion, hangs somewhat precariously on whether, in the conditions of 1957, (a) a temporary military occupation of the Canal would have been enough to effect a permanent change in Egypt's policy of nationalisation; and (b) whether the United Nations,

Russia and the United States would have become reconciled to the result if the Anglo-French operation had been militarily complete and successful.

Both assumptions are open to challenge. It can be said, first, that as soon as the temporary occupation of the Canal was over, and the *status quo ante* July, 1956, restored, Egypt could have begun again at the beginning by renationalising the Canal. And that so long as this possibility existed, Britain and France would have come to realise that a temporary occupation would have to be indefinitely extended, at a considerably increased cost. For it is, secondly, hard to imagine that the occupying forces, as long as they remained, would not have been subject to just as much, if not more, "terrorist activity" as the occupying forces in Cyprus or North Africa, particularly, since, quite apart from the Russian and American reaction, the General Assembly might be expected to continue giving moral support to Egypt—a stubborn persistence in the striking of moral attitudes, even when they are hopeless and futile, being one of its most common characteristics.

Either way, the direct and military losses which Britain and France would be liable to incur by forceful intervention could be estimated beforehand as either great or small, depending on unprovable suppositions. Opinions may differ but there is little hard evidence to be found on either side.

DIPLOMATIC REACTIONS

The same is not true of the diplomatic costs and risks of forceful intervention. Here the great weight of evidence showed incontrovertibly that Britain and France would incur risks of a very grave character indeed—unless a whole set of attitudes and policies toward the Egyptian nationalisation were to be suddenly and totally overturned and reversed. The most important of these attitudes, clearly, were those of the United States and the Soviet Union, and, after them, of the Commonwealth countries and the rest of the United Nations.

In a brief article, there is not space for a complete survey

of these attitudes which have, in any case, been much more fully considered elsewhere.¹⁰

Briefly, then, Russian opposition to the Anglo-French action in November was most dramatically and forcibly expressed, it will be remembered, in a message from Prime Minister Bulganin to Sir Anthony Eden and M. Guy Mollet on November 5. Charging Britain and France with waging unprovoked and unjustifiable aggressive war on Egypt "for the purpose of restoring the régime of colonial slavery" on the peoples of the Middle East, Mr. Bulganin asked, hintingly, "In what position would Britain have found herself if she herself had been attacked by more powerful States possessing every kind of modern destructive weapon? And there are other countries now," he added, "which need not have sent a navy or air force to the coasts of Britain, but could have used other means such as rocket techniques."

And on the same day, Marshal Bulganin proposed to President Eisenhower that the United States and the Soviet Union should combine in a joint effort to stop the Anglo-French aggression. "The United States has a strong fleet in the Mediterranean," he wrote. "The Soviet Union also has a strong fleet and strong air units. The joint and immediate use of these means on the part of the United States and the Soviet Union, if the United Nations so decides, would be a competent guarantee of stopping aggression." But if the war were not halted, there was a danger that it could develop into a Third World War.

These broad hints at Russian reprisals—as they were widely interpreted in the British press—were followed up five days later by a Tass statement in Moscow, announcing that the Soviet Government was prepared to allow "volunteers" to go to Egypt to help defend her against aggression, unless Britain and France really did withdraw. Reminiscent as this was of the Chinese Government's warning in 1950 that, if United Nations troops crossed the 38th parallel, Chinese "volunteers" would be allowed to go to help North Korea,

¹⁰ Peter Calvocoressi, *Middle East Crisis*, 1957; Michael Foot, *Guilty Men*, 1967, 8 & M. Bromberger, *Secrets of Suez*, 1957.

the threat was undoubtedly felt to be more menacing than it appeared on the surface.

To assess the diplomatic risks of the Suez adventure, these hints should be compared closely with the previous Russian statements in mid-September on the Canal question.

On September 15, a Soviet statement had declared that British and French military preparations ("with the support of the United States") were a "rude contradiction of the principles of the United Nations organisation," and that Britain and France were "running the risk of bringing on themselves irreparable damage" by an attempt to "capture Suez" which would lead to damage to the Canal, to the oilfields and to the oil pipelines.

This, though it made clear the Soviet opposition to the use of force, contained no threats, and seems to suggest that in the event, Soviet reactions depended somewhat on the degree of unity between the United States, Britain and France.

In November, seeing the isolation of the latter from the United States, the Soviet Union clearly risked less by her open and disguised threats than if Eisenhower were standing firmly behind Eden and Mollet. In fact, it seems difficult yet to say with any certainty how decisively these Russian threats influenced the British-French decision first to agree to the United Nations Emergency Force in the Canal area and then on their own withdrawal from it. Events moved so fast between November 5 when the paratroops landed at Port Said and November 9 when Sir Anthony told the House of Commons that Britain welcomed the Israeli decision (taken the day before) to withdraw.

Mr. Dulles, who might not be expected to overrate their importance, was afterwards prepared to admit that they were not altogether unimportant. Asked at hearings of the House Appropriations Committee on January 29, 1957, whether he thought Russian threats to use atomic weapons had been decisive, he answered:

"I believe they (Britain and France) would have withdrawn without them. I have talked to some of their statesmen in Paris . . . the impression I got was that the

principal factor in their withdrawal was the force of world opinion as reflected at the United Nations, which included the adverse opinion of quite a few of the members of the British Commonwealth, and it threatened to strain the ties not only with the United States but with the Commonwealth itself. I cannot say that the other element did not come in, but I do not think it was decisive.”¹¹

Mr. Dulles, incidentally, also categorically denied the validity of the excuse produced by Britain—actually by Mr. Thorneycroft on November 8—that Anglo-French intervention had forestalled Russian penetration and domination of the Middle East, had “revealed” the extent of Russian arming of Egypt and had prevented the Egyptian Air Force, organised by Russia, from “running amok” in the Middle East.

Russia, Mr. Dulles said, had “an appreciable amount of influence” in one or two countries in the Middle East, but “was not in a position to dictate policies or to turn those countries into satellites.”

On the United States’ own attitude, Mr. Dulles said in the same testimony :

“There were certain elements in Britain and France who wanted to move at once with force. We took the same position at that time (August) that we took later on when they did move, namely, that that could not be done consistently with the Charter of the United Nations and with our NATO treaty.”

Asked then whether the United States had taken no action to try to solve the problem between the time of the seizure and the Anglo-French aggression, Mr. Dulles replied :-

“Yes, we were continuously working on it almost day and night, and were working on it very actively at the moment when the attack occurred. We have had continuous meetings, almost continuous meetings, in London and New York with the countries who represented the principal users of the Canal to work out a solution.

¹¹ *Manchester Guardian*, April 9, 1957.

Considerable progress was made at the Security Council meeting that was held in October when certain principles were agreed to and accepted by the British, the French and the Egyptians and the application of those principles with Secretary-General Hammarskjöld was proceeding quite actively. When that meeting broke up or ended in New York about the middle of October, it was expected that the talks would be resumed in Geneva within a few days."

Indeed, little evidence is needed to demonstrate the basic fact of the whole situation—that the United States was never prepared to back forceful reversal of the Egyptian nationalisation. This was implicit in the whole history of negotiations, certainly from August 10, when the State Department published five principles on which it stated the United States believed a peaceful settlement should be based, and in both the London conferences, right until November. The conclusive proof of this lay in the obvious care taken by Britain and France to conceal their military plans from American representatives.

Dependent as they were on American protection, through NATO, against Russia (quite apart from the many other ways in which they were vulnerable to American pressure), neither Britain nor France were really in a position in the nuclear age to take any risks at all that Russian threats were only bluff. In short, the British and French Governments were banking on the United States, distracted by the Presidential election, at best backing them up, and at least holding the ring for them while they subdued Egypt. And they were doing so in spite of the fact that there was no basis at all for assuming that the United States would change its attitude.

Much the same applied to the attitudes of other countries in the United Nations and in the Commonwealth. The London conferences, the meetings of the General Assembly and Security Council in the three months since July 1956 had amply demonstrated the lack of any support for a policy of force towards Egypt. The Indian Government as early as August 8 had made plain its disapproval of British and

French threats to use force against Egypt. It may have been that Sir Anthony Eden hoped the old pull of Commonwealth solidarity would keep at least the older Dominions from openly dissociating themselves from Britain. But in the event, it is now clear that if Canada had not taken so active a part in "regretting" the Suez action and in bringing the United Nations in with the Pearson plan for an international emergency force to supervise a cease-fire—thus demonstrating that disapproval of Britain was not incompatible with continued Commonwealth association—the Asian members might easily have withdrawn from it.

All in all, it ought to have been abundantly obvious that, in addition to the military and economic costs of the operation, the diplomatic risks run by it—the potential damage to the American alliance, to the Commonwealth association and to relations with other Western European and Asian countries—were so great as completely to dwarf the possible diplomatic gains to be had in the Suez Canal.

This point has been so exhaustively treated elsewhere that it seems hardly necessary to go over such familiar ground again. (For the same reason, the question of British-French-Israeli collusion has also not been dealt with here, for the reason that extensive investigation and argument seem already to have established, beyond all reasonable doubt, a degree of mutual foreknowledge which effectively destroys any pretence either that the British-French action accidentally coincided with the Israeli attack on Egypt, or that there was the slightest truth in the "police operations" excuse.)

More and more, as evidence and subsequent events accumulate, the decision of November 1956 seems only explicable, not in terms of logic or reason, but only in terms of national and individual neurosis and hysterical panic.

THE EFFECTS OF SUEZ

In what way, however, may all these events be said to have changed the patterns of international relations today? What conclusions can be drawn from it of value for the future?

What old illusions has it shattered, and what new ones, if any, has it created? These are the questions which ought now to be asked, even if a complete answer to them is as yet impossible.

First, surely, the Suez affair may be said to have demonstrated in a new way the relative weakness of two declining Powers—Britain and France—in terms of power politics. They have been shown before the Arab States and the entire world to be impotent to use their military force without American support and in the face of Russian opposition.

In fact, a number of factors—the attitudes of the United States, the Soviet Union, the Commonwealth, the United Nations and the Labour Party and a large section of British public opinion—all played at least some part in having the Anglo-French action called off. The danger is perhaps that later, in other circumstances, too much importance could be attached to any particular one, and wrong conclusions drawn.

As in the experience of the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian and retreating imperial Powers, the open revelation of weakness tends to increase international instability. It is an invitation to others to “have a go,” and the danger is that the invitation could be taken up in circumstances more favourable to the imperial Power.

More specifically, the Suez affair revealed the limited value of British bases both in Libya and in Cyprus. It showed the Libyan base might be used in global war, but was probably of little or no use in local, regional strategy. And it showed the range of large-scale operations which could be mounted from Cyprus—even with several months of preparation—was also limited. Indeed, it may be significant that within six months of November 1956 British opinion seemed ready for a radical change on the minimum military requirements in Cyprus; and, on the political front, that the Government, with the release of Archbishop Makarios, was getting ready to negotiate.

The attention given, also, to the £85 or £40 million extra added by the Suez operation to the British defence estimates—

fractional as it was compared to the total annual defence bill—suggested strongly that British military strength was already over-stretched before Suez. And it is difficult to believe that the experience did not contribute something to the subsequent re-thinking, however incomplete, of British defence expenditure revealed in the Defence White Paper of April 1957.

Conclusions concerning the role of the United Nations in the affair have varied more widely. At one point, soon after the Anglo-French withdrawal there seemed to be a tendency to award more credit (or blame, according to taste) to the influence of the General Assembly than was really justified. But this interpretation was afterwards corrected somewhat by difficulties experienced by the Emergency Force in the Gaza Strip.

Moreover, coinciding as it did with the Hungarian Revolution, in which the General Assembly showed itself powerless to intervene or even to observe, the Suez affair did not so much demonstrate the power of world public opinion expressed through the General Assembly as show that while certain member-States are practically impervious to United Nations criticism, others are not. Equality of voting rights conceals an unequal sensitivity to Assembly opinion—an inequality which does not necessarily coincide with the inequality of power. The least sensitive include the completely totalitarian and the politically peripheral (such as South Africa) and may also include certain States, such as India, whose wider influence and prestige may sometimes be proof against outside criticism of one particular part of Indian policy. The most sensitive almost certainly includes a State such as Britain which has more or less openly declared its wish gradually to substitute moral and indirect influence for the coercive power of direct imperial control. In 1946, when Russia withdrew troops from Persia and Britain and France withdrew troops from Syria and Lebanon at United Nations' request, the difference was not so apparent. But in 1957, the contrast between Hungary and Suez could not be overlooked. The net effect will in time be seen to be a substantial weakening in one form or another

of British resistance to the already mounting anti-colonial pressures in the United Nations.

As far as United States policy is concerned, the direct effect of these events since the nationalisation of the Canal is still very hard to gauge precisely. One may point to the Eisenhower Doctrine, so called, as evidence that the Anglo-French action stung the United States to some attempt at least to develop and clarify a Middle East policy which had hitherto been singularly negative and ill-defined. But whether, since its enunciation, American foreign policy has really been all that much less ambivalent and indeterminate in practice, it seems hard to say as yet with any confidence.

What has, perhaps, been demonstrated by the Suez affair is the peculiar and not wholly rational indestructibility of the Anglo-American relationship—alliance is too bald and limited a word for it—under even the greatest strain.

For though the British action did not move the United States to offer the slightest support for British policy towards Egypt and clearly was highly inconvenient and annoying to the United States (to say the least), yet the following period of strained relations was of remarkably short duration. By the Bermuda Conference of March 1957 the breach appeared quite genuinely healed and all between them as before.

The effect on Russian policy must, surely, in the long run be the exact opposite of that claimed by the British Government. Far from putting an end to Russian influence in the Middle East, the loss of face suffered by Britain and France, the encouragement given to Arab nationalism and the continued failure of either the United States by force or the Secretary-General by mediation to pacify and stabilise regional international relations in the area, all combine to offer new opportunities to Russia to take a part in those relations. Indeed, if the Suez affair demonstrated anything anew, it was the impossibility of excluding the Soviet Union altogether from Middle Eastern politics. The nature of Soviet influence and its effects, however, cannot be predicted; they are almost certain to be as fluid and opportunist as is necessary in Russian self-interest.

In short, not only may it be said that the whole Suez affair, seen as a development of Anglo-French policy, failed to achieve any of the advertised objectives assigned to it, it also has not, apparently, shed much new and blinding light on the international situation. Some of the old illusions, mostly minor ones, have been shattered; new ones have grown up to take their place. Those who before were unwilling to recognise and acknowledge the nature of the changing modern world and of the powerful forces of change at work in it are still very unwilling to do so, and some might even say that the traumatic experience of Suez has produced in some sections of British and French psychology an intensified wish to take refuge in the schizophrenic's world of illusion and unreality.

It would be nice to record that the fruits of adversity and failure were greater wisdom and understanding. But, to judge by the evidence to date, it would not be altogether true.

THE DOUBLE STANDARD OF THE UNITED NATIONS

By

L. C. GREEN

WHEN 1956 commenced it appeared that it would be a year not very different in the history of the United Nations from any of those that had preceded it. This impression was emphasised as the first rumours began of the subjects that were likely to appear on the agenda of the eleventh session of the General Assembly. There was likely to be the usual debate on French actions in North Africa, the situation in South Africa, the Middle East, Cyprus, human rights, and on suggestions for amending the Charter in order to broaden the representative character of the various organs to meet the situation produced by the increased membership of the Organisation.

SUEZ

Things took a more novel turn in the middle of the year. In a speech on July 26 President Nasser, after inveighing against the Suez Canal Company, which he described as "a State within a State," announced the nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company.¹ He contended that "the Suez Canal constituted an edifice of humiliation [and] today, we achieve true sovereignty, true dignity and true pride." This action met with major criticism from the Governments of France and the United Kingdom, which were most directly concerned with the rights of the Company, as well as from the United

¹ For documents relating to the Suez Crisis see U.S. State Dept. Pub. 6392, *The Suez Canal Problem, July 26-Sept. 22, 1956*, 1956; Society of Comparative Legislation & International Law, *The Suez Canal: Documents Nov. 30, 1954-July 26, 1956*, 1956; Watts, *Documents on the Suez Crisis, 26 July to 6 Nov. 1956*, 1957. See also H.M. Stationery Office, Cmd. 9853 (1956), *The Suez Canal Conference, Aug. 2-24, 1956*, Cmd. 9856 (1956) *Exchange of Correspondence regarding the Future Operation of the Suez Canal*.

States which was fully aware of the implications of the action for the maritime countries which habitually used the Canal.

President Nasser had used the refusal by the United States and the United Kingdom to finance the construction of the Aswan Dam as one of the reasons for his act, and declared his intention to use some of the income from the Canal for the purpose. When the three Western Powers met in London in August to consider the effect of the Egyptian nationalisation, they did "not question the right of Egypt to enjoy and exercise all the powers of a fully sovereign and independent nation, including the generally recognised right, under appropriate conditions, to nationalise assets, not impressed with an international interest, which are subject to its political authority. But the present action involves far more than a simple act of nationalisation. It involves the arbitrary and unilateral seizure by one nation of an international agency which has the responsibility to maintain and to operate the Suez Canal so that all the signatories to and beneficiaries of the Treaty of 1888 can effectively enjoy the use of an international waterway upon which the economy, commerce, and security of much of the world depends. This seizure is the more serious in its implications because it avowedly was made for the purpose of enabling the Government of Egypt to make the Canal serve the purely national purposes of the Egyptian Government rather than the international purpose established by the Convention of 1888. . . . They consider that the action taken by the Government of Egypt, having regard to all the attendant circumstances, threatens the freedom and security of the Canal as guaranteed by the Convention of 1888."

In view of this, the Powers called a Conference of the signatories of the 1888 Convention and sixteen other nations regarded as principally concerned. Invitations were not extended to Israel and the Arab States of the Middle East, despite the fact that Egyptian closure of the Suez Canal against Israeli ships and ships going to and from Israeli ports, allegedly as a consequence of Egypt being at war with Israel, had been a matter of international concern for over six years. It is

true, as a spokesman of the British Foreign Office pointed out in the House of Commons in April 1957, that Israel could not be considered as a major user of the Canal. He did not point out, however, that it was the Egyptian activity just mentioned which prevented Israel from being such.

Before considering the recommendations of this Conference it is as well to glance at the status of the Canal and of the Company before the promulgation of the Egyptian nationalisation decree. Under the concessions granted by the Viceroy of Egypt in 1854 and 1856, the Suez Canal Company was established as a joint stock company with its seat at Alexandria and its administrative domicile in Paris. The Company was to be formed in the same way as French joint stock companies and regulated in accordance with the same principles, and its legal domicile and assignment of jurisdiction were stated to be Paris. By a further concession of 1866 it was provided that the Company, being Egyptian, was governed by the laws and customs of Egypt, although "with respect to its status as a company and relations between its shareholders, it is governed by the laws which govern joint stock companies in France. All disputes of this nature will be judged in France by arbitrators subject to appeal to the Imperial Court [now the Cour de Cassation] in Paris. . . . Disputes which arise between the Egyptian Government and the Company will be placed before the local courts and decided according to the laws of the country." Here it must be remembered that according to international law, local legislation does not override international obligations. It is possible, therefore, that an Egyptian court, acting in accordance with this clause of the 1866 concession and applying Egyptian law, may well be acting contrary to the rules of international law concerning, for example, the duration of the concession itself, and so incurring international responsibility for Egypt.

The Canal was opened in 1869 under the Company's administration for ninety-nine years, that is to say until 1968, when the Canal and its installations would revert to Egypt, although the international character of the Canal as a waterway was to remain undisturbed. In 1875 Disraeli

acquired 44 per cent. of the shares, making the British Government the largest single shareholder, while 52 per cent. of the shares are held by French private shareholders.

In 1888 the Convention of Constantinople² was signed between Great Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Russia and Turkey regulating the status of the Canal. By the Peace Treaties terminating the First World War, Turkish interests under the 1888 Convention were terminated and, generally speaking, conveyed to Great Britain.³ When, in 1922, Great Britain recognised Egypt as an independent sovereign State, there was expressly reserved to the former the security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt and the protection of foreign interests in Egypt.⁴ By the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance, 1936,⁵ Egypt recognised "that the Suez Canal, whilst being an integral part of Egypt, is a universal means of communication as also an essential means of communication between the different parts of the British Empire," and agreed to the presence of British troops in the Canal Zone to secure the security of navigation and the defence of the Canal. When Great Britain surrendered the military bases in the Zone to Egypt in 1954,⁶ the two Governments recognised "that the Suez maritime Canal, which is an integral part of Egypt, is a waterway economically, commercially and strategically of international importance, and express [ed] the determination to uphold the Convention guaranteeing the freedom of navigation of the Canal signed at Constantinople" in 1888.

By Article 1 of the Convention the Canal is to be (*sera*) open, in war and in peace, to merchant vessels and warships regardless of flag. In time of peace, at least until the signature of the Egyptian armistice with Israel in 1949, this principle has been observed; while in war it has been observed save during the two World Wars. In Article 4 the parties further agreed that no warlike or hostile act, nor any act directed

² H.M.S.O., *Handbook of Commercial Treaties*, 1931 (751), 79 B.N.S.P. p. 18.
³ For the relevant extracts, see Hackworth, *Digest of International Law*, Vol. 2, 1941, pp. 816-818.

⁴ H.M.S.O., Cmd. 1592 (1922), pp. 29 *et seq.*

⁵ Cmd. 5360 (1937).

⁶ Cmd. 9586 (1954).

at obstructing the free navigation of the Canal, was to be committed in the Canal or within three marine miles of its ports, even if the Ottoman Empire was a belligerent. It was further recognised, however, that this Article did not interfere with any measures which the rulers of Egypt might find it necessary to take to secure the defence of Egypt and the maintenance of public order, but such measures were in no case to interfere with the free use of the Canal.

The Convention said little about the Company. In its preamble it made clear that it was intended to give effect to the system envisaged in the various concessions that had been granted, while in Article 2 the parties took note of the engagements of the Khedive towards the Company and in Article 3 they pledged their respect for the plant, buildings, works, and the like, of the maritime canal. These installations are those of the Company which was responsible for administering the navigation of the Canal. Indirectly, therefore, at least for the duration of the concession, the Convention conferred an international guarantee upon the property rights of the Suez Canal Company. A further recognition of the connection between the Convention and the Company is to be found in Article 14, which provides that the engagements arising under the Convention were not limited to the duration of the concession of the Company.

As regards enforcement of the Convention it was provided that, while no warship was to be kept within the Canal proper, the signatories could station warships at Port Said and Suez, so long as no more than two were placed there by any signatory. In the event of any threat to the freedom of the Canal, therefore, it would have been perfectly feasible for any signatory which was so minded to provide armed protection for any vessel threatened by such discrimination. In such a case, however, there was always the possibility that another signatory to the Convention might favour Egypt and send warships through as a counter-measure. Furthermore, the representatives of the signatories in Egypt were charged with watching over the execution of the Convention and, in the event of any threat to the security or free passage of the

Canal, were to meet on the summons of any three of them and inform the Government of Egypt so that it could take proper steps to ensure the protection and free use of the Canal. Apart from this watchdog activity, the diplomatic representatives were enjoined "especially [to] demand the suppression of any work or *the dispersion of any assemblage on either bank of the Canal*, the object or effect of which might be to interfere with the liberty and the entire security of the navigation."⁷ At the time of the hostilities in the Sinai desert between Israel and Egypt and the Anglo-French ultimatum and military action in the Suez area, too little awareness of this right of the parties to the Convention was evident in either the British or the French case against Egypt.

Even before the nationalisation of the Company had been effected, an Agreement had been entered into by Egypt and the Company whereby Egypt, after expressing satisfaction with the fashion in which the Company was carrying out its task, became a privileged partner of the Company and received an undertaking that the Canal and the Company would revert to Egypt absolutely at the end of the concession in 1968. Between 1949 and 1968 Egyptian participation in the administration of the Company was to be gradually increased. As has been pointed out, President Nasser did not wait for the passage of these twenty years.

By international law a State may nationalise the property of its nationals, including companies possessing its nationality—a principle that was recognised in the statement of the three Powers after their meeting of August 2. Limitations are imposed, however, when the rights of foreigners are involved.⁸ When, for example, Great Britain nationalised the iron and steel industry, the Ford Works at Dagenham, because of the large foreign holdings involved, was excluded from the scope of the Act.⁹ If foreign assets are nationalised, there must be compensation—real, full and immediate. In the case of the

⁷ Article 8 (*italics added*), this part of the Article was left unamended by the Anglo-French Declaration of 1904

⁸ See Schwarzenberger, "The Protection of British Property Abroad," 5 *Current Legal Problems* 1952, p. 295, at pp. 309 *et seq.*, also Foughel, 26 *Acta Scandinavica*, 1956, p. 89

⁹ *The Times*, January 28, February 2, 1949.

Suez Canal Company there was every indication, particularly in view of the statement about financing the Aswan Dam, that compensation, if any, would be neither full, adequate nor immediate.

For nationalisation of foreign assets to be legal, it must be for purposes of public utility, but, in view of the absence of previous complaints against the Company, it is difficult to justify the action of the Egyptian Government on this ground. In addition, the large holdings of the British Government and the presence of three Government-nominated directors on the Company's Board tend to change the conflict from one between a State and a private company to one between two States. A similar phenomenon was present in the case of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951.¹⁰ This principle has been recognised by both the United States State Department and the Washington District Court. In December 1952, in connection with investigations into the existence of an international oil cartel contrary to the United States anti-trust legislation, a subpoena was served on the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company requiring it to present certain documents. The Company tendered a letter from the British Minister of Fuel and Power which the State Department accepted as an assertion of sovereignty. The judge upheld the immunity of the Company as a unit of the British Government, pointing out that although the Government only owned slightly more than one-third of the capital investment of the Company, it in fact controlled the Company by owning the greater portion of the voting stock.¹¹ In the case of the Suez Canal Company, the role of the British Government is even clearer, and this attempt to seek the real ownership and centre of control of the Company is fully in accord with the judgment of the Permanent Court of International Justice in the case concerning *Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia*, 1926.¹²

As an immediate reaction to the nationalisation of the Company, Great Britain imposed restrictions on Egyptian

¹⁰ Schwarzenberger, *loc. cit.*, p. 315.

¹¹ *The Times*, December 16, 1952.

¹² Series A, No. 7. See, for general discussion of the "control test," Schwarzenberger, *International Law*, Vol. 1, 1949, pp. 177-180.

sterling holdings in the United Kingdom as well as having initiated the international conference to which reference has already been made. The London Conference, which Egypt refused to attend, produced a proposal which was endorsed by eighteen of the participants, but which was not acceptable to Ceylon, India, Indonesia or the Soviet Union. The Eighteen Nations affirmed the principle of free navigation through the Canal, to be effected by a system which, while having due regard for the sovereign rights of Egypt, would assure efficient operation of the Canal as an international waterway in accordance with the principles of the 1888 Convention, "insulation of the operation of the Canal from the influence of the politics of any nation," and a fair return for Egypt for the use of the Canal, while keeping tolls as low as possible. To give effect to the objects, the Proposal called for the creation of a Suez Canal Board consisting of Egypt and representatives of the signatories of the 1888 Convention, operating "without political motivation in favour of, or in prejudice against, any user of the Canal." It was also proposed that the Board should make periodic reports to the United Nations.

Despite the dispatch of an explanatory mission to Cairo, Egypt refused to accept the Eighteen Nations' Proposal and a further Conference of the Eighteen met in London from September 19-21. This Conference had before it the report of its Committee which had been negotiating with President Nasser and a speech from Mr. Dulles in which he pointed out that Egypt's statement that Egypt intended, despite the nationalisation of the Company, to carry out the terms of the 1888 Convention was no guarantee for the future, for "if the Government of Egypt insists that ships' masters be in the position of suppliants, who can never pass through the Canal except under such conditions as the Government of Egypt may from time to time impose, then there is no guarantee of free and secure passage such as the Convention of 1888 prescribes." In view of this he suggested the establishment of a Suez Canal Users' Association to assist ships in operating through the Canal, to employ pilots, collect dues

from users prepared to pay them to the Association and, where necessary, co-operate with the Egyptian authorities administering the Canal. The Conference adopted this suggestion and appointed a permanent Council to execute it and to extend facilities to non-member nations which might wish to make use of it. In the months that have elapsed since the Second London Conference the Association has succeeded in appointing an Administrator, has held a number of meetings and has decided to study the position and to see what advice and assistance it can offer to users. In addition, the British Government has indicated that it does not consider that Israel, or any other non-member, can join the Association yet, and Mr. Dulles has made it clear that if Egypt refuses to co-operate with the Association, then ships will have to make other arrangements—either to agree to Egypt's terms or to go round the Cape. Egypt refused to have anything to do with the Association and on September 28 Great Britain and France referred the matter to the Security Council, and Egypt called for consideration of Anglo-French actions which were described as a threat to the peace.

This was not the first time that questions concerning the freedom of navigation through the Canal had been referred to the United Nations. From the date of the termination of the British Mandate for Palestine and the outbreak of hostilities between Israel and her Arab neighbours, Egypt had closed the Canal to Israeli ships and those visiting Israeli ports. This closure continued beyond the signature of the Armistice Agreement, 1949,¹³ in which both parties agreed that, as an indispensable step towards the liquidation of armed conflict and the restoration of peace in Palestine, and in the light of the Security Council's injunction against force being used to settle the Palestine problem,¹⁴ no hostile action of any sort would be taken against each other. Egypt, nevertheless, claimed that she was at war with Israel and maintained her right to close the Canal against Israel. On September 1,

¹³ 42 U.N. *Treaty Series*, p. 252.

¹⁴ Resolution, November 16, 1948; U.N. *Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council 1946-1951*, 1954, p. 387.

1951,¹⁵ the Security Council, "considering that since the armistice régime . . . is of a permanent character, neither party can reasonably assert that it is actively a belligerent or requires to exercise the right of visit, search and seizure for any legitimate purpose of self-defence," found that the maintenance of the Egyptian blockade was inconsistent with the achievement of a peaceful settlement and completely unjustified, and called upon Egypt to cease these activities and to observe the Convention.

This resolution, which was of a fact-finding character and not a binding decision of the Council in the technical sense of the Charter, had no effect whatever upon Egypt, nor upon the signatories to the Convention, any of whom could, in accordance with the Convention, have provided warship protection to any Israeli ship seeking to go through. In addition, at that time the Canal Zone was occupied by British troops, and it is doubtful whether Egypt could have taken any preventive measures against any vessel seeking to traverse the Canal without the acquiescence of the occupying authority. Despite this blatant breach of the Convention and continuing affront to the Council, no suggestion was made that any action should be taken against Egypt.

When there was the danger that the navigational rights of those States upon whom the burden of ensuring freedom of navigation for Israeli ships rested were threatened, then, as has been indicated, the Powers were far more concerned and referred to the Council for action. The resolution put before the Security Council embodied the proposal of the Eighteen Nations and, in an attempt to effect an acceptable compromise, the foreign ministers of Egypt, France and Great Britain met under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and agreed on six basic principles: freedom of navigation through the Canal without discrimination; respect for Egypt's sovereignty; insulation of the operation of the Canal from national politics; tolls and charges to be decided by agreement between Egypt and the users; a fair proportion of the dues to be used for development; and any unresolved

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 343-344.

dispute between the Company and Egypt to be referred to arbitration. These agreed principles formed part of the resolution moved in the Council, which went on to provide for United Nations endorsement of the proposals of the Eighteen Nations, called for Egyptian co-operation with the Users' Association pending a final settlement, and invited Egypt to put forward its own scheme provided it contained guarantees for the users at least as acceptable as those in the London proposals. When the resolution was put to the vote the six principles were adopted unanimously, but the remainder of the resolution was subjected to a Soviet veto, as was the resolution as a totality.¹⁶ The Egyptian complaint against Britain and France was not even discussed.

In the days that followed it became clear that Egypt was not prepared to meet the claims of the users, nor even to carry out the six principles adopted by the Security Council. Suddenly the Suez crisis changed in character. Throughout the discussions in the Security Council reference had been made to the blockade being exercised against Israel as evidence of lack of Egyptian good will. While the debate was on, Egyptian infiltrations across the Armistice line continued and on October 25 President Nasser announced the establishment of a joint military command between Egypt, Jordan and Syria, as a result of which Israel found herself surrounded by co-ordinated hostile forces. These forces were to be under an Egyptian commander and, conscious of Egyptian presidential statements that it was a basic aim of his policy to drive Israel into the sea, four days later Israeli troops moved into the Sinai peninsula.

Within twenty-four hours of the Israeli invasion the issue had developed into a major international problem. An emergency meeting of the Security Council was called on United States initiative, while Great Britain and France presented both Israel and Egypt with a twelve-hour ultimatum calling upon them to cease all warlike action and to withdraw their forces to a distance of ten miles from the Canal. In

¹⁶ *The Times*, October 15, 1956.

addition, the Egyptian Government was invited to agree to the stationing of British and French forces, temporarily, at key positions in Port Said, Suez and Ismailia. This ultimatum was accepted by Israel but not by Egypt, and on October 31 British bomber operations commenced. Before the expiry of the ultimatum the United States resolution¹⁷ calling for the withdrawal of Israeli troops and upon all members to refrain from the use or threat of force "in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations," and to refrain from giving any assistance to Israel until she had withdrawn, and authorising the Secretary-General to watch the situation and make recommendations, was vetoed by France and Great Britain. A somewhat similar Soviet proposal suffered the same fate.

The Security Council had become accustomed to witnessing the Soviet Union exercising a veto over action of which it did not approve, or which was in any way critical of the activities of the Soviet Union or its "protectorates," but it was something new for such action to be resorted to by Western Powers which had acquired a reputation for law-abidingness and respect for both the letter and the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations. For example, in the issue concerning the presence of French and British troops in Syria and Lebanon, both Britain and France announced that although the resolution of the Council was not a binding decision the Soviet Union had abstained from voting and Mr. Gromyko made it clear that at that time a Soviet abstention was equal to a Soviet veto—they intended complying with it.¹⁸ Not only were the members of the United Nations surprised to find the two Powers defying the general opinion of the Organisation on the issue, but they were confronted with the strange experience of the United States and the Soviet Union voting together against the two leading allies of the United States.

While the Security Council was discussing its resolutions

¹⁷ A summary of the United Nations resolutions from October 30 to November 5 is in *The Times*, November 6, 1956.

¹⁸ See L. C. Green, "The Security Council in Action," *this Year Book*, 1948, p. 125 at p. 159.

Britain and France were engaged in preparing for their armed offensive against Egypt, and Israeli forces were speedily approaching the Canal. After things had reached this stage the problem of peace in the Middle East was referred to an emergency session of the General Assembly, while the Egyptians announced their intention of blocking the Canal unless hostilities ceased forthwith. When it came to voting in the Assembly France and Great Britain once again found themselves opposing the overwhelming majority of the United Nations, with the United States and the Soviet *bloc* voting against them. In this resolution the Assembly called for an immediate cease-fire and the halting of all military movements and of the introduction of arms and men into the area. It further called for an Israeli withdrawal behind the Armistice lines and for the opening of the Canal and the restoration of "secure freedom of navigation" upon the cease-fire becoming effective. The Secretary-General was also requested to observe the situation and report on compliance with the resolution to the Assembly which remained in emergency session.

The British and French Governments explained why they were unable to accede to this resolution. They pointed out that their "police action" was essential and had to be maintained to stop the operations which were threatening the Canal, to prevent a resumption of these hostilities and to pave the way for a final Arab-Israel settlement. They declared their willingness to terminate their own operations when both Egypt and Israel agreed to accept a United Nations force to keep the peace, provided the United Nations would maintain such a force until a final Arab-Israel settlement and a settlement of the Suez Canal issue, both settlements to be guaranteed by the United Nations, and until such a United Nations force was established they considered it vital to keep limited Anglo-French detachments between the combatants. This *démarche* led to the adoption of a further resolution, sponsored by Canada, calling upon the Secretary-General to submit a plan for setting up "with the consent of the nations concerned" an emergency international United Nations force to supervise

the cessation of hostilities. On November 4 a further resolution was adopted establishing a United Nations command for an emergency force to supervise the cessation of hostilities. General Burns, Chief of Staff of the truce supervision organisation, was named Commander of the force and authorised to recruit members from his organisation's Observer Corps and from member States. It was provided that the members of the Emergency Force were not to possess the nationality of the parties to the dispute or of the permanent members of the Security Council. At first sight, this provision appears inconsistent with the assertion in Article 2 of the Charter that the Organisation is based on the sovereign equality of all its members. This discrimination, however, was in keeping with the spirit of the Charter and the promotion of international peace, for it was in direct line with the political realities, fears and doubts in the area, which has long been recognised as lying across the international frontier between East and West.¹⁹ That these fears were real was made clear the next day when the Soviet Union warned the British and French Governments of its determination to crush "aggression" and restore peace in the Middle East, and proposed to the United Nations and the United States the use of naval and air forces, with the possible employment of rockets, to stop war in Egypt and restrain aggression. The United States immediately announced its opposition to this plan, its determination to oppose any effort of Soviet or other military forces to enter the area, and condemned the proposal of Soviet-American intervention as "unthinkable." Undeterred, the Soviet Union, the following day, moved a resolution in the Security Council for the dispatch of United States-Soviet forces to the Middle East if Anglo-French military operations did not cease within twelve hours. That same evening a general cease-fire was announced, although Israel for long refused to withdraw her troops from the Sinai peninsula and the Gaza strip.

The cease-fire was, of course, acclaimed as a great victory for Soviet diplomacy. The Arab States tended to proclaim

¹⁹ Hall, *Mandates, Dependencies and Trusteeship*, 1947, pp. 16-19.

that their sole friend was the Soviet Union and that it was only the Soviet threat, together with an offer of Chinese Communist volunteers to Egypt, which forced Britain and France to comply with the resolutions of the General Assembly and agree to a termination of hostilities. It should be borne in mind that, legally, resolutions of the General Assembly and mere recommendations of the Security Council are not binding upon the members of the United Nations, although it might well be said that it is in accordance with the demands of international morality - and also the spirit of the Charter that such resolutions, when adopted by an overwhelming majority of the members, ought to be observed. In April 1957 Mr. Dulles stated that in his opinion, while the Soviet threat might have played a minor role in dictating Anglo-French compliance, the strongest power affecting them was public opinion and the attitude of their democratic allies.

Israel's final compliance with the resolutions of the United Nations came after long debate in the United Nations and private discussion with the United States. After Israel had received a pledge, or something which she and a large part of the world considered to be a pledge, that there would be no interference with Israeli shipping either in the Suez Canal or in the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Akaba, she withdrew her forces behind the Armistice line. The security of this line was "guaranteed" by the presence of the United Nations Emergency Force and a statement from Egypt, which President Eisenhower said there was no reason to disbelieve, that the Armistice line would be observed. Although various members of the United Nations declared their conviction that Israel was entitled to use the Canal and that the Straits and Gulf were international waters open to international shipping, by April 1957, after a United States vessel on Israel charter had passed through to the port of Eilat, Mr. Dulles was having second thoughts. This was apparently under pressure from the Government of Saudi Arabia, which was the newest ally

²⁰ See, for example, Schwarzenberger, *Power Politics*, 1951, Chap. 14, and Judge Lauterpacht's "Separate Opinion on South West Africa—Voting Procedure," *I.C.J. Reports* 1955, p. 67 and p. 90.

of the United States in the area and was breathing fire and brimstone at the thought of Israeli commerce going through. Once again Israel was being warned of the unpleasant consequences likely to befall her if she presumed to take advantage of those parts of United Nations resolutions and reports of the Secretary-General that appeared to favour her assertions that there was no true war between her and her Arab neighbours²¹ or which appeared to extend to her the rights apparently enjoyed by other maritime Powers.

The Charter of the United Nations recognises the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence against an armed attack, and it might appear from this that the State which first resorts to the invasion of neighbouring territory cannot be exercising the right of self-defence. But the right is inherent and exists regardless of its preservation by Article 51 of the Charter.

As was pointed out by Kellogg at the time of the signature of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, every nation is entitled to protect itself against invasion or armed attack and is alone competent to decide that its security is endangered in this way. He also emphasised the danger of seeking any definition of the circumstances justifying measures of self-defence as "it is far too easy for the unscrupulous to mould events to accord with an agreed definition."²² It is implicit in this statement that, by way of self-defence, the victim of aggression may be driven to strike the first blow, thus presenting all the appearances of itself being the aggressor rather than the victim of the aggression. At the time of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict it was partly as a result of the desire of the Emperor of Ethiopia not to be considered as provocative in any way that Ethiopia was not only the recipient of the first blow but was overrun, and merely the recipient, temporarily, of the moral sympathy of the world. As regards Israel's rights to resort to anticipatory self-defence, the *fedayeen* raids, the speeches of Egyptian

²¹ See L. C. Green "Armed Conflict, War and Self Defence," 7 *Archiv de Völkerrechts*, 1957.

²² This statement, together with the various reservations made at the time, is to be found in Wheeler-Bennett, *Documents on International Affairs* 1923, 1929, pp. 1-14; see also Toynbee, *Annual Survey of International Affairs* 1928, 1929, pp. 10-26 and 36-47.

statesmen, the military preparations of the Arab States and the inability—or unwillingness—of the United Nations to deal with the situation, all contribute to a clear basis for Israeli fears and indicate grounds for action.

In addition, it sometimes happens that aggression and threats of aggression need to be dealt with outside the United Nations. This is the underlying basis of the Eisenhower Doctrine for the Middle East, and in March 1957 the President's representative "selling" this Plan stated that the plan was already in operation: "There is no waiting. Any country in this region attacked by international communism would receive support. Where other forms of aggression are concerned, the American attitude was that it should be dealt with by the United Nations."²³ If the United States is entitled to assume that Communist aggression, as defined by the United States, in the Middle East is a threat to American security, enabling it to resort to its inherent right of self-defence, then it cannot complain if Israel regards the guerrilla activities of Arabs and the other phenomena referred to as constituting similar threats justifying the resort to anticipatory self-defence; nor if France and the United Kingdom regard the security of the Suez Canal as essential to their national security, for they too possess the same rights as the United States. Not only are the members of the United Nations entitled to equal rights, but in this situation the United Nations as such seems to a great extent to have abdicated its functions to the United States and its representatives in Cairo.

The United Kingdom and France were fully entitled to come to the collective self-defence of Israel, and the fact that their action was not so described does not invalidate it, nor alter its character as such.²⁴ Furthermore, both countries had grounds to exercise their right of self-defence in protection and vindication of their treaty rights to insulate, even by military measures, the Suez Canal after the rejection of their ultimatum by Egypt, particularly as the United Nations had shown itself so inept at dealing with Egyptian threats to the

²³ *The Times*, April 1, 1957.

²⁴ Letter from Dr. Schwarzenberger to *The Times*, November 8, 1956.

Canal consequent upon the nationalisation of the Company. The fact that the military operations resulted in the Canal becoming completely blocked—and it may well be argued that the Egyptian measures blocking the Canal were further breaches of the Convention, for the Anglo-French action against which these measures were taken was intended to protect the international status of the Canal and not to threaten the security of Egypt—does not alter the legal basis of the steps taken. Furthermore, at the time of the British ratification of the Kellogg Pact it was made clear that the British Government reserved to itself freedom of action where certain unnamed regions of the world were concerned. These regions were considered as being essential to imperial security, and a contrast was drawn with the Monroe Doctrine. It was generally understood that this reservation referred particularly, if not exclusively, to Egypt,²⁵ while in 1922 Egypt herself recognised the Canal's significance for Britain. France, too, had reserved the right of legitimate defence in 1928, and in her case there was ample ground to move against Egypt in view of Egyptian assistance, by way of armaments, propaganda and sanctuary, to rebels in French territories in North Africa. There is no reason why, in exercise of her legitimate right of self-defence, France should not take advantage of any incident, such as the Israeli move against Egypt, which she might consider as facilitating her exercise of this right.

Much has been said, in connection with the timing of the Anglo-French military operations, about collusion with Israel.^{25a} In fact such accusations are completely irrelevant, at least from a legal point of view; from a political point of view, far from such collusion being deplorable, there is much to be said for the three Powers having co-ordinated their operations. However, if each of them possessed, as it has been suggested they did, legitimate grounds for taking measures of self-defence against Egypt, the fact that they planned their operations together, or jointly discussed and timed the commencement

²⁵ *Loc. cit.*, n. 22 above. On the British Monroe Doctrine, see Schwarzenberger, *Power Politics*, 1951, pp. 46–48 and 506–507.

^{25a} See, e.g., Bromberger and Bromberger, *Secrets of Suez*, 1957.

of their measures of self-defence, would in no way alter the legal validity of these measures.

It should also be borne in mind that Article 8, para. 3, of the Constantinople Convention which was left unamended by the Anglo-French Declaration of 1904 respecting Egypt and Morocco, gave to the diplomatic representatives of the signatories the right to call upon Egypt to ensure the dispersion of any assembly on either bank of the Canal, the object of which might be to interfere with the liberty and entire security of navigation. Given the premise that Egypt had no right of self-defence against Israel, this is all the two Powers had done in their ultimatum, to which they had added the warning that if Israel and Egypt did not take the necessary measures, they would be compelled to do so themselves. In addition, the resolutions of the United Nations merely deplored the resort to armed force contrary to the principles of the United Nations. One of the principles of the United Nations is the maintenance and preservation of international justice as well as of international law and peace. As Lord Strang has pointed out, if the Anglo-French action is tested "against passages from the United Nations Charter, taken from their context, subordinating the claims of justice to the claims of peace, it is easy to condemn them. But, . . . in our deeply divided world-society international law is not, and cannot be, a regulative force in the realm of world power politics, and approval or disapproval of intervention in Egypt cannot depend on a judgment in the light of international law, but must be decided on the levels of either interest or moral duty."²⁶

HUNGARY AND KASHMIR

As was perhaps to be expected, the Afro-Asian group in the United Nations was wholeheartedly in support of Egypt and was not prepared even to concede, at least at the beginning of the operations, that Israel, Britain or France might have any case. The leadership of the group in its pro-Egyptian stand was assumed by India.

²⁶ *Sunday Times*, November 18, 1956.

Indian spokesmen went out of their way to emphasise the limited scope of the United Nations Emergency Force. They insisted that the Force could only have a police and defensive role and was on no account to take any offensive action. So much was this the case that a member of the Force who fired at an Egyptian whom he suspected of loitering with intent to loot the Force's supplies, and who failed to respond to a challenge, was subjected to disciplinary action. The Indian representative also supported the Egyptian contention that the Emergency Force could only be present in a member State's territory so long as that State acquiesced and could, in view of this, only be made up of personnel from States which were acceptable to the territorial State concerned. This interpretation was one in which the Secretary-General of the United Nations appeared to acquiesce. As a result of it, the Canadian contingent originally offered was declined, even though it was the largest, the best equipped and one of the first made available. The "face" of the United Nations was saved by suggesting that this was for the security of the Canadians and the success of the Force, since Canadian troops wore British pattern uniforms and embittered Egyptian nationals would not know that they were Canadian and not British. Nobody seems to have pointed out that Norwegian and Indian troops wear similar uniforms.

The implications of this Indian attitude soon became clear on a larger scale.

About a fortnight before the commencement of military operations in the Middle East there had been a successful anti-Soviet revolt in Poland which had resulted in a loosening of the Soviet bond. This success proved somewhat infectious and had repercussions in Hungary. From October 21, 1956, demonstrations of an anti-Soviet and anti-Government nature were taking place in Budapest calling for the return of the deposed Communist leader Nagy as Premier and a democratisation of the régime. On October 24 it was announced that Nagy had become Premier and had invoked the Warsaw Treaty of 1955 appealing for support of Soviet troops to help restore order.

According to the text of this Treaty²⁷ there is no provision for the troops of one party to come to the assistance of another. There is a pledge not to use threats of force and to settle all problems peaceably, consulting "whenever, in the opinion of any one of them, a threat of armed attack on one or more of the Parties has arisen, in order to ensure joint defence and the maintenance of international peace and security," and provision for resort to collective self-defence in the event of an armed attack "by any State or group of States." Finally, there is a pledge of adherence "to the principle of respect for the independence and sovereignty of the others and non-interference in their internal affairs." It is, therefore, only by reason of most extensive interpretation that it is possible to find in this Pact the basis of the Hungarian Government's request for support from the Soviet Union, unless it be based solely on the need to protect Soviet forces already in Hungary. On the other hand, there is no reason why a legitimate Government should not call upon friendly States which have recognised it to lend it aid in seeking to crush any armed rebellion directed against itself, which is what happened in the Greek Civil War at the end of the Second World War. Within a matter of hours Soviet troops were reported to be in action in Budapest and other parts of Hungary, but on October 25 both Nagy and Kadar, First Secretary of the Hungarian Workers' Party (Communists), announced that Soviet troops would be withdrawn as soon as order was restored. Nagy then formed a more widely representative Government and Soviet troops were reported to have begun to evacuate Budapest, while Nagy announced his intention to open negotiations for the total evacuation of Soviet troops from Hungary. On October 28 the three Western Powers sought to indict the Soviet Union before the Security Council for repressing the rights of the Hungarian people by military action. Despite the receipt of a protest from the Hungarian Government that the events of October 22 were of exclusive domestic concern,

²⁷ 49 *American Journal of International Law*, 1955, Supplement, p. 194, reproducing *New Times*, (Moscow), No. 21, May 21, 1955, Supp. p. 65.

the Security Council, with only the Soviet Union opposing and Yugoslavia abstaining, inscribed this item upon its agenda.²⁸

While events were running their course in Budapest, Israeli troops invaded Sinai, and on the date of the Anglo-French ultimatum it was announced that Soviet troops were withdrawing from Budapest. The same day the Soviet Government announced that it was proceeding to discuss with its allies the whole question of Soviet troops within their territories and had given orders to the Soviet Commander in Budapest to withdraw his troops as soon as the Hungarian authorities desired it. It also announced its willingness to start discussions with the Hungarian Government as to the future position of Soviet troops in Hungary. The following day Nagy announced that Budapest had been evacuated and that he favoured an internationally guaranteed neutral status similar to that of Austria for Hungary. On November 1, while the Soviet Union was fulminating against British, French and Israeli activities against Egypt, Nagy announced that Hungary had renounced the Warsaw Pact and declared her neutrality. He also stated that Soviet troops were pouring across the frontier and asked the Secretary-General to place the issue on the agenda of the General Assembly, then busily discussing the Middle East. After this events moved apace.

Concomitant with further appeals to the Assembly by Nagy, the Western Powers saw their proposal that the Security Council discuss the situation vetoed by the Soviet Union. When senior Hungarian officers went to sign the agreement that had been negotiated by the Nagy Government for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, they were kidnapped by the Soviet authorities. On November 4, immediately after announcing that Russian forces were attacking Budapest, Nagy was displaced by Kadar who formed a new Government out of Budapest under Soviet protection and announced the end of Hungarian neutrality. Mr. Nagy took refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy. After receiving a safe conduct, he left the Embassy, only to be deported by the Russians to Rumania.

²⁸ A useful summary of these events is to be found in Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The World Today*, Vol. 12, December 1956, Vol. 13, January 1957.

After the Soviet Union had again vetoed Security Council discussion of the situation, the General Assembly passed a resolution calling on the Russians to evacuate Hungary. On this issue there was far less support for the resolution than there had been for those calling for the withdrawal of the Western Powers and Israel from Egypt. The Indian Prime Minister, for example, refused to condemn the Russians, announcing that he had received a message from Russia explaining everything to him. Eventually, however, after the Soviet Union indicated that it had returned its forces to Hungary at the request of the Kadar Government to help suppress a "fascist and criminal" revolution, even India became critical. Attempts to persuade the Assembly to raise an expeditionary force to go to Hungary were completely unsuccessful, especially as the Hungarian "Government" refused any co-operation with the United Nations and maintained that the Soviet troops were assisting it in restoring order and preserving Hungarian democracy from fascist reactionaries.

After long debate the General Assembly confirmed its resolution calling for the withdrawal of Soviet troops—the Indian Government expressed the opinion that foreign troops should never be present in friendly territory. It also agreed that the Secretary-General should visit Hungary to make an on-the-spot investigation. As with the Middle East Force, so with the Secretary-General. Although Hungary was a member of the United Nations—the General Assembly found little difficulty in recognising the credentials of the Kadar representative—she did not concede that it was obligatory upon her to admit Mr. Hammarskjöld, and the General Assembly did not insist or suggest what action should be taken to overcome Hungarian recalcitrance. This might appear surprising as the General Assembly was at that very time concerned with discussing all sorts of threats to compel Israel to agree to evacuate the territory she had occupied and which in the past had been used as bases for Egyptian raiding parties against her territory. Not until April 1957 did Hungary express readiness to admit the Secretary-General.

Reference was made in connection with the British campaign against Egypt to a British Monroe Doctrine. The Soviet Union, too, has its Monroe Doctrine and this has received some measure of recognition from both Great Britain and the United States. At the Moscow Conference between Churchill and Stalin in 1944, the former suggested that influence in the Balkans be divided between the Soviet Union and the Anglo-American alliance as follows: Greece: 90 per cent. Anglo-American, 10 per cent. Russian; Rumania: 90 per cent. Russian, 10 per cent. Anglo-American; Bulgaria: 75 per cent. Russian, 25 per cent. Anglo-American; Yugoslavia and Hungary: 50 per cent. to 50 per cent.²⁹—Stettinius gives the division for Hungary as the same for Bulgaria and Rumania, namely, either 75 per cent. to 25 per cent. or 80 per cent. to 20 per cent. in favour of the Soviet Union³⁰—and Churchill makes no reference to any opposition from the United States. Although Cordell Hull comments with some disfavour upon this agreement in his *Memoirs*,³¹ he gives no hint of any protest ever having been sent to either Britain or the Soviet Union. The attitude consistently adopted by the Soviet Union towards the election of non-permanent members of the Security Council, an attitude in which she has equally consistently received British support, is further evidence of the existence of a Soviet Monroe Doctrine concerning Eastern Europe.³²

India, having been most forthcoming in her criticism of anti-Egyptian activities and not nearly so forthcoming where the Hungarian situation was concerned, now decided to take a more active role where her attitude to the United Nations was concerned. Ever since the establishment of India and Pakistan there had been differences between the two over Kashmir, and the problem had first come before the United Nations in 1948. In this issue the United Nations sought to get the two sides to agree to peaceful settlement and to accept

²⁹ W. S. Churchill, *The Second World War*, Vol. 6, "Triumph and Tragedy," 1954, p. 198.

³⁰ *Roosevelt and the Russians*, 1950, p. 20.

³¹ Vol. 2, 1948, p. 1458.

³² See L. C. Green, "The Security Council in Retreat," *this Year Book*, 1954, p. 95, at pp. 106 *et seq.*

a plebiscite to decide the final destination of the State. After many abortive attempts to settle the dispute it appeared that the Security Council was satisfied with the preservation of the *status quo*, even though this situation was not satisfactory to either of the disputants.

Matters came to a more serious head again in 1957. It was announced that the Kashmir Constituent Assembly, without paying any regard to Security Council resolutions and without waiting for any plebiscite, intended acceding to India completely and finally so that Kashmir would become a constituent part of the Indian Union. Pakistan immediately referred the matter to the Security Council and the same day as the Council, with the Soviet Union abstaining, called for no action to be taken, the Constituent Assembly gave effect to its intention. It has been asserted in Pakistan that the Soviet abstention shows an intention by the Soviet Union to reciprocate India's attitude over Hungary and not embarrass her by a binding Security Council decision condemning the proposed action. In fact, it seems far more likely that the abstention by the Soviet Union, instead of a veto, was intended to prevent the matter being referred to the General Assembly in accordance with the Acheson Plan, especially as there was no guarantee that in the then existing temper of the Assembly India would have seen its policies vindicated. In so far as India is concerned, there has been a tendency to indulge in the specious argument that at the time of the resolution it was only Kashmir that was passing legislation to liquidate itself and that India, as a democratic State abstaining from interference in the affairs of Kashmir, could do nothing to prevent such action. She also pointed out that at that time there was no similar legislation pending before the Indian Parliament. This is to ignore what the world knows, namely, that the Kashmir Government on all matters of major policy is a mere reflection of the Indian Government and that, *de facto* and regardless of the legal position, Kashmir has long been in the position of part of India—a fact that Bulganin and Khrushchev recognised during their Indian trip in 1956.

In an attempt to settle the Kashmir issue the Security

Council called for supervised elections and there was even a suggestion of an expeditionary force to keep the peace between India and Pakistan. The Indian position with regard to the dispatch of the United Nations Middle East Force now came home to roost and it became obvious why India had asserted with such finality that troops, even United Nations troops, could only be present on a member's territory with that member's consent. She made it perfectly clear that on no account would she consent to such action and would, in fact, treat any foreign troops as invaders whose coming must be opposed by arms. Finally, the Security Council agreed to send its Chairman on a personal fact-finding and reporting mission and during his visit he received the full co-operation of both parties.

GUATEMALA

The events of 1956-1957 were not the only occasions on which the United Nations showed varying standards when dealing with matters of a regional character. In April 1953 the extreme left wing, perhaps Communist, Government of Guatemala had informed the United Nations that it feared interference in its internal affairs from outside sources, and in June 1954 it called for a meeting of the Security Council to consider aggression against itself by Honduras and Nicaragua by means of dissident Guatemalan rebel bands supported by aircraft supplied by the United States. Honduras and Nicaragua denied these accusations, although they maintained that there was a major revolt going on in Guatemala, which was an outpost of international Communism aimed at the destruction of the inter-American system.³³ When the emergency meeting of the Council took place it was faced with a resolution stating that the proper place for this matter to be discussed was the Organisation of American States, which

³³ For the background of the Guatemalan question see U.S. State Dept., "Penetration of the Political Institutions of Guatemala by the international Communist Movement: Threat to the Peace and Security of America and to the Sovereignty and Political Independence of Guatemala," 1954; H.M.S.O., "Report on Events leading up to and arising out of the Change of Régime in Guatemala 1954." Cmd. 9277 (1954); Thomas & Thomas, *Non-Intervention: The Law and its Import in the Americas*, 1956, pp. 161-168.

should inform the Security Council as to what measures were taken. This resolution was vetoed by the Soviet Union on the ground that the maintenance of peace and the duty to deal with aggression lay with the Security Council. This led the United States delegate to declare that by its action the Soviet Union had disclosed its designs on the western hemisphere, and he went on: "I say to the representative of the Soviet Union 'Stay out of this hemisphere and do not try to start your plans and your conspiracies over here.' " The implication of this statement is that whenever a dispute arises concerning an American State the attitude of the United States will be that it is beyond the competence of the United Nations, for there it will always be subject to Soviet "interference." It should therefore be dealt with by the local regional organisation, which is in fact nothing but a twentieth-century emanation of the Monroe Doctrine.

The resolution of the Security Council merely called for the cessation of all action likely to cause bloodshed and requested all members of the United Nations to abstain from supporting such action. By the time the Council again met at Guatemala's request the Organisation of American States had set up a commission of inquiry to investigate the situation and the allegations. Guatemala denied the competency of the Organisation, especially as it had not ratified the constituent instruments and still contended that it was a victim of aggression. Nevertheless, the Security Council declined to inscribe the Guatemalan complaint upon its agenda on the ground that the Council should await the decision of the Organisation. This was on June 25, and on June 30 truce talks were opened in Guatemala. Two days later it was announced that there was no longer any controversy between Guatemala and any of her neighbours. On July 8 the rebel leader became head of the State, having four days before been a guest at the Fourth of July celebrations at the United States Embassy.³⁴ The impression of the *Manchester Guardian* correspondent in Washington was that "in Washington the first rough impression is that a revolt supported by the United States has

³⁴ *Manchester Guardian*, July 6, 1954.

triumphed and that a régime approved by the Soviet Union has collapsed.”³⁵

The rightness of the attitude adopted by the American States in this issue is at least open to argument. It is true that the Charter recognises the importance of regional arrangements. Chapter VIII provides that the members of such arrangements shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through the medium of such arrangements before referring them to the Security Council, and requires the Security Council to encourage pacific settlement by such methods either on the initiative of the States concerned or by reference from the Council. Article 52 goes on to preserve unimpaired the application of Articles 34 and 35 of the Charter. These Articles authorise the Security Council to investigate any situation or dispute which might give rise to a dispute or lead to international friction in order to determine whether the maintenance of international peace and security are endangered, and they permit any State to bring such controversies before either the Council or the General Assembly. Articles 34, 35 and 52 relate to the pacific settlement of disputes, but do not deal in any way with the problem of enforcement measures which are normally involved when there has been an act of aggression.

By Article 24 of the Charter the Security Council possesses primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and Chapter VII provides for the action to be taken by the Council to deal with threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. Article 53 deals with enforcement measures and regional arrangements. It enjoins the Security Council, where appropriate, to utilise such regional arrangements for enforcement action under its authority. It clearly stipulates, however, that, with the exception of such action against a former enemy State, “no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements, or by regional agencies, without the authorisation of the Security Council.”

When Guatemala brought its complaint before the Security

³⁵ *Ibid.*, July 5, 1954.

Council it did not call upon that body to recommend measures for the pacific settlement of international disputes, which would have involved making use of the processes of the Organisation of American States. Instead, Guatemala specifically referred to the commission of acts of aggression and requested the Council to take the measures necessary to prevent the disruption of peace and international security and to put a stop to the aggression already in progress. Guatemala further pointed out that the issue involved no dispute which was amenable to pacific settlement, but a straightforward act of aggression and that she had informed the Peace Committee of the Organisation of American States of the invasion, asking that no action be taken by this body until the Security Council had acted. Guatemala further pointed out that although she was a member of the Organisation of American States, in view of the fact that she had not ratified the Treaty of Rio or that of Bogotá, she was under no obligation to resort to the regional agencies established thereby, and that the Security Council alone was competent.

Even if one does not accept the Guatemalan contention that only the United Nations could deal with its complaint, or whether one accepts that the Organisation of American States was also competent, there is much to be said for the argument that the Security Council somewhat over-readily surrendered the issue to the regional agency, without even troubling to ascertain whether it was a dispute amenable to pacific settlement and so of the type which the Charter recognised as being properly dealt with by such an agency, or whether an act of aggression involving enforcement measures was in issue. If it were the latter, the regional agencies could only take action at the request of the Security Council. There seems little doubt that if the matter had been left to the Security Council any attempt to refer it to the Organisation of American States would have been vetoed by the Soviet Union, while any attempt to resort to enforcement measures against Honduras or Nicaragua would almost certainly have been vetoed by the United States. In order to enable something positive to be done—even though it meant incidentally recognising United States and not United

Nations hegemony in the area—the Security Council decided to leave the question for settlement with the only Organisation that might have been able to achieve a settlement.

THE TWO STANDARDS

From what has been said in connection with the cases discussed it would appear that the United Nations has now adopted two different standards when dealing with different groups of Powers. In the first place, it is quite clear that when an allegation has been lodged against a State which is normally law-abiding, the organised “town-meeting of the world,” realising that its opinion may carry some weight, is much more ready to stand on its dignity, to pass condemnatory resolutions and to threaten various types of sanction if compliance is not forthcoming. At the same time, as the position of Israel indicates, the Organisation is not very willing to offer guarantees or pledges to a “formal” wrongdoer, even though such pledges are required to forestall a recurrence of the situation which caused the original wrongdoing. In fact, in this connection Mr. Dulles suggested to Israel that as a moral, law-abiding member of the United Nations she should comply with resolutions and show her faith in her friends, even though when the time came to redeem the pledge, as when a United States tanker on charter to Israel passed through the Gulf of Akaba, it became clear that the “friends” were not quite sure what was the price of their friendship.

In the same way, when Britain and France have been concerned with Egyptian unwillingness to recognise the rights of British and French ships to pass through the Suez Canal, President Eisenhower has tended to say that there was no evidence that President Nasser did not intend to allow this, nor has he been willing to say that he expected the same moral conduct from Egypt as from others.³⁶ Eventually in April 1957 even the United States, to whom the United Nations seems to have abdicated all representative rights in connection with Egypt, agreed that Egypt could not be talked to and

³⁶ *The Times*, April 4, 1957.

recognised that the matter should once again be returned to the Security Council for consideration, together with new Egyptian proposals ³⁷ deviating from the agreed Six Principles. The past history of Security Council treatment of the matter lends no promise of hope for the future.

To expect law-abiding States to carry out their obligations and to rely on their friends for observance of their rights is only possible when the friends recognise that there may be different assessments of the significance of rights and of vital interests. Also, it is absolutely essential that the friends demonstrate that their pledges may in fact be relied upon. It must be remembered by all members of the United Nations, and this is particularly true of the small irresponsibles who make up the majority of the United Nations and who can effectively prevent any two-thirds majority being obtained in the General Assembly, that the United Nations exists for the security of all and the vindication of international justice, and that the latter sometimes requires an apparent wrongdoer being given the benefit of the doubt in order to ascertain the background which compelled a normally observant State to resort to such extreme action.

Another factor that must be recognised is the role of the United Nations in power politics and its position as a plaything between the two colossi of the modern world. When action is taken by a State, even a *soi-disant* Great Power, which will not regard threats against it as tantamount to a declaration of the third world war and against which the members of the United Nations, particularly the United States or the Soviet Union, secure in this knowledge, are prepared to move, then the United Nations can appear to be effective. When, however, it is the vital interests of one of the Big Two that are affected, the situation is very different. The attitude adopted by the United Nations, and by the United States which appears to have become the moral mouthpiece of the United Nations since the events in Egypt, towards Hungary and the Soviet intervention there merely emphasises this point. Where the United States is concerned, care for the Monroe Doctrine might

³⁷ *Ibid.*, April 25, 1957.

also contribute to her accepting the realities of the Soviet Monroe Doctrine, when she will not afford the same respect to the British Monroe Doctrine.³⁸ With the latter, too, it must be remembered that this operates in an area where United States policy is directed to weaning the Arab States away from Soviet inducements and she is therefore unwilling to do or tolerate anything which might make this task more difficult. This is perhaps also partly responsible for Israel finding herself still upon a limb where United Nations guarantees are concerned, long after she has complied with United Nations resolutions, particularly when her enemies are not quite so observant.

In the same way, India has acquired leadership of the Afro-Asian group of States which, together with the Soviet group, can almost produce the votes necessary to prevent action in the General Assembly. For this reason, India must be treated gently and not criticised too fervently and her two-level morality—one for herself, and another for the rest of the world, particularly the non-Soviet part thereof—must be acquiesced in.

The events since the middle of 1956 have enabled a number of States, including some whose responsibility for the maintenance of world order demands a higher concept of duty, to abandon their own searches for a policy. It is so much easier to express confidence, belief and faith in the United Nations, even if it is only equipped with a nominal Armed Force on an emergency footing. The man in the street tends to be blinded by such lofty idealism without realising that, as such, the United Nations has no policy. The policy of the United Nations is nothing but the policy of the numerical majority of its members. If the more responsible members have no policy, one cannot complain that the others are irresponsible. Such a situation merely means that the United Nations has no policy either, and to leave matters to the United Nations is to make confusion worse confounded. Even countries which are most verbose about the responsibilities of the United

³⁸ On this aspect, see further Schwarzenberger, "The Forms of Sovereignty," 10 *Current Legal Problems* 1957.

Nations are not quite so verbose where their own vital interests are concerned. The Soviet Union and its satellites maintain that whatever happens within their part of Europe is domestic in character. The United States has announced that only non-Communist aggressions are, in so far as they are concerned, matters of interest to the United Nations, while India argues that since Kashmir has become part of India the question whether she could legally so become is in fact a domestic question concerning India alone. This attitude was maintained by India to the report to the Security Council by Herr Jarring on his fact-finding mission. This report is likely to go on record as yet another attempt by those from whom India demands one standard of behaviour to deal with a problem concerning herself to which India applies a very different standard.

The same sort of double standard was demonstrated in the further retreat from Egypt in May 1957. Egypt's proposals for the Canal were far from satisfying the six principles. Nevertheless, the Suez Canal Users' Association accepted the factual situation and everybody resumed use of the Canal, while the Security Council decided to do nothing about it. One is tempted to parody Mr. Noel Coward, and say that whoever one wishes to criticise—"Don't be beastly to the Egyptians."

Mr. Menzies, the Prime Minister of Australia, has shown the double standard in its true light: "[Some] apparently thought it good policy to take the dispute over the future of the Suez Canal to the United Nations; but that was not a policy at all. It was sheer abdication of leadership to leave the situation to the United Nations. That great truth had been overlooked, with results that had deeply weakened the position of Britain and France. . . . The United Nations had made Israel a victim of a double standard on belligerent rights. Egypt had sought to justify her denial of passage through the Canal to Israel ships on the ground that she was at war and had belligerent rights, and thus she had been in contempt of the United Nations for six years. Israel, having accepted the proposition that she was at war with Egypt, had attacked, but had been ordered out of the Gaza strip and the Sinai peninsula, and Egypt still refused to allow her ships safe

passage. He could not believe that kind of thing was a triumph of international justice. The futility of the United Nations in Hungary and its swift action in Suez must have convinced Russia that it had nothing to fear from the United Nations and might continue to divide and conquer.”³⁹ With this should be contrasted the comments of Assistant-Secretary of State Wilcox concerning the different attitudes towards Hungary and the Middle East for he apparently finds nothing wrong in applying a double standard: “Any consideration of a double standard [in this connection] must be weighed on the positive side of General Assembly accomplishment. For any measure that reveals the methods of despotism and suppression of freedom serves the cause both of the oppressed and of the free who wish to remain free.”⁴⁰

Those States which now employ or condone this double standard with enthusiasm should remember that a time might come when the cohorts in the United Nations return the compliment.

³⁹ *The Times*, April 10, 1957.

⁴⁰ U S Embassy (London), *Daily Wireless Bulletin*, April 12, 1957

THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC

By

W. BURMEISTER

ONE of the reasons why, during 1956, the centre of the cold war shifted from Europe to the Middle East was the fact that the Soviet leaders had evidently concluded that the Middle East offered infinitely greater possibilities of political penetration. There Britain and France could be attacked and weakened simply by Soviet encouragement of existing nationalist movements. In the Middle East, as distinct from Europe, neither Britain nor France could count on energetic support by the United States since the interests of the United States in the area are not nearly as vital as those of her European allies. Moreover, American public opinion, nurtured in a tradition of anti-colonialism, presented an obstacle to any supporting action by the Administration, particularly while there was a new Presidential election pending. Above all, from the Soviet point of view, tension in the Middle East had the great advantage of diverting a maximum of strength from Britain and France with a minimum of risk or expense to the Soviet Union.

The choice of this new theatre of operations became almost inevitable once it was clear that, for the time being, Communism could not hope to make further decisive gains in Europe. Although the Communists of France and Italy remained strong and well organised, they had no early prospect of gaining political power. On the contrary, they had been weakened and to some extent demoralised when the Stalin cult which had occupied such a central place in their domestic propaganda was suddenly abandoned and discredited by its originators. The weakening of the Communist party dictatorship in Poland and the ruthless intervention of the Russian

army to crush the Hungarian revolution caused further division of opinion among the members of the Communist parties in Western Europe so that, by the end of the year, they had become quite unfit—temporarily, at least—to exercise their traditional function of extending Soviet power. But perhaps the greatest obstacle to the Communist penetration of Western Europe remained the consolidation of the German Federal Republic.

The Soviet rulers must have been reluctant to postpone the attempt to draw the whole of Germany into their orbit. They cannot, of course, afford to abandon it. Without Germany they cannot hope to dominate Europe. Without Germany, discontent, unrest, revolt in the satellite countries of Eastern Europe will continue to present a threat to Soviet power. So far the Soviet rulers have been able to contain that threat, but events have forced them to give up the pretence that the Communist régimes there represent the will of their peoples.

In Germany, too, Communist hopes have been disappointed. Both the Communists and their half-brothers, the neo-Nazis, have been reduced to insignificance. In fact it can be argued that the German economic miracle has been accompanied by a political one.¹ These two political groups, which between them represented a majority of the electorate in the last years of the Weimar Republic, have almost disappeared. Even before their political organisations were banned, they had been reduced to utter insignificance in free elections. When in 1956 the German Communist party was finally outlawed by a decision of the Constitutional Court, acting on the principle of the Basic Law that freedom is not to be granted to the enemies of freedom, the judgment hardly excited any interest. Only the puppet rulers of the Soviet Zone, whose regime would be swept away by free elections, claimed to be horrified by this denial of the freedom to undermine democratic institutions. Inside the Federal Republic the measure was criticised because it was considered unnecessary and because the ban prevented

¹ Cf. "*Ist der Nationalsozialismus tot?*" by Prof. M. Freund in *Die Gegenwart*, August 11, 1956.

the German Communists from revealing themselves as the tools of their Moscow masters. Perhaps the most decisive argument against prohibition was that the protection of a democracy must ultimately be based on the determination of its citizens to uphold their freedom, and that too pronounced a tendency to resort to the courts may easily obscure this fact.

DELAYS IN THE DEFENCE EFFORT

Compared with the speed and energy of German actions in other fields, the performance of the Federal Government in implementing its defence obligations has been painfully slow and disappointing. Some of the reasons are obvious. The nation as a whole is quite content to rely for its defence on its allies who were so recently converted to the idea that German armed forces were positively desirable. It so happens that this attitude also serves the immediate material interests of Germany since it enables her to devote all her resources in manpower and finance to the strengthening of her economy and her foreign trade. However, in view of the unequal distribution of the financial burdens of defence among the NATO countries, Germany has agreed in principle to pay support costs to Britain for the British forces stationed in Germany. Then there are the technical and ideological arguments or after-thoughts. It is frequently argued in Germany that in an age of atomic warfare the presence or absence of some German divisions can make very little difference. This idea is, of course, based on the assumption that similar arguments cannot, or will not, be used by Britain or the United States to abolish their own land forces. A second line of argument, and a sounder one, is that all armies are now being reorganised as a result of the development of new weapons and new methods of warfare and that it would therefore be unwise for Germany to take any definite decisions on the organisation of her armed forces until it is clear what other nations have decided to do. The Social Democrats are opposed to conscription, particularly while Germany remains divided. They view with apprehension the possible influence of German armed forces on the future conduct

of domestic and foreign policy. They also hope that, if they come to power after the General Election in the autumn of 1957, they might induce the Great Powers to agree to a gradual withdrawal of their forces from German territory—east and west—or, at any rate, to the establishment of a demilitarised zone. Some such agreement, they believe, is a condition of reunification. And reunification, in their view, would not be compatible with Germany's continued membership in NATO whose place would eventually be taken by a European security system. It is a view by no means confined to Social Democrats. And, as elsewhere, young people in general do not display any conspicuous enthusiasm for military service at a time when civilian life offers them much better chances. Hence they are glad to hear the arguments of experts who show that conscript armies are now out of date and that only professional soldiers—or a large element of them—can make the armies of the future effective. There is also some measure of conscientious objection to service in the armed forces, based not merely on pacifist arguments, but also on the view that the frontiers and institutions of the Federal Republic are provisional, because Germany is still divided, and that there is therefore no clearly defined Fatherland to defend. The Vatican must have considered this particular kind of reservation important since the Pope's Christmas message included a special paragraph condemning this kind of reasoning.² Some, or all, of these aversions might have been overcome by the establishment of a European Defence Community since the idea of European co-operation made, and still makes, a very real appeal to Germans. This was frustrated by the rejection of EDC in the French National Assembly.

The action, or inaction, of the Federal Government must be seen against this background. Since conscription is not

² "If, therefore, a body representative of the people and a Government—both having been chosen by free elections—in a moment of extreme danger decide, by legitimate instruments of internal and external policy, on defensive precautions, and carry out the plans which they consider necessary, they do not act immorally. So that a Catholic citizen cannot invoke his own conscience in order to refuse to serve and fulfil those duties the law imposes."

The Manchester Guardian,
December 24, 1956

popular and since new federal elections will soon be at hand, the Government sometimes gave the impression that the more energetically they worked for the establishment of the armed forces, the longer the actual call-up would have to be delayed. However, by April, 1957, the first 10,000 national service recruits had been called up, in addition to the 85,000 long-service volunteers who had previously been accepted. Thus the Federal Republic was expected to have five divisions under arms by the end of 1957 and seven divisions by April, 1958.

Similar uncertainty prevails about the equipment of the German forces. At one time, hopes were held out that a great deal of this equipment, particularly armour and fighters, would be ordered from Britain, but towards the end of 1956 it was decided that, if possible, the sources of supply should be beyond the range of Soviet bombers—a decision that gives North-American aircraft constructors a near monopoly.³ This decision, as was pointed out at the time, ignores the difficulties of such long-distance supplies when war is actually in progress. But whatever ultimate policy Germany might adopt in this matter, her armed forces—like her industry—will start with the advantage of having the most up-to-date equipment at their disposal. It is to be hoped that the spirit which will animate her soldiers will be similarly unencumbered by remnants of the past. In this particular field good use seems to have been made of the long period of preparation for planning the “inner structure” of the new forces—and observers in other countries will watch with interest, and possibly with profit, to see the practical application of these plans throughout the German armed forces.

GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

Although Dr. Adenauer has been under constant attack from the Opposition, there has been no change in his foreign policy of aligning Germany with the West. The differences between what he has done and what the Opposition would do if they were in office seemed more apparent than real, “The world is

³ *The Times*, December 20, 1956.

changing, but not Dr. Adenauer," Herr Ollenhauer said at the annual conference of the Social Democratic party in July, 1956. He pleaded for a German approach to the four Powers so as to secure reunification. But this, he argued, would only be possible after some fundamental changes in international affairs. A European security system, with a united Germany as a member, should be the object. Like many other Germans, Herr Ollenhauer evidently assumed that, as a result of the "thaw," the Russian position on German reunification had changed and that they no longer maintained the adamant attitude which had brought failure to the Geneva Conferences.

The Social Democrats, and some other oppositional groups on their Right, see the division of Germany as a consequence, or at least as an aspect, of the division of Europe between Russia and America. In their view, Germany can be reunited only if that division can be overcome. But the hopes they attached to the "summit" conference at Geneva in July, 1955, were doomed to be disappointed. The Soviet Government made it perfectly clear that any withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Germany would be conditional on keeping intact the apparatus of Communist penetration which they have built up in their zone of occupation. Mr. Bulganin stated that the "remilitarisation" of Germany and her membership in NATO were decisive obstacles from the Russian point of view. A united Germany would not be permitted to enter into any alliances or military obligations. His most important point, however, was that there could be no "mechanical union" between the "two Germanies," but that they should gradually draw together. His words about "mechanical union" were meant to mask his refusal of free elections. These, he said, "should be considered at the proper time"—presumably when the East German Communists had "gradually" acquired sufficient control of the administrative apparatus to ensure satisfactory results in those elections. This point was emphasised by his further condition that there should be a security pact of all the European countries and the United States in which both the German Federal Republic (with 50 million

inhabitants) and the Soviet zone régime (with a population of 17 million) would participate "on a basis of equality." This implied that in both the provisional parliament and, above all, in the provisional government responsible for "gradually drawing together" the "two Germanies," the Communists would claim half the seats, with probably the Ministry of the Interior and the control of the police forces thrown in for good measure. In addition, Mr. Bulganin related the solution of the German problem to agreements about disarmament and the ban of atomic weapons, so that the Soviet Government would always be able to stop the process of reunification, if it did not go their way, by pleading lack of agreement on related questions.

Russian intentions became even clearer at the subsequent Foreign Ministers' Conference at Geneva in November, 1955. There the Western Powers proposed the conclusion of a European security pact concurrently with the conclusion of an agreement to reunify Germany in accordance with the "Eden Plan" put forward at the Berlin Conference in 1954. Among other things, the treaty envisaged the renunciation of the use of force, withholding support from aggressors, limitations of forces and armaments and the establishment of a zone on both sides of the lines of demarcation between a reunified Germany and the Eastern European countries. Inside this zone, levels for armed forces were to be specified and controlled so as to establish a military balance. In the Western part of the zone, a radar warning system was to be operated by the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European members of the treaty. A like system in the Eastern part was to be operated by the NATO members of the treaty.

The Soviet proposals provided for a European security treaty with the United States as a member and the People's Republic of China as an observer, the dissolution—after an interim period—of NATO, the West European Union and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. Both the Federal German Republic and the Soviet zone of Germany were to join the security pact on the basis of equal rights. The proposals contained no provision for free elections. When the question

of free all-German elections was discussed, Mr. Molotov declared that the East German workers would "never permit the disappearance of their Government and its achievements." This, as Mr. Macmillan pointed out, implied that there will be no choice of their future for the German people, even if NATO and the WEU were to be destroyed. They must continue to accept the odious system that has been imposed on Eastern Germany, or else continue to remain divided. "The brutal fact is that, for the Soviet Government, the only acceptable guarantee for the reunification of Germany is the Bolshevisation of the whole country." The failure of the conference caused deep disappointment throughout Germany.

At that stage, even the Opposition found it difficult to see an alternative to Dr. Adenauer's foreign policy. But then came the "thaw." The Soviet leaders were talking expansively of peaceful co-existence, and the moment had not yet arrived when all the "different roads to Socialism" were found to be covered by the guns of Russian tanks. By the end of 1956, however, the Opposition had reached the conclusion that the events in Poland and Hungary would not permit the Soviet Union to resurrect its former system of domination. This crisis in the Soviet *bloc* was seen to be equalled by the weakening of NATO as a result of the Anglo-French intervention in Suez. The critics of Dr. Adenauer therefore argued that this presented Germany with an opportunity for an independent foreign policy which must not be missed. The Social Democrats appeared to hope for a policy of neutrality, similar to that of Austria or Sweden. They still were a little vague in their arguments and seemed inclined to overlook that Germany belongs to a different order of magnitude.

The Chancellor's critics on the Right, who also advocate an independent foreign policy, have different aims in mind which they were still too cautious to formulate very clearly. They seemed to hope that they might be able to use the European idea for the purpose of advancing German power. From a position of independence they ultimately expect Germany to emerge as the leader of Europe, of yet another

“Third Force.” Hence they were never particularly disappointed with Britain’s aloofness in matters of European co-operation, whereas the “good” Europeans in Germany have always hoped for a more active British interest in these plans. If Britain, by associating with the Common Market, were to become more effectively linked with Western Europe, she would help to strengthen those forces in Germany which see Western unity as the best safeguard for their country’s future. However divided they are in other aspects of their policies, both the Federal Government and the Social Democratic Opposition are conscious of the fact that the idea of European unity has made an imaginative appeal to German youth greater perhaps than any other post-war development. It is difficult to say how reunification would affect the balance of internal forces. A great deal would of course depend on the circumstances in which it was achieved. The view is widely held in Germany that it would bring proportionately greater gains in voting strength to the Social Democrats than to the Christian Democrats, although the latter believe that East Germans, after their experience with the Soviet variety of “Socialism,” will gladly vote for the “free enterprise” policy of the CDU.*

THE ODER-NEISSE LINE

There is both in Britain and in Germany an abiding fear that the other Powers might come to an arrangement with the Soviet Union at the expense of its partner. People who advocate such a solution can be found in both countries, although their influence, during the period under review, was insignificant. The Soviet leaders have, of course, every reason for keeping these fears alive as an excellent and inexpensive method of dividing their opponents. The French Government, too, is keenly conscious of the risks involved in a revival, in changed circumstances, of the situation of 1939. M. Mollet, referring to his conversations in Moscow, said that “what they (the Soviet leaders) were after was a revival of the

* *Christlich Demokratische Union.*

German-Russian *entente*—a concept which is not just the memory of an historian.”⁵

It is obvious that no German Government today could hope for the uneasy balance of power between Germany and Russia which Hitler and Stalin maintained between 1939 and 1941. In the circumstances of today, a German-Russian *entente* could hardly result in more than a temporary partnership. Its outcome could only be either the subjection of Germany or a new conflict between the partners. As an object of policy it is likely to appear more attractive to the Russians than to the Germans. The incorporation of all Germany into the Soviet *bloc* would not merely restore the Russian domination of her East European satellites whose loyalty is not completely assured. It would virtually settle the fate of Continental Europe. Hence the Soviet insistence that the “German Democratic Republic” could only be united to the Federal Republic as a unit, *i.e.*, with its instruments of political infiltration kept intact. Hence also the vital British interests involved in the outcome of a political struggle in which Russia cannot only offer reunification but possibly even some concessions over the lost eastern territories.

The problem of the Oder-Neisse line always looms up immediately behind the question of German reunification. Dr. Adenauer's Government has consistently refused to accept the Oder-Neisse line as final and has based Germany's territorial claims on the frontiers that existed before Hitler's annexations. Although it is probable that a majority of Germans have privately resigned themselves to the loss of the eastern provinces, neither the Government nor the Opposition have been prepared to risk losing votes among the millions of refugees from these territories who have moved into the Federal Republic.

A notable exception was the statement by Herr von Brentano, the Foreign Minister, made during his visit to London in May, 1956. After saying that the German Government could be expected to renounce the German claim to these

⁵ *The Times*, July 12, 1956.

lost provinces, he added, " I think the German nation may one day have to take a decision whether to renounce these other territories if thereby the seventeen million Germans of the Soviet zone can be freed, or whether this should not be done in order to maintain our somewhat problematical title to these other territories."⁶ For this he was bitterly denounced by the refugee organisations which issued a statement saying: "The Minister is not entitled to trade German soil against other German soil, or one kind of justice against another. He is not even entitled to discuss the subject."⁷ In fact this pressure forced the Minister to " re-interpret " his declaration, although he had made it clear that he was speaking for himself.

Since Federal elections are due in 1957, German politicians have to take into account the emotional pressure maintained by the extremely well organised refugee groups. These organisations are always careful to point out that there can be no question of using force but—perhaps because their claims are not often spontaneously mentioned in Germany, either publicly or in private—they put them forward with an aggressive insistence which is not without political dangers. Nevertheless, a number of factors may combine to restore some freedom of negotiation to the German Government. The political influence of the refugee organisations is bound to decline as refugees get absorbed into their new environment, although the organisations claim considerable successes in keeping alive their desire to return to their former homes. In the spring of 1957, they began to step up their demands. Leaders of the B.H.E. Refugee party pressed for the return of the provinces east of the Oder-Neisse line formerly inhabited by Germans, including apparently Hitler's "last territorial demand," the Sudetenland.⁸ Some observers felt that the refugee leaders, in staking such claims for the other side of the moon, were simply trying to stem the decline in their electoral fortunes. Others feared that this might turn out to be quite an effective form of political blackmail since the

⁶ *The Times*, May 2, 1956.

⁷ *The Manchester Guardian*, May 4, 1956.

⁸ *The Manchester Guardian*, April 9, 1957.

other political parties would not want to risk losing refugee votes by opposing these claims.

The Opposition, too, have been pressing the Government to develop more initiative in the matter of a renewal of negotiations, though with the Soviet Union rather than with Poland. Another important factor was the change of government in Poland and the growing realisation that one way of helping the Poles to free themselves from Russian domination was to reassure them about their western frontiers. The Federal Government was urged to give up the shadow of this claim for the reality of pushing back Soviet power in Europe. Towards the end of 1956, Herr von Brentano said that "the Federal Republic was prepared for sacrifices in its relations with Poland in exchange for reunification. Negotiations between a free and united Germany and a free Poland could lead to satisfactory results for both countries."⁹ Direct negotiations would not be simple, since diplomatic relations between the two countries did not yet exist. In any case, the statement puts reunification before negotiations, and reunification cannot be achieved without Russian agreement. While the Russians will certainly have no desire to increase Polish feelings of independence, they may nevertheless have pondered the desirability of reaching some agreement with the Federal Republic while the Ulbricht régime in the Soviet Zone is still intact. With the fate of Hungary before their eyes and their memories of 1953, the East German workers are unlikely to attempt a rising. There can be no doubt that the overwhelming majority hate and despise the régime under which they have to live. The importance attached to the area of the "German Democratic Republic" by the Soviet Union is indicated by the fact that some twenty-two divisions of the Red Army are reported to be stationed there, by far the greatest concentration of Soviet troops outside the Soviet Union. If a rising were to occur in the Soviet Zone after the Bundeswehr has been established and possibly equipped with tactical nuclear weapons, it is difficult to imagine that these new German divisions would look on passively while the East Germans were being massacred

⁹ *The Times*, December 28, 1956.

by Soviet forces. And if not, would nice distinctions between limited and unlimited wars continue to be observed? Potentially therefore this remains one of the most dangerous areas of conflict.

The future of the Saar, which at one time threatened to cause serious friction between France and Germany, was settled by mutual agreement. Accordingly, on January 1, 1957, the Saar became politically part of the Federal Republic. Until the next Federal elections ten deputies elected from among the members of the Saar Diet will represent the *Land* in the Federal Parliament in Bonn. For a transitional period, which will end not later than December 31, 1959, the Saar will remain part of the French Customs and Currency area. The Saar mines will pass back once more into German (public) ownership, thus making Germany an even more powerful partner in the European Coal and Steel Community.

DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROSPECTS

At the end of 1956 the coalition parties, particularly the CDU, evidently hoped to retain their majority after the elections of 1957 because of the prosperity and the unprecedented strength of the German economic position. As Professor Erhard, the Minister of Economics, maintained in large advertisements published in the German press, this prosperity is due not to luck or accident, but to hard work—and the skill and foresight of the Government which refused to have any truck with the “doctrine of materialism.” The Social Democrats have shown that they are not merely determined to bid for power in the next elections, but that they are preparing themselves for responsible action. The leadership in forming the Government will only fall to them if they can attract the votes of a large middle section of the electorate whose political allegiance is somewhat indeterminate, but who would not be prepared to risk their increasing prosperity in a series of social or political experiments. With a steadily rising standard of living and increasing opportunities offered by an expanding economy, there is hardly any life left in the traditional conception of the class struggle. This does not

mean, of course, that Germany is moving towards social equality, but those who are, or feel, underprivileged seek other means of improving their position without being particularly interested in creating a new social order. When Professor Erhard claimed: "Growing prosperity will free us from the chains of materialism," he was presumably thinking only of one particular brand, dialectical materialism. Other types of materialism seemed to be quite flourishing under the impact of prosperity. In fact, one of the striking features was the concern expressed by many Germans that the golden calf of conspicuous consumption should have become the centre of national life, that political indifference was widespread, and that there was not enough inclination to cultivate matters of the mind. This concentration on economic pursuits may be merely one aspect of the German escape into private activity where personal success might subdue feelings of uneasiness about the past and of anxiety for the future.

On the other hand, it must be noted that the cultural life of German cities—their theatres, operas, concert halls and art galleries—seemed vigorous and well sustained and compared favourably with that of many other European countries, including Britain apart from London. Religious organisations, too, were making energetic efforts to encourage a more reflective attitude. It is perhaps significant that this should have happened while the Christian Democrats were turning their organisation more and more into a "secularised" conservative party.¹⁰ Evangelical Academies have been established in different parts of the Federal Republic as residential colleges where people come together to discuss the problems of our time in an atmosphere of intellectual freedom. Similarly, German adult education institutions have grown both in number and vitality, and their influence was probably greater than at any previous time in German history although they themselves were conscious of their relative weakness in the field of political education.

It seemed, however, unlikely that growing prosperity would

¹⁰ Cf. Dr. F. Luchsinger, *Die Deutschen und ihr Staat*, p. 26 (Separatabdruck aus der *Neuen Zürcher Zeitung*, 1956).

diminish the clash of economic interests. The average trade unionist may not be particularly interested in programmes for the transformation of society, but he will certainly insist that his organisation should help him to increase his share in the general prosperity. He has been told about the German economic miracle. He has read that his country's gold and dollar reserves have established a new record,¹¹ that its credit balance with the European Payments Union has become a positive embarrassment and that Germany has become the largest single holder of United States short term Treasury bonds and bills.¹² And while he may not be particularly eager to change a social system which can achieve such things, he would certainly insist that his union should help him to secure higher wages, shorter hours and better working conditions.

In the early years after the currency reform, the German trade unions exercised a good deal of restraint, partly from choice and partly from force of circumstances. A majority of the electorate had rejected economic planning and controls. The Government was not pledged to full employment policies. In any case, millions of refugees had recently flooded the country. Credit and taxation policies were designed to foster the rapid accumulation of capital and to protect the currency against inflation. The rebuilding of foreign trade was given priority over domestic considerations.¹³ Thus the bargaining position of the German trade unions was not particularly strong. But now, with a sense of achievement behind them and full employment almost a reality, the climate of industrial disputes seemed likely to change.

¹¹ \$4.4 billion by the end of 1956.

¹² *The Manchester Guardian*, January 8, 1957.

¹³ Cf. H. C. Wallich, *Mainsprings of the German Revival*, Yale University Press, 1955. "This policy was imposed by the near desperate problem facing a country living on foreign aid, with a greatly increased population and practically no exports." (p. 107) "The ultimate lesson drawn from all this by those responsible for making fiscal and monetary policy is a rejection of full-employment policies. They carry the threat of inflation and controls and thus touch the two most sensitive spots in German economic experience. It is only fair to say that this conclusion is not shared by the leadership of the Social Democratic party. They continue to adhere to full-employment policies like those of the British Labor party, but they would probably pursue them much more moderately" (pp. 111-112).

Other interests, too, are highly organised in Germany. Pressure groups and political lobbying are probably much more powerful in Bonn and the capitals of the different *Länder* than they are in London. Organised economic interests, party bureaucracies, denominational organisations—all exercise a robust and often uncontrolled influence upon policies and persons, particularly in the selection and promotion of civil servants and others charged with public functions. In the view of some observers, the power of sectional interests in Germany has reached dimensions where it represents one of the greatest dangers to normal democratic processes because it increasingly subordinates the organs of the State to the schemes and bargains of these pressure groups.¹⁴ The problem is not peculiar to Germany, but it is likely to have more serious effects in a relatively new political system.

So far, however, that system has shown an impressive capacity for growth and a stability which seems all the more remarkable when one remembers the recent history of Germany and compares the post-war development of her institutions with that of her great European neighbours, France and Italy. Balfour claimed that sound parliamentary government presupposes “a people so fundamentally at one that they can safely afford to bicker; and so sure of their own moderation that they are not dangerously disturbed by the never-ending din of political conflict.” If this is true, Western Germany has still some way to go, but there can be little doubt that she has been travelling in the right direction. The multi-party system with its sectarianism and fragmentation of the political will, which helped to ruin the Weimar Republic, has not returned. The decline of the ideological approach to politics has made possible the formation of large political parties which cannot afford doctrinal narrowness. With Christian Democrats and Social Democrats towering over the smaller political groups which still remain, the Federal Republic appeared to be fast approaching the two-party system. It is true that neither of these two parties was able to draw on a

¹⁴ Cf. T. Eschenburg, *Herrschaft der Verbände*? Stuttgart, 1955.

liberal heritage and on the spirit of reform to anything like the same degree as the two great political parties in Britain. But both the CDU and the SPD ¹⁵ have been compelled, by external and domestic circumstances, to adopt policies of moderation.

Soviet policy after the war—as distinct from Soviet propaganda—left no practical alternative to a policy of co-operation with the West. And the domestic political scene is dominated by the requirements of the “small man,” who is less interested in theories than in results, who in return for honest work wants security, some comfort and his freedom. At any rate, he wants the freedom to be left alone. He controls the priceless gift of a majority at the next election. Without him neither the CDU nor the SPD can hope to attain office by themselves, a solution which both of them obviously prefer to participation in a coalition government. Their programmes show that they have carefully studied his wishes.

In the field of foreign policy, the question of reunification will probably claim more attention in the future. All the political parties are agreed that unity must be achieved “in conditions of peace and freedom.” In the past, unity and freedom have often been presented as alternatives to the Germans. It is possible that new nationalists will one day attempt to present the choice again in similar terms. In fact, the surrender of freedom is the price which the Soviet rulers and their East German tools hope to extract in return for “unity.” That is why the East German régime makes use of nationalist arguments in its propaganda, while West German nationalists quickly find themselves in Communist company. In other parts of the world, the combination of nationalism and Communism has proved a most explosive mixture. In Germany the obvious connection between these two partners may turn out to be a safeguard. There the real danger might arise if aggressive nationalism could ever be made to appear again as a force in its own right. But it must be remembered that the Germans have now been burnt more than once.

Some doubt must remain as to whether the conditions

¹⁵ *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands.*

which have favoured peaceful progress can be preserved. The Germans themselves are conscious of the fact that they have not conquered their political freedom, but that they have merely settled down to it. Will it seem worth defending? In a crisis, reserves of energy and steadfastness may count for more than gold and dollar reserves, but the former are perhaps more difficult to accumulate, especially in a nation that seems to have been living at full stretch for more than a generation. The maintenance of prosperity and, above all, of external stability will clearly be of profound importance for the political fate of the Federal Republic. But these are factors over which her rulers will not be able to exercise any exclusive control.

THE DIVIDED MIND OF JAPAN

By

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WHILE Europe is preoccupied with such issues as those of Arab nationalism little attention is being given to a development that may be hardly less important during the next few years : the rising discomfort of the Japanese with their international position. The interest of Japan in coexistence with the Communist world reflects in part the sense of non-involvement left behind by the Occupation. But possibly more influential are problems which in Japanese eyes have little relation with Communist aggression or subversion ; problems of livelihood, lost territories, finding a place in the sun again. Since the peace treaty came into force on April 28, 1952, foreign policy has been concerned with these rather than with strategy or ideology, for the presence of American forces in the country has tended to obscure any risk there was of attack from the mainland. Juxtaposed as they are between the two worlds, the Japanese have an outlook not unlike the divided mind of the child of divorcees. While committed to the West through their strategic dependence upon the United States, they feel the gravitational pull of the Communist orbit in more acute form than many people not formally so committed. For a country in Japan's situation, lacking almost every natural resource for her industries, the choice lies between attempting to earn a living by *force majeure* or the present technique of *yuzu muge* (" universal adaptability "). The West must hope that she will make a success of the latter. The imperialist dream may have been ended for all time at Hiroshima, but Japan on the other side of the ideological fence could transform the political picture in the Far East.

NECESSITIES OF LIFE

Japan's population in the four home islands by the Census of 1985 was 69 million. In the Economic Plan for 1956 the corresponding figure in 1955 was estimated as 89.26 million and almost a million increase was expected in 1956, representing a growth of a little more than one per cent. per annum. The actual figure last July was 90.017 million. It is estimated by the Institute of Population Problems that 100 million will have to be provided for in 1974 and 108.5 million by 1990, giving Japan the doubtful privilege of being the fifth most populous country in the world. With the recent falling birth and death rates the production-age and old-age groups have tended to increase proportionately, and this trend will continue. The economy will therefore have to find employment for some 10 million more workers during the next decade. Unemployment reached 840,000 in March, 1955, and has since fallen to about half a million, but concealed unemployment, especially in agriculture, has always been a feature of Japanese life, estimates having varied from three to ten million out of a total working force of 40 million.¹ It is clear that the prospects for this growing labour force (and hence for political stability) are dependent upon a high level of demand for Japanese goods in the world as a whole. Can such coups as the £5 million contract for the erection of a viscose factory in Yugoslavia, won by the Shoko Shoji Company in 1953 in the face of stiff competition from Britain, the United States and West Germany, continue to be pulled off? And what will be the effects of efforts in the West to bring inflation under control and create a free trade zone in Europe?

For the maintenance of such numbers Japan since 1945 has had to rely on the four islands of Japan proper, which are only half as large again as the British Isles and cultivable only to the extent of one sixth of their area. The effects of the defeat were that Japan was estimated to have lost 44 per cent. of her considerable overseas assets, 80 per cent. of her powerful merchant marine, and no less than 86 per cent. of her total

¹ *The Times*, May 20, 1955; *Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East*, 1953, United Nations, 1954, p. 82.

national wealth.² In addition the war left in its wake a legacy of mistrust in the outside world seriously embarrassing to the country's attempts to reassert herself in overseas markets.

The recovery of the economy after the war was much slower than that of any other advanced industrial nation, industrial output in 1948 being only a half of what it had been in 1937 and one third of the 1944 figure.³ Only by 1951 was lost ground gradually being recovered. Mining and manufacturing had advanced by then 81 per cent. on the average figure for the years 1934-1936, agricultural output was on the same level as in those years, per capita income 90 per cent. of what it had been in 1934-1936 and the level of consumption 85 per cent. But foreign trade remained disastrously low, exports being only 31 per cent. of the pre-war figure and imports 49 per cent.⁴ From this devastating failure in the revival of foreign trade the Korean war for the time being saved the country. While inflation was stepped up with the higher prices of raw materials and the ending of coal supplies from China, the pouring of American dollars into Japan to the tune of \$750 million a year in payment for special procurements for the forces in Korea and Occupation personnel, as well as direct economic aid, gave Japan a temporarily balanced position on international trade account. The heavy dependence on the United States for supplies was registered in 1952 in almost half of Japan's imports coming from that country, while only 15.7 per cent. of exports were marketed there.

1952 and 1953 were further unsatisfactory years for Japanese foreign trade. The gains won by private business in orders for United Nations forces in Korea were lost, and perhaps more than lost, by the country as a whole owing to the precipitous rise in prices. At the end of 1953 a net deficit of \$198 million in international trade was experienced.⁵ In particular,

² Figures given by Mr. Yoshida in "Japan and the Crisis in Asia," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 32/2, January, 1953.

³ *A Statistical Survey of the Economy of Japan*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, 1953.

⁴ *Economic Survey of Japan 1952-1953*, Tokyo, 1953.

⁵ *An Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East*, 1953, United Nations, 1954, p. 137.

Japan's sales in sterling markets touched low levels and hand-to-mouth expedients had to be resorted to, such as the "swapping" of dollar proceeds for sterling and the grant of import concessions in trade with the colonies by the United Kingdom. The Government was therefore driven to apply highly unpopular deflationary measures to reduce the import bill, leading to many business bankruptcies and industrial unrest as redundancy was lessened; in August, 1955, the Bank of Japan raised its discount rate to 7.3 per cent., a severe measure for a country which has come to rely so much on long-term orders for capital equipment.

Nevertheless these measures, together with the general rise in world demand for manufactured goods in 1954, had their effects, as in 1954 visible items of export showed a 30 per cent. increase in value over the previous year, with total sales amounting to \$1,680 million. A further increase of 27 per cent. in 1955 brought the value of exports to \$2,000 million and there was a slight fall in payments for imports. It is testimony to the extent of the success of Japan's recent export drive that the Six Year Economic Plan, which was to have begun in 1955, originally envisaged a target of \$1,880 million as the value of exports in 1957. This was already being achieved in April, 1955, and the target was raised to \$2,200 million in August. This figure again was realised at a monthly rate of account in October and December, 1955. It is true of course that in 1955 Japan's net gain of \$100 million in receipts as against payments includes the effects of United States special procurements for the supply of forces still in Japan. But it tends to be forgotten by the Japanese, who since the Occupation incline towards underestimating the assets they do possess, that this figure (\$560 million in 1955) is by no means a grant, and that if these procurements were ended the labour and raw materials used in fulfilling them would be available for other purposes. As it is, special procurements are falling year by year. One is justified in concluding that since the peace treaty Japan has succeeded in achieving a real if somewhat precarious balance in dealings with the rest of the world and in attaining a measurable degree of economic independence from the United

States. The phenomenal rise of 45 per cent. in Japanese sales in notoriously impervious dollar markets in 1955 over 1954 is especially notable in this recent Japanese boom.⁶

This does not mean that the economic equilibrium at which Japan has recently arrived is anything like a stable one or that it will not continue to exert a dominating influence over foreign policy. Perhaps its weakest feature is the inadequate rate of new capital formation, which cannot but make itself felt in rising costs as competition in world markets stiffens. Contrary to popular belief in the outside world, Japanese costs of production, though low in cottons, rayon and damask, are not uniformly so, and although wages are generally much below European standards it is wrong to think that "sweated labour" gives the Japanese any appreciable advantage against their competitors. The reasons for these high production costs, after allowance has been made for heavy freight charges on imported raw materials, are chiefly the prevalence in Japanese industry outside of textiles of much obsolete equipment badly in need of replacement. In a report to the World Bank in 1954 the Minister of International Trade and Industry stated that 24 per cent. of machine tool manufacturing equipment, 41 per cent. of hydro-electric power plant and 85 per cent. of openhearth steel equipment in active operation was more than twenty years old.⁷ Unfortunately, capital for modernisation has flowed into the country from outside at a sluggish rate. Extensive loans have been applied for from the World Bank and by September, 1955, the Bank had authorised \$40 million in loans, chiefly for electric power development.⁸ The Bank authorities have tended to take the view (which any visitor to the big cities will confirm) that Japan could do much more to economise on luxury buildings, thus raising a surplus for industrial needs. It has also been questioned whether the country has been altogether wise to build up gold and dollar reserves in larger quantity than many feel to be necessary for current needs, though the psychology of this is

⁶ *The Times*, June 20, 1956.

⁷ *The Economist*, May 29, 1954.

⁸ World Bank, Annual Report 1954-1955, Washington, 1955 Appendices, pp 28 and 31.

understandable.⁹ But the net result of the inadequate supply of new capital to Japanese home industries is that national income per head is extremely low as compared with that of other advanced countries.

High production costs, coupled with the spate of postwar trade union demands for better living standards, will not make it easy for Japan to face the highly competitive conditions which prevail in world markets. In contrast with pre-war experience, Japanese textiles have been finding themselves priced out of South African markets by rival products from Scandinavia, and in Malaya Japanese cottons have proved no longer competitive with Soviet manufactures.¹⁰ The efforts of the Government since the Occupation to eliminate unfair trading practices, while essential if a good name is to be won abroad, have not in themselves helped export prices to fall; it is an example of how Japan's attempts to solve economic problems by an expedient of one kind may create difficulties in another direction. Again, Japanese admission to GATT as a full member in September, 1955, has won for Japan most-favoured-nation treatment among the twenty-one members who have so far extended her full privileges of membership and bilateral tariff agreements with all members; on the other hand it has served to bring Japanese commercial integrity before the scrutiny of the trading world more than ever before. This is not merely a question of mercantile ethics; it touches upon the entire structure of industry, the size of units of production and of marketing organisations.

RELATIONS WITH NON-COMMUNIST ASIA

It is against such an economic background that recent developments in Japanese foreign policy have to be seen, its influence being persistent in relations with each of the three groups of countries with which Japan is chiefly concerned: South and South East Asia, the Communist world and the non-Communist

⁹ Foreign currency holdings reached the comfortable figure of \$1,400 million on December 31, 1955. Cf. Nobutane Kiuchi in *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 34/3, April, 1956.

¹⁰ *Manchester Guardian*, April 10, 1956.

West, in which the leading country having to do with Japan is the United States. It is not surprising, in view of the dominant American interest in Japan, that Britain since the war should have consented to stand in the sidelines and watch American policy unfold. At the same time it is regrettable that Japanese opinion since 1945 should have been obliged to think of Britain chiefly as a churlish opponent of Japan's efforts to meet her overdraft in foreign trade, when there is otherwise so much admiration for British diplomacy in the cold war. A start has been made with improved Anglo-Japanese relations with the admission of Japan to the Colombo Plan as a donor country in October, 1954.¹¹ Lord Selkirk's mission last autumn did something to remove the impression of British indifference. The sooner these modest beginnings are carried further the better, for Japanese political extremists alone stand to gain from any sign that Japan can look for little in the West but hostility that dies hard.

The factor which has so far poisoned Japanese relations in East Asia has been the protracted and bitter reparations issue. Only where claims to reparations from Japan have either not been put forward by non-Communist Asian countries or were subsequently waived have diplomatic relations been speedily restored to normal. India, for example, who refused to attend the San Francisco conference in 1951 or sign the peace treaty, ended the state of war with Japan by an agreement in Tokyo on June 9, 1952, and Japanese-Indian relations have been uneventful since that date, apart from differences in attitude towards Peking.¹² Similarly Pakistan, who signed the treaty, agreed on March 31, 1953, to restore Japanese property which had been confiscated during the war, although by the terms of the treaty it was open to her to sequester this. Otherwise the reparations problem has been almost as vexatious as it was between the Allies and Germany in the 1920s.¹³ The

¹¹ Japan's contribution to the Plan was reduced from 38 million yen a year to 14 million yen in January, 1956; *The Times*, January 19, 1956

¹² *Journal of Parliaments of the Commonwealth*, Commonwealth Parliamentary Association, Vol. XXII, 3, 1951. *Documents on International Affairs*, 1952 R I I A, pp 483 487.

¹³ Japan's total war debt was officially estimated in March, 1956, at \$24,000 million (£860 million). *The Financial Times*, March 8, 1956.

difference in the case of Japan is that the reparations problem was disposed of as far as the leading Allied Power, the United States, was concerned before the peace conference actually met, while other major claimants refused to sign the treaty owing to dissatisfaction with the treatment of their claims.

The United States have continuously pressed for a closing of the reparations account, provided Japan's economic capacity is taken into consideration, since the Communist countries are bound to benefit from frictions between Japan and her neighbours in non-Communist Asia. These pressures were not sufficient to prevent two years elapsing between the peace treaty and the registering of progress. A settlement with Burma had been held up in the autumn of 1953 by Burmese insistence on equality of treatment with Indonesia and the Philippines. This was inconsistent with an original Japanese formula as between these three countries, the offer in Burma's case amounting to \$100 million, only one quarter of the Burmese demand for \$400 million.¹⁴ By mid-September, 1954, when a Burmese mission led by the acting Foreign Minister, U Kyaw Nyein, was in Tokyo, the Japanese offer had been raised to \$160 million and the Burmese demand reduced to \$200 million. A compromise initialled in Tokyo on September 25 provided for an actual war indemnity of \$200 million and a further \$50 million as an investment in Burma's eight-year National Welfare Reconstruction Plan.

By the treaty of peace and reparations agreement with the Union of Burma signed at Rangoon on November 5, 1954, Japan undertook to pay goods and services to the annual value of \$20 million over a ten-year period and also "to facilitate economic co-operation whereby the services of Japanese nationals and the products of Japan would be available to Burma" for a period of ten years at an annual value of \$5 million. This co-operation was intended to take the form chiefly of joint enterprises in hydro-electric power, steel and fertiliser plants, cement, sugar and engineering industries. The agreements entered into force on April 16, 1955, and represent a marriage between Burmese moderation and Japanese

¹⁴ *South China Morning Post*, August 12, 1954.

ingenuity. Whether the proposed joint enterprises will result in the economic imperialism of Japan feared by many Burmese remains to be seen, although many safeguards against this are provided; only 40 per cent. of the capital in these concerns is to be supplied from Japan.

Shortly before these arrangements came into effect an agreement was reached on April 9, 1955, between the Japanese authorities and the visiting Thai Foreign Minister with regard to the redemption of the Baht debt contracted by Japanese forces in Thailand during the war. The understanding reached, which was formally signed in Bangkok on July 7, 1955, provided that Thailand would receive \$15 million in cash and \$26.6 million either as credits or investments.¹⁵

Reparations talks with Indonesia and the Philippines fell into a far more intractable category of diplomacy. In the case of the former, Japan was reported to have offered goods and services up to a maximum value of \$500 million. This was at once rejected by the Jakarta authorities and relations reached a crisis when the Japanese charged Indonesia with non-payment of imports from Japan as a unilateral means of satisfying her reparations claims. In July, 1954, Japan therefore restricted exports to Indonesia, which at that time owed Japan \$150 million, and the situation has not materially altered since. Progress was hardly easier with the Philippines. The opening of conversations in January, 1952, was followed by an embarrassed silence as soon as the Japanese heard the sum demanded; this was \$8,000 million, or three times the current Japanese budget. After two years for sobriety to return, the so-called Ohno-Garcia memorandum in the spring of 1954 laid down an agreed figure of \$400 million in the form of goods, the processing of Filipino raw materials, the salvaging of vessels sunk in Filipino harbours during the war, and other services. This was a favourable settlement for Japan, but for that very reason opposition developed in the Filipino Senate and the draft was scrapped. Many months passed until on August 12, 1955, President Magsaysay formally

¹⁵ *Nippon Times*, February 17 and July 7, 1955.

proposed that Japan should pay \$550 million, of which \$500 million should be in capital goods and only \$30 million in services, the balance being a cash payment; in addition \$250 million would be made available by Japan in long-term credits. An agreement on these lines was arrived at in Manila on May 9, 1956.

The Filipino settlement could be described as "not merely a settlement of a debt but also a springboard for greater trade between the two nations," as had been hoped for on the Japanese side from the outset.¹⁶ The long-drawn-out negotiations, however, have scarcely served to improve Japanese-Filipino relations. The suspicion lingered on both sides that better terms could have been gained by more stiffness, the Japanese in particular feeling that the agreement is not only likely to be burdensome but will stimulate unsatisfied claimants to put up their demands. Nor do the recriminations accompanying the negotiations, such as the Filipino charge that Tokyo had set up a \$15 million fund for bribing Filipino senators, make the best of foundations for the future.

It is clear that the hopes that Japan might play the role of an industrialised Big Brother to the new States in South East Asia, and thus have her attention diverted from the Communist world, are still far from being realised. The massive economic aid to that area from the West on which these hopes turned has not materialised and fears are abroad there that Japan is seeking to encompass by "economic diplomacy" the stranglehold she failed to achieve by military conquest. It is on account of these fears that Japan was not invited to the conference to establish SEATO which met in Baguio, the Philippines, in September, 1954, and had to be content with an account from Mr. Dulles on his way home. Although Japanese trade with South East Asia has been steadily moving upwards since the end of the war, the reparations issue has been a long-standing source of friction, especially with the Philippines, Japan's foremost supply of iron ore.

Japan's relations with other countries in the non-Communist areas of the Pacific have not been much happier. Both

¹⁶ *Nippon Times*, April 13, 1954.

Australia and South Korea (though their relations with Japan are very different in other respects) have sought to exclude Japan's far-ranging fishing fleets; Australia by declaring her right to control pearl-fishing on the bed of the Arafura Sea,¹⁷ and Korea by the extraordinary "Rhee line" extending the territorial waters of the Republic to an average of sixty miles beyond the coast and in some places up to 170 miles. In January, 1954, Japanese technicians were even excluded from an American strategic survey of New Guinea as a result of Australian protests. Australian memories of the Japanese in wartime are understandable factors in such attitudes, although the Japanese in recent years have been excellent customers for Australian wool, while Japanese exports to Australia have been on a much smaller scale owing to the latter's draconian import quota system. During the last few months relations with Australia have improved and Mr. Menzies, the Australian Prime Minister, was to have visited Tokyo last August but was prevented by other tasks. It will be long before the Rhee Government and Japan see eye to eye; mistrust accumulating from the past is old and hard.

THE COMMUNIST ALLUREMENT

These chastening experiences of Japan in the Far East during the last few years have strongly enhanced the appeals of the adjacent Communist orbit. Ever since 1953 organisations seeking to lessen American influences on foreign policy have been on the increase; they include the Japan-Soviet Friendship Association, claiming a membership of 100,000, and the National Council for the Restoration of Relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China, backed by Sohyo, or General Confederation of Trade Unions, with its three million members; the Japan-China Amity Association and the Dai Nippon Fishery Association, of which the former Minister of Agriculture, the influential Ichiro Kono, the leading exponent of co-existence in the Liberal Democratic Party, is the spokesman in everything but name.¹⁸

¹⁷ This issue is now to go to the International Court; *The Times*, June 12, 1956.

¹⁸ *Nippon Times*, March 7, 1955.

During his visit to the United States in November, 1954, Mr. Yoshida, Prime Minister during most of the Occupation, stated the case for increased capital aid to Asia to offset the appeals of Communism, and also to ensure his own continuance in office. The reply was disheartening, as were also the quibbles over the value of surplus farm products to be shipped to Japan under the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement and the use of the counterpart funds available to Japan under the agreement. On November 17, 1954, a week after Mr. Yoshida's return from this tour, the ruling Liberal Party split for the second time and a large fraction united with the Progressives and the rump of the Japan Liberal Party to form a new group, the Liberal Democratic Party. The leader of this, Mr. Hatoyama, succeeded Mr. Yoshida on the latter's resignation on December 7 after seven years of almost uninterrupted office.

The new party raised its standard for a "people's diplomacy" and the purification of political life. The former was intended to appeal to a more old-fashioned nationalism than Mr. Yoshida could lay claim to, but actually took the form of disastrous indiscretions on the part of Mr. Hatoyama and public wrangling between himself and his more circumspect Foreign Minister, the late Mamoru Shigemitsu. Mr. Shigemitsu himself expressed all the self-contradictions of the new course in explaining the Government's objects in December, 1954. He said they would "seek abiding co-operation with the free nations, especially the United States," provide for Japan's own defence "to an extent commensurate with Japan's own resources," give technical and other assistance to other Asian nations "as a guarantee against Communist penetration," and "restore normal relations with China and Russia without prejudice to our basic collaboration with the free nations."

Opinion polls showed a decided leaning in favour of resuming relations with China and the Soviet Union.¹⁹ The desperate plight of the many communities dependent on fishing as a result of restrictions imposed by South Korea and Soviet Russia in the Sea of Okhotsk and the apparent failure of the

¹⁹ *Nippon Times*, November 5, 1954.

containment policy in Indo-China in particular underlined the need for an independent approach to the Communists. Accordingly at the elections on February 27, 1955, to test the standing of the caretaker Hatoyama administration, all the parties with differences of emphasis called for "normalised relations" with the Communists. The Hatoyama-Shigemitsu partnership, behind which stood business forces which had tried and failed with Yoshida, was returned to office, though without an absolute majority, and promptly insisted that the United States could not be offended by an attempt to secure an endorsement of the peace treaty by Moscow, if not by Peking. After all, by its terms Japan was entitled to enter into relations on the same terms with countries not party to the treaty within three years of its coming into force; thereafter she was free to negotiate a new agreement.

The Communist Powers themselves have been relatively slow since 1952 to make bad blood between Japan and the West, but they exploited to the full the rising feeling against the United States during Mr. Yoshida's last months of office. Besides the welcome given in Peking and Moscow to an important visiting delegation of Japanese M.P.s, the occasion of the "summit" talks between Chinese Communist and Soviet leaders in Peking in September-October, 1954, was utilised to undermine Mr. Yoshida's position. Communist benignity was laid on with a trowel in the *communiqué* issued on October 12; it was listened to eagerly nevertheless by Japanese fishermen looking out on the forbidden northern waters, shipping merchants, wives and mothers of detainees who had not seen their homes for a decade or more.²⁰ As well as these moves towards a diplomatic *détente*, private trading organisations in Japan led by the Japan-China Trade Promotion Association have acclimatised opinion to the idea of an Eldorado on the other side of the fence. As far back as 1953 small deals began between Japanese businessmen and Chinese officials. The most highly publicised of these was concluded in Tokyo in May, 1955, when the visiting Chinese Vice-minister for Foreign

²⁰ Text in *New China News Agency*, October 18, 1954.

Trade, Lei Jen-min, agreed with Japanese merchants on an exchange of £30 million of goods in both directions.¹ The agreement for 1955-1956 raised the value of these exchanges to £48 million.² In the first six months of 1955 Japanese exports to Communist China were treble what they had been in the corresponding period of 1954 and imports double. Nevertheless this represented only 2 per cent. of total Japanese foreign trade.³ Not surprisingly, the Japanese attribute this to the embargo laid down by COCOM⁴ on trade with Communist China, which is more severe than that on trade with any other part of the Communist world, especially as in 1955 the value of exports to Communist China was hardly more than half that of imports from there.

At first sight the commercial possibilities in mainland China seem almost unlimited for Japan. The economies of the two countries are still to a very large extent complementary. Freight charges by sea are insignificant compared with the costs of transport, especially for industrial raw materials, between Japan and the non-Communist world, and the coming years of industrialisation in China should under favourable conditions provide a market for Japanese capital goods as far ahead as one can see. Before the war Japanese trade with what is now Communist China accounted for over a third of Japan's total overseas business.⁵ Some of the items on the import list in those days, such as coking coal from the British-owned Kailan mines, salt and soya beans, could be classified as indispensable. It should be remembered, of course, that at that time Japan was in political control of Manchuria and Korea and leased the Kwangtung province. No less than two-thirds of Japan's trade in the 1930s with territory in China now under Communist control was done in the areas in which Japan was politically dominant.⁶ Moreover the pattern of

¹ *The Times*, May 5, 1955.

² *Nippon Times*, March 18, 1956.

³ *Manchester Guardian*, January 5, 1956.

⁴ A NATO committee functioning in Paris.

⁵ N.S. Roberts, *Economic and Commercial Conditions in Japan*, H.M.S.O., London, 1952, p. 4.

⁶ J.B. Cohen, "Japan's Foreign Trade Problems," in E.O. Reischauer (ed.), *Japan and America Today*, 1953.

Sino-Japanese trade is likely to be so different in the future as to make inferences from pre-war misleading.

Before the war 83 per cent. of the copra and oilseeds imported by Japan came from China, 69 per cent. of her imports of coking coal and the same proportion of organic fertilisers, 89 per cent. of salt imports, 81 per cent. of imported iron ore and 27 per cent. of hides and skins. The chief Japanese exports were consumer goods. Of the former imports from China coking coal and iron ore may well be entirely needed by the Chinese themselves in future, organic fertilisers have been largely replaced by chemicals and salt is now produced on a large scale in Japan by evaporating from sea water. As for former exports from Japan, China now appears to be more interested in purchasing industrial equipment than consumer goods, and it is doubtful whether she will have to go far outside the Communist orbit for these; in May, 1956, for instance, trade with the Communist countries accounted for between 75 per cent. and 80 per cent. of all Peking China's trade.⁷

Politically the Japanese can hardly be complacent about the rise of the new China to the position of an industrial colossus. The more far-sighted realise that Japan cannot benefit in the long-term from having the mainland united, for the first time in modern history, under a disciplined régime bent on steady national development and upheld by a population growing at an even more hideous rate than that of Japan. This would be to set at naught over fifty years of Japanese diplomacy. Considerations of this order explain the anxiety of the Government to seize the role of intermediary between Peking and the West, Formosa included, to act as a "mental bridge," to use Mr. Shigemitsu's expression. The *cliché* is tricked out with rhetoric on Japan's cultural juxtaposition between East and West, but underlying it is the calculated desire to avoid involvement in differences between China and the West. Japanese strategy at the Bandung conference in April, 1955, gave expression to this; the aim, though derided

⁷ "Building the New China," *The Times*, May 16, 1956

at home as colourless, was to lessen asperities, strive for peaceful trade and hold a balance.

Hence Japan has been moved by legal inconsistency and practical logic in attempting to hold talks with both Chinas at the same time. While the peace treaty between Japan and Nationalist China signed at Taipeh on April 27, 1952, acknowledges no claim of the latter to the mainland, Mr. Yoshida in a letter in December, 1951, to Mr. Dulles, at that time a special adviser to the State Department, confirmed that Japan had no intention of concluding a treaty with the Chinese Communists. In the view of the Japanese Foreign Office this does not constitute a binding contract,⁸ but it always much haunted the thoughts of Mr. Shigemitsu. On December 15, 1954, Mr. Hatoyama, on acceding to office, created a sensation by referring in one of his broadcast "fireside chats" to both Chinas as "fine independent régimes." Next day this was flatly contradicted by the Foreign Minister, who said that Japan did not propose to recognise Communist China. But even he refused to close the door completely as on the very day when the Premier thought aloud he told the Diet that relations with the Communists would be approached "realistically" and apart from ideology. The Premier Mr. Tanzan Ishibashi, who took over from Mr. Hatoyama on the latter's retirement last December (he has since been succeeded by Mr. Kishi) reaffirmed that trade with China need not compromise the recognition issue. When faced with procedural obstacles few minds are as resourceful as the Japanese, and it would be surprising if ways were not found for holding the balance between the two Chinas while discouraging either from attacking the other. As Mr. Hatoyama has said, "Asia is big enough for both."⁹

MAKING PEACE WITH RUSSIA

The Soviet offer of a diplomatic resumption on December 16, 1954, was timed to chime in with Mr. Hatoyama's reiteration that he could make friends with the Communist world without

⁸ *Manchester Guardian*, December 17, 1954.

⁹ In an interview reported in the *Daily Mail*, July 11, 1955.

injuring the country's "basic" collaboration with the United States. Once the Soviet bait had helped him win the elections in the following February both sides cooled and it was not until the end of April that agreement was reached even on the *venue* of the talks. Conversations eventually opened between Mr. Jacob Malik and Mr. Shunichi Matsumoto in London on June 1, 1955. The terms put forward by the latter lacked nothing in optimism, seeing that Japan was the defeated Power. They included the release of involuntary Japanese detainees in Soviet territory (the Minister of Welfare put the number of these in Communist countries at 60,000); the return of Habomai and Shikotan, which the Japanese claim form part of Hokkaido and were handed over to Russia in 1945 only through a "mistake"; "territorial questions relating to the Kuriles and South Sakhalin," which also passed under Soviet control in 1945; the ending of the Soviet veto on Japan's admission to the U.N.; fishing questions and trade.¹⁰ It was an impressive list, all the more as little was heard of concessions in return.

The Soviet counter-proposals handed over on June 15 were heavy with provisos. Fishery and commercial agreements would be available after the signing of a peace treaty; "war criminals" in Soviet hands could be attended to after the resumption of relations; the Soviet Union would support Japanese membership of the United Nations provided Communist China were admitted also. The claim for Habomai and Shikotan was ignored and the main Soviet demands were almost identical with those put forward at the San Francisco conference in 1951; the recognition of Russian sovereignty over South Sakhalin and the Kuriles, a Japanese pledge not to enter military alliances against any country which fought against Japan, and agreement that only countries bordering on the Sea of Japan should enjoy access into it. These signs of the low price set by the Soviet Union for winning over their good will came as a severe shock to the Japanese after the heady neutralism of the election campaign.

¹⁰ *Nippon Times*, June 10, 1955.

Some progress did appear towards the end of August when the Soviet delegation agreed to surrender the two smaller islands if Russian sovereignty over the other territories in dispute were recognised and the use of Okinawa and the Bonin Islands denied to the United States.¹¹ This gesture was clearly timed to accord with Mr. Shigemitsu's visit to the United States for the purpose, among others, of discussing the future of these islands. It now appears that he was told that the United States would never give up Okinawa so long as Russia held the Kuriles. In reply Mr. Matsumoto refused to have conditions attached to the return of Habomai and Shikotan, but proposed that the question of Sakhalin and the Kuriles be referred to a general international conference, or in other words shelved. Both suggestions proving unacceptable, discussions shifted to the matter of the detainees. Replying to the Japanese demand for the unconditional repatriation of 11,300 war prisoners and 1,365 war criminals Mr. Malik baldly asserted that only the Soviet Supreme Court could exercise clemency "in certain circumstances," which might include the signing of a peace treaty; he denied that any detainees existed except actual felons. This ended the first phase, since Mr. Malik announced his intention to attend the U.N. General Assembly in September and Mr. Matsumoto was left with no alternative but to return home.

Towards the end of 1955 Japan was obliged to lower her sights and limit herself to the return only of Etorofu and Kunashiri, the most southerly islands in the Kuriles chain, in addition to Habomai and Shikotan. In other respects positions on both sides had stiffened when the talks reopened in London in January, 1956. The merger of the two Japanese Conservative parties the previous November moderated Mr. Hatoyama's impulse to play for quick results and the third Soviet veto on Japanese membership of the U.N. in December depressed the atmosphere. Again there were signs that the Soviet authorities were appealing to the Japanese Premier through intermediaries in Tokyo and feeding his desire to end

¹¹ *New York Herald Tribune*, August 17, 1955.

his political life with a coup.¹² When this came to nothing Soviet patience quickly ran out. On February 14, Mr. Malik announced that he would be returning home for the 20th party congress and simultaneously the Japanese found that inconveniences created by Russia were weakening their position. Russian mines drifted from their moorings and floated ashore in Japan. Trade with the Soviets was at a low level, only \$7 million worth both ways having been exchanged in 1955 as compared with the Foreign Office's estimate of the \$30 million or \$40 million worth possible under normal conditions.

The dreaded shot in the Soviet locker came on the day after the talks were adjourned, March 21, when Moscow announced that fishing in the north-west Pacific would be restricted for the four months following May 15. The new regulations meant that the total catch for the season would be limited to 25 million salmon as compared with the approximately 100 million taken by the Japanese alone in 1955. The question was cruelly urgent since the Japanese fishing fleet, a force of almost a third of a million men, was preparing to leave on April 28 and Mr. Dominitsky, the unofficial Soviet agent in Tokyo, was threatening dire penalties for infringement of the new regulations. On May 15 an interim arrangement to cover the 1956 season was reached in Moscow, together with a long-term agreement and sea-rescue convention to come into force on the exchange of ambassadors. When it is realised that Moscow made the deal contingent on the resumption of peace talks not later than July 31, it is seen with what ruthlessness the Russians have pressed the case for an embassy in Tokyo.

On August 1 last year what was known in Tokyo as the "decisive phase" of the negotiations opened in Moscow. But Mr. Shepilov was adamant in refusing to cede the southern Kuriles save on impossible conditions, and the Japanese argued that the Yalta agreement on these could not bind Japan. The chief impression made by the talks was how deeply relations with Russia have become enmeshed with internal Japanese politics, no politician wanting the odium of a bad treaty and

¹² *Christian Science Monitor*, January 27, 1956.

yet all thirsting to be the architect of peace. In Moscow Mr. Shigemitsu, the leader of the delegation, now shifted his ground and agreed that the territorial issue be shelved and diplomatic relations restored on the terms accepted by Dr. Adenauer in Moscow in September, 1955. This led Mr. Kono to demand that the Prime Minister go to Moscow. But the end that this proposal at last brought to the negotiations in October did very little to gratify Japanese feelings. When Mr. Hatoyama arrived in Russia on October 12 he had already agreed by correspondence with Bulganin on the main heads of a declaration to end the state of war, but if there was anything to gain by further pressure on the territorial issue he was ready to try. There were talks on this between the Prime Minister and Bulganin and between Mr. Kono and Mr. Khrushchev. While they were in Japan the Liberal Democratic Party passed through convulsions of factionalism. When agreement was reported on the 19th it was merely in the guise of an extended "Adenauer formula." The state of war was to be ended, ambassadors exchanged, known detainees repatriated, trade and fishing agreements reached, and Japan's application for membership of the United Nations supported by Russia. The only reference to territory was that a peace treaty would be negotiated and thereafter Habomai and Shikotan returned. The inference was that any further Japanese pressure for the South Kuriles could only postpone the return of the two smaller islands. Hence, when relations with Russia were resumed last December and Japan was admitted into the UN, dissatisfaction on the territorial issue remained, but the general feeling was that further talks would be absurd.

The Soviet-Japanese negotiations, like every aspect of Japanese diplomacy, reflect the vicious exigencies encompassing the country. Having irredentist claims in both camps, Japan can reach a settlement with neither Russia nor the United States which does not set back the chances of success with the other. On their side the Soviet authorities appear to see no reason for disgorging their cheaply won gains unless Japan can be definitely prised out of the Western containment

belt. For the moment Japanese appetite for co-existence can be whetted, now by a few detainees, now by a couple of trawlers seized in the narrows between Hokkaido and Habomai. But should it become necessary to feed Japanese resentment against their international position, with all its frustrations, the Russians have many rich plums in reserve. At present these feelings are increasing without the need of stimulation.

PACIFIC AIRSTRIP ONE

While relations between Japan and her Communist neighbours have taken an upward turn since 1954, the stock of the United States has worsened *pari passu*. The United States have many psychological disadvantages in Japan, physical presence, for example, and association in the Japanese mind with distasteful things, such as higher taxes and foreign military bases, whereas the Communists have the appeal of trade and apparent freedom from responsibility. The services of the United States to Japan's recovery were indeed unprecedented when compared with the customary attitude of Great Powers towards enemies overthrown after long and bitter fighting. But in politics present grievances are more likely to rankle than past favours to be remembered. Moreover, the good will earned by the United States in Japan during the Occupation was subjected to immense strain as the containment policy was put into effect. The United States-Japanese Security Pact of 1951 has appeared to a nation of patriots as symbolising offshore national status, as well as ensuring that Japan would be one of the first targets for destruction in any global conflict. From time to time in 1955 there were not very convincing denials by the Government that American aircraft based in Japan were armed with nuclear weapons, and some extremely ugly situations occurred in the summer of that year and again last October with local resistance to the extension of airfields to accommodate American bombers believed to be equipped with nuclear bombs and to American artillery practice on the slopes of the sacred Mount Fuji. The alternative to foreign troops is to provide for one's own defence, but the perversity of life is

such that American insistence that this is precisely what Japan should do has stimulated even more anti-American feeling.

The formal basis of the United States contribution to Japanese rearmament was laid down in the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement signed in Tokyo by the American Ambassador, Mr. John Allison, and the Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Okazaki, on March 8, 1954.¹³ This provided that the United States would supply to Japan military equipment to a value not specified¹⁴ and that an American military advisory group would be created—the so-called “country team,” the numbers and cost of which were the subject of much hard bargaining—in order to screen Japanese requests for military aid, assist in the training of the new Japanese forces, and supervise the use of mutual defence equipment. The United States in a separate agreement also undertook to sell to Japan surplus farm products, chiefly wheat and barley, against payment in yen. Of the yen proceeds from the disposal of these farm products in Japan the United States was to refund a smaller fraction (known as the counterpart funds) for the development of Japanese defence industries; the remainder was to be spent by the United States in Japan for the procurement of military supplies for shipment in part to other Asian countries in receipt of American military assistance. The amount of surplus American food grains in each of the agreements since 1954 (the first was valued at approximately \$100 million) has been determined by bargaining not always free from acerbity on either side, as also the proportions to be free and lent respectively, the rate of interest to be charged on the latter and the uses to which the counterpart funds are to be applied.

On March 2, 1954, the Cabinet approved the texts of two Bills providing for the creation of a National Defence Force, subsequently brought under civilian control, with a complement of men rising to 164,000 over the following eight years.

¹³ For text see *Nippon Times*, March 9, 1954.

¹⁴ It was reported in March, 1954, that something like \$500 million worth of military equipment was involved; *Nippon Times*, March 10 and April 17, 1954.

This represented an extremely disappointing level of anticipated achievement in the American judgment and Tokyo was firmly told to raise its sights again to the 350,000 target agreed to the previous year by Mr. Yoshida and Mr. Shigemitsu, then leader of the Opposition. Even so, the Bills were not approved by the Diet in May and June, 1954, without criticism from the Socialists culminating in physical violence. While the hopes entertained by certain Americans that the Japanese could be converted by the Occupation into Christian pacifists were absurd, there is no doubt that Japanese experiences in the war did a great deal to encourage an *ohne mich* feeling about world affairs. For a defeated people it is obnoxious to return to the hard world again, and the Americans are accessible scapegoats. Apart from pacifist sentiment, arms cost money, and much money these days. Any Cabinet embarking on rearmament has to forgo the low taxation rates and industrial subsidies which have done so much for every Government's public relations since the Occupation. When Mr. Yoshida told Japan of its duty "to contribute to the defence of the free world" in January, 1954, he also introduced an "austerity" budget to raise the wherewithal to pay for it. This was at once denigrated in the Diet as "made in America," although it provided for defence costs amounting to only 8 per cent. of ordinary Government expenditure.

The Japanese have not been averse to the building up of their arms industry, the heavy sector of industry being most in need of modernisation. It is the provision of manpower for the forces, except the air force, that is objected to on the grounds that military service is a subtraction from the productive capacity of the community, and also (this being the fear of the Left) an increase in the army means an increase in the power of Right-wing nationalism. Rearmament, as in Europe, has accentuated political discord, which is already grave in Japan; the parties of the Right call for a revision of Article IX of the Constitution which prohibits the building of armed force in excess of the requirements of internal order, and they contend that Japan's membership of the UN now makes revision urgent. The Left see in any constitutional change the

point of a lever which ultimately may extirpate from Japanese life the democratic forms which have improved the influence of the working class since the end of the war. At the elections in 1955 both the main Conservative parties undertook if elected to revise the Constitution so as to make rearmament legal. In the event Mr. Hatoyama's majority fell short of the two-thirds required for amendments to the Constitution and Japan remains in the position of being by fundamental law a pacifist nation while being bound by treaty to "make its contribution to the defence of the free world." The weakness of the position of the Socialists in all this is that they cannot reasonably object to a constitutional provision for rearmament, yet they are well aware that Conservative dissatisfaction with the American-sponsored Constitution extends to matters beyond those covered by Article IX.

If the rearmament imbroglio is the chief reason for recent frictions in relations between Japan and the United States, there is no dearth of others to sustain the growing feeling that the country is bound hand and foot by the interests of Washington and by American interests Washington cannot control. Outstanding among these is the continuing American occupation of the Okinawa islands, the most southerly group of the Ryukyus, which offer facilities for striking deep into Communist China, Manchuria and Russia's Far Eastern territories. During the negotiation of the peace treaty in 1951 it was anticipated that the Ryukyus would be converted into strategic trust territories to be held by the United States and this was foreshadowed in Article III of the treaty. When this idea was dropped there was some gratification in Japan as it was felt that a trusteeship might be more permanent than the control provided for in the occupation agreement; by the terms of this "residual sovereignty," to use the expression applied by Mr. Dulles, was definitely reserved to Japan over the Ryukyus and the Bonin islands.¹⁵ The gradual withdrawal of American ground forces from Japan proper, however (the process should be completed this year), has helped to produce

¹⁵ *Nippon Times*, April 2, 1955.

a new situation, and American military advisers are firm about the indispensability of Okinawa. There is also much discontent among the local population in the Ryukyus with the rents paid for the use of land by United States military authorities and the failure so far to fulfil the islanders' demands for self-government.¹⁶

On August 8, 1953, the ten smaller islands to the north, called the Amami-Oshima group, which are situated between Kyushu and Okinawa and contain one quarter of the total Ryukyu population of 800,000, were restored to Japanese political control. In announcing this Mr. Dulles said that American control over the major strategic islands, including Okinawa, would continue "during the present tension in the Far East." The most recent affirmation of the American intention to hold Okinawa unchanged was made by General Lemintzer, the Commander-in-Chief United States Far East Forces, in Tokyo on July 4, 1956.¹⁷ Apart from the sentimental desire to resume control over people indisputably Japanese in nationality,¹⁸ it has been always held in Japan that these islands were seized by the Americans with scarcely a tithe of justification, as they cannot be said to have been taken by Japan "by violence and greed," the condition laid down in the Cairo and Potsdam agreements on Japanese territory. Irredentism extends also, though far less passionately, to the Bonin islands lying to the south of Tokyo and also occupied by American forces in 1945.

On a more emotional level was the dramatic outburst of feeling in Japan over the *Fukuryu Maru* incident of March 1, 1954, when twenty-three Japanese fishermen, one of whom later died, were affected by fall-out from an American thermonuclear weapon exploded in the Marshall Islands. Festering indignation was suddenly discharged in the countrywide demand for an apology and was revived again in May, 1956, when the Hiroshima "council for banning atomic and thermonuclear weapons" protested to President Eisenhower against the 1956

¹⁶ *The Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 29, 1956.

¹⁷ *The Daily Telegraph*, July 5, 1956

¹⁸ In August, 1954, the District Court of Hawaii quoted the legal adviser of the U.S. State Department for this opinion.

hydrogen bomb tests in the Pacific.¹⁹ But whether emotional or rational there has never been lacking in Japan in recent years material for anti-American prejudice to feed upon: the dispute over the proportion of Occupation costs, estimated at \$2,000 million, to be reimbursed by Japan; the scale of the American contribution to the Japanese rearmament effort; the utilisation of the counterpart funds in Japanese industry and agriculture; the size and composition of the new Japanese defence forces; jurisdiction over American troops in Japan under the Security Pact; the harm inflicted on the Japanese merchant marine by pressures exerted by American shipping lobbies in Washington; the strategic embargo on trade with Communist China; the measures of dubious international legality directed against Japanese textiles by State legislatures in South Carolina, Alabama and Mississippi, which require sellers of Japanese cloth in those States to advertise the country of origin²⁰; and so the recital of discontent continues.

On their side the Americans have little cause for feeling satisfied with the Japanese attitude towards themselves. Minor grievances such as the matter of the full rate of income tax recently imposed in Japan on foreign businessmen and residents mingle with greater, such as the reluctance of Japanese politicians to jeopardise their popularity by cutting Government spending and bracing up the economy so as to better their performance under the mutual aid programme. This American restiveness reached a climax in the spring of 1955 when a proposed visit to Washington by Mr. Shigemitsu was postponed by the State Department as it did not permit "adequate time for preparation." It was suspected that what the Foreign Minister was really out for was to improve his own political stock and the State Department did not eagerly fall in with this. When the visit took place at the end of August it resulted in none of the concessions in the matter of increased aid, the release of war criminals ("the scar at our heart") and the revision of the Security Pact which Mr. Shigemitsu was notoriously angling for. What is more, a loose

¹⁹ *The Times*, May 22, 1956.

²⁰ *New York Times*, April 6, 12 and 18, 1956.

reference in the *communiqué* issued after the meetings to a Japanese "contribution to the preservation of international peace and security in the western Pacific" provoked an outcry as it was construed as a pledge to send troops abroad to fight in America's wars.

For all this, the Hatoyama Cabinet (and the same must be true of any Conservative successor) was careful never to allow the deterioration in relations with the United States to proceed beyond the point of no return. Much of the credit for this must go to Mr. Shigemitsu, who astutely managed the talks with Russia so as to reinsure against any abandonment of ties with the West. But so long as Japan is directed by Conservatives it is unlikely that the alliance with the United States will lapse. The unburdening by politicians of grievances against Washington and a little reluctance to repress popular anti-American riots have a value in defending the Government against defeat as an American pawn; they may also encourage the Communist Powers to make gestures that may be used later to lever up Japan's bargaining power with the rest of the world. But in essentials the policy and attitudes of Japan towards the United States are ambivalent and must be so while the world situation and social forces in Japan remain what they are: *odi et amo et excrucior*.

BETWEEN TWO WORLDS

Few countries had more to suffer from an unsuccessful bid to rule half the world than Japan. Few were as poorly endowed to recover from total defeat and the packing of her vast population into four small islands. Since the recovery of her sovereignty the internal politics of Japan have been disturbed and heavy with unquiet omens, her politicians opportunist and vote-catching, her people inexperienced in parliamentary democracy, though learning fast. But, after all account of this is taken, the gains of the past decade should not be understated. An economic equilibrium of a kind has been realised; many of the social advances effected under the Occupation have been consolidated; progress is being made, however haltingly, towards the re-establishment of relations with Japan's

neighbours. Above all, the international status of the country is being very slowly pushed up, however much malcontents on both political wings protest, either that Japan is dragged along in the train of America or "orphaned in the Pacific." This rehabilitation compares favourably with that of her wartime ally, Germany.

And yet the outlook for Japan is far from rosy. Simply because of her preoccupation with urgent Japanese interests, added to bitter experience elsewhere of how these interests have been furthered in the past, Japan has few real friends in the world. The goodwill she earns has to be worked for, inch by inch, and the relative freedom she has enjoyed to go her own way since 1952 has been due as much to indifference towards her in the West, especially in Britain, as to any following by other countries of Japanese leadership. The last card which in the past States have been able to play to advance their cause, that of war, is now even more out of Japan's reach than it is of almost any other country in the world. Militarist factions and secret societies may come out of hiding, especially if the ominous gulf between Socialists and Conservatives widens, but the door to another Pearl Harbor was closed for all time at Hiroshima. The future of Japan is in the hands of her industry and commerce, her adroit, tenacious diplomacy, her ability, as in the past, to canvass her argument in the world's markets and chancelleries. In these arts Japanese leaders have shown outstanding ability, their strength lying in a certain lack of nostalgia or psychological inertia, their skill in adapting themselves to the present and future. For its part the West cannot profit from arraigning Japan with self-interestedness, for her difficulties are too great to let her act otherwise. The aim should be to try to create a world in which the Japanese can satisfy their minimum legitimate expectations. It is not only that otherwise the Communist allurements will grow and possibly swing the whole internal structure of politics to one extreme or the other. The tragedy will be that an opportunity will have been lost to harness Japanese industry and enterprise to the raising of living standards in non-Communist Asia.

SOVIET AID TO UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

By

F. PARKINSON

DURING the last two years Soviet aid to underdeveloped countries has been emerging as a new factor of international politics.¹ At one time, between mid-1955 and mid-1956, this produced considerable alarm in the West, where many people were inclined to take Western near-monopoly of the supply of capital goods and technical aid to underdeveloped countries for granted. But the first shock of this new development has spent itself, and Westerners by and large are now prepared to see the problem in a new light. Soviet aid to underdeveloped countries is no longer a premier preoccupation, but precisely for this reason this may be a suitable moment for an analysis of its wider political implications in international relations.

THE GREAT POWERS AND THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

A comparison of the international panorama of 1945 with that of 1957 shows a marked decline of the area under direct rule of the Great Powers. In the tropical and subtropical regions of the world a belt of new States, the underdeveloped countries, is now emerging. This does not necessarily mean that the Great Powers are undergoing *capitis deminutio*. The appearance of the Italian *renaissance* States in the late Middle Ages marked the formation of new centres of strength in an international environment of weakness, but the emergence of the underdeveloped countries during the second half of the twentieth century, on the contrary, marks the formation

¹ Underdeveloped countries, in the context of this paper, are those countries which are both *economically and technically* (in a broad sense) backward. Viet Nam, Jordan, Pakistan and Bolivia would be typically underdeveloped countries. Australia, Canada and South Africa, with their high standards of technical culture, on the other hand, would not.

of areas of weakness in an international environment of great strength.

The causes for the inherent weakness of the underdeveloped countries are many, but basic economic instability caused by poverty, and often also by an over-reliance on single-crop exports, is perhaps the chief cause. Thus, the underdeveloped countries represent a power vacuum which threatens to undermine the stability of international society. What is worse, the position is steadily deteriorating. Hardly a year passes without another ex-colonial State joining the existing underdeveloped countries, aggravating the problem even more. Worse still is the uneven rate of economic development. The Great Powers, highly industrialised, are constantly feeding on auto-accumulation of capital, while the underdeveloped countries, devoid of capital resources and unbalanced in their economic and political structure, stagnate.

Since independence was first granted to them, the newly sovereign among the underdeveloped countries have undergone a far-reaching change of outlook. The original enthusiasm and in some cases extravagant self-confidence of independence has led to sober reappraisal of the situation and then to a mood of bitterness, as the prospect of continued economic and technical dependence on the Great Powers became apparent. Two social factors are mainly responsible for this development. First there is the so-called "revolution of expectations" which, as a result of increasing cultural contact with the West, produces in the socially and economically depressed populations in the underdeveloped countries the desire to attain standards of living enjoyed in the West. This places the governments of these countries in a position in which—if they wish to remain in power—they have to expound and implement policies leading to a substantial rise in the standard of living. In practice that means working for industrialisation which, under modern technological conditions, is the only quick and effective way of producing wealth. In one form or another, this is in fact the method being employed in most underdeveloped countries today.

Second, industrialisation in underdeveloped countries spells not only higher standards of living for the population but also greater power for the State in its relations with foreign countries. It is a poor status of independence which is not solidly founded on a sound industrial basis. But it is one thing to be agreed on a policy of rapid industrialisation, and quite another to carry this into effect. This placed the governments of underdeveloped countries into a serious dilemma. If, by accepting foreign economic aid on a massive scale—where they can get it—these governments are to choose the short and technically easy path to industrialisation, they are running the risk of deepening their economic and technical dependence on the Great Powers, from which alone adequate amounts of economic and technical aid can be obtained. If, on the other hand, internal savings are to provide the means of industrialisation, fresh economic sacrifices—which the underdeveloped countries can very ill afford—have to be made, and the day of ultimate economic independence put off for some considerable period of time. Either course clearly incurs the political danger of Great Power re-encroachment on the newly won and jealously guarded national independence.

Basically, there are only two ways of avoiding this dilemma. The traditional direction of international power pressure can be reversed and the two rival groups among the Great Powers subjected to “competitive” pressure, the object being the extraction from each side of ever-growing quantities of capital on conditions which would exclude the danger of renewed political suzerainty. The other way, at bottom merely a nicely dressed-up variant of the method just described, consists in compelling the Great Powers in the United Nations to place sufficiently large amounts of capital at the disposal of an international institution, such as SUNFED,² a proposed specialised agency on which the underdeveloped countries would be represented on the basis of equal voting rights. Such an international agency would then arrange for the collection, and supervise the distribution,

² Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development.

of capital according to principles of strict equity, as determined collectively by the executive of the agency.³

The latter alternative has in fact proved itself to be the less effective one, and more and more reliance is therefore being placed on the former. Both individually and collectively the underdeveloped countries are now attempting to exercise diplomatic pressure on the Great Powers towards this end. This clearly reflects itself in the general voting pattern of the underdeveloped countries in the United Nations. Of the three principal issues affecting the Afro-Asian-Latin American constellation in that body—the containment of the Soviet Union, the colonial question, and the provision of economic aid for underdeveloped countries—it is the latter which produces the highest degree of voting solidarity among the underdeveloped countries.

Normally, no amount of diplomatic pressure, whether exercised individually or collectively, is sufficient to coerce the Great Powers into granting aid against their own free will. What compels them to pay attention to the wishes of the underdeveloped countries is the fierce rivalry between the two halves of the world oligarchy, each of which is prepared to profit from the mistakes or omissions of the other. In such a situation neither the United States, leader of the Anglo-Franco-American camp and principal source of capital in the West, nor the Soviet Union, hegemonial power and only fully industrialised country of the Sino-Soviet sphere, can afford to stand by and watch the other side taking the initiative towards binding the underdeveloped countries economically, diplomatically and politically. Viewed in this light, economic aid to underdeveloped countries becomes an imperative for the Great Powers also. In the present international constellation, this results in “competitive” economic aid.

THE SOVIET BID

Before 1951 Soviet diplomatic practice showed a tendency to place the underdeveloped countries together with the highly

³ For a detailed analytical account of this, see F. Parkinson, “Bandung and the Underdeveloped Countries,” in this *Year Book*, 1956, pp. 65-83.

industrialised countries of the West into one and the same category of potentially hostile States. "Subjectively," it would be argued, the underdeveloped countries might consider themselves free and independent, but "objectively" (as determined by Soviet experts) they had to be regarded as the willing or unwilling tools of the West, and therefore had to receive identical international treatment.⁴

The war in Korea, however, marked a turning point in this respect. Bitter experience had taught the Soviet leaders that any attempted advance into areas of potential strength, such as certain parts of Europe and the Far East, merely serves to add to the military strength of NATO and the US-led Korean Alliance the industrial power of Germany and Japan. A policy of territorial expansion, it was feared, would alarm the underdeveloped countries which, by and large, formed the last remaining area that was still outside the Western alliance system. It was with the object of gaining the friendship of these countries while they were still politically uncommitted that Soviet policy took a new turn.

Between 1951 and 1955, while negotiating a diplomatic stalemate with the West, and consolidating its positions in Europe and the Far East, Soviet policy shifted its main focus of attention from the developed northern hemisphere, where the limits of possible expansion had been reached, to the underdeveloped countries in the south, a much more promising field for Soviet diplomatic operations. But it was not only the direction of Soviet policy that was changing; it was also its character. Economic aid was chosen to replace crude military-diplomatic pressure, and has proved itself a mode of diplomacy peculiarly fitted for application to the underdeveloped countries. The "cold war" in its old form was liquidated during the three Geneva Conferences of 1954

⁴ For this phase see Hugh Seton-Watson, "Five Years of Cold War," in this *Year Book*, 1953, pp. 20-44. See also G. McT. Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia*, 1952.

and 1955, and Soviet policy was set free to concentrate on the economic offensive in the underdeveloped countries.⁵

At first the change in Soviet foreign policy was barely perceptible. Only from a few vantage points, such as the United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), was it possible to observe the genesis of the new Soviet tactic.⁶ In January 1953, the Soviet delegate to that Commission made a general, if somewhat vague, offer of economic aid to the underdeveloped countries of the region.⁷ A month later, also at ECAFE, the Soviet delegate made a concrete offer to supply electrical equipment, agricultural machinery and ready-made plants for light industry.⁸ On July 15, 1953, Mr. Arutinian, the permanent Soviet delegate to the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) at Geneva, announced his government's intention of contributing the amount of 4½ million roubles (unconvertible) to the United Nations programme of technical assistance. This amount was firmly pledged during the United Nations Conference on Technical Assistance held in October 1953.⁹ The delegate of the United States at this conference, who had earlier on in the discussion made further American contributions in this field dependent on wide international agreement on disarmament, was so startled by this announcement that he at once reversed his attitude, pledging an amount of \$12 million as the new contribution of the United States.

Finally, Mr. M. A. Menshikov, former Minister of Foreign Trade of the Soviet Union, and then Ambassador to New Delhi, in his capacity of Soviet delegate to the Tenth Congress of ECAFE, on February 8, 1954, laid down the general principles which were henceforth to govern Soviet economic aid to the underdeveloped countries.⁹ These amounted to the following—

⁵ For an analysis of these conferences see F. Parkinson, "From Berlin to Bangkok," in this *Year Book*, 1955, pp. 56-80, and Lord Lindsay of Birker, "The Geneva Meetings," in this *Year Book*, 1956, pp. 1-20.

⁶ For a detailed description, see Hans Braker, "Die Wirtschaftsbeziehungen der Sowjetunion zu Süd- und Südostasien," in *Osteuropa*, Vol. 5, Nr. 5, October 1955, pp. 336-344.

⁷ *Izvestia*, January 31, 1953.

⁸ *Pravda*, February 27, 1953.

⁹ *Izvestia*, February 11, 1954.

(1) all trade relations to be conducted on a footing of strict reciprocity and to be based on long-term agreements;

(2) firm prices to be maintained, the unit of account being the currency of the underdeveloped country concerned, with currency surpluses to be settled on a sterling basis;

(3) Soviet willingness to accept payment by instalments;

(4) Soviet willingness to supply industrial equipment; and

(5) Soviet willingness to grant technical assistance within the framework provided for that purpose by the United Nations.

When the Menshikov principles were expounded at Manila the implementation of the new Soviet policy had already got under way. On August 5, 1953 (significantly just after the end of hostilities in Korea) an agreement was signed with Argentina according to which the Soviet Union was to supply oil and industrial equipment in return for the traditional exports of that country.¹⁰ On December 2, 1953, a similar agreement was signed with India which, for the first time in Soviet practice, provided for direct technical assistance to an underdeveloped country not already within the orbit of Soviet political influence.¹¹ Similar agreements with Afghanistan and Lebanon followed, and in October 1954 the 1937 trade agreement with Turkey was reactivated.

In the West there was a tendency to dismiss these signs as sporadic Soviet attempts to hoodwink the underdeveloped countries. Few Western observers thought there was much substance behind them. But twelve months later, in autumn 1955, close on the heels of the South Asian tour of Mr. Bulganin and Mr. Khrushchev, there followed a determined economic offensive of major dimensions, leaving little doubt as to its purpose. Here is part of the Soviet timetable—

September 1, 1955 :	Yugoslavia	(agreement)
September 27, 1955 :	Egypt	(agreement)
November 17, 1955 :	Syria	(agreement)
December 7, 1955 :	Burma	(agreement)
December 12, 1955 :	India	(agreement)

¹⁰ *Vneshnaya Torgovlya*, 10/1953.

¹¹ *Izvestia*, December 4, 1953 and *The Indian Trade Journal*, December 12, 1953.

December 18, 1955 :	Afghanistan	(agreement)
January 16, 1956 :	Venezuela	(offer)
February 6, 1956 :	Pakistan	(offer)
February 7, 1956 :	Turkey	(offer).

Structurally, Soviet economic aid differs from Western aid in several important respects. Soviet *credits* usually consist of closely "tied" loans (convertible loans are granted only in cases of exceptionally high political priority) at a low rate of interest (usually 2 per cent., as against the $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. usually charged by the World Bank) and are repayable over a period of ten or more years. Grants, a very common form of economic aid extended by the United States, are practically unknown in Soviet practice. (The only material exception here is a Soviet grant of reconstruction to North Korea.) Western credits are usually freely convertible, but are not as a rule granted without previous scrutiny of the commercial soundness of the projects concerned. Soviet *technical assistance* is either channelled through the United Nations or rendered directly as a by-product of specific, Soviet-aided projects. Western technical assistance flows both through the United Nations and organisations such as the British-inspired Colombo Plan or the American Point Four programme. Lastly, Soviet bulk buying of *surplus crops* from certain underdeveloped countries with monocultures (usually when they are in balance of payments difficulties), has no counterpart in Western practice.

Estimates as to the actual volume of Soviet aid to underdeveloped countries vary considerably, but it is generally agreed that it is far from negligible, and that it would be exceedingly foolish to shrug it off as unimportant. There also seems to be little doubt as to the ability—as distinct from the willingness—of the Soviet Union to deliver the goods promised.

What lends Soviet economic aid its peculiar political effectiveness is not so much its functional composition or its physical volume, as the general manner of its delivery. It is here that the Soviet Union is making political capital, and the West is lagging sadly behind. Actually, this is hardly

surprising, since the Soviet side enters this competition with several major advantages, to be treated subsequently under two aspects: material and psychological.

SOVIET MATERIAL ADVANTAGES

In economic aid to underdeveloped countries Soviet material advantages are threefold: (a) the centralised character of the individual economies of the Soviet sphere, (b) the high measure of international economic integration achieved within the Soviet sphere, and (c) the close international coordination of Soviet *bloc* policies towards the underdeveloped countries.

Because they can be shaped and formed so as to serve a variety of purposes, centralised economies—like those of the Soviet sphere—which for decades have been kept on a wartime footing, can be a much more effective instrument of international policy than can the uncontrolled peacetime economies of the West, in which the vast majority of economic decisions are taken independently by the individual members of the business community. Governments in the Soviet sphere, not being politically responsible to their public for economic decisions taken, are in a position to pursue economic policies in complete disregard of commercial benefits. Soviet sphere countries contain populations inured to the hardships and deprivations demanded by a high rate of forced savings over a long period of time. As one leading Western statesman put it: “One of the leaders of Russia told me when I was there last autumn that it was his conviction that we in the West were a pretty soft lot, and that we could not endure nearly so well as the Soviet people the rigours and the sacrifices which competitive coexistence would involve.”¹² Indeed, as any Western minister of finance knows, Western people, whose standard of living has been rising steadily for some time, are not easily induced in peacetime to make substantial sacrifices which do not bring quick returns in their train.

¹² Mr Lester Pearson, Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, speaking at Toronto, Ontario, on March 12, 1956. See Information Division, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, *Statements and Speeches*, Nr 56/3, March 12, 1956.

For the first time since the inauguration of the first Five-Year Plan in 1928 the Soviet Union has certain surpluses available for export. These happen to be mainly producer goods for which there is an insatiable demand on the part of the underdeveloped countries. It is, of course, true that Western potentials for capital export and technical aid are considerably higher than those of the Soviet sphere. It is also true that the Soviet Union is hampered by rival demands from her own satellites and China. The point is that *private* capital in the West—at any rate so long as boom conditions are prevailing at home—is showing decided tendencies of either staying at home altogether or of flowing into safe and sound areas like Canada, Australia and South Africa, avoiding the high-risk underdeveloped countries. The significant exception here are the extracting industries, like oil, which will be mentioned subsequently. The raising of *public* money for capital export to underdeveloped countries is meeting great difficulties in the West, where legislatures, such as the United States Congress, rarely loosen their purse strings, thus hindering their governments from pursuing generous policies of foreign economic aid. Senator Russell, for instance, representing the State of Georgia, remarked recently that “there are not many members of Congress who are strong enough in their bailiwicks to vote for increased foreign aid spending and then vote against all the domestic programmes.”¹³ In spite of insistent and sometimes pathetic appeals to Congress made by various Administrations in the United States, the former never conceded, and is unlikely to concede in the near future, the principle of long-term appropriation of funds, which alone would enable the United States to pull its full weight in competition with the Soviet sphere.

Soviet aid suffers from no such inabilities, and can therefore flow unrestrictedly wherever this is deemed politically expedient. By raising taxes for the purpose, governments of the Soviet sphere can enter into long-term contracts with the governments of underdeveloped countries, enabling

¹³ *The Economist*, March 9, 1957, p. 812.

the latter to dovetail Soviet aid with their own long-term plans for economic development.

The Soviet Union possesses in COMECON (an international economic planning centre in Moscow) an instrument enabling her to steer the economies of her satellites along predetermined lines.¹⁴ For purposes of rendering economic aid to underdeveloped countries, the Soviet *bloc* is thus in a position to act as a single unit. In this international division of labour the four most industrialised countries of the Soviet *bloc*, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Eastern Germany and the Soviet Union herself, are assigned special tasks.¹⁵

Western Europe is now with great difficulty and at a slow pace transforming itself into a unified economic sphere and may in time evolve organs for international economic cooperation. The West on the whole, however, is still lacking in this respect. In May 1956, following a NATO Council meeting, a committee was set up to study this question, but its findings were that NATO was not a fit institution to undertake the task of economic aid to underdeveloped countries, and the matter was quietly dropped.¹⁶

SOVIET PSYCHOLOGICAL ADVANTAGES

In addition to these material advantages, the Soviet side also enjoys certain striking psychological advantages which probably weigh even more heavily in the international struggle of competitive aid to underdeveloped countries.

In the minds of many statesmen of underdeveloped countries, the West, rightly or wrongly, particularly in

¹⁴ *Soviet ekonomicheskoy vsaymopomoshchi.*

¹⁵ For the delivery of complete plants and their installation in the underdeveloped countries, see *Economic Survey for Europe 1955*, Geneva, 1956, p. 182. For the East German contribution, see a statement by Herr Gregor, Minister of Foreign Trade, reported in the *New York Times*, March 8, 1956. The place of China in this scheme is less apparent. She is now dispensing aid on a pattern identical to that of the Soviet *bloc* States. It is possible that Sino-Soviet policy was coordinated during the important Peking talks held in October 1954. For full text of the Peking Agreements, see *Izvestia*, October 12, 1954.

¹⁶ See Report of the Committee of Three on Non-Military Cooperation in NATO, December 1956, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, *Supplementary Paper Nr. 56/9*, December 15, 1956.

connection with its past policy of the "open door," is still associated with the practice of economic exploitation. This makes the underdeveloped countries, most of which were only recently emancipated from colonial domination, wary in their dealings with the West. As if to give nourishment to these suspicions, the patterns of Western private investments in underdeveloped countries are still showing a marked emphasis on the extracting industries, especially those producing strategic minerals. It was only very recently that changes in this pattern could be observed.¹⁷

These stigmas—rightly or wrongly—are not attached to the countries of the Soviet sphere. As Mr. Lester Pearson said "These various Soviet *bloc* offers and proposals have been made with such shrewdness, and have often been so tied up with political appeal, that they have received publicity in the underdeveloped countries out of all proportion to their importance in economic or assistance terms."¹⁸ Previous Russian attempts to exploit underdeveloped countries economically, such as the various railway schemes in Persia and China towards the end of the nineteenth century, not to speak of the systematic Soviet economic exploitation of Eastern Europe before 1954, are quite often conveniently overlooked.¹⁹

These extraordinary attitudes can be explained by reference to some important psychological factors which are underlying these practical considerations. There is, above all, the deep emotional experience of passing through a phase of relative economic and technical "underdevelopment," an experience which the Soviet Union herself has had to undergo. This breeds painful feelings of inferiority *vis-à-vis* the relatively advanced Western countries.²⁰ Westerners often reproach statesmen of underdeveloped countries for their sensitiveness and supposed

¹⁷ See *International Conciliation*, Nr. 510, November 1956 which is devoted exclusively to a discussion of issues before the Eleventh General Assembly of the United Nations.

¹⁸ See, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

¹⁹ For Russian attempts to penetrate the Levant economically, see W. E. Mosse, "Russia and the Levant, 1856-1862" in *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 26, Nr. 1, 1954.

²⁰ On this point see T. A. von Laue, "A Secret Memorandum of Sergei Witte on the Industrialisation of Russia," in *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 26, Nr. 1, 1954.

irrationality. It seems to be often forgotten that the Western countries were the first in the field with industrialisation and technical modernisation of their economies. They consequently never felt the psychological stresses and strains produced by economic and technical backwardness. If the Asian tour of Mr. Bulganin and Mr. Khrushchev is any guide, Soviet leaders and statesmen, who are frequently none too tactful in their dealings with Westerners, have shown themselves remarkably understanding towards the representatives and peoples of underdeveloped countries. The latter are therefore inclined to prefer Soviet States as partners in the enterprise of overcoming economic and technical backwardness. The fact that both sides are employing similar methods of State-managed planning merely deepens existing feelings of solidarity. Soviet leaders are aware of this, and adjust their behaviour accordingly.

“Trade, not aid,” was once the anguished cry of a United Kingdom Chancellor of the Exchequer.²¹ The Soviet Union has in fact demonstrated that trade and aid can become one. “Trade has sometimes become the substitute for aid, with a purpose more political even than economic aid has had in the past.”²² Soviet negotiators are making a special point of stressing the fact that economic relations between the Soviet sphere and the underdeveloped countries are being conducted on the basis of strict reciprocity. “Trade agreements between the Soviet Union and the countries of South-East Asia and the Middle East are based on the strict observation of the principle of mutual benefit, the equality of partners, and respect for national sovereignty.”²³

Soviet credits are in fact quite often arranged in harmony with the desires of the underdeveloped countries, and never carry any property rights with them. (The position is different where the underdeveloped countries concerned are situated *within* the Soviet sphere.) Nowhere is there any

²¹ Mr. R. A. Butler in 1952.

²² *The Times*, February 25, 1956.

²³ See S. Viktorov, “The Expansion of Commercial Ties between the USSR and the Countries of South-East Asia and the Middle East” (in Russian), in *Vneshnaya Torgovlya*, 12/1955, p. 3.

suggestion of incurring gratitude. As Mr. Khrushchev put it at the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party: "Today the underdeveloped countries need not go begging for up-to-date equipment."²⁴ (Burma, however, anxious to market her rice surplus, failed to secure from the Soviet Union industrial machinery in exchange, and finally had to be content with large quantities of concrete for which she had only limited use.²⁵)

In sharp contrast to the very skilful handling of the underdeveloped countries by the Soviet Union, the American approach, with its insistence on a measure of inspection and supervision of the projects for which money is given, must be considered clumsy. Her expectation that outright grants will produce a willingness to support United States policies and a desire to join Western-initiated regional defence arrangements is often naive.

SOVIET POLITICAL OBJECTS

The most crucial question of all still remains to be answered. What are the intentions behind the new policy of Soviet economic aid to underdeveloped countries? Is there a design to make these countries economically and politically dependent on the Soviet sphere?

Several theories have been put forward, and some will be examined here. There is, for instance, at first sight, a fairly close analogy with the policies practised by Dr. Schacht, Nazi Germany's Minister of Economics, in the middle of the 'thirties in relation to the countries of South-Eastern Europe.²⁶ But there are also striking differences.

Briefly, Dr. Schacht's techniques consisted in purchasing surplus crops at elevated prices, and then to use the balances, piling up in Berlin, in order to compel the South-East European countries to accept large quantities of otherwise unsaleable German manufactures at a Reichsmark rate of exchange highly favourable to the Germans. In this way Germany was not

²⁴ Speech by N. S. Khrushchev, *Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, 1956, p. 19.

²⁵ *Daily Telegraph*, May 30, 1956.

²⁶ For a comprehensive account, see A. Basch, *The Danubian Basin*, 1944.

only able to conquer badly needed markets for her manufacturing industries, but also to bring those countries within the German economic sphere, cutting them off from any substantial trade with the West in the course of this process. Once economic dependence on Germany was assured, German political and diplomatic penetration of South-Eastern Europe was facilitated considerably.

Like Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union is now buying surplus crops of underdeveloped countries at prices often above those ruling on the world market. This happens at a time when many Western countries are once more embarrassed with agricultural surpluses.²⁷ This gives the Soviet Union a chance for selective buying. Unlike Nazi Germany, however, the Soviet Union is offering in return a wide range of capital goods for which there is a high demand within the Soviet sphere, and a sellers' market on a world scale. In supplying the underdeveloped countries with these capital goods, the Soviet Union is actually denying her own allies and satellites the benefit of making extra-investments. The immediate economic motive, predominant in the case of Nazi Germany, is therefore non-existent in the case of the Soviet Union. But the ultimate effect, namely the political and economic dependence of the underdeveloped countries, could still be the same. The Soviet Union, moreover, may be aiming at the acquisition of political influence through technical assistance rather than economic aid. This she can achieve by gaining control over a few, carefully selected key-projects, such as steel mills in India, which require the prolonged application of refined technical skill of a kind which the Soviet Union is now in a position to supply.²⁸ It may also be that the Soviet

²⁷ "Over two-fifths of the current Egyptian cotton crop is destined for the Soviet bloc; Afghanistan exports to the Soviet Union 50 per cent. of her cotton crop, 75 per cent. of her wool and 90 per cent. of her oil seeds. Jute and cotton from Pakistan and about half the Burmese rice crop are to be taken under long-term barter agreements. Sugar from Cuba, hides from the Argentine, tobacco, cotton and wheat from Turkey, and coffee, cotton and sugar from Brazil are among other examples of Soviet purchases facilitating the export of primary commodities." *The Financial Times*, October 29, 1956.

²⁸ A Texas construction firm has applied for United States visas for Soviet experts to advise on the use of a new Soviet turbo-drill, reportedly ten times as fast as corresponding American types. See *The Times*, September 26, 1956.

leaders are expecting a major economic crisis to develop in the West which, they hope, would leave the underdeveloped countries economically at the mercy of the countries of the Soviet sphere.²⁹

In order to find a satisfactory answer to these hypothetical questions, one has to examine the theory and practice of Soviet policies towards underdeveloped countries in the past. Such an analysis reveals the existence of two, sharply conflicting, almost mutually exclusive, policies which are pursued alternately over certain periods of time.

There is first of all the policy of *unlimited objectives*. Inherently aggressive—though not, as a rule, warlike—it aims at the direct political domination of the underdeveloped countries on the model of Eastern Europe and Outer Mongolia. Apart from heavy diplomatic pressure such a policy involves the employment of pro-Soviet revolutionary forces within those countries which are selected as suitable targets.³⁰ The Sixth World Congress of the Communist International held in Moscow in 1928 gave this tactic its theoretical formulation. It was decided that both agrarian and industrial revolutionary forces operating against the bourgeoisie of those countries must be given support.³¹ The intention underlying this principle was the weakening of the economies of these underdeveloped countries in order to precipitate a political collapse. Soviet policies based on this theory were actually pursued between 1928 and 1935, and again between 1945 and 1953.³²

On the other hand there is the policy of *limited objectives*. This is essentially defensive, aiming at the consolidation and preservation of the existing Soviet positions, *i.e.*, it is a policy in defence of the *status quo*. (As the example of

²⁹ The constant harping on this theme was a noticeable feature at the Twentieth Party Congress.

³⁰ It should not be too readily assumed that these forces are always left-wing. For an instructive sociological analysis of the revolutionary forces in a typically underdeveloped country, see "Syria on the Move," in *The World Today*, Vol. 13, Nr. 1, January 1957.

³¹ For details see *International Press Correspondence*, Vol. 8, December 12, 1928.

³² 1928 was the year after the great Communist debacle in China. In 1935 the "popular front" policy was publicly proclaimed in Moscow by Signor Togliatti (Ercoli) in his key-speech during the Comintern Congress.

Hungary has shown, Soviet positions within the Soviet *bloc* are included in this conception.) The function of pro-Soviet revolutionary forces in this case is to give support to their governments. This line found its theoretical expression at the Fifteenth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in 1926, where Bukharin developed the novel thesis that the industrialisation of the underdeveloped countries must be actively promoted by the Soviet Union so as "to prevent their engulfment by capitalist imperialism."³³ Support for the national bourgeoisie and national independence of the underdeveloped countries as well as the normalisation of the international relations between the Soviet Union and those countries is clearly implied in Bukharin's thesis. This policy, the immediate political objective of which is the erection of barriers of strength against the Western Powers, was pursued between 1923 and 1928, and is again being put into commission today.³⁴

The basic dilemma of Soviet policy towards underdeveloped countries plainly manifests itself in those two attitudes: on the one hand there is the desire to see those countries turned into Soviet satellites, and on the other hand there is the international necessity to develop them as buffer States against the West. Because both policies have tactical advantages and disadvantages, Soviet foreign policy tends to switch from the one to the other, though not, as has been shown, with great frequency.

"Competitive coexistence" implies a limitation of objectives, and present Soviet policy towards underdeveloped countries therefore belongs to the second type described above. It is interesting to see how the policy of economic aid to underdeveloped countries varies in direct accord with the exigencies of Soviet overall policy. Mr. Khrushchev, speaking at the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956, established

³³ See *XV Konferentsia*, October 26–November 3, 1926. Stenographic record, 1927.

³⁴ During the anti-Hitler decade of Soviet foreign policy, 1935–1945 (the brief spell of the Nazi-Soviet pact, 1939–1941 excepted) both Soviet diplomacy and pro-Soviet revolutionaries in the underdeveloped countries supported the anti-Hitler imperialist Powers.

a sliding scale of five categories of countries, for each of which there is a standard Soviet attitude. He listed these groups in the following order: (1) Eastern Europe and China (with North Korea, North Viet Nam and Outer Mongolia), (2) Yugoslavia (a category all of its own), (3) the "neutral" underdeveloped countries (which Mr. Khrushchev described as "countries which refuse to be involved in military blocs"), (4) the "neutral" and "neutralised" Western countries (such as Switzerland, Sweden and Austria), and (5) the Western countries and their allies among the underdeveloped countries.³⁵

A few figures will illustrate how political objectives determine the actual distribution and size of Soviet economic aid, as witness the table below³⁶:

Total Soviet Commitments to Underdeveloped Countries:
(figures in million dollars, official rate of exchange).

(1) China	:	\$480
(2) Yugoslavia	:	\$800
(3) India	:	\$150
(4) Afghanistan	:	\$100
(5) Indonesia	:	\$100

The main contribution made by Soviet aid towards Egypt consists in the purchase of two-fifths of her cotton crop and the delivery of large quantities of modern arms in return.

The political purpose behind Soviet economic aid is plainly apparent: potential waverers among Communist States are receiving top priority, with some "neutrals" among the underdeveloped countries coming a close second. There is some direct documentary evidence available to support that thesis, witness the following passage, taken from a joint

³⁵ Speech by N. S. Khrushchev. *Report of the Central Committee. Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, 1956, p. 81.

³⁶ Figures taken from Harry Schwartz, writing in the *New York Times*, May 6, 1956, and from *The Financial Times*, October 29, 1956. For details on Soviet economic aid to China and North Korea, see two excellent studies by Vsevolod Holubnychy in the *Bulletin of the Institute for the Study of the USSR*, Vol. 3, Nr. 1, January 1956 and Vol. 4, Nr. 1, January 1957.

communiqué issued in Moscow on July 17, 1956, at the close of the talks between the Soviet leaders and Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia: "The Soviet Government has expressed its readiness to render technical and economic aid to Cambodia without self-seeking conditions and with full respect for the sovereignty, independence and national dignity of Cambodia, with a view to enabling her to develop her economy, *to continue to pursue a policy of neutrality* (the italics are mine), and to maintain friendly cooperation with other nations in the interests of Cambodian prosperity and well-being . . . etc."³⁷

Present Soviet policy tends to encourage "neutralist" sentiment wherever it can be found, and to awaken it where it is dormant.³⁸ This task is facilitated by the growing fashion among underdeveloped countries to bring their diplomatic, political and economic relations with the West into balance with those of the Soviet sphere. In the course of this readjustment old links are being severed with the West while new ones are being forged with the Soviet sphere. This has given some "neutralist" underdeveloped countries the reputation of being supporters of the Soviet foreign policy. Actually, however, it was Soviet policy which veered round in support of "neutralism" after 1953.³⁹

If further evidence of the political function of Soviet aid to underdeveloped countries were needed, it could be found in Soviet attitudes towards those underdeveloped countries which are situated *within* the Soviet orbit, where Soviet conduct is free from diplomatic trammels and where Soviet armed forces provide an effective sanction. Three distinct phases can be distinguished. Between 1945 and 1946 those countries suffered the wholesale removal of industrial equipment

³⁷ For full text, see *Pravda*, July 8, 1956.

³⁸ For a brief moment it looked as if Soviet diplomacy would be given a unique opportunity for doing this when U Nu, Prime Minister of Burma, during a visit to Moscow, invited the Soviet leaders to participate at the next Afro-Asian conference. A few days later, however, this invitation was withdrawn. See *The Times*, November 2, 1955.

³⁹ There are at present no indications that either side among the Great Powers is working for the "neutralisation" of any single or group of underdeveloped countries.

to the Soviet Union. It is conceivable that this phase is historically unique and not likely to recur. The same could hardly be said of the period 1947-1954, during which systematic Soviet economic penetration and exploitation was the order of the day. This was done in two ways: through the imposition, in secret clauses of commercial agreements, of terms of trade highly favourable to the Soviet Union, and through the establishment of joint industrial enterprises in which the Soviet Union was holding the majority of shares.⁴⁰ It was not before October 1954 that there were signs of a more equitable relationship developing between the Soviet Union, China and the Soviet satellites in Europe and the Far East. It seems that, in the Soviet sphere, political co-ordination is an essential condition for international economic equality.⁴¹

SOVIET RISKS

Contrary to a widespread view, the present Soviet policy towards underdeveloped countries is not entirely without its dangers. In the first place, even though it may serve the purpose of separating those countries from the West, such a policy tends to create in the long run a number of positions of strength against the Soviet Union herself. The latter may, for instance, one day find herself in a position analogous to that which existed between 1918 and 1922. In those days she was confronted with the awkward choice of either working for the collapse of the politically weak Weimar Republic in the hope of producing a German Communist revolution (risking the military intervention of France), or supporting the creation of a strong Germany capable of acting as a buffer State between the Soviet Union and France. After an initial period of vacillation, the latter course was in fact adopted. Germany, however, far from being a buffer State, presented an

⁴⁰ For an interesting case study of Soviet economic relations with a satellite, see "Die sowjetisch-rumänischen Gesellschaften," in *Osteuropa*, Vol. 6, Nr. 2, April 1956.

⁴¹ Most "mixed companies" were wound up after October 1954, but some are still in existence.

insuperable barrier to Soviet advance across Europe, and ultimately turned into a deadly menace to the Soviet Union herself.⁴²

In the second place, industrialisation has proved itself to be an effective medicine for many of the social ills normally afflicting underdeveloped countries, such as chronic overpopulation. This explains why revolutionary situations occur more frequently in underdeveloped than in developed countries. By encouraging industrialisation, Soviet policy is helping to lessen social tensions and thereby destroying the very essentials for successful social revolution.

But these are long-term considerations, and it is possible, indeed probable, that Soviet statesmen are hoping to achieve their first objective, the gradual elimination of Western diplomatic influence from most underdeveloped countries, long before the latter are anywhere near being so highly industrialised as to constitute an effective barrier to further Soviet expansion. In the meantime, barring a radical change of attitude on the part of the West, Soviet economic aid will continue to appear an attractive proposition to the underdeveloped countries. The temptation to accept this aid and to copy Soviet methods of high-speed industrialisation will vary in indirect proportion to the political disinterestedness shown by Western economic aid.

PRESENT TRENDS

Soviet aid towards underdeveloped countries has no autonomous function. It is part and parcel of general Soviet foreign policy and is used as a stick with which to beat the Western Powers. It is still rather early to judge the success or lack of success of this policy. Nevertheless, an interim assessment should be attempted.

On the economic side, the commerce of the Soviet sphere with the underdeveloped countries has been expanding up to October 1956, when events in Eastern Europe slowed down the rate of expansion. (Egypt, for instance, had placed

⁴² For a detailed historical analysis of this phase, see L. Kochan, "The Russian Road to Rapallo," in *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 2, Nr. 2, October 1950.

a number of large orders in Hungary. Intra-Soviet *bloc* planning also has been affected adversely by the partial reorientation of Polish coal exports.) It has also been reported that Yugoslavia is now encountering Soviet resistance to fulfil previous agreements.⁴³ This may be due either to political blackmail (which would be a departure from the present pattern) or, more likely, to Soviet impossibility to perform. Neither conclusion can be confirmed at the time of writing. But it is quite possible that Soviet aid on a pre-October scale will be resumed presently.

On the political side some headway has been made. The area of "neutralism" among the underdeveloped countries has been widened, and now includes such countries as Laos, Cambodia, Syria, Egypt, Jordan and the Sudan. The qualified political success of the new Soviet tactic is attested by the newly circumspect attitude towards underdeveloped countries lately adopted by the United States.⁴⁴ It is not unlikely that this will strengthen the hand of the governments of the underdeveloped countries *vis-à-vis* the Great Powers, and exacerbate the battle of "competitive co-existence." Spectacular changes, however, are not to be expected in the near future. So long as it is the primary Soviet purpose to eliminate Western influence, Soviet policy will remain basically unchanged. Mr. G. M. Malenkov, replying to a question put to him by a British journalist during a press conference held in London on April 5, 1956, predicted that the struggle for the underdeveloped countries would ultimately be won by the Soviet Union. By way of consolation to his British listeners he added, somewhat apologetically, that this would not, however, happen for another hundred years.⁴⁵ This should give the West ample time to set its house in order and to confound Mr. Malenkov's predictions.

⁴³ *New York Times*, February 28, 1957.

⁴⁴ *The Times*, June 27, 1956.

⁴⁵ *The Scotsman*, April 6, 1956.

NATIONALISM ON TRIAL

By

J. FRANKEL

Is nationalism still a dominant force in the world? While scarcely entering the main conflict between the two power blocs, it still plays a substantial part in other international relations and lies behind the many colonial troubles. An objective evaluation of a major force of one's own lifetime is invariably coloured by the actual problems of the time and place of writing but in the West an objective analysis can at least be attempted. Here nationalism has lost most of its virulence and judgment is less obscured by emotion.

It is not the purpose of this essay to add to the discussion of the nature or the history of nationalism. Literature on these is abundant and the reader may be referred to several acknowledged authorities.¹ The subject is the role of nationalism today and only those features of earlier history which are strictly relevant to the main theme are therefore touched upon.

THE BACKGROUND

The first relevant feature of nationalism is its universality. Unlike the family, the nation is the outcome of historical conditions and not of biological needs, but is at present as all-embracing an institution as the former. With the exception of small primitive and isolated groups, membership of one of the nations is now universal. Great diversity is the natural result of this universality; nationalism is shaped according to local conditions which are vastly divergent, and on the whole generates much more heat in its early, formative stages than

¹ e.g. Carlton J. Hayes, *The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism*, 1931; The Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Nationalism*, 1939; Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism*, 1951.

in its ripe, satiated periods. Hence generalisations must remain vague and cautious in order to apply to all times and places.

Secondly, nationalism has become the leading principle of organisation of States and has consequently become closely connected with the problem of inter-State relations. There is a general tendency for the equation of the nation and the State : each nation aspires to Statehood and each State aspires to national unity within its boundaries. Often nationalism turns against the Great Powers governing multinational empires which come under the attack of the component nationalities or subject peoples. Thus the First World War ended the Habsburg and the Ottoman Empires while the Second World War spelt the end of the majority of the colonial empires. The pronouncedly multinational character of the Soviet Union is potentially a source of weakness.

Thirdly, opinions vary as to the significance of national self-determination as an overriding moral principle, generally according to the background of their holders. Thus the disruptive effect of the principle on the settlements after the First World War appeared clear to some British critics but was scarcely convincing to a member of one of the beneficiary nations, for instance a Pole or a Czech. Similarly, a colonial aspiring to independence today has little understanding for or patience with the logically compelling arguments advanced against its immediate grant by the metropolitan country. Even from a similar background reaction can differ ; while John Stuart Mill happily and rather naively equated the nation with the State and postulated the national State as the supreme type, Lord Acton, with greater foresight, saw the disruptive forces of nationalism and presented the multinational State as the only type capable of preserving the freedom of the individual.

National self-determination cannot be logically defined since a logical definition of a nation does not exist. Are the Macedonians, or the Catalans, or the South Sudanese, or the Ashanti entitled to their own Statehood or only to a degree of autonomy ? Should the Cypriot Greeks obtain self-determination against the protests of the Cypriot Turks ? In international

gatherings national self-determination has become a well-nigh sacrosanct principle, but often lip-service only is paid to it and it is accepted more in the spirit of resignation than of enthusiasm. This applies not only to the colonial Powers concerned with their empires but also to some of the colonials now on the threshold of independence. And yet, apparently, the wheel of history cannot be turned back and, for better or for worse, the whole of mankind seems to be destined to go through the nationalist phase. This is not necessarily inimical to some final universal organisation. The national groups are often antagonistic but would nevertheless be easier to organise among themselves than with groupings of a different character.

It is well worth reminding ourselves how the principle of national self-determination has been raised to its high pedestal. Until the First World War and even well into it, a peaceful solution of the conflicts between the multinational empires and their component nationalities appeared to be possible. Having learnt the lesson of the American War of Independence, the British were readily granting self-government to those politically advanced colonies which had claimed it. In the Habsburg Empire many blueprints were developed for the satisfaction of its nationalities, some of them reasonably realistic at the time of formulation even though appearing rather academic and insufficient in the light of subsequent events.² The unexpected opportunity for complete independence came to some of its national groups only as the result of the long war which ruined the Empire. The war affected similarly the Ottoman Empire and, to a certain extent, also the Romanov Empire; it hastened the process of complete emancipation of the British Dominions.

Despite President Wilson's firmly established views, the ideal of national self-determination made slow progress among the Allies.³ Its first internationally significant formulation as one of the foundations of peace was advanced by the Bolsheviks, immediately after their advent to power. In his

² For a recent discussion see Robert A. Kann, *The Multinational Empire*, 2 vols., 1950.

³ Cf. A. Cobban, *National Self-Determination*, 1944, pp. 11-15.

note to the Allied Ambassadors in St. Petersburg on November 21, 1917, Trotsky proposed "a democratic peace without annexations or indemnities and based on national self-determination."⁴ The strong attraction of this simple formula necessitated a Western reply. This was included in President Wilson's "Fourteen Points" in January 1918, but was limited owing to the Allies' conviction that the Austro-Hungarian Empire should be preserved. However, during 1918 the Empire disintegrated and the successor-States were recognised. This was the peak of success of the principle of self-determination. During the subsequent Peace Conference it was fighting a losing battle.⁵ Not only were the non-enemy States exempt, as previously agreed, but even in its application to ex-enemy countries the principle was not fully observed: the goal of military security of certain States prevailed over it in the case of Germany, and the principle of the sanctity of treaties—the Treaty of London of 1915—in the case of Austro-Hungary; economic reasons led to the inclusion of three million Germans in Czechoslovakia and of three million Ruthenes in Poland.⁶

Even so, the postwar map followed the ethnic frontier much more closely than the prewar one. Nevertheless, minorities became a disturbing element, especially as the roles of the subject and the dominant nationalities had become reversed. National self-determination scarcely entered Hitler's ideology, as proved by his sacrifice of the South Tyrolean Germans, but it was convenient for him to use the grievances of German minorities as a justification for his aggressive policies.

THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH

Naturally the principle of national self-determination was strongly criticised in the West; the splintering of Europe into a host of national States had proved unworkable, the equation of State and nation pernicious, and the principle open to gross

⁴ For full text see J. Degras, *Documents on Soviet Foreign Policy*, vol. 1, p. 4.

⁵ Cobban, *op. cit.*, pp. 33–34.

⁶ H. W. V. Temperley (ed.), *A History of the Peace Conference 1920–1924*, vol. IV, pp. 429–434.

abuse. The illness was easy to diagnose even if a remedy was difficult to find. The prominent American historian of nationalism, Professor Carlton Hayes, stated in 1941: "At the present nationalism is the chief obstacle to international comity and peace" but warned that it could not be disposed of by reference to it as a myth.⁷ Writing in 1942, Professor E. H. Carr called the crisis of self-determination one of the major problems of our age. He suggested a solution through the break-up of the rigid State—internally the States should grant cultural self-determination, as was proved possible in such divergent political systems as those of Britain, Spain and the Soviet Union; externally, they should surrender some of their traditional sovereignty in order to fit into a framework of international military and economic cooperation.⁸ By 1945, Professor E. H. Carr's diagnosis had not changed and the suggested solution had not become more specific. He realistically mentioned the dependence of any postwar arrangements on the continuing cooperation between the Big Three, and he was not sure whether the pattern of regional or of universal international organisation would prevail.⁹

Official programmes gave no prominence to national self-determination. The Atlantic Charter included the declaration on non-aggrandisement and the goal of restoring independence to the victims of aggression, but diplomatically omitted the problem of colonies. In fact, the colonies and India constituted the major bone of contention between Roosevelt and Churchill. The attitudes of the three Great Powers to self-determination differed according to their national interests. On the international forum, Britain was vitally interested in the preservation of her empire, the Soviet Union was mainly pre-occupied with her gigantic struggle against Hitler, but was developing designs on her neighbours, while the Americans supported the principle, but without the crusading spirit of Wilson.

⁷ *International Conciliation*, April 1941, pp. 227 *et seq.*

⁸ E. H. Carr, *Conditions for Peace*, 1942. Professor Cobban's comprehensive treatise on *National Self-Determination*, published in 1944, arrived at similar conclusions.

⁹ E. H. Carr, *Nationalism and After*, 1945.

In domestic policies, the order of relevance of nationalism was somewhat different. In the United States the brusque resettlement of the Japanese from the Pacific Coast—including those born in the United States and consequently United States citizens—had little practical importance and only demonstrated the high estimate of the attractions of race and nation against that of citizenship and of economic ties. Britain had serious difficulties in India, but the Soviet Union was in the most invidious position. Here nationalism joined the pent-up discontent with the communist régime, resulting in the sympathy of several non-Russian groups with the invaders. It was only Hitler's clumsy policy of persecution of all Soviet citizens, independently of their nationality, that led to the rally of the Soviet peoples round a new "Soviet patriotism." Cruelly, but not without some justification, Stalin felt impelled to resettle whole large ethnic groups which, in his opinion, were likely to give aid and comfort to the enemy.

Though it was impolitic to discuss in public these domestic difficulties among the wartime allies they naturally contributed to the lack of enthusiasm for self-determination. In deference to the sentiments of the smaller nations, in the enumeration of principles in article one, the Charter of the United Nations included "the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples" as a basis for the development of friendly relations among nations. Moreover, the development of self-government in the colonies and of self-government or independence in the trust territories implied the eventual application of the principle. The Charter, however, included no concrete procedures and prescribed no concrete obligations. Moreover, international protection of minorities, an important though unsuccessful branch of the League's activities, was omitted in the United Nations system.

The Axis Powers influenced the development of nationalism to a much greater extent. There was a fundamental difference, however, between the effects of the German and of the Japanese occupations, arising partly from divergent circumstances and partly from divergent policies.

There is some justification for the view that Hitler was not

really a nationalist since he transcended the idea of the nation and substituted for it the hazy idea of the race. He discounted the strength of nationalism as a spiritual force round which other peoples might rally themselves. Indeed, nationalism failed to provide sufficient resistance, and groups of disloyal citizens, "the quislings," allied themselves with the invader. The only exceptions were Britain, which was not subjected to the ordeal of invasion and occupation, and Poland, where innate patriotism combined with an effective underground movement and with resentment against inhuman persecution. In Western Europe Hitler's occupation did not have the effect of the Napoleonic Wars in making subject peoples aware of their unity in opposition to the foreign occupier. On the contrary, the peoples emerged from the difficulties of occupation with social and political rifts deeper than before; with the class-struggle exacerbated and with the additional division into "collaborationists" and "resisters." By contrast, "the Great Patriotic War" united the Soviet peoples to an unprecedented extent. This fundamental difference in the reaction to war and occupation in Western and in Eastern Europe was not due fully to the Nazi policies which were much harsher in the East and scarcely conducive to the emergence of collaborators. It seems also to be connected with the phase of the development of nationalism, a sentiment which had reached an advanced, senile stage in the West, but was still young and vigorous in the East.

Hitler attempted to unravel the tangle of European nationalities. He united the German people in the Reich, eliminated a large proportion of European Jews, and began a large-scale resettlement programme in the East. The idea of national homogeneity achieved through the inhuman expedient of mass-expulsion took root and was to act as a boomerang against the Germans themselves after their defeat.

The Japanese empire showed a much closer parallel with the Napoleonic conquests in Europe: in both cases peoples previously not fully aware of their identity and unity were stirred into a period of feverish political activity resulting in the emergence of new nations and States.

The Japanese were not entirely insincere in their plans for Greater East Asia and for the Co-prosperity Sphere for the benefit of the peoples included, even if primarily the region was conceived as an extension of the Japanese empire with Japan as the leader and beneficiary. They were partly successful in their propaganda for these ideas since the peoples included shared with them the desire to become emancipated from Western rule. In 1945, facing imminent defeat and the loss of all recent gains, Japan further developed the originally tenuous concept of the other East Asian nations as allies and not merely satellites. Thus she expected to preserve at least one gain, the exclusion of her Western rivals.¹⁰ In Indonesia and in Burma the impact was direct, since the establishment of native governments under Japanese patronage led directly to independence. The indirect influence on the development of national aspirations throughout South and South-East Asia, including India, was almost equally strong. The resounding initial defeat of the colonial Powers destroyed one of the most convincing arguments for the benefit of colonial rule—the provision of security—and demonstrated their vulnerability in the area. Independence once tasted was later insisted upon.

The Great Powers emerged from the victorious war without any degree of real agreement. Their differences centred not round the problems of national self-determination, but rather round the question of the form of government. This may be, indeed, indicative of the fact that nationalism is no longer the major moving force in international politics, except in the underdeveloped areas.

Since there was no common attitude to national self-determination, the situation in the various parts of the world developed according to their respective historical backgrounds.

In Europe, adjustments of national boundaries were effected on a large scale, generally rectifying the grievances of the victors and cutting into the prewar boundaries of the defeated countries. Germany was divided into zones of occupation, not conceived as permanent, and was “provisionally” deprived

¹⁰ Cf. F. C. Jones, *The Far East 1942–1946, Survey of International Affairs 1939–1946*, 1955, pp. 84–97.

of important territories both in the East and in the West. Italy lost territory to Yugoslavia and Hungary to Rumania, Poland was compensated for the loss of her Eastern territories to the Soviet Union by German territories on her Western boundaries. Following the Nazi techniques of mass-expulsion, Poland and Czechoslovakia expelled millions of Germans from their territories while smaller transfers took place between the Rumanians and the Hungarians and the Yugoslavs and the Italians. Minorities, one of the greatest difficulties of the interwar period and the ostensible immediate cause of the Second World War, thus became at least numerically reduced.¹¹

All these important ethnic and political changes have not resulted in full stabilisation and the several *terrae irredentae* still harbour the makings of future conflicts. The crucial problem of postwar Europe lies, however, less in these national rearrangements than in the question of the form of government. Important as these rearrangements are for the peoples immediately concerned, they do not present as acute an international problem as the incidence of the "iron curtain." Also to some, at least, of the individuals directly concerned, the problem of the form of government may appear more important than the identity of the national government. In the frontier zones, where nationalities overlap, a situation can easily arise where ideological allegiance is much clearer than national identity. The Saarlanders have shown considerable fluctuations in their national sentiments and to an inhabitant of Teschen or of the Slovene areas of Carinthia it may be often more important to live under a certain form of government—be it non-communist or communist—than to be a citizen of one of the two competing national States.

Asian nationalism, stimulated by the war, took the obvious form of anti-colonialism. Two obstacles confronted the independence movements rising within the existing administrative units. First, the opposition of the colonial rulers, ranging from the mild reaction of the British to the belligerency of the Dutch and the French; secondly, the centrifugal forces of

¹¹ Cf. Inis L. Claude jr., *National Minorities*, 1955, Part III.

national, religious and ideological minorities. The Great Powers differed in their attitudes. While the United States and the Soviet Union favoured the anti-colonial movements, Britain supported with some misgivings the Dutch and the French, although she gave up her sovereignty over the Indian subcontinent. The casually agreed international boundaries between the military occupation zones—the 38th parallel in Korea and the 16th parallel in Viet Nam—gradually hardened into the “iron curtain” cutting across the bodies politic of two nations, overriding their national coherence and unity. The possibility of a similar division of the Chinese nation was avoided by the unexpectedly swift communist victory in 1949.

The impact of the war on Africa was considerably less. The Northern and the North-Eastern parts were theatres of actual hostilities and were therefore most strongly affected. Moreover, the colonial possessions of Italy situated in these regions remained without a legal master and thus obtained a chance of independence despite their low level of political advancement.

NATIONALISM IN THE POSTWAR WORLD

The present significance and the future of nationalism and of the principle of national self-determination are not yet clear. Although the institution of the national State has been severely attacked both from within and without, no other clear principle of political organisation has yet emerged. Moreover, in the politically and socially backward parts of the world, the process of formation of national States is still going on apace. It is, however, clear that the national State is incapable of coping with the changing and expanding forms of social organisation in the atomic age and it is quite possible that we are now on the threshold of the “depolitisation” of nationalism similar to the “depolitisation” of religion at the beginning of modern times.¹² This idea is too speculative to warrant its use for the arrangement of further argument, but is sufficiently interesting and promising for a short digression.

Some historians, including Lord Bryce, have stressed the connection between the rise of nationalism and the decline of

¹² H. Kohn, *The Historical Development of Nationalism*, pp. 23–24.

the influence of religion. It seems, indeed, logical that human life cannot be governed simultaneously by two supreme ideologies. We can find another example in the Moslem world where Islam remained dominant until about half a century ago and the rise of the nationalist movements was accordingly delayed. There appears also to be a parallel between the abdication of religion after its failure to solve the difficulties of the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries and to prevent recurrent wars, and the present inadequacy of the national State confronted by the problems of the atomic age. A closer investigation reveals, however, that the picture is much more complex and that nationalism has not been the only heir of religion. In fact, as Professor Toynbee has recently argued, the moral revulsion against religious strife, reinforced by an intellectual revolution, made man turn not to nationalism, which was then limited to a few individuals, but to science.¹³ It was not solely an intellectual revolution, but a shift of faith. During the Age of Enlightenment the belief in science and in scientific progress became the religion of the intellectuals while the masses still remained under the sway of traditional religion.

Nationalism arose from different needs, in order to provide the States with a new legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens. It was emotional and held a wide appeal not limited to the intellectuals. In the course of the nineteenth century the faith in science and nationalism became inextricably mingled. On the one hand, the new States included the patronage of science among their manifold activities; on the other, popular education resulted in the spread of the belief in science among the broad masses. Faith in science and technology as agents of progress was the base of the Victorian era in Britain and of its counterparts elsewhere.

As religious strife had shattered religious faith, so did the First World War and the Great Depression destroy the faith in science. Nationalism, which had found its apogee in the principle of national self-determination at the end of the First World War, became a temporary substitute. Faith in the nation became more emotional, nationalist ideologies more

¹³ A. Toynbee, *An Historian's Approach to Religion*, 1956, pp. 168-169.

fanatical, the national State more efficiently totalitarian. Subsequent disillusionment with nationalism was followed by an increased revulsion against science due to the development of the atomic bomb. Mankind lost faith both in nationalism and in science. Simultaneously ideologies rose in political importance but have not, so far, provided a substitute. The future of the religious revival in the West is equally uncertain. The present uncertainty is not really surprising. If the parallel with religion holds good, we must remember the long time-lag between the end of the Middle Ages and the full growth of the heirs of religion science and the nation.

The clearest and most serious challenge to nationalism arises from outside the national State: it lies in the stage of development of international society. In the process of multiplication of units over eighty States have come into being and more are being founded. Obviously the prevalent majority of these States cannot compare with the Great Powers either in actual or in potential power; in fact they could be justly considered as units of a different kind. Notions of international law such as "sovereignty" or "equality of States" are psychologically important and did for a time render international co-operation easier by allaying the self-consciousness of the small nations. However, they scarcely correspond with reality. With the exception of the atomic Powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, and partly also Britain—the national States are entirely incapable of providing adequate security for their citizens, which has been the fundamental task of States in the past and is still so regarded. The result of this situation is the postwar bipolarisation: one group clustering round the United States and another round the Soviet Union with a third group uncommitted. Also in the vital field of economics no State, apart from the superpowers, can aspire to self-sufficiency, and, at least to some extent, all the other States depend on the support of one of the giants.

During the first postwar years it appeared possible that security and economic pressures would reduce the smaller States to the level of satellites subordinate to the superpowers, and that the world would become divided into two rigid hostile

blocs. The very reverse movement has, however, taken place. The uncommitted bloc which jealously preserves its independence has grown in power and influence. Also the smaller members of the Western and even of the much more rigidly organised communist blocs have begun to press their national policies, sometimes in disagreement with the leading Power. The small Powers are naturally subject to strong influence by the Great Powers both in the realms of defence and of economics and they feel compelled and, in the East, actually are compelled to shape their policies accordingly. They have, however, been lately discovering that not only in law, but also in fact, they still remain their ultimate masters in these fields and that they can show at least a degree of independence without necessarily cutting off their own noses. If any small Powers develop atomic weapons, which is no longer a remote possibility, their sense of equality and freedom is bound to increase further.

Furthermore, the national State is exposed to challenges from within. During the two World Wars and the Great Depression it has increased its control of and power over its citizens, and its fortunes fundamentally affect theirs. The State is the provider of security against an outside attack; a guardian of law and order; a protector of economic and social welfare; and, through the medium of the national language, the source of culture. Paradoxically, the very accumulation of power has exposed the inherent weaknesses of the State. The Leviathan has developed in our days two appalling deficiencies: first, having centralised overmuch, it tends to become inefficient; secondly, having spread its activities so widely, it has become oppressive. It is a question of serious practical deficiencies generally felt and not of theoretical imperfections diagnosed by scholars. It seems that the modern State has reached the limits of integration. There is a strong, even if politically not yet fully articulate, demand for local self-government and for devolution. Sometimes this opposition to centralisation crystallises round nationalism, and small nationalities such as the Scots, the Catalans, the Welsh, strive within the political

means at their disposal to revive and maintain their national separateness.

Another clear case is the survival of federations despite the acknowledged clumsiness and costliness of this form of government. The trend towards centralisation *within* the federations seems lately to have been reversed. For example, in their vastly different conditions, both the Australians and the Swiss have been stubbornly refusing to grant their respective federal governments powers deemed necessary by the experts. In the Soviet Union the reorganisation process in 1956 included a degree of devolution in favour of the political units.¹⁴ This recalls a similar process initiated in 1953 in Yugoslavia. Also in the uncommitted countries the initial process of centralisation, exemplified in the abolition of the federation in Indonesia, seems to be giving way to growing manifestations of local and separatist forces so powerful that they cannot be ignored even by a relatively well-organised State like India.

A new obstacle to national integration is ideological. Ideology in our days has little to do with class distinctions in the original Marxian sense. There are communists among the members of the upper classes and there are anti-communists among workers, even in communist countries, as demonstrated by the workers' riot in Berlin in June, 1953, and in Poznan in July, 1956. The ideological cleavage reaches very far and may prevail over national allegiances. It appears likely that many Western communists would support Soviet invaders of their national States, while many anti-communists in Eastern Europe are likely to behave similarly towards a Western invader. In all likelihood the situation is quite different from that preceding the First World War when the professions of international solidarity of the workers were hollow, as the War proved.

On the other hand, the interrelation between nationalism and ideology may develop in the opposite direction: they may combine and reinforce one another to the point that it might

¹⁴ See I. P. Zamerjan, "The Development of National Statehood of the Peoples of the USSR," in *Voprosy filosofii*, 3/1956 (or in an abridged German translation in *Ost-Probleme*, 33/1956).

be impossible to recognise which is dominant. Combination of patriotism and of ideological purity is an ideal already in existence both in the Soviet and in the Western worlds. The more extreme Americans who believe in the American "way of life" to the point of intolerance, and Soviet patriotism developed during the war, are pointing in this direction. In both cases dissenting groups persist. But another world war could easily lead to their partial disappearance and partial elimination. Substituting ideology for religion, this would be a revival of the principle *cujus regio ejus religio*.

An important problem of nationalism is the stability of the existing nations. The present indications are that the nations are stable among the white race where they are connected with well-established States. Despite important frontier changes, the prewar European States have continued in existence with the sole exception of the three small Baltic States which had been established only after the First World War. The Germans are divided, but are striving for unification. In Latin America the frequent changes of régime indicate rather the instability of social order than of national identity. It seems at present unlikely that they will be swallowed up either by a United States dominated empire or by a broad *hispanidad*. By contrast, the situation in the other parts of the world is fluid. The general tendency is for the continuation of traditional States and for the consolidation of the nations within their boundaries. This is often counteracted by external and by internal pressures. Even in the Arab world, where the single units are of relatively long standing, there is still a loose tendency for some form of Pan Arab union. In the recently emancipated colonies the new national governments find it difficult to maintain centralised, unifying administrations bequeathed by their colonial predecessors. While the surge of nationalism has brought them independence, it has also stirred the political consciousness of minority groups which now endeavour to assert themselves against the central government. Consciousness of separateness often combines with linguistic distinctions, confronting with acute problems even the best organised new States, such as India or Ceylon. In Indonesia separatist

movements have resulted in prolonged hostilities ; in Burma the Karens are still in rebellion. Some emerging nations show dangerous fissiparous tendencies and it is by no means certain that Libya will continue united or that the Gold Coast and Nigeria will emerge so. It is even more difficult to foresee the future of plural societies, such as Malaya or the Central African Federation.

This divergence between the white race and the other races is not necessarily due to the difference in the development of nationalism alone, but also to a difference in the State-making process. It is the States rather than the nations which lend a degree of permanency to the European and the American scenes. Within these established States the nations remain by no means stable, fixed entities. Though the position of the Welsh or of the Scots within the British nation appears fairly well stabilised, this is certainly not the case with the Catalans in Spain, or with the Ukrainians and Georgians in the Soviet Union, or with the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in Yugoslavia. In time, the separation of any of these nationalities may appear as improbable as that of the Welsh or the Scots, but their relations with the State are still fluid and their final merger within a State-nation is by no means a foregone conclusion. In the Americas, too, the nations are not fully consolidated : the United States has not yet solved the problem of the negroes and the Asians, nor the Latin Americans that of the Indians.

In the rapidly shrinking colonial world, nationalism fights for independence, even where the metropolitan country is reluctant to grant it and the colonial society is unripe or rent by internal divisions. In the domain of colonial emancipation nationalism is spectacular and changes are fundamental and rapid but of uncertain permanency.

Finally, reference must be made to the differences between the members of the Western, the communist and the uncommitted blocs. In the preceding discussion of nationalism as a world-wide phenomenon some generalisations have been made with application to all the three groups. While some basic trends are identical, within their vastly divergent politics and

social contexts nationalism does not occupy an identical place. Therefore, in order to avoid doing violence to facts, every major geographical region requires a brief separate analysis.

WESTERN EUROPE AND THE AMERICAS

In this region nationalism is, relatively speaking, old and ripe and the existing national units are stable and tend to consider their fellow-units as stable. This generalisation describes accurately the situation in the Americas: neither the United States nor the larger Latin American States are likely to overcome the distinctness and separateness of the existing States even where the latter exhibit a bewildering variety of political and social upheavals. At first glance Hitler's recent attempt to dominate Europe may appear to contradict this statement in its application to Europe. Is it not, however, a telling tribute to the permanence of the prewar units that, despite their vicissitudes, nearly all of them have been resurrected? Divided Germany is an exception. Here a powerful nation has been divided for over a decade and is showing little promise of immediate unification. The situation is the result of Germany's complete defeat in the Second World War. Despite their territorial losses and their division, the Germans have exhibited an amazing vitality in the unification of the Western zones and in their economic and political revival. Even the oppressed Eastern Germans fared not worse than other satellites and staged the first rising in Eastern Europe in June 1953. Despite important sectional interests opposed to unification and despite the disagreement among the Great Powers, it is by no means unlikely that in time Germany will become reunited.

The greatest challenge to the traditional nation-States in the region arises from dependence on the United States in the two crucial fields of security and of economics.

In Latin America the problem is of long standing. In fact, the threat was much greater during the "big stick" and "dollar diplomacy" periods and has considerably abated since the inauguration of the "Good Neighbor" policy in 1933. The dependence, however, still continues. In the field of security, the United States, without a special effort, provides a shield

against possible aggression. The whole territory of the United States and of Canada protects Latin America from an atomic attack by the Arctic route, and any additional defence installations will increase this security. The danger of invasion by sea is slighter and the United States is the greatest naval power. Hence there is no need for an American equivalent of NATO ; the Latin Americans can bask in their relative security without being called upon to contribute to their defence or to limit the exercise of their sovereignty by the grant of bases. The situation is less happy as far as internal security is concerned. Groups sympathising with communism find ample opportunity for revolution in the unsettled social conditions of the continent. As shown in the lightning assistance to the opponents of such a revolution in Guatemala in 1955, the United States is unlikely to refrain from action in such a contingency, even if this may not completely conform with the " Good Neighbor " policy.

In the economic field, the Latin Americans have rapidly frittered away their accumulated war-time earnings and feel aggrieved that their rich neighbour has been spending enormous sums of money outside the continent while granting extremely small aid to them. Nevertheless, the United States remains the major single market for their produce and the major supplier of capital.

In Western Europe, the existence of the traditional national States has been threatened since the thirties, but the nature and the source of the threat have been changing. First came nazism which culminated in war-time occupation of a large part of the continent ; then came the Soviet threat ; and finally, the combined necessities of reconstruction, defence and maintenance of the standards of living, made Western Europe dependent on continuous aid from the United States. The reaction to these contingencies differed in the various States. The smaller units were helpless ; France dismally failed in 1940 and was threatened by an actual communist upheaval after the war ; Britain, saved from the trials of occupation and rallied in the defence of the country, emerged united and maintained her unity through the social revolution under the postwar

Labour Government. Britain was also the only West European Power capable of a degree of independence in her dealings with the United States owing to her Commonwealth links and to her independent development of the atomic weapons.

In defence matters, the problem confronting Western Europe is the very opposite of that facing Latin America. Instead of being able to screen behind the shield of the North American continent, Western Europe is dangerously exposed and is likely to become the battlefield in any global conflict. The basic strategic goal of the United States and of Western Europe is identical: it is defence against the danger of a communist aggression.

There is, however, a vast difference in detail. First, the European allies feel much more acutely the dangers of becoming a battlefield and resent the fact that to a certain extent they are "expendable" since the centre of power is in the United States. This applies with particular force to Western Germany which has had so far little opportunity for sharing in the making of grand strategy. Secondly, the West European States can scarcely afford the burden of armaments necessary for their defence despite a considerable American contribution. NATO was a remarkable compromise between the conflicting interests, made possible by the shared estimate of the immediacy of the Soviet threat and by American generosity and restraint in the use of superior power. In the post-Stalinist period the basis of NATO has weakened since the perils of the present situation are differently evaluated by the United States and by its NATO allies. Moreover, the latter see clearly that even the highest defence expenditure cannot buy complete security. Thus in 1956 the future of NATO became uncertain. The organisation has made unprecedented inroads into national sovereignty: national contingents are pooled together in a supranational force under unified command; the "Annual Review" involves the discussion of national defence programmes by the Atlantic Council before the national legislatures have the opportunity to become acquainted with them and thus limits the power of decision of

the latter. The members did not, however, relinquish their final authority in defence matters. Some ignored the Council's repeated urgings for a two-year national service; in 1956 Iceland asked for the evacuation of the NATO bases on the island.

West European countries face some difficult economic problems. Many of them used to depend on colonial empires as a mainstay of national economy. These empires have been rapidly winding up since the end of the war and, in the case of France and the Netherlands, their stubborn defence has created a serious drain on resources. Furthermore, recovery from wartime damage and modernisation of obsolete industries require enormous expenditures. Finally, it is difficult to restore prewar trading patterns as during the war many traditional overseas markets have developed their own industries. With the generous assistance of Marshall Aid, recovery has been miraculously rapid and although still dependent on the ups and downs of American economy and still recipient of American aid, West European economy is now probably sounder than at any time since 1914.

Apart from security and economic challenges, Western Europe is confronted by an ideological challenge. Here the position is acute in Italy and in France while Great Britain is practically immune from danger. The communist menace was greatest during the severe winter of 1947 before the initiation of the Marshall Aid, but has been diminishing since. The full meaning of communism in Western Europe must not, however, be reduced to the chances of an actual political upheaval. It is the result of the failure of the nations and nation-States to integrate the working class to the point of inducing them to support another State against their own. This failure has been averted in Britain through a series of social reforms culminating in the Labour Government legislation after 1945. Similar integration has been achieved in the Scandinavian countries while the other countries occupy positions intermediate between those of Britain and Italy. The situation in Germany is not yet clarified.

The triple challenge—of security, economics and ideology—has enhanced schemes of European integration, particularly in the eyes of youth. Here the attitudes of Britain and of the continental nations differ. Saved from enemy occupation, united, and commanding Commonwealth links, Britain has naturally remained much more self-sufficient than her less fortunate neighbours. With the important exception of Sir Winston Churchill, significantly only when he was a leader of the opposition, the British have adopted an aloof attitude to continental initiatives. They are in favour of functional cooperation but are opposed to any form of closer integration; in the apt metaphor of Sir Oliver Franks, they aspire only to a country-membership of the forming West European club.

West European integration has not proceeded very far and the existing national units have not, to any appreciable extent, lost their paramount position. Although discussions between the representatives of the hard core—Western Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux Powers—are still proceeding, we may safely assume that the postwar integration phase is drawing to its close and endeavour to sum up its results. After considerable vicissitudes, a degree of economic integration has taken place within the Benelux, despite the divergent Dutch and Belgian economic systems. France and Germany have merged their vital steel and coal industries with others in the European Steel and Coal Community endowed with some supranational powers, but the merger has been of too short duration to lead to the aspired goal—to deprive the participants of nationally self-sufficient industries in the field and thus of the means of waging war. Nevertheless, the institutional development is potentially important and when applied to the field of atomic energy, it may in the future lead to the intended result. With the exception of the establishment of a loose common market other integration plans have not shown much promise and the Council of Europe has not developed beyond a talking forum. So far, the national States have survived the challenge.

THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Although the Soviet Union and China are in different stages of national development, the Second World War and its aftermath had similar effects on both: a strengthening of patriotism, an increased sense of unity and an enormous growth of national power. In the Soviet Union the process of westernisation, begun by Peter the Great, has successfully proceeded in the field of technology, raising the country to a position of a superpower. There are some indications that this process is gradually penetrating also into social arrangements and, indeed, there is some cogency in the argument that, in the long run, the millions of skilled technologists will claim the right to apply their trained minds to social and political matters.¹⁵ The non-Russian nationalities, amounting to about one-half of the total population of the Soviet Union, have been allowed a degree of cultural freedom, but are subject to rigid central control. Their russification is pursued slowly, but relentlessly, particularly in the Central Asian territories which are being colonised. This is not due to chauvinism but to the ruthless determination of the communist régime to destroy all opposition which, in the case of the non-Russian peoples, usually takes the nationalist form. However, the oppressed nationalities are unlikely to find an opportunity for active opposition in peacetime and, if standards of living continue to rise, their grievances are likely to diminish.

The communist victory in 1949 meant for China governmental and administrative unity of an unprecedented nature. In all likelihood the initial zeal and elation of the communist cadres are sorely tried by the mounting difficulties of actual government but the remarkable mobilisation of human energies and the sense of national unity may well overcome the obstacles, especially if the Chinese remain convinced of the hostility of the world and of the possibility of aggression on the part of the United States. While it is true that China is a junior partner in her alliance with the Soviet Union, the cradle of communism and the supplier of tools and weapons, she has

¹⁵ Cf. I. Deutscher, *Russia After Stalin*, 1953.

not sunk to the position of a satellite. The friction which doubtlessly exists on many points of issue between the two Powers, is likely to reinforce rather than to weaken the proud Chinese nationalism. Although the Nationalist Government of Formosa and some of the overseas Chinese are violently anti-communist, this does not by any means enfeeble their national consciousness or render improbable their final reconciliation with the present régime.

Finally, there are the East and South-East European countries, mainly "satellites" under communist régimes which have come into power with the assistance of the Red Army and which remain dependent on Soviet support; they lack popular following and they are not strategically secure or economically viable. For some time it was doubtful whether these countries would preserve their national identity but, despite their ruthless methods, the Russians were unable to ignore the forces of nationalism. They incorporated in the Soviet Union the small Baltic nations—the Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians—but they did not follow this procedure with the larger nations. In Finland they even left in power a non-communist government.

While the communist régimes in Eastern Europe remain dependent on Russian support and are slavishly imitating the changes in the Soviet Union, they have remained national in form and have thus continued as potential rallying points for nationalism. In 1948 Tito's government in Yugoslavia successfully asserted itself and the example was not ignored in other communist countries. The relations between the Soviet Union and the satellites were eased by the post-Stalin "thaw" rather late. But by 1956 the Cominform was dissolved, the Titoists rehabilitated and the imitation of Moscow less pronounced. The satellite governments are now in a quandary: popular pressure for social and political changes may eventually sever them from Soviet protection and lead to Soviet intervention, while rigid insistence on the existing system and the calling in of Soviet assistance may lead to their overthrow by popular upheavals. The Russians are playing a cautious game. They are ready to protect the communist régimes against sudden

riots, like those in Berlin in June 1953 or in Poznan in June 1956, but they may require their protégés to exhibit sufficient political skill to avoid major upheavals.

ASIA AND AFRICA¹⁶

Analysis of nationalism in Asia and Africa presents even greater difficulties of generalisation. Here the claims of self-determination are of quite recent standing and neither the new national States nor the independence movements have exhibited sufficient permanence and stability to allow a reasonably full evaluation. Moreover, anti-colonialism which invariably combines with nationalism, is intertwined with two other equally important revolutions: a revolt against poverty and what may be termed a racial revolt against the supremacy of the white man. The three revolutions sometimes become fused but sometimes also conflict.¹⁷

Owing to its anti-colonialism, Asian nationalism strives to avoid involvement in the struggle between the two power-blocs and tends to show a greater distrust of the Western bloc (which includes the colonial Powers) than of the Soviet Union (which is considered a non- and even an anti-colonial Power). Despite their dire need, Asian countries often refuse economic aid from Western sources—*timeo Danaos et dona ferentes*—but are attracted by the simple communist formula of pulling oneself up by the bootstraps. The Russians also seem largely immune from racial, anti-white sentiments.

Further development of Asian nationalism is likely to be strongly influenced by the outcome of the communist experiment in China and of the socialist-liberal one in India. The success of either cannot as yet be assured. Ruthless modern methods of political control have enabled the present rulers of China to organise her for the first time in history as a fully unified, centralised State, and to mobilise the energies of her citizens. They must, however, overcome the problems of

¹⁶ Cf. W.L. Holland (ed.), *Asian Nationalism and the West*, 1953; W. MacMahon Ball, *Nationalism and Communism in Asia*, 1952; W.Z. Laqueur, *Communism and Nationalism in the Middle East*, 1956; T. Hodgkin, *Nationalism in Colonial Africa*, 1956.

¹⁷ Cf. MacMahon Ball, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

industrialisation and collectivisation before their survival is assured. Indian nationalism has succeeded in obtaining independence and in maintaining the State structure, but has alienated the majority of the Moslem inhabitants of the sub-continent. Despite considerable successes of the Congress Government in maintaining and even increasing the administrative unity of India, they are confronted with a continuing independent Pakistan and with large Moslem minorities within India as well as with other fissiparous forces crystallising round language differences.

Japan is the only modern Asian State of long standing with a well established central government and free of the challenge of minorities or uncontrolled regions. Japan failed in her bid for Asian leadership but, with the exception of China, she did not leave behind her the same resentment as did Hitler in Europe. After all, the Japanese had been fighting the colonial Powers and not the colonial peoples; in fact they enabled the latter to gain independence. A degree of distrust does, however, persist, and there are several points of issue, particularly reparations.

The smaller Asian States share certain common features. They all struggle to maintain a unitary government in the face of separatist forces which are often organised into armed rebellions, sometimes territorial, sometimes national, sometimes ideological. The problems of Pakistan are the 1,000 miles distance between her two parts, the Hindu minority and the North-West frontier; the Philippines have the Moro minority and the Huks in rebellion; the Burmese have been fighting the Karens and two separate brands of communists; in Viet Nam the nationalist successors of the French are carrying on the conflict with communist forces; in Indonesia the Government successfully suppressed a communist insurrection in 1948 but its writ scarcely holds in some islands; in Malaya, the Federal Government has inherited the communist guerillas and the more fundamental problem of a plural society with the Chinese nearly as numerous as the Malays—in fact, counting the artificially separated Colony of Singapore, even slightly above their numbers; Korea is divided into a

communist and an anti-communist State. None of these countries is stable or consolidated. On the whole, challenges based on ideology are more serious than those based on nationalism, and two small nations, the Koreans and the Viet Nameese, are divided without much hope of early unification. Does this indicate a certain preponderance of ideological divisions over national ones?

Although anti-colonialism is still a living issue in Asia little has survived of the colonial empires. Owing to the differences between the Malays and the Chinese, Singapore may remain a colony, Hongkong's survival depends on the goodwill of the Chinese Government, Goa is kept stubbornly by the Portuguese against rising Indian opposition. Politically undeveloped territories like North Borneo, Timor, and New Guinea, end this short list.

In the Middle East, Arab nationalism is in a virulent stage. It crystallises round anti-Israeli sentiments combined with anti-colonialism directed against France and Britain, and lately also against the United States. The Arab States are still in a state of flux. The tradition of the ancient empires of Mesopotamia and Egypt avails little as a guide in their recently started independent careers. The vague notion of Arab unity is now forcibly represented by President Nasser despite the fact that culturally Egypt is not an Arab State. Will the existing States continue as separate units or will they merge in some form of Arab unity? They are facing tremendous challenges—the problem of nomad tribes, the necessity of agrarian and social reforms even more urgent in view of the riches from oil-royalties now flowing into the area. It is possible that social failure may lead to political upheavals and to the spread of communism which could bring to an end the precarious existence of the present national units.

Until recently, the whole continent of Africa was divided into colonial dependencies, and national self-assertion is there a new phenomenon. Africa is racially mixed and so far no movements integrating the races have appeared. By "African" we usually mean negro movements, but national

movements among the Europeans and the Arabs are more articulate and politically advanced.

Nationally organised European communities are in an advantageous position, but are struggling against the surge of nationalism among the Africans. The South Africans, the largest white nation in Africa, are fully fledged but internally divided. They have been in command of their destinies since 1909 and are now endeavouring to safeguard their dominance by the *apartheid* policy. The French settlers in Algeria are fighting what appears to be a losing battle against the surge of Arab nationalism in this last outpost of French rule in North Africa; the small but rapidly maturing Central African white community is as yet undecided between a programme of racial co-operation and the preservation of white privilege.

The Arabs have established independent States in Libya, Morocco and Tunisia and are fighting for independence in Algeria where they are confronted not only by the opposition of the million French settlers, but also by large Berber minorities.

The negroes, by far the largest group of Africa's inhabitants, are only on the threshold of national development, despite the existence of three independent negro States, Abyssinia, Liberia and the Sudan. The degree of their political advancement greatly varies, ranging from complete stagnation under the paternalistic rule of the Belgians to independence in the Gold Coast and near-independence in Nigeria. Where the Africans live in plural societies and where their nationalism confronts the opposition of white settlers, conflict on the lines of Mau Mau in Kenya seems now more likely than co-operation for which no precedent has been as yet established.¹⁸ But even in territories free of plural societies, such as the Gold Coast and Nigeria, the national movements are threatened by centrifugal tribalism and may find it very difficult to maintain the administrative unity introduced by the retiring colonial Power.

¹⁸ The Capricorn Africa Society, founded by Captain David Stirling in 1949, has formulated the only concrete integration plan. It was, however, launched in public only in 1956 and its future is by no means assured.

THE OUTLOOK

Nationalism has caused much postwar disturbance in the colonial world, but is not the major threat to international peace. On the contrary, in a world split into two hostile ideological blocs, the nations act as useful buffers between the two blocs, preventing their complete rigidity and rendering their clash less likely. Despite powerful internal and external challenges the national State seems to survive as a basic unit, a useful preserver of worthwhile cultural diversity. The role of the national State is, however, rapidly changing. The State is no longer the sole holder of legitimate force in international relations; for most practical purposes international power is concentrated in the hands of the atomic Powers alone. The historically evolved national State must adjust itself to the changed conditions of our times: to citizens who do not give it their undivided loyalty, to an international organisation infringing the traditional concepts of State sovereignty, to a solution of international conflicts and of minority troubles without the possibility of a final resort to war and violence.

Although most people still consider loyalty to their nation as their overriding duty, this faith has been shaken where the national State has proved incapable of providing security and social justice. Thus, according to a French observer, some French workers no longer consider their country as an object to cherish. They have shifted their allegiance either to the Eastern or to the Western bloc, but perhaps to neither. The newly established States will be subject to this severe dual test before the loyalties they command can be considered as lasting. Most individuals still look to the State both as an end in itself and as a means of securing their own ends, despite the fact that some activities have been actually taken over by international organisation, but this may be no more than appearance. Perhaps G. Myrdal is right in asserting that “. . . people at the bottom, and behind all the façade of national idiosyncrasies, do believe in and desire international cooperation. This is their general and long-range faith, however negative their attitude may be on particular issues of

the day.”¹⁹ The United Nations Charter has carefully preserved the national sovereignty of its members and has not empowered the organisation to establish direct contacts with individuals, but the practice of the United Nations has not always been consonant with these principles. In time, nations and nation-States may be obliged to abdicate their paramount position and their citizens may develop multiple loyalties, with the nation ranking lower than the universal organisation.²⁰

Even before the long-term adjustment has taken place, national States are faced with two immediate problems. First, they must find a method of settling their conflicts with other nation-States without recourse to war, since atomic war is too dangerous and unwieldy a tool. Secondly, they must meet the demands of minorities within their political boundaries since the defence of domestic jurisdiction is becoming increasingly vulnerable. The renunciation of the use of force written in the Charter is not given general credence and the substitutes—peaceful settlement of disputes, collective security, and peaceful change—have not progressed sufficiently to offer an insight into their future.

Elimination of national conflict within the States has made more progress. Colonial dependence is rapidly disappearing and national minorities have been greatly reduced in numbers. Within the existing multinational States, where minorities consist of immigrants desirous of assimilation to the majority group, the American “melting pot” solution is likely to lead to unitary nations by an historical evolution similar to that of the French or the British nation. This solution is likely to prevail in the United States, Canada and Australia although it has not so far been successful against racial barriers, with the negroes or the Asians in the United States or with the aborigines in Australia.

The communist pattern of cultural autonomy with rigid central political and social control has survived, with some

¹⁹ Quoted by H. Guetzkow, *Multiple Loyalties*, Princeton University, 1955, pp. 25-27.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 45-52. Mr. Guetzkow convincingly disputes the contention that the establishment of a universal organisation is seriously impeded by the absence of an out-group, on which hostility could centre.

difficulty, the challenge of the Second World War and has been applied with some important modifications in China and in Yugoslavia.²¹ Many of the communist claims for the achievements of their system must be discounted, but the "cold war" tendency to equate the Soviet system with thinly disguised Russian rule is equally misleading. Whatever its drawbacks or merits, the Soviet system seems to be much more viable than the colonial one.

No existing pattern is applicable to the multi-racial plural societies of Africa, where the white minority cannot easily renounce its supremacy, or to the delicately balanced relations between the Malays and the Chinese in Malaya. Although we have possibly reached the last chapter in the history of the political development of nationalism, this chapter is bound to be both lively and intricate.

²¹ For details on the Yugoslav system see J. Frankel, "Communism and the National Question in Yugoslavia," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, April 1955.

THE CHANGING CONCEPTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH

By

L. A. SHERIDAN

“CONCEPT” is a word which is inclined to suggest deliberateness: a thinking out of an idea. When applied to “Commonwealth,” it may insinuate that some individual or committee has given thought to an idea, and has then put the idea into execution, thus producing a Commonwealth. My title is not meant to convey that suggestion at all. Undeniably, particular events in the evolution of the Commonwealth have been due to this process of deliberation made fruitful, but there has been no master plan. Even when a constitutional development is designed, its consequences are not always foreseen.

Self-government in Northern Ireland, for example, was quite deliberately created. There would have been no Parliament of Northern Ireland at Stormont but for the need to compromise between those who wished Ulster to be governed from Dublin and those who desired government from Westminster. Many in 1920 regarded the constitution of Northern Ireland as an experimental prelude to a united Ireland. Yet today in Northern Ireland and in England (who were on opposite sides in 1920) there is widespread (though not, of course, universal) satisfaction at the functioning of devolution. (Whether this satisfaction is misplaced or not is an argument not relevant here.) More striking, the basis of the border is shifting. Conceived as a measure of (partial) religious segregation, and still partly retained for that purpose, the separateness of Northern Ireland from the Republic of Ireland is also justified nowadays on the ground of the superior provisions for social welfare which exist in Northern Ireland

when compared with the Republic — a superiority allegedly and probably due to a closer association with Great Britain. Complementally, the sparsity of direct rule of Northern Ireland from Westminster is nowadays rationalised on the ground that a local legislature is more conversant with local needs. (That is not the same thing as being more rapid at supplying local needs. The latter is not wholly a constitutional matter: it depends heavily on the character of the party in power — a point not explicitly stressed by Scottish or Welsh nationalists.) Thus some people have their own conceptions of what the Commonwealth is, or what it ought to become, but there is not a concept of the Commonwealth. There is, however, no doubt that it is changing. You may not be sure what it is changing from, or what it is changing to, but the changing can be perceived for all that.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

Whichever of the usual meanings may be attributed to "Commonwealth," it is changing. Nevertheless it would be a good idea to select one meaning for present purposes. "Commonwealth" is a multi-purpose word *de luxe*. In seventeenth-century England it designated the republican régime; in the twentieth century it has sometimes been the rallying call of antiquarian royalists. In modern times it is also a balm word. "The British Empire" became "the British Commonwealth and Empire" to distinguish the countries where the choice of executive was in local hands (sometimes euphemistically described as "self-governing" territories) from those in whose government the United Kingdom executive still had some legal voice. "Empire" was dropped because it had associations with "imperialist," which had associations with European expansion, oppression, exploitation, and alien control. Nowadays you do not hear of "the Empire" at all, unless from cranks or from dogs too old to learn new tricks. Nor do you hear of "the British Commonwealth," for "British" also had for some people overtones of alien superiority. So "the Commonwealth" is used indiscriminately to signify the countries whose prime ministers

attend Commonwealth conferences, sometimes to signify the legally independent countries of what used to be "the British Empire," sometimes to include them and the colonies, and sometimes to cover all these and protectorates (of all kinds) and mandated and trust territories as well. In this paper I shall use the phrase in its most restricted sense of legally independent States. In this sense, "admission to the Commonwealth" is sometimes spoken of.

"Independence" is a term of comparison, not of identification, and can be as misleading as "self-governing." No State can be independent in the sense that its authorities can take decisions and put them into execution without paying attention to the views and desires of powerful people (such as governments) in other countries. Most State authorities must keep an eye constantly on the United States of America or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, but this is merely mention of the outstanding influences of the moment. Less striking incumbrances upon independence are so abundant as to be uncountable.

But the range of possible effective action of some State authorities is wider than that of other State authorities. One way (among others) in which the range is increased is by the State attaining the position of immunity from outside legislation. This is frequently styled "independence" or "self-government." State A is said to be "self-governing" or "independent" when no authority other than the organs of State A can take decisions which will be enforced by the judiciary of State A. Independence of a State in this sense does not necessarily involve a greater range of possible activity on the part of people living within its territory, nor that these people have a greater voice in its government. In Pakistan, for example, before the litigated dissolution of the constituent assembly in 1954, the electorate were for a long time denied the opportunity of sacking a legislature which, in the confident opinion of observers, had for years ceased to represent that electorate even to the modest extent to which the government in power in the United Kingdom can ever be described as representative of the United Kingdom electorate.

Moreover, independence may be simply the transfer of power from an alien government overseas to an alien government on the spot. In the Union of South Africa, a sovereign State beyond question, the corporate self-government is an independence of the majority of the white minority to make laws for what is conceived to be the advantage of that minority. This is done without regard to the welfare of the African, Indian, and coloured majority, and with scant regard for the constitution (itself the result of a political agreement between groups of whites).

Thus "independence" or "self-government" in its formal sense of immunity from outside legislation does not solve any substantial problems. People who are opposed to specific grants of independence, such as to Singapore, frequently point out that economic and social problems do not disappear automatically when the grant is made. While this is true, it is not an argument against independence, which may still be a condition precedent to solutions of these other problems, if only for psychological reasons. The ultimate choice facing the United Kingdom government in most cases is likely to be whether to grant early self-government to a colony and so acquire an independent (if possibly unstable) friend, or to have self-government taken eventually by a hostile rebel (possibly also unstable).

Clearly the degrees of independence from the United Kingdom are myriad, and shade off into one another. Countries which rank as British territory range in their form of government from complete immunity from United Kingdom legislation (unless requested) to direct rule under the royal prerogative or under the British Settlements Acts. It is possible to say that one extreme is independence while the other extreme is absence of self-government without necessarily being able to tell where (if anywhere) the line should be drawn. One possible criterion of independence is local control not only of internal affairs but also of external relations. Even then, the seemingly sharp distinction is not capable of application with clear-cut results. No one would maintain that Northern Ireland is independent of the United Kingdom, yet external

relations are to some extent conducted on a Provincial basis (e.g., transport matters extending athwart the land frontier). However, the rough test of immunity from United Kingdom legislation in internal affairs and external relations can be taken as the distinguishing mark of an independent State within the Commonwealth, and countries which satisfy this test will be designated "Commonwealth countries" in the rest of this paper. They include, by popular consent, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Ghana. Other countries with claims to similar status now or in the near future include the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the Federation of Malaya, and the projected West Indian federation. Closely analogous to the former group is the Republic of Ireland, which is neither in the Commonwealth nor a foreign country. Closely analogous to the latter group is Singapore, whose government claims independence but wishes to cede back to the United Kingdom out of the bundle of its sovereign powers the conduct of external relations and some responsibility for internal order in emergency situations.¹

Three most interesting questions for the inquirer into the changing conception of the Commonwealth are: (1) What binds these independent countries together in the Commonwealth? Or, in other words, what is there in the relationship of Commonwealth countries to each other which is absent from their relations with countries outside the Commonwealth? (2) What qualifies a country which has not been self-governing to

¹ This sentence describes the proposals put forward by the Singapore all-party delegation which went without success to London in 1956 under the leadership of the then Chief Minister, Mr. David Marshall. While this paper was going through the press, another all-party delegation under the leadership of Mr. David Marshall's successor as Chief Minister, Mr. Lim Yew Hock, has reached agreement in London on a proposal for a wholly elected Singapore legislature with a government responsible to it. This Singapore government will have the sole responsibility for internal affairs, subject to what is said in the next sentence, and also for external relations so far as they relate to trade and culture. The proposal is to have a security council consisting of three representatives of Singapore, three of the United Kingdom, and one of the Federation of Malaya, to deal with matters of internal security. The general conduct of external relations, diplomatic and military, is to be left with the United Kingdom.

become a Commonwealth country? (8) How does a non-self-governing territory become a Commonwealth country?

NATURE OF THE COMMONWEALTH CONNECTION

Common allegiance can be dismissed from consideration as a candidate for the position of basic link in the Commonwealth connection. For many years this legal fiction was trotted out as if it were a substantial matter. Many Commonwealth citizens, even citizens of England, feel no loyalty to the crown, as opposed to loyalty to their country, Commonwealth, or species generally (some, of course, do not feel the latter type of loyalty either). For people who do revere the monarchy, or even look up to its tenant in possession as superhuman, the crown is merely symbolic (at most) of the Commonwealth association, and not the means of juncture. (This is not necessarily to belittle the pro-monarchist feeling of those who have it, any more than being an atheist is necessarily a sneer at religious people.)

It may be said that the assumption of common allegiance to the crown has practical legal consequences. That is possibly so, but does not make the concept any less a legal fiction. The fictitious activities of John Doe and Richard Roe had devastating legal consequences, but they were fictitious nonetheless. It may be the law (*e.g.*, of England) that only a person owing allegiance to the crown can be convicted of treason. That is merely a shorthand expression, antiquarianism aside, of a more complex set of rules. To apply the English law of treason it is necessary to know who owes allegiance. Classes of people in that position can be enumerated in the light of judicial decisions: British subjects; aliens on British territory; holders of British passports; (possibly) British protected persons and citizens of mandated and trust territories. Others may be added in times to come. The law of treason could take account of the enumeration without paying attention to the shorthand "persons who owe allegiance to the crown." Or there could be some other shorthand formula. Republics have their criminal offences corresponding to the English crime of treason. The nature of

the offence does not vary with the form of government (though details of the offence may so vary). Treason (and its counterparts elsewhere) consists of serious forms of treachery to the high policy interests of the State concerned. In a monarchy this may be expressed as breach of allegiance to the crown (and so would include killing the king) while in a communist republic it may be expressed as treachery to the people (and so would include counter-revolutionary activities). But the basic idea is the same, and the common ground enormous. In any country the most obvious forms of treason are its own citizens levying war against the State, and aiding and abetting such a war (as by conducting propaganda for the enemy). Treason and its kindred offences can be defined at length without reference to the crown, and the appropriate shorthand formulation (e.g., breach of allegiance to the crown or subverting the interests of the community) is a matter of taste. The nature and details of an offence are not governed by the name of the offence.

In any case, common allegiance to the crown, after long being a fiction, has been exposed as a fiction by the presence of republics within the Commonwealth. The Irish Free State was a republic while a member of the Commonwealth; India and Pakistan are republics now; South Africa and Ceylon are on the road to republicanism; other Commonwealth countries will probably follow suit. The change from monarchy to republic affects nothing besides emphasis and name. Criminal prosecutions may cease to be called *R. v. Murphy* and become *The People v. Murphy*; no substantial interests are affected. Even the organisation of government does not change, for the king has long ceased to have any part in government. Certainly the relations between one Commonwealth country and the others are not affected by its becoming a republic. It is conceivable (though unlikely) that some country will in the future leave the Commonwealth while retaining the formal monarchy.

Common forms of government or common legal systems are also not the binding links between Commonwealth countries. It is true that the United Kingdom model of executive

government responsible to an elected legislature has been in form or in substance adopted in all Commonwealth countries, but so also has it been adopted by many other countries besides. The machinery for choosing a government in the Republic of Ireland, for example, is much closer to the English than is that in South Africa.

Within the Commonwealth there are unitary and federal States, monarchies and republics, unicameral and bicameral legislatures, universal and restricted franchises. The major conflicts between political parties are entirely different in the different Commonwealth countries, as indeed they are within the United Kingdom (Conservative v. Labour in Great Britain and Unionist v. Anti-partitionist in Northern Ireland). Two-party systems and multi-party systems are both usual. Nor is there a common legal system. The common law does not run throughout the Commonwealth countries (or even throughout the United Kingdom), yet is the basis of the laws of the United States of America and the Republic of Ireland.

If an interest in preserving similar internal political machinery is not a binding force in the Commonwealth, what of an interest in a joint or co-ordinated attitude to relations with countries outside the Commonwealth? No such joint or co-ordinated attitude is apparent. Foreign policy alignments cut across Commonwealth. Organisations such as that of the North Atlantic Treaty are joined by some Commonwealth countries and frowned upon by others. India and Pakistan are to some degree influenced in their relations with other countries by their relations with each other. These two Commonwealth countries have even fought a local war in Kashmir.

If no common foreign policy exists, still less can the Commonwealth be bound together by common strategic planning to meet hostilities. Ceylon has recently joined the ranks of Commonwealth countries opposed to United Kingdom bases on their territory. It may be said that the meetings of Commonwealth prime ministers, and meetings of other ministers of Commonwealth countries, give a unique opportunity for co-ordination of political and economic policies. Yet to the extent to which these meetings are especially fruitful

that is a result of especial confidence of each participant in the others, and that seems to be at least as much a consequence of their association in the Commonwealth as a reason for it.

Economic interests may be a centripetal factor in the association of the Commonwealth countries. The possibility of benefiting from a system of imperial preferences would work to hold the association together. There is, however, nothing to stop one Commonwealth country setting up trade barriers, such as discriminatory tariffs, against another Commonwealth country, and it is done. One of the reactions of India to the South African government's attitude to Indians in the Union was to clamp down by legislation on trade between the two countries. Besides, it is possible to share the benefits of economic association with the Commonwealth without sharing in the political association. The economic relations between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland, for example, are on the same close basis as before 1949. Nor is the Commonwealth coextensive with the sterling area. Canada is not in the area, while many countries outside the Commonwealth (e.g., the Republic of Ireland) are sterling area countries. Membership of the gold and dollar pool manipulated by the Bank of England is also not coterminous with membership of the Commonwealth.

There is certainly no question of pooling Commonwealth resources for the equalisation of benefits. The Commonwealth is not so named because it is an organisation for the redistribution of wealth. Specific projects of economic aid from the United Kingdom or other wealthy Commonwealth countries to underdeveloped areas of British territory exist, and there are plans like the Colombo Plan, and institutions like the Colonial Development Corporation. But there is no general principle of sharing resources. In fact, the extent to which United Kingdom resources should be utilised for the purpose of raising the standard of living of other parts of the world is a matter of party controversy—at least, increased aid was one of the Labour Party's planks in its 1955 general election platform. In any case, economic "assistance" (perhaps "disguised investment" would be a more accurate description, or perhaps

“repayment of unacknowledged debts”) is not confined to the Commonwealth. The greatest dispenser of aid of this kind, since the end of the Second World War, has been the United States of America. Russia is probably about to become a competitor in this field. All countries, inside and outside the Commonwealth, will probably tend to become polarised, economically speaking, around the system of the United States of America or that of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This process is likely to be accelerated as the two colossal amazons turn from bleating destruction at each other to high-pressure competitive salesmanship.

Sentiment probably plays some part in holding the Commonwealth together, at least in those countries whose population contains considerable numbers whose ancestry can be traced back to the British Isles. People in general are inclined to be nostalgic, and this feeling often seems strong when the object of the nostalgia is known to the person who feels that way only by oral tradition. It is not suggested that Canadians, Australians, and New Zealanders look upon the British Isles as “home”: if some do, they are probably the newest arrivals. Moreover, the pull does not apply to any other country (except, in a peculiar way, to South Africa). People of British Isles extraction are in a tiny minority in the Union, but they constitute about half the political power. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland may be in like case.

A possible conclusion is that there is no strong general principle holding the Commonwealth countries together in the Commonwealth association. There may be particular interests urging that way and affecting particular States. For example, it may be that South Africa considers that her claim to the neighbouring protectorates would be weakened by secession. It may be that the Prime Minister of India considers that the Commonwealth offers unique opportunities (such as Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ conferences) to spread acceptance of his views on international relations. But strong general principles do not appear to exist.

It is interesting to note that no independent sovereign State (with the possible exception of Malta) has ever asked of

her own volition to become a Commonwealth country. The movement has been from colonial status (or other status subordinate to the United Kingdom) to independence within the Commonwealth, and then sometimes on further to independence outside the Commonwealth. Parts of British North America, Burma, and the Republic of Ireland have progressed from stage one to stage three, but no country has gone from the third status to the second or first without compulsion.

In the light of that, perhaps the question should not be, What holds the Commonwealth countries together in association? Perhaps it would be more pertinent to ask, In respect of countries which have left the Commonwealth, what has taken them out? It may, in other words, be a safe assumption that territories which have entered the Commonwealth willy-nilly, and which have become self-governing, will, if there is no reason for remaining or seceding, stay put.

The British North American colonies which seceded from the Commonwealth in the eighteenth century did so at a time when self-government within the Commonwealth was an unknown idea (except for the British Isles). For them the choice lay between colonial status and independence as a foreign country. Their objection to the Commonwealth was their dissatisfaction with colonial status—involving, as it did, the sovereignty of the Parliament at Westminster. In the case of Burma, there were still traces of the same feeling, including the notion that Dominion status implied remnants of subordination. There was some opinion amongst Burmese leaders that internal disorders could be more confidently coped with by a government as independent in name as a Dominion government was in fact. By 1949, the Irish Free State had no more ties with the Commonwealth (apart from names) than the Republic of Ireland has had since. Formal secession from the Commonwealth was probably the price Mr. Costello had to pay for the membership in his coalition government of the republican party led by Mr. MacBride. The Irish reason was special, the United States secession no longer relevant to modern conditions, while the Burmese example (and the Irish) merely shows that emotions can be stronger in politics than

ratiocination, and names of governments more potent than forms.

QUALIFICATIONS FOR INDEPENDENCE

The general tendency is for all political entities to become independent sovereign States. Sometimes (as, for example, in New Zealand) this is achieved by a subordinate territory acquiring sovereignty itself; sometimes (as, for example, in Canada) by several subordinate territories federating into a collective sovereignty; and sometimes (as, for example, in Malta) by union with an already sovereign State. This tendency has been operative for a long time, but only recently has it become generally recognised that every subordinate territory will sooner or later attain or demand sovereignty in both internal affairs and external relations.

The British Empire was built up with subordination to the United Kingdom in mind. Territories were annexed or protected for reasons of economic gain, strategy, or prestige. It is now generally (though not universally) accepted that the United Kingdom's objective is to end the subordination. The task of the United Kingdom is envisaged as that of preparing the subordinate territories for independence and then granting it to them. The erstwhile empire has become (in expressed intention) an organisation for tuition in the art of self-government. There is but slight difference of opinion about the general principle, more about its application to particular territories, and a great deal over the speed with which the process should be applied. A change-over has been taking place from a state of affairs in which some subordinate territories gradually increased their range of sovereignty, which was then recognised by United Kingdom statute, to one in which some subordinate territories demand active legislative assistance from the United Kingdom towards sovereignty. The Statute of Westminster, 1931, did not grant sovereignty to the six Dominions listed: it brought legal rules into line with realities of power. It is true that the constitutions of these Dominions were granted by or under Acts of the United Kingdom Parliament, but their power to conduct their own external

relations was not conferred by legislation. The king, as a purist would probably say, began to act on the advice of his local ministers of external affairs, instead of exclusively on that of his Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Since 1931, grants of autonomy in internal and external affairs have been simultaneous, and have been to countries not having already attained that position *de facto*. The question then is: When is a subordinate territory qualified to become a Commonwealth country?

Until after the Second World War the sovereign States within the Commonwealth were all populated primarily by Europeans or people of European extraction. The indigenous populations of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were and are small in number, and have never been organised political forces. Only in South Africa are the Europeans outnumbered—by a population of Africans, Indians, and “coloureds.” Political power in the Union, however, was acquired by the white citizens, and only they can be described as self-governing. It is true that one minor protection of the political rights of non-white voters was “entrenched” in the constitution of 1909, but this entrenchment is precarious. A major legal battle over the entrenched clauses is indeed going on at present, and the concluded rounds have so far been won by the opponents of change.² It is difficult, though, to imagine that a determined party will not find an effective method of removing constitutional obstacles to implementation of *apartheid* (though other obstacles may prove ruinous), and difficult to believe that the courts of law could finally emerge victorious from a struggle with the legislature. In any case, the entrenched protection does not afford much substantial defence against the ambitions of the present rulers of South Africa, and the issue of separate representation of coloured voters is chiefly symbolic of the real conflict.

It is justifiable to speak of the 1931 Dominions as white. India made claims to independence long before the Second World War, but it was only in 1947 that legislation to that end

² While this paper was going through the press, the Appellate Division held valid the reconstitution of the Senate.

was first proposed. When India, Pakistan and Ghana became Dominions, Burma a sovereign independent foreign State, and Ceylon a sovereign State within the Commonwealth, a new departure was made. Asians and Africans were recognised as the political equals of Europeans, even in their own countries. Conservatives now raised the charge of "throwing the empire away," but it may be coincidental that the granting of self-government to Asians was the occasion, for it was raised again over Palestine and the Suez Canal Zone and reared its shadow over Cyprus before the strong arm became settled policy.

Probably neither party in the United Kingdom would object in future to a subordinate territory becoming a Commonwealth country solely on the ground of its non-European character. Under Conservative rule since 1951 great advances towards sovereignty have been made in areas whose population is not mainly white. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (which, however, may still turn out a miniature replica of South Africa), Nigeria, a prospective federation of the West Indian colonies, the Federation of Malaya, and Singapore, all stand on the threshold of complete self-government. Other colonies are not so far behind, but there is no need to multiply instances: they will all get there sooner or later, and mostly sooner. It is probably safe to assume that the non-European character of these countries will be one factor which will in no way impede their progress to independence. (The arrogance which might lead anyone to advocate the contrary is virtually incredible.) There is only a remote possibility (which will be considered later) that would upset that assumption: that the principle will come to be accepted that only by the unanimous vote of the Prime Ministers of existing Commonwealth countries can a new Commonwealth country be constituted. Should that happen, it was at one time generally expected that South Africa would probably veto the claims of African states such as Ghana, which would then have to follow in the footsteps of Burma. Since the 1956 Prime Ministers' conference this seems less likely.

Strategic position is taken into account in determining

whether a subordinate territory shall become self-governing. That is to say, the more useful bases on a given territory are considered to be to the United Kingdom in a hypothetical war in which the United Kingdom may in future be involved the less willing is the United Kingdom Government to accede to external relations or internal security passing under the control of local hands. This is one of the factors which led to the unhappy state of hostilities in Cyprus, to the temporary deadlock in Singapore, and to the strange answer to Malta's constitutional difficulties. It is likely to arise in the case of Gibraltar, and may lead to that colony too becoming part of the United Kingdom.

Foretelling future strategic requirements is largely guess-work. In peacetime, the military planners can do no more than arrive at some modification of the demands of the previous war in the light of what imagination suggests the next one may be like (if it occurs). Perhaps one of the objects of strategic scheming is to ensure that the next war does not take place. But even assuming it can help in that way, this is only on the assumption that the scheme is devised so as to win the next war if the peace is broken. New weapons and new defences, new potential enemies and new alignments of alliances are constantly rendering strategic appraisals old-fashioned.

But even assuming that it is desirable from the United Kingdom point of view never to relinquish a base, it is not impossible to do so, and wars are not necessarily lost when a single base is. In the Second World War military victory came after Singapore was occupied. But even assuming a given base to be vital (*e.g.*, Cyprus to replace Suez as a Middle Eastern donjon), it by no means follows that strategic planning is advanced by impeding the development of independence in the territory where the base is situated. It is possible that the military usefulness of a military installation rises in inverse proportion to the hostility of the surrounding civilians. It is also probable that that hostility rises in direct proportion to delay in according self-government. There is no lack on the

part of the Australian or Canadian Governments of military co-operation with the United Kingdom. In other words, community of interest is militarily valuable. In every case, from the strictly strategic point of view (only one of the points of view to be taken into account), a choice has to be made between the benefits to be derived from a base held by force amidst a hostile population and the possible benefits to be derived from speedy recognition of independence.

Cyprus itself is an interesting example. Before the announcement of the United Kingdom Government that Cyprus would never be granted complete independence (a policy since resiled from) there was no organised political violence in the island, and Greece was a part of the "Western" defence system—in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Balkan Pact—and a traditional United Kingdom ally. It seems that the majority of those Cypriots who desired independence from the United Kingdom wanted the next step to be union with Greece. United Kingdom opposition to this has led to (without saying "caused" or any other implication of moral judgment) the present situation. Not only is the military value of the Cyprus base diminished by the diversion of its resources to the task of holding the base, but a serious risk is incurred of Greek defection from the "Western" cause. (And if it be said that *Enosis* is resisted for the benefit of the Turks, it may be asked whether the measures taken by the United Kingdom against the Greek Cypriots are sterner or more repressive than those the Greeks might have been expected to employ against Cypriots of Turkish extraction.) The publication of Lord Radcliffe's constitutional proposals has so far, unfortunately, been an occasion for further recrimination.

Sometimes what is called "viability as an independent State" is brought into the reckoning. It seems to mean that the greater the natural resources, the higher the national income from sources other than these, the more numerous the population, and the larger the territorial area, the more persuasive is the claim to become a Commonwealth country. These are all put forward as factors to be considered; none of them is suggested as an essential test on its own; prowess in

one respect may compensate for backwardness in another ; and no precise measure is applicable to any.

Lack of mineral resources may be balanced by income from manufactures, agricultural products, entrepôt activities, tourist traffic, military bases, and so on. Then there seems no reason to object to sovereignty going with smallness. People sometimes boggle at independence for tiny countries, but they have before them successful examples. Singapore, for instance, need give no one any qualms on the score of its economic viability in prevailing economic conditions, and its size in area and population cannot be aspersed as too small for self-government except by someone prepared somehow to explain away the Bailiwicks of Jersey and Guernsey (self-governing for at least seven-and-a-half centuries). It is difficult to see the relevance of area and population except as factors in the general sum of economic stability. Malta is to become part of the United Kingdom because (for one reason) the small island is not capable of supporting the small number of inhabitants at what is considered to be the appropriate mid-twentieth-century standard of living. But the argument would appear to be just as conclusive against a claim for sovereignty by the leaders of, say, five million people occupying the whole vast area of the Sahara Desert. Moreover, it is rather misleading to imply that a single State can in modern conditions be isolated as an economic unit. Economic relations are international and the position of the political boundaries is merely an influence. The internal prosperity of any State depends on the condition of world markets, which depends on the whole complex of behaviour in the universe. Even direct cash subsidies are nowadays dispensed by one sovereign State to another. Nevertheless, it remains true that the degree of independence of a State and the placing of its borders affect its economic prospects, and these prospects have to be assessed in contemplating constitutional advancement.

“Readiness for self-government” is another item in the account. This seems to have two aspects (apart from the economic ones already mentioned). First, the existence of a

class of local people ready and able to discharge executive, legislative and judicial functions in the new State, and, secondly, political stability. These two matters are not neatly separable, nor are they distinct from economic viability. The requirement of a reservoir of competent governors is a difficult one to satisfy. During the colonial status of a territory the British Isles tend to supply at least the higher ranking administrative officials, and the impact of European ways tends to weaken customary modes of leadership generation. By the time a strong movement in that direction has obtained United Kingdom assent to home rule, it may be too late to embark on a transitional period of apprentice independence under United Kingdom tutelage.

Once sovereignty has been conceded in principle, so soon is it demanded in full. The remedy of keeping on British administrators after independence (as technicians from outside countries are often kept on) is an obvious but sometimes impracticable one. People conscious of their emerging nationhood do not like to admit incapacity for the task of government. Besides, it does not follow that an Englishman's view that Englishmen are best qualified for a job would be shared by anyone else. Also, the presence of British administrators is a symptom of subordination to the United Kingdom, and the symptoms are as anathema as the disease itself. To remove United Kingdom rule (often very slight anyway) and leave the man in the street to meet an Englishman every time he deals with government is something that would be done only by someone confused as to the malady.

It is not that a colony desires the status of a Commonwealth country because its people disapprove of the laws the colonial power makes, or of the way those laws are administered, or of the adjudication of litigation, but because its people resent every suggestion of inferiority and would rather make bad laws themselves than have good laws thrust upon them. This is an emotional problem and it cannot be resolved by physiotherapy. That brings the United Kingdom back again face to face with the choice of granting independence to a country

before it has (in United Kingdom opinion) produced replacements of the same standard of competence as that of the displaced British personnel, or of holding back the grant until it is too late to make it on a friendly basis. What arguments would impel selection of the latter course is perhaps difficult at first glance to see. An altruistic desire not to see bad government of good people is hardly a strong enough motive to push the United Kingdom into imposing good government on the good people by force. The United Kingdom must prefer good government because it wants political stability. It may be true that a stable political situation is unlikely or impossible without trained classes of administrators. It is certainly not true that trained administrators ensure political stability, at any rate in a country where the choice of political leaders rests with an untrained electorate.

The two, however, are connected. The interest in political stability is inextricably bound up with both economic and strategic objectives. Investment of capital, either by local capitalists or from overseas sources, will not take place unless the territory has a fairly settled political future. There is probably a considerable amount of British-owned property in the country concerned before independence, and some assurance both of a continued profit and of immunity from expropriation is desired by the owners. This means that what is wanted is not merely political stability, but stable centre or near-centre government. From this point of view, stable Marxism has to be guarded against just as much as has instability. This is especially so when one turns to the strategic considerations, including trade in what are sometimes given the bizarre title of "strategic goods," and to foreign policy aims generally. The future is likely to be tiresome for anyone who wants to keep both Marxism and instability out of the Commonwealth. The colonies of Malaya, Singapore, Guiana, Honduras and Cyprus have provided plenty of warning.

THE ACQUISITION OF INDEPENDENCE

Commonwealth countries, in the sense of this paper, do not coincide exactly with countries whose Prime Ministers attend

the irregular Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conferences. For example, Southern Rhodesia and later the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland has long been among the latter, but has recently failed to convince the Commonwealth Relations Office of the immediacy of its claim to join the ranks of the former group of countries.

Membership of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference seems to be a matter for the members for the time being. So far as one can tell, the host country (the United Kingdom) sends out the invitations after consultation with the Prime Ministers who attended the previous conference. At the 1956 conference two decisions were made on this subject. One was that the practice respecting the Central African Federation should change. Previously Lord Malvern had been invited each time without any understanding that the Prime Minister of the Federation would be invited to any future conference. From now on the Prime Minister of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland will be invited to every conference as a matter of course.

The second decision was merely to defer for future discussion the question of whether an invitation should be extended to the Prime Minister of the Gold Coast. This bears out the generally held and widely applauded view that no broad principles apply. Some observers had been expecting an authoritative pronouncement from the 1956 conference on conference membership and progress towards independence. The communiqué issued at the end turned out to be a string of vague generalisations. It is not even known whether the inviting of a new member requires a consensus of opinion or merely a preponderance of opinion amongst the previous members.

Yet it is clear that there is a connection between being a Commonwealth country and being represented at Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conferences. An invitation has never been refused to a Commonwealth country, and other Prime Ministers invited have represented countries with a strong claim to independent sovereignty in the near future. It is also clear that existing Commonwealth countries are consulted when

the admission of a new one is mooted, but they are not necessarily all consulted, and consultation does not necessarily take place during a Prime Ministers' conference.

It must be remembered that there is no formal Commonwealth constitution. The leaders of a subordinate territory who seek to emerge from their subordination are asking ultimately for legislation. The legal expression of a grant of independence is an Act of the Imperial Parliament. But this is simply ratification (possibly with amendments) of the decision of the United Kingdom executive. The Imperial Parliament does not reject government measures, nor is alteration of a colonial constitution a conceivable subject for a successful private member's bill.

The leaders of the aspiring Commonwealth country do not approach Parliament directly, but initially deal with some official in the Colonial or Commonwealth Relations Office. The ultimate decision of the United Kingdom executive will come not only after negotiations with leaders of the applicant subordinate territory, but also after consultations with all other Commonwealth personages that the United Kingdom executive considers to have a substantial interest in the constitutional status of the territory concerned. It would be idle (though it seems to be fashionable) to pretend that the informal way in which intra-Commonwealth relations function and the absence of general guiding principles in the development of the Commonwealth have led to the best possible results. Equally there seems little evidence that constitutional formulas have a great deal of influence. It is probably misguided to cast the responsibility for Commonwealth failures on its informality. The experience of France does not support that verdict.

CONFERENCE ON THE TEACHING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

GENEVA, AUGUST 1956

By

PAUL DE VISSCHER

THE teaching of international relations, which less than fifty years ago was still the exclusive province of historians and lawyers, has become in our time a fundamental part of all higher education, in the professional as well as in the academic fields. Today, economists, sociologists, political scientists, demographers and geographers show an ever-increasing interest in international relations. The growing attention which is being paid to international affairs has positive advantages. Interdisciplinary studies are contributing to a deeper and more objective understanding of their true nature, yet, in so far as teaching is concerned, excessive specialisation on the one hand and an accumulation of a great variety of subject matters on the other, may prevent the student from acquiring that complete and well-balanced background which the university is normally called upon to provide.

University teaching of the social sciences, which for too long placed undue emphasis on strictly formalistic and subjective methods, thereby generally spreading doubt and scepticism, is today characterised by a marked tendency toward diversification and specialisation.

This trend, which can be whole-heartedly endorsed when applied to *research*, should be encouraged in actual *teaching* only if the various disciplines contribute to present the young student with an integrated pattern of society. Between the prerequisites of a thorough and complete scientific training and the equally exacting requirements of a general education,

the institutions of higher learning owe it to themselves to seek the balanced programme which enables them to remain centres of scientific learning while continuing to provide a general liberal arts education.

This problem, shared by all the social sciences, is especially acute in fields related to international relations. The events of the last forty years have, indeed, forced international society to undergo a series of upheavals which, while they swept away the doctrines and methods patiently built up over the years, have (after having spread confusion and doubt) definitely convinced the large majority of scholars of the need for more objective and more realistic study of the international environment.

Because of its awareness of the importance of this problem, the Carnegie Endowment decided that it would be useful to hold two discussions devoted respectively to the teaching of international relations (Geneva, June 4-6, 1955) and to the teaching of international law (Geneva, August 13-15, 1956).

Since these discussions had no other purpose than to open the way to a debate, the organisers did not endeavour to obtain a balanced representation of the different points of view or of the various geographical areas. It was considered that by bringing together a small number of personalities well established in the field, chosen from both the Anglo-Saxon and the European countries, an open and frank exchange of views could take place. Such a forum, it was believed, would be more successful than a formal or larger conference. The following persons attended the discussion on the teaching of international law.¹

Mr. Charles de Visscher (Chairman), former judge at the International Court of Justice and Professor at the University of Louvain.

Madame S. Bastid, Professor, Law Faculty, the University of Paris.

¹ Professors Roberto Ago (Milan) and Maurice Bourquin (Geneva) were unable to attend.

Messrs :

- J. P. A. François, Professor of International Law,
Netherlands School of Economics,
Rotterdam.
- P. Guggenheim, Professor, Law Faculty and Graduate
Institute of International Studies,
Geneva.
- C. W. Jenks, Assistant Director General of the
International Labour Organisation,
Geneva.
- P. C. Jessup, Professor, Columbia University, New
York.
- C. Rousseau, Professor, Law Faculty, University
of Paris.
- G. Schwarzenberger, Professor, University College, Lon-
don.
- C. H. M. Waldock, Professor, Oxford University.
- H. Wehberg, Professor, Graduate Institute of
International Studies, Geneva.

Mr. Paul de Visscher, Professor of Law at the University of Louvain, was the General Rapporteur. He was assisted by Miss Anne Hutchison.

The group held three sessions on: Monday, August 13 (afternoon), Tuesday, August 14 (morning), and Wednesday, August 15 (morning). The conclusions attached to this report were agreed upon during the last meeting.

The President, in a preparatory paper, suggested that consideration of programmes and subject-matter should be deliberately excluded from the discussions; attention was to be directed to the two main problems: the general orientation and methods of teaching international law.

In a final statement, the place of this teaching in a general legal education was discussed.

GENERAL TRENDS IN THE TEACHING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

A fact worth stressing is that the members of the group accepted without reserve the first conclusion concerning the

general trend of the teaching of international law. This is in itself proof that a view which only a few years ago was highly controversial has finally been widely accepted. After the dogmatic approach of the advocates of legal formalism, who described international society according to a pattern they had themselves elaborated from a purely deductive system of norms, and after the reaction following the Second World War of those authors who considered international law as merely the hypocritical veneer of a purely anachronistic social state, the time now seems to have come when the internationalists are ready to associate themselves with a more moderate and more scientific approach which will bring them to judge objectively and with an open mind the respective roles played by social realities and by law in the various phases of international life. This strictly scientific frame of reference will compel the student of international law to devote time to a careful study of the multiple political, economic, and psychological facts which he formerly believed possible to bypass, but whose influence must today be recognised as basic to the formation, the interpretation, or the disappearance of the norm of law. To express their common views on this point, the participants adopted their first conclusion, stating that the teaching of international law must necessarily, under whatever form it may be presented, "give adequate consideration to the analysis of the social realities underlying the norms of positive law."

In adopting this conclusion, which they considered valid for all types of instruction in international law, whether at the university or the professional level,² whether undergraduate or postgraduate (licence or doctorate), the members of the discussion group considered that they were making a statement of fact rather than a recommendation.

² The discussion group, in including professional teaching, took into consideration the fact that in many countries (England, U.S.A.), access to certain professions (the Bar), or careers, is based on an examination prepared by the pertinent profession. The criteria used in the preparation of these examinations influence considerably both academic teaching and the interest of the students in the various subjects taught. Generally speaking, the group considered that the professional examinations did not reserve an adequate place for the subject-matter of international law.

The fact should be stressed, for the benefit of those who would disparage the teaching of law, that the profession has given up the method of exegesis and other strictly formal methods which were characteristic of teaching towards the end of the nineteenth century. The constant effort made in the field of legal teaching to explain the rule of law in terms of its function in the social environment has been apparent in private, public, and international law for almost fifty years.

The group considered encouraging the attempt being made to bring teaching up to date, which is particularly noticeable in numerous recent treatises and text books. In order, however, to avoid the delicate debate on the limits or order of importance of the different disciplines which this trend would have entailed, the members preferred to note, without any specific reference to a term, the fact that such a modernisation was taking place. With reference to their own speciality, namely the teaching of international law, the group at Geneva preferred to place more emphasis on the particular requirements of this new trend in teaching than on the generally accepted usefulness of the trend itself.

A more complete and realistic study of the fundamental aspects of international law should not turn this topic into an encyclopedic science, a result which, as far as teaching is concerned, could only be superficial and subjective. All the members of the group stressed the necessity of avoiding the distortion of law by confusing it with sociology or political science. Law is a science with its own characteristics, its own particular requirements relative to method and argumentation, which must not, under any circumstances, be abandoned. It is rather a matter of "carefully sifting out, by means of a more broadly oriented examination, the rules and the practices of international law as taken in the course of their actual application," to quote the President.³

METHODS OF TEACHING INTERNATIONAL LAW

From the beginning of the discussion concerning the methods

³ See Ch. de Visscher, *Théories et Réalités en Droit International Public*, 2nd ed., 1955, p. 449.

of teaching, the members of the group deemed it essential to base the choice of these methods on the level of the students for which the lectures are intended.

While keeping constantly in mind the difference between professional and purely academic teaching, as well as that between the teaching intended for specialists in the field of law and that meant for non-specialists, the group formulated their conclusions in the light of another, more fundamental distinction. It was made clear that there were two basic groups of students, (1) the large majority, for whom the course in international law is only part of a general legal education, and (2) the minority who, in postgraduate work, wish to acquire a specialised or wider knowledge of international law.

A.—The Basic Teaching Intended for the General Student Body

At the outset of this debate the members encountered their first stumbling block: the fact that international law has not yet become a required subject in all law or political science departments. Despite the fact that the majority of the members were in favour of the principle, the group refrained from recommending that international law be a required subject in all law and political science departments, deeming that such a proposal involved the general balance of teaching programmes and schedules; a problem which it was not the purpose of the discussion group to solve. One member pointed out, furthermore, that the scientific aspect, for which the great majority of students will never evince more than a limited interest, would tend to be considerably compromised by the systematic introduction of a general required course in international law.

In cases where there exists a basic teaching, it can be devised either exclusively for law students, exclusively for students of political science (in the broadest sense) or for the two combined.

A single course, attended alike by specialists and non-specialists in the field of law, seems to be the most common arrangement in practice today. This fact has an historical explanation (the belated creation of political science or economics departments) and is also the result of measures of

thrift. The difficulties inherent in this system are not insurmountable, especially when, before entering this field of training, the political science or economics students have been able to follow an over-all course in law or general legal principles. Quite the contrary, after a short period of adjustment, the fact that students of political science, economics, and law meet together in seminars, seems to meet rather well the requirements of the new orientation in the teaching of international law described above. This point of view was supported more particularly by the Anglo-Saxon members, whose experience in the case method system tends to substantiate the claim that the most profitable work can be accomplished by a group of students having a common interest but a different basic training.

What is the most appropriate stage in the university programme for the introduction of fundamental teaching of international law?

After having discussed the various aspects of this problem, the group recommended that this instruction be offered "to those students already well advanced in their university curriculum."

This formulation, which leaves a rather large margin for interpretation, was chosen to indicate that basic teaching, conceived along the lines described above and founded on the realities of international life, is fruitful only when offered to students who have already acquired a general knowledge of the various scientific disciplines, and more particularly of law.

Experience tends to prove that when a course in international law is given to first-year students, the subject-matter runs the risk of being either (1) completely above the student's comprehension or (2) considered as a course in current events, and accordingly relegated to a secondary position. Nevertheless, since the fundamental courses should induce a minority of the students to specialise, the group was of the opinion that the universities should be able to so organise their curricula as to take advantage of the interest roused in certain students by the basic course, without having to greatly lengthen the study programme.

If the fundamental course in international law should not be placed at the very beginning of the university programme, it should not either be postponed till the end. The wish was therefore expressed that such instruction be "offered to those students already well advanced in their university curriculum."

The members of the group agreed that, as far as the methods of teaching the fundamentals of international law were concerned, facilities available should be taken into account and a distinction made between the few well-staffed universities enjoying a particularly favourable financial and material situation and the large number of less favoured institutions.

In addition to the difficulties stemming from the unequal resources available to different universities, there are those arising from the traditional conceptions of university programmes held respectively on the European continent and in the Anglo-Saxon countries. In Europe, the schedule of each department is essentially planned so as to form a logical and coherent whole; this implies a large number of required courses and leads to a rigid programme. In contrast, the Anglo-Saxon universities lend themselves more easily to an integration of methods and disciplines, and also present a greater opportunity for specialisation on the *post-graduate* level than their European counterparts, because of the flexibility of their programmes and the large number of elective courses they offer.

The group did not propose to choose between these two different approaches; both products of the tradition and the mentality of their respective peoples. It seemed more advisable to contemplate the means of adjusting, in each case, the teaching methods to the new trend.

In so far as the material situation would permit (schedules, programmes, financial and human resources) it was believed that the teaching of international law based on the concrete realities of international life could be undertaken, either by giving special lectures in diplomatic history, geography, international law, or by the use of seminars, discussion groups, and case method studies involving a more active participation of the students.

The alternative resorted to in the conclusion⁴ is an indication of the hesitation in the minds of certain of the European members concerning the implementation of methods of teaching involving the active participation of students who have scarcely been introduced to the subject-matter. On the American continent the relatively greater resources available to the universities make possible the active participation of the students from the beginning of their university studies, thus satisfying a more empirical, more analytical way of thinking than is generally found on the European continent. The case method is, moreover, widely used in all branches related to the study of law, and is successful, in certain American universities, for classes of over a hundred students.

On the European continent, the basic teaching of law consists essentially in formal lectures which, in so far as the general balance of the programme permits, can be increased so as to illustrate, in a more interesting fashion, the special aspects of international juridical life. Seminars, discussion groups, and case method studies will be part of the teaching programme once the level of specialisation is reached, but can be adapted to the more elementary levels only with a certain amount of reserve. The primary advantage of these methods would be the opportunity given for selecting the best students to take part in discussion groups, with the intention of preparing them for specialised studies.

Among the reasons advanced by the Europeans present to justify this careful approach to the active participation of the students are the following :—

(a) The principal concern of maintaining the high scientific standing of university teaching and of avoiding falling into the realm of vague ideas during the seminars grouping younger students.

(b) The psychological difficulty of reacting against the attitude of students who, at this stage in their work, are not accustomed to preparing the subject-matter on their own before hearing it from the teacher's lecture.

⁴ See point (2), para. 1, p. 271, below.

(c) The material difficulty stemming from the necessity of breaking down large numbers of students into relatively small discussion groups under the guidance of a qualified instructor.⁵

(d) Lastly, the responsibility for preventing already overloaded programmes from being increased to disproportionate size.

To sum up, without excluding the possibility of occasionally resorting, on an elective basis, to the active participation of the students, the European members of the discussion group considered that, when financial and other situations permitted, it would be essentially by setting up special formal lectures (including possibly a question period), that the basic teaching of international law would best fulfill its purpose.

In the Anglo-Saxon universities, the trend toward the active participation of the students in class work is much more pronounced, and seems to coincide well with the mentality and the traditions particular to these countries.

In the case, in continental Europe, where financial, programme, or personnel difficulties prevent an increase in the number of formal lectures offered, the group expressed the opinion⁶ that the new orientation in the teaching of international law could be implemented by giving one special course.

The group unanimously agreed that to give such a course, at an early stage in the programme, would not over-tax the energies of one professor. The basic teaching of international law should in no way aspire to provide the students with an extensive scientific knowledge of all the phases of international law or of all the aspects (historical, political, economic) of law and legal institutions. It is of the utmost importance that this teaching, at the same time that it provides the students with a

⁵ In 1955-1956, the Law Faculty of the University of Paris, where, since the reform of law studies, international law has become a required subject for the 3,022 students preparing their "licence," has been able to solve these problems, but not without difficulty. Only those students having elected international law as a subject for a written examination are required to attend discussion groups. Thus 822 students have been divided into groups of 40 which actually bring together 25 to 30 students under the guidance of a professor or assistant professor

⁶ See point (2), line 3, p 271, below

certain minimum of basic knowledge, should succeed in giving them a more realistic way of thinking by drawing their attention to the social phenomena which play a role in the creation, the interpretation, and the disappearance of legal norms. Such a legal training, "coloured and enhanced" by even occasional glimpses into social, political, or economic principles, is the only way to revive an interest in international problems among the student body, and to arouse in a select few the desire to specialise and to carry on personal research. The art of the teacher will lie in his ability to combine the amount of legal and extra-legal material offered in his courses in such a way as to preserve the coherence and the original characteristics of law.

To assure the success of such a system, the members believed that certain requirements should be met.⁷

First of all, it is essential that this extended programme of teaching international law should coincide with an increase in the number of hours generally falling to this subject. It is obvious that in the majority of law faculties, international law has not yet acquired the share of prestige in the university programme which the importance of international life, the development of international relations, and the increase in the number of international institutions should have bestowed upon it. Since this problem cannot be settled without previous consideration of the particular needs of all the university departments, the group refrained from any kind of precise recommendation, confining itself to drawing the attention of university circles to the question.

The second criterion for the success of any fundamental teaching of international law has already been pointed out above among the reasons given to explain why such a system of teaching could only be inaugurated at a relatively advanced moment in the student's university programme.

In conclusion, the discussion group deemed that even when the fundamental teaching takes the form of a single formal course, the students should be given the possibility to enrol

⁷ See point (2), para. 2, subtitles (a), (b) and (c), p. 271, below.

in a seminar which proposes to illustrate certain particular questions pertaining to the lectures.

B.—*Advanced Teaching of International Law*

Teaching at the level of specialisation is adapted to meet the requirements of those students who both by their age and by their back-log of knowledge are considered to be initiated into the scientific method. At this point the university must take pains to see that the personality of the student has full opportunity to develop and to disclose what aptitude the student actually possesses for the practice of a speciality which he has freely chosen.

The teaching of international law on advanced levels undeniably calls for a great degree of flexibility, with consideration of the basic studies which each student has completed.

The teaching methods should likewise differ according to whether or not the student already possess a background in international law. Advanced programmes of study for medical men, military men, or as is at the present time the case in Geneva, for the interpreters employed by international organisations, can easily be conceived.

While underlining the importance of specialised training given to those lacking a background in law, the group devoted the major part of its attention to a more common problem; namely, the programme to be followed by those who, from either a law or political science department, have acquired a certain basic legal background and have taken a course in international law.

It was unanimously agreed that the active participation of the student should constitute the principal part of the advanced programme. The instruction which was for the most part "handed out" in the more basic classes should now be mainly "directed" or "controlled." To what degree, and by what methods should this plan be put into practice? The members of the group, after having reported on the methods in practice in their respective countries, admitted that the same approach

would not be universally acceptable. Any method's intrinsic value was in direct relation to: the case with which it could be adapted on the basic teaching level, the requirements of each university expressed in terms of subject-matter and openings for their graduates, and finally, the different types of students and the personality of the various professors.

By the use of seminars, lectures, discussion groups, a year of studies outside the field of law, research centres and study groups, the active teaching method will find its place in the advanced-level programme. To assure the most effective use of the above methods, two points should be kept in mind.

First of all, there must be a limit placed on the number of students in each seminar or discussion group. Students permitted to attend the new seminars held at the Hague Academy of International Law will be divided, according to their linguistic background into groups of not more than fifteen. In the national universities, with a more homogenous student body, the number could be slightly increased without, however, greatly exceeding twenty students to each group.

The second prerequisite for the success of the active teaching method is the ability to sustain the lively interest of all the members of the seminar in the subject at hand. This basic element is rarely present when the students take turns presenting their various research projects to the assembled seminar. The seminar, in such cases, becomes too often a private interview between research student and professor. It would seem preferable, in order to adapt the seminar to the needs of the group as a whole, that the entire group concentrate its attention on some central issue, the different aspects of which can then be studied by every student in turn. These collective studies, highly esteemed in the United States, often become the basis for a published work, and thereby spur the students on to increased effort.

Several members of the group pointed out that specialised training in international law appealed to an insufficient number of students. This state of affairs seems to be due first to the lack of knowledge on the part of students concerning career possibilities and, secondly, to the fact that the families of the

students often find themselves financially unable to permit an extra year of specialisation added on to the years of basic study. Along with more exact information concerning what openings exist in the field, should therefore be added a generous system of scholarships for the exclusive use of those students who possess the ability required for advanced study in international law.

C. — Teaching of International Law and a general legal Education.

In a final conclusion, the group considered it worthwhile to draw the attention of university circles to the role international law should play in a general legal education. Despite the need for correlating international law with history, economics, and sociology, care must be taken that this discipline, which is essentially legal, is not isolated in the over-all legal programme. It is the task of the professor to make certain that the students never lose sight of the close relationship which exists between international law and the municipal public law of various countries, especially the connection between constitutional and international law.

Only on those conditions will the teaching of international law be entirely adapted to the study of all the underlying social realities, and will it therefore be able to form a valuable part of a well-balanced legal education.

CONCLUSION REACHED BY THE CONFERENCE

The members of the Conference on the Teaching of International Law met in Geneva under the auspices of the European Centre of the Carnegie Endowment. Having decided not to consider specific programmes or curricula, but to limit their discussions to the general orientation and methods of teaching international law, the members were of the opinion

- (1) that in so far as the general orientation of the teaching is concerned, such academic instruction, whatever its setting, should give due attention to the social realities underlying the norms of positive law and, by so doing,

give the students a sound understanding of international life which the rule of law is called upon to govern, and

- (2) that this can best be provided for in the basic teaching intended for the general student of law and political science by formal lectures (diplomatic history, geography, international economic relations, etc.), or by using methods of teaching involving active participation of students in the study of law (seminars, discussion groups, case method).

This fundamental teaching, based on the study of the international "milieu" should stimulate the interest of the students in the over-all development of law, economics, political science and of international organisation, and encourage among some of them a wish to acquire more specialised and extensive knowledge. In view, however, of the practical difficulties encountered by universities and other institutions of higher learning in carrying out these newer methods, it was considered that the basic teaching intended for the large majority of the students could deal successfully with the concrete study of the international milieu in a general course of a strictly scientific nature, on condition that the following points were carefully kept in mind:

- (a) that more time be given to the professor responsible for the general course of international law than is usually the case;
 - (b) that this teaching, enriched by the study of fundamental aspects of international life and thereby forming one of the essential ingredients of a general legal culture, be offered to those students already well advanced in their university curriculum;
 - (c) that the general course be supplemented by a seminar devoted to the discussion of concrete cases.
- (3) With regard to the minority of university students who wish to acquire a specialised or more complete training

in international law, it was agreed by the members of the conference that such instruction be characterised by a large degree of flexibility and variety in order to meet the special needs of given situations, such as the turn of mind particular to each country or, indeed, the personality of each professor. Attention was drawn to the importance, at this level, of courses intended to stress certain particular aspects of international legal relations as well as methods intended to bring about the students' individual and active participation in scientific research.

It is during the course of seminars, research projects and study groups, of not more than twenty students and devoted either to the discussion of participants' work or to the study in common of some definite problem, that the professor will find it easiest to create an interest on the part of his students in the study of international law.

- (4) It was also pointed out that it is especially necessary today that the role of international law in the legal framework of society be more clearly understood. With this consideration in mind it was further believed that more attention should be given, whether on a university or professional level, to the relationship between international and municipal law, specifically as concerns the connections between constitutional and international law.

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UNITED NATIONS REPORTS

THE recurrent reports of the United Nations agencies are by now so well established as to require little introduction. *The Economic Survey of Europe in 1955* is already in the ninth of a useful series and it analyses the most recent developments in the European economy and the framework within which European policies are formed as well as drawing attention to such long-term developments

as seem important. Of the latter it selects the problem of investment for attention in the current issue. The selection of a level of investment appropriate to a balanced rate of growth of the economy is a problem to which governments have for some time been turning their attention and it is appropriate that the *Survey* should devote special attention to investment problems. It is good to note that a growing volume of information upon Eastern Europe is finding its way into the *Survey*, but in developing this side of the Report the Secretariat has been handicapped by the lack of regularly published and clearly defined statistics for such countries. Supplementing the annual report the *Economic Bulletin for Europe* continues to appear three times yearly with useful articles of a more specialised nature. The statistical bulletins continue to provide data on a wide range of topics and of these the *Yearbook of International Trade Statistics*, the *Annual Bulletin of Transport Statistics* for Europe (now in its sixth year) and the *Quarterly Bulletin of Steel Statistics for Europe* are all worthy of note.

Few aspects of national investment programmes have received such widespread attention since the Second World War as housing. To the ordinary citizen housing has been a personal problem, to the politician it has been a means to win electoral favour and to the economist it has often meant the diversion of resources from more directly productive forms of capital outlay. The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, which has already published two post-war reports on European housing, now gives us a third in *The European Housing Situation*. This gives us a quantitative and qualitative picture of the housing stock in each country and of housing requirements and shortages based on the most recent census material. There is a separate analysis of the housing situation in each of twenty-three countries and appendices describe the methods of analysis employed and the sources used. A short summary deals with housing in Europe as a whole and draws attention to certain common features of the situation. The Report is a useful source of reference for those interested in European social and economic conditions.

In 1955 the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations asked the Commission on International Commodity Trade to "keep constantly under review the movement of world primary commodity markets by the assembly and analysis of appropriate data." One of the results of this request is the *Survey of Primary Commodity Markets 1955*, which reviews the production, consumption and market conditions of a wide range of products. Each product is the subject of a section in the main report, but

the literary matter is followed by a large number of tables and charts which amplify the information of Part One. The Report is clearly printed and arranged for quick reference and the tables are well set out and clear.

The report of the Expert Working Group on the Iron and Steel Industry in Latin America composed of steel industrialists from Latin America, Europe and North America is contained in the two-volume *Study of the Iron and Steel Industry in Latin America*. Volume I contains the findings of the meeting and the study papers of the Commission. Volume II contains the working papers presented by experts and the summarised discussions of these papers. These volumes are for the specialist, discussing as they do the problems of new and experimental processes in steel-making and in the utilisation of coal reserves, but certain more general matters of interest to the economist are also included. Of these the size and character of Latin American markets, the scarcity of capital, the attributes of raw materials and the special problems of industrial location are perhaps the most interesting.

Broader in scope is the *Special Study on Economic Conditions in Non-Self-Governing Territories*. This volume is part of the annual series containing summaries and analyses of information on these territories and of the special studies on economic, social and educational conditions there and consists of eight chapters in which such matters as development plans, standards of living, finance, foreign trade and a number of basic industries are dealt with. There is a wealth of information here for the student of colonial development, but it is none too well presented and in a work which surely should be designed for sectional reading it is often difficult to come upon the precise matter in which one is interested, still less to be sure that there is not more of it tucked away in other sections of the work. Subject to this criticism, however, the Report is useful and readable.

Finally, among the United Nations Reports there is *The Quest for Free Trade*. This supplement to the *World Economic Report 1953-1954* examines in detail the various obstacles to international trade that have resulted from national commercial policies and from balance of payments difficulties. It also reviews such national and international action as has been taken with a view to removing or reducing such obstacles. This Report has two merits: the fact that it deals clearly and quite comprehensively with the tangle of controls and trade barriers which have ramified

widely in the international economy; and the fact that it does so in comparatively short compass. It is descriptive rather than prescriptive—a wise decision by its authors—and supplies the international economist with a handy reference guide to some indispensable but hitherto dispersed information.

OTHER REPORTS

The report of the Secretariat of the Council of Europe on *The Present State of Economic Integration in Western Europe* is an interesting document and can be all things to all men. Those who want information on the various attempts at integration will find them adequately described; those who have been the advocates of integration can point to certain limited gains which are recorded, while critics can point to the high ratio which planning and effort bears to achievement. But these are general reflections induced by the subject-matter of the Report, which in itself we must judge for its presentation of facts. This is satisfactory enough. The main experiments in integration are dealt with *seriatim*; there is a reflective analysis of the planning methods used and some interesting concluding speculations upon the future. Those who seek more detailed discussion of the European Community for Coal and Steel—perhaps the most ambitious of the European experiments—will find ample material in the *Monthly Report of the High Authority*. This, besides reviewing the political background, deals with such matters as the common European market for iron and steel products and the investment policies which have been and should be pursued by the Authority. The Report is in French and is supported by a separately bound volume of statistical information.

A good deal is written from time to time of the processes of economic development in backward countries. It is less often, however, that we are told of the impact which such development may have upon the structure of society and upon social and class relationships. The academic organisation of the social sciences which decrees that one task falls to the economist and one to the sociologist separates these issues. We should then welcome a report from the International Institute of Differing Civilisations on the *Development of a Middle Class in Tropical and Sub-Tropical Countries* (text in English and French), which records the papers and discussions at the 29th Session of the Institute in London in September, 1955. The International Institute of Differing Civilisations is a Belgian organisation which, since 1919, has existed to study the problems created by contacts between people of differing

civilisations. The publication which has been received consists of a collection of a large number of reports by various persons on the development of the middle classes in a number of countries together with several general reports on discussions. This is liberally adorned with accounts of preliminary speeches at the session, messages from regal personages and such platitudinous verbiage as seems to be the inevitable overture to sessions of international learned conferences. They add nothing to the enjoyment of a reader who is anxious to penetrate to whatever of worth took place at the meeting. There is matter of worth in this Report but it has to be sought for with diligence and patience. Good editing could have reduced its girth and its price and added to its interest and usefulness. It might be well for organisers of such conferences to remember that meetings, which have thus been organised around the discussion of a single theme, and which eventuate in a readable and balanced book of, say, a dozen essays, can have great ultimate influence. But this can only be achieved by some judicious selection.

Another compilation of reports is presented by the Free Europe Committee Inc., in their *Europe: Nine Panel Studies by Experts from Central and Eastern Europe*. These reports are the results of a "study project" which was undertaken at the instigation of exiles from Central and Eastern Europe and they examine various aspects of the problem of how the Soviet satellite and subjugated countries of this region might be incorporated in the various functional economic agencies of Western Europe, of what changes might then have to be made in these agencies and of what mutual advantages might accrue from this widening of scope. Assuming that these countries, if liberated, would in fact join the various West European economic institutions (the authors may be rather optimistic on that point) the problem is that of analysing the effects of a substantial widening of the existing membership both upon old and new participants. In this respect the reports fail.

The analyses are brief and superficial, making no real effort to grapple with the problems involved and, indeed, appearing in some cases to be ignorant of the nature of the existing organisations. It took the best economic brains of sixteen countries laboriously to evolve over three years the machinery of EPU: the problem of adding to it nine countries of widely differing industrial, trade and payments structure is dismissed by these panel experts in a few pages of generalities. Most of the studies are of this quality and indeed many are such as would cause one to wonder whether the hearts of the experts were really in the job.

A second and somewhat more illuminating publication sponsored by the Free Europe Committee is *Satellite Agriculture in Crisis*, a "study of land policy in the Soviet sphere." This study comes appropriately at a time when the agricultural policies and the process of agricultural development in the Soviet Union have been under criticism and overhaul by the new régime there. The study is not, however, concerned directly with the Soviet Union, but with her East European satellites, for whose welfare the Free Europe Committee is ever vigilant. The analysis is here of a higher order than in the previous report and follows a logical progression dealing with Eastern Europe before the war, with the later application of Soviet principles of collectivisation and finally with the arguments for and against the collective system. There is much here to interest the economist and the observer of East European affairs.

The Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics sends us a selection of writings, *Economic Policy and Development*, by D. R. Gadgil. These are a miscellaneous collection, but there is a bias in favour of problems of economic development and of economic policy of the State with special reference to India. Moreover, as the writer claims in his preface, the writings have interest in that they demonstrate the development of the economic thought of a student who began his economic studies when economic policy in India was a facet of British rule and continued them in the days of independent India's Five-Year Plans. It is thus interesting to compare the earlier specialised problem essays (they are in publication date order) with the later essays on general policy—particularly No. 11 on the Economic Prospect for India and No. 13 on 'Some Requirements for Technical Progress in India.'

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS

In the Year Book for 1955¹ there appeared a review of W. S. and E. S. Woytinsky's large survey, *World Population and Production*. Now comes its sequel, *World Commerce and Governments*, which claims "to outline the current changes in foreign trade, transportation and the political and financial organisation of nations and their co-operation in our era"—a grandiloquent claim, but one which has ample backing in the 688 pages of this massive volume.

The authors' purpose is to sketch the factual background to the changes in foreign trade, transportation and forms of

¹ Cf. this Year Book, Vol. 9. (1955), p. 256.

government which have accompanied the industrial revolution in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The breakdown of multi-lateral trade and payments and the slow growth of international economic co-operation; the growth of democratic forms of government; and the breakdown of the great colonial systems: all these are main themes running through the Woytinskys' work. The book is divided into three sections entitled Trade, Transportation and Government. Within these sections the treatment and mode of presentation are similar to those in the first volume. There is a continuous literary text supplemented by hundreds of tables, charts, diagrams and tabulated information. A vast mass of well-organised and documented information is thus presented and the reader is saved much labour in hunting for facts which are elsewhere widely dispersed. Again some skill and originality have been used in presentation and the excellent pictograms are well up to the standard of the earlier volume. As for the text it is simple and informative and does not succumb to the temptations of speculative analysis which was a feature of the first report. Altogether this volume appeared to the reviewer to be more workmanlike and crisp than its somewhat wordy predecessor. It is a useful reference book for the economic historian of the modern period and since its price is a little high for individuals it should be acquired by libraries and research organisations for their use.

There is great interest nowadays in the problem of the development of backward areas. A good deal is written by economists of the necessity of investment by the mature western economies of surplus capital: not so much is heard, however, of the help which the underdeveloped countries require in the solution of technical problems. The Truman Point Four Program has been an attempt to meet this need for technical assistance and has provided salutary lessons in the difficulties involved. The authors of *Prelude to Point Four*, Merle Curti and Kendall Birr, believe that in implementing the Truman Program much might have been learned from earlier attempts to bring American technical knowledge to backward countries, and their book is a useful examination of the results and problems of American technical missions overseas during the period 1838 to 1938. Beginning with the work of agriculturists and geological experts in Latin America, Turkey, China and Japan in the nineteenth century they go on to tell of the problems of American financial advisers to Persia and Liberia early in the twentieth. They review the record of American intervention in the Caribbean in the years following the Spanish-American War and conclude their story with accounts of the many American missions abroad during and

following the First World War. The general lessons which emerge seem obvious but that they have not yet been learned is fairly evident. There is a refreshing honesty and sense of willingness to learn from experience in this book which saves it from being partisan or doctrinaire.

The PEP report on *World Population and Resources* has been compiled by a group of social scientists and seeks to present a systematic survey of the natural and economic resources of the world relative to the growth of population which may be expected during the next few decades. The report is in four parts. Part One deals with world supplies of food, primary commodities, minerals, power and the other agents of economic development; Part Two with local variants of the food and population problem in nineteen territories. Part Three deals with population policy, and Part Four makes recommendations for action and for further research. The general conclusions of the Report are that while world requirements of power and primary commodities can probably be met, the task of meeting the food requirements of a growing population will become increasingly difficult and even precarious. This latter problem will of course weigh most heavily on the backward areas where productivity is low and human fertility and the reproduction rate is high. The tone of the Report is somewhat more bleak and pessimistic than that of Sir John Russell's book *World Population and World Food Supplies* which we reviewed last year, but it has the advantage of presenting its problem more concisely and with the main and controversial issues better lit than did Sir John. The conclusions of the Report are in fact not easy to come by. The authors have sought rather to provide a factual agenda for further work and discussion and judged in this light their Report is useful, workmanlike and timely.

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has been one of the most quietly successful of the post-war international economic agencies. Unlike its twin, the International Monetary Fund, the Bank has been able to discharge its intended function free of controversy and on a steadily increasing scale. The Bank has now been in operation for a decade and its staff have produced a useful and informative book, *The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 1946-1953*, covering the first seven years of its working. This gives a straightforward account of the Bank's work, its foundation at the

Bretton Woods Conference, its membership and organisation, its financial structure and its operational policies. Unfortunately, the inevitable delays of publication make the information contained in the book less up to date than that to be found in some of the Bank's recent periodical reports but that is perhaps unavoidable.

ECONOMIC THEORY AND POLICY

In recent years economists have often drawn attention to themselves by their willing forecasts of future trends of income, employment and the balance of payments. Several much publicised forecasts—notably that of eight million unemployed in the United States within a few months of the end of the war and Laurence Klein's econometric forecasts of more recent years—have gone awry and the public, seeing only the failures, have been caustic about our efforts. A good general survey of the problem of economic forecasting is therefore welcome and Henry Grayson's *Economic Planning Under Free Enterprise* provides this in small compass. The book falls into two parts: the first chapter which gives a clear account of the nature and methods of economic forecasting and three subsequent chapters which deal with economic planning and forecasting in the United States, in Canada and in Great Britain. The treatment throughout is simple. No attempt is made to introduce mathematical techniques, or even theoretical concepts new to the non-economist, but the material is well chosen and expounded and references will direct the enthusiastic reader to more sophisticated material. The later chapters are informative and useful for the student of post-war economic policy.

Messrs. Ampersand provide in their small handbooks published under the title of "Bellman Books" some useful pamphlets on world affairs. Four have come to hand: *The Economics of Defence* by Jules Menken; *Modern Man's Living Standards* by G. D. N. Worswick, *Economic Imperialism* by Alfred Zauberman, and *Economic Co-operation* by B. J. P. Woods. The purpose of such pamphlets, one supposes, should be to inform the reader of the main facts, to present some formal discussion of the problem involved and to provide the reader with references whereby he can carry his study further. The four booklets listed shape up well to the first criterion, less well to the second and not at all to the third. They present their facts in a rather unpalatable form with sub-headings and short chapters. They are too short to develop any theme or to provide any of the controversial ideas which are surely necessary if the intellectual appetite is to be whetted and they provide neither footnote, reading-list nor index.

As a former (and possibly future) French Premier the thoughts of M. Mendès-France are significant and worthy of attention. In his *Economics and Action* this French statesman, who is also an economist of distinction, shows how modern economic theory, particularly Keynesian theory, can be used in economic policy and shows that economics can be of use in the conduct of public affairs. The book is in two parts; one dealing with the problem of equilibrium, or the determination of the level of output, and one dealing with the problem of choice, that is with what goods and services should be produced. A short final chapter presents the main conclusions. This book was originally written in French and was intended for a French public. The present edition (which is published by Heinemann for Unesco) is an English translation. It is as well to remember this, for English and American readers may feel inclined to impatience that the book deals with facts and ideas long familiar and, in great part, accepted in their countries. It is necessary, however, to remember that in France the Keynesian revolution has never taken place. Having been preceded by that other revolution of 1789 so much of Keynesian economics seems to the French mind to lead to *dirigisme* and, even if tolerable, its policies are applicable to the industrial economies rather than to the balanced economy of France. Moreover, let us face the fact, academic economics in France is not what it was when the physiocrats taught Adam Smith political economy. In a word, Keynes is not much known, and, where known, not much liked. Perhaps France has never forgiven him for his harsh treatment of Say. This we must remember when we read M. Mendès-France's excellent book. For it is excellent, and familiarity with its thought cannot detract from our enjoyment of its lucidity, precision and logic. The economics is unimpeachable, the argument cogent, the politics shrewd. It is to be hoped that, in due time, the lagging French living standard, the all too volatile price-level and the capricious balance of payments will be brought to order by such thinking as is here.

It would be true to say that no economist, not even Keynes, has given so much thought to the monetary aspects of the economy as has R. G. Hawtrey. For him money is the balance wheel of the whole economic system. Master its dynamics and you have the means of understanding much of the rest of the system. From this central position as a monetary economist

Hawtrey has made many sallies, however, to examine the way in which monetary forces react upon other parts of the economy, and from time to time such matters as foreign exchange policy, employment and anti-cyclical policy have claimed his attention. Now, in his *Cross Purposes in Wage Policy*, he considers how our competitive wage structure under collective bargaining is influenced by, and itself influences, monetary affairs. Thus fiscal policy, employment policy, exchange rate policy and investment policy all must assure some guaranteed condition of the wage level. It is tempting, therefore, to try to control this variable and, by some artificial machinery, curtail its movement. This brings us face to face with that all too familiar question: can full employment and collective bargaining co-exist? Sir Ralph's book is an attempt to answer that question. It is written with the skill and appreciation of economic reality which always has marked his work.

The name of Hayek has for long been coupled with the defence of capitalism, private enterprise and the profit motive. The smoke of his gallant rearguard action fought in the *Road to Serfdom* has, indeed, not yet drifted away. He has defended and propounded the economic theory of capitalism. He has attacked the political forces which threaten it. Now, in *Capitalism and the Historians*, of which he is the editor, he has marshalled a strong patrol of similar defenders of the faith. It has for long, indeed since the Webbs and the Hammonds, been usual to regard the early nineteenth-century industrial system as oppressive and acquisitive, and the social conditions which it engendered as squalid and unpleasant. To those of us who learned our social history in the twenties and thirties the so-called "bleak age" seemed the epitome of grim ugliness and social injustice. Latterly it has been fashionable to regard such views as exaggerated, to claim that the early factory system was little, if at all, worse than the domestic system which preceded it and that its many defects were merely cast in relief by the growing humanitarianism and self-consciousness of the Victorians. This book of five essays is a contribution to this latter-day view. On the merits of the controversy we leave the reader to decide. The essays themselves are excellent. T. S. Ashton supplies a good opener reviewing the treatment which capitalism has had at the hands of historians. Bertrand de Jouvenel on the treatment of capitalism by continental intellectuals is at his urbane and polished best, while the other contributions by Messrs. Hacker and Hutt are no less praiseworthy. The controversial nature of this book is really

irrelevant, the theme serving only to give it unity and purpose. It is something which should be read by all economic historians on whichever side of this particular fence they may be.

A reissue of an older book, in this case entirely from Professor Hayek's pen, is *The Pure Theory of Capital*, which was first published in 1941 and is by now well enough known to require no introduction. The theory of capital has always been dear to Hayek's heart. He took Keynes severely to task in his review of the *Treatise on Money* for "having no theory of capital at his back," a shortcoming which Keynes remedied in later works, but not to Hayek's entire satisfaction. This book then gives the first systematic statement of the theory of capital, building on foundations laid by Jevons, Böhm-Bawerk and Wicksell, and carrying the pure theory to the point at which monetary influences come to play a role. The book is not easy reading—no theoretical work by Hayek is—but it is largely in verbal terms supplemented by diagrams and eschews mathematical exposition. It contains a useful bibliography of the recent literature on the theory of capital.

When Professor James Meade published the first volume of his *International Economic Policy* in 1951 he promised that Volume I on the balance of payments should be followed in time by a second volume which would deal with such matters as the control of foreign trade, international migration of labour, international capital movements and other international transfers of purchasing power, insofar as they influence the efficient use of the world's economic resources, their total supply and distribution. This second volume has now appeared under the sub-title of *Trade and Welfare* together with a separately sold Mathematical Appendix. It is larger than its predecessor, highly abstract in content, and no easy reading even for the initiated. Professor Meade proceeds upon the assumption that internal and external balance are being maintained by the price mechanism alone, and examines whether in these circumstances economic welfare can be increased by direct controls over international movements of commodities or factors. There may be cases in which direct intervention is necessary in order to promote a more efficient use of the world's resources or in order to improve the distribution of income. This necessitates some general examination of the theory of economic welfare, and this is the role of Part One, while its application to the special case of international trade is the theme of the remainder of the book.

It is impossible to approach this second volume of Professor Meade's great work without thinking of that searching, and to

many it seemed damning, review of Volume I by Mr. Harry Johnson in the *Economic Journal*. One must ask with Mr. Johnson before launching on the task of reading Volume II: is the conception of a general theory of economic policy tenable at all? Is it not better to treat the problems of international economic policy as a series of more or less related case-studies each to be judged on its merits? To these questions Professor Meade replies in his preface that he remains convinced of the value of his approach. To condemn it out of hand, he argues, is to condemn all general economic theory and to resign oneself to a laborious examination in the case studies of all sorts of possibilities which in a general theory would emerge logically at the outset. We must leave the reader to ponder the merits of this controversy after reading the book. As for the book itself, it is written with that clear-cut precision, amounting almost to elegance, which we now expect from Professor Meade. It is difficult, unavoidably so, but the text is nowhere impeded by the solution of secondary problems which are banished to the appendices. As in Volume I, the method of thinking out the book has been mathematical, but its exposition is verbal, the mathematical background being reproduced in a separately sold appendix for those whose technical ability, and patience, are not already exhausted. Lastly, tribute should be paid to Professor Meade's industry and patience in completing in a comparatively short time a work of such size and complexity—a work which it would be impertinent to judge at short range, but which in due time may fall into place as one of the leading works on international economics.

Professor David McCord Wright has given us in his *Key to Modern Economics* an interesting and extremely readable textbook, in which he tries to give the student an explanation of the fundamentals of the economic machine; for the specialist these are to serve as a foundation, for the general reader as an aid to understanding general economic problems. The mode of attack is traditional enough. The exposition proceeds quickly via the monetary system to the main tools of market analysis, thence to the theory of the market, and so to the zones of market power in business and the trade unions. The book finishes with a series of chapters whose relation to one another and the book as a whole is uncertain, but whose inclusion, since they deal with international economics, public finance and the like, was pretty well inevitable. This is a fair textbook. It has two faults. In trying to include too much, it covers nothing really well; and it would be difficult to incorporate it in a lecture course or scheme of organised teaching. It has to set against these defects

the merit of being racily written and of holding interest. Insofar as the student of economics seeking enlightenment "pays his money and takes his pick," this book would not be a bad choice.

Albert Lauterbach's *Man, Motives and Money* is a much needed attempt to examine some of the basic assumptions made by economists as to human motive and behaviour. Since the classical economists set up the preposterous monstrosity of "economic man" these assumptions have been consistent only in their unreality, and every teacher of the first-year economics class knows with what pitying looks the standard explanations of business and consumer behaviour are received. While economics is not psychology, it deals with matters which are the province of the psychologist: choice, preference, decision making, expectations. There is some need, therefore, that modern economics should be in step with modern psychology and that we should listen to what the psychologists have to tell us of these matters. Mr. Lauterbach has, therefore, written his book in order "to focus the attention of the reader upon the psychic processes that determine, underlie, or accompany important happenings in economic life." He examines the motivation of business activity, the effects upon the individual and the group of economic instability and personal insecurity, and the psychological urge and reaction to economic reform. The book is written clearly and without too much of the hateful jargon which is too often the stock-in-trade of the psychologist.

Several books on American industry have recently appeared. One of the most interesting has been *Monopoly in America* by Walter Adams and Horace Gray. It is remarkable that the United States, where bigness and economic power in the firm are revered, should consistently have campaigned and legislated to curtail the activities of the monopolies which were the inevitable concomitant of bigness and concentrated control. It is as if the national conscience was ever uneasy at the consequences of the national genius. There are few topics upon which there is so much muddle-headed thinking as on that of monopoly, and this applies to all countries and not merely to the United States. Perhaps most vocal of all are the politicians who, with scant respect for precise meanings, use the word monopoly as a term of abuse and demand that all monopolies should end because they are such, irrespective of their role, *raison d'être* or efficiency. This confusion, however, is not the fault of the economist. The theoretical position is clear and well established. Some useful riders can, however, be added in the matter of tracing the activities of monopolies in the past, in assessing data as to their

behaviour and in assessing the efficacy of the measures taken for their control. These matters are within the purview of Messrs. Adams and Gray's book and they have provided useful information, confining themselves (wisely) to the United States economy. Their work is a useful addition to an already large literature.

Herrymon Maurer's *Great Enterprise* seeks to provide "a general perspective on the large modern corporation" through scrutiny of the history of United States business and of the daily behaviour of fifty selected companies. While the result is interesting enough it can scarcely be said to add to the data we already possess. Messrs. Berle, Means, Galbraith and Burnham have said most of what Mr. Maurer has to say. Moreover, the book, probably because it assumes a popular style, has the air of providing an apologia for the big corporation rather than of subjecting it to objective examination. Students of business organisation may find the sections on management techniques useful, but, for the rest, Mr. Maurer's four-year research programme has borne disappointing fruit.

A. D. H. Kaplan's *Big Enterprise in a Competitive System* is a more serious research study with a similar theme. He too has set out to examine the role that big business plays in a private enterprise economy and to re-assess the nature of the so-called private enterprise system in the light of the large industrial units which operate within it. He too has worked with the records of large American firms but he has, it seems to the reviewer, selected more meaningful questions to ask and gone some way towards providing answers to them than has Mr. Maurer. Mention has already been made of the confusion of ideas and terminology surrounding the discussion of monopoly. Mr. Kaplan clearly has been troubled by this and he clears the ground at the outset by an attempt to establish the semantics of the subject and thus to proceed with some surety of what he is discussing. This is useful and original. The task done he goes forward to assess the size distribution of business firms and to examine the sources of their concentration of power. Later chapters deal with the forms of competition, of the force they exert and of their effects on business and public policy. Lastly, there is a useful summary chapter in which the main findings and conclusions are presented. Altogether Mr. Kaplan's book is workmanlike and useful.

Philip Wernette's *The Future of American Prosperity* is an interesting series of speculations, backed by a little statistical forecasting, about the future of the American economy. It is concerned not only, as the title implies, with the trends of American income and employment but with certain of the

instruments of policy which influence these variables—with monetary and fiscal policy—and with broader extra-economic issues such as war and peace and the influence of the arms race of East and West. Economists will find nothing that is new and little that is stimulating in this book, but the earnest general reader and student at the adult education class will find it useful.

Two further volumes of the official *History of the Second World War* have recently appeared—both concerned with certain of its economic aspects and closely related in subject-matter. In *North American Supply* Duncan Hall examines the problems, economic and political, of transatlantic supply in war, leaving aside for another volume and another writer the history of how supplies were transported. The book is thus the story of the progressive welding together of the English-speaking countries of the Atlantic community under the common stress of war: of Canada's development as a supply centre and her financial aid in dealing with exchange problems; of the steady progression of the United States from "friendly neutrality" through "cash and carry" to full pooling in lend-lease. Slowly during the past decade the picture of Britain's precarious exchange position during the war years has been emerging. Sir Winston Churchill gave us some inkling in his war memoirs of how dire was our need and how scant our exchange resources when he came to power in 1940. Other writers, notably R. F. Harrod in his *Life of John Maynard Keynes* and E. F. Penrose in his *Economic Planning for the Peace* have told of the later transition from lend-lease to the post-war schemes of monetary co-operation conceived in 1943 and born in 1944 at Bretton Woods. But the missing link lay in the war years themselves and this has now been supplied in Mr. Hall's book. Like other writers in this series Mr. Hall has had free access to the official documents and he is therefore obliged to supply a fairly complete and documented account of what took place. There is always some danger that in so doing a writer may succumb to the temptation to crowd his pages with detail to the detriment of his narrative and the interest which his subject possesses. Mr. Hall has not done this, but has preserved a fine balance between the objective and scholarly and the literary approach. As a result his book will be equally welcome to the specialist and the bookman.

Miss Behrens has a large and attractive theme for her contribution to the series, and her *Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War* rises well to the occasion. As the title implies, she is concerned with the great strategic and transport problem which remained once the economic procurement of the supplies was assured. In a sense her book is the natural sequel to that of

Mr. Hall. In it she describes the needs which British ships had to meet in the various phases of the war and tells how they did in fact meet them, by what means and at what cost. Most of the outlines of Miss Behrens' story will be already familiar to readers of the growing literature of war memoirs and unofficial history, but the large wealth of detail with which the author garnishes her tale will all be new and is at times astonishing. The part played by the elaborate organisation of procurement and allocation of ships by the Ministry of War Transport in achieving a precarious balance of supply and demand emerges well from her narrative. The whole book is well planned, interestingly written, and is improved by the inclusion of good photographs.

Australia too has her official history of the Second World War which will consist, when completed, of twenty volumes covering the army, navy, air, civil and medical aspects of the Australian campaigns. Volume III of the Civil Series *War Economy 1939-1942* by S. J. Butlin is the first of two volumes on the war economy and takes the history up to just after the Japanese attacks in the Pacific. The writer traces the economic preparations for war, and then deals separately with various aspects of economic organisation—price control, transportation, primary production and manpower. He shows how, as the war progressed, these strands became inter-knit. It is interesting in this record to observe the impact of the war on a great primary producing country and one which for at least two years was not in a theatre of conflict. The picture which emerges is greatly to the dominion's credit and shows that great skill, forethought and design went into the making and execution of policy.

The Economic Development of Nigeria is the report of a mission to Nigeria, organised by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development at the request of the Governments of Nigeria and the United Kingdom. The mission's task was to assess the resources available for future development, to study the possibilities for development in different sectors of the economy and to make recommendations for practical plans. This Report is a massive factual survey covering every aspect of the country's economy. Part One sketches the elements of the Nigerian economy, the conditions necessary for its expansion and the means whereby these may be met. Part Two consists of the technical reports from which the specialist may take his pick, and Part Three contains five appendices, consisting mainly of statistical data. The objectivity of the recommendations made and the mass of evidence which supports them cannot fail to impress. Certainly if fact-finding is the

essential preliminary to development planning this Report will be invaluable to the governments concerned and is of interest to all who seek data on the Nigerian economy.

The observation of such a controversial phenomenon as the Labour housing programme is a temptation to which some American was, early or late, sure to succumb. Richard Sabatino, in his *Housing in Great Britain 1945-1949* attempts to find out the reasons for Labour's failure to provide their promised four million houses in the first decade of peace. His work is short, terse and workmanlike and in it he lays the blame squarely at the door of the building industry, whose inefficiency and monopolistic practices have made cost reduction impossible. Nor does labour escape. Low productivity he assigns to inadequate supervision in many small firms, primitive equipment and inadequate attention to the wage structure. These factors, combined with the fact that Labour's housing targets had no scientific basis but were mere utopian hopes, ensured the failure of the programme. Mr. Sabatino's book is interesting reading. There is little in the conclusions of which we in this country are not already aware. What inspires wonder is that as the years pass no serious attempt is made to tidy, still less to clean, these Augean stables.

Chatham House provides the only book on this year's list dealing with the Soviet Union—Margaret Dewar's *Labour Policy in the USSR 1917-1928*. This is probably the first detailed study of labour policy in the formative period of the Soviet Union to appear in English, and the fact that it is an intensive research study culled principally from Russian sources and appears under the stamp of an institution whose objectivity is unimpeachable makes it the more valuable. Mrs. Dewar has traced the development of Soviet labour policy solely on the basis of official documents, from the first halting steps of the Bolshevists, through subsequent modifications to the final form achieved at the beginning of the first Five-Year Plan. The basic structure of Soviet labour policy was built up during that period and there has been no essential modification since then. The study of Soviet labour relations has great interest for western countries at a time when their own labour relations are passing through a period of flux, and it is not impossible that the Soviet Union has something to teach us. The formulation of wage policies of an authoritarian character are, of course, precluded in the western democracies, but within different political frameworks problems remain similar—

productivity, wage-structure, incentives, collective bargaining. Mrs. Dewar has provided an excellent factual study to which the British student of industrial relations can go for guidance. The book is well documented and is provided with a useful bibliography.

Dr. G. F. McCleary's *Peopling the British Commonwealth* is a clearly written and informative study of the demographic position and prospects of the British Commonwealth. The book is in four parts. First comes a short account of the development of the British Commonwealth and of its political structure. Second, there is an outline of the history of opinion on population in Britain and the main population trends which have occurred and have influenced this opinion. This is followed by corresponding sections on each of the Dominions. A final section evaluates present opinion and policy on migration. The author has struck a pleasing balance between technicality and readability. There is in fact a great deal of information in the book, but it is so well woven into the fabric as to be easily carried. Equally attractive is the author's fairmindedness. He has opinions, but he does not allow them to cloud his judgment nor to exclude their contrary. This book deserves to be widely read, not only by specialists but by all people who feel that the British Commonwealth is something worth preserving and developing.

The dollar problem is a blessing to economists. It is always there and it promises to have a long life. When all else fails the economic publicist may turn to this, treating it in good middle-brow terms as "an international structural disequilibrium" or in good low-brow, knock-about fashion. It has the added advantage that national prejudices can be aired. The Americans can point to the ceaseless flow of unrequited American goods and treasure to Europe: the European may show the American how ill-planned his aid has been, how tardy, how charged with political self-seeking. Melchior Palyi's *The Dollar Dilemma* is an American example of the second group. This represents what the Americans term "a smear." It is ill-informed, ill-written and its howlers and inaccuracies are too numerous to mention. To spend time in its analysis would be to pay it the implicit compliment of taking it seriously. Better to consign it to the limbo whence diligent historians of the future raking the mid-twentieth century's murkier depths may perhaps retrieve it for some odd moments of light entertainment.

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W. M. SCAMMELL.

EDUCATIONAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS

- Soviet Attitudes towards Authority.* By MARGARET MEAD. (London: Tavistock Publications. 1955. 148 pp. 21s.)
- Cousins and Strangers.* Edited by E. GORLEY PUTT. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 1956. 222 pp. 28s.)
- My Host Michel.* By J. C. COLE. (London: Faber and Faber. 1955. 284 pp. 15s.)
- Last Letters from Stalingrad.* Translated by ANTHONY G. POWELL. (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd. 1956. 70 pp. 6s.)
- Without the Chrysanthemum and the Sword.* By JEAN STOETZEL. (London: William Heinemann. Paris: UNESCO. 1955. 334 pp. 18s.)
- Working-Class Anti-Semite.* By JAMES H. ROBB. (London: Tavistock Publications Limited. 1955. 239 pp. 15s.)
- The Study of Groups.* By JOSEPHINE KLEIN. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1956. 186 pp. 21s.)
- Colonial Students in Britain.* By P.E.P. (London: Political and Economic Planning. 1955. 253 pp. 21s.)
- Freud and the Crisis of Our Culture.* By LIONEL TRILLING. (Boston: The Beacon Press. 1955. 59 pp. 7s. 6d.)
- Psychoanalysis and Politics.* By R. E. MONEY-KYRLE. (London: Gerald Duckworth. 1951. 182 pp.)
- Communism and Christ.* By CHARLES W. LOWRY. (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode. 1954. 192 pp. 9s. 6d.)
- Multiple Loyalties.* By HAROLD GUETZKOW. Princeton: Center for Research on World Political Institutions. 1955. 62 pp.)
- States and Mind.* By MICHAEL BALFOUR. (London: The Cresset Press. 1953. 152 pp. 15s.)
- On Human Thinking.* By K. W. MONSARRAT. (London: Methuen. 1955. 155 pp. 15s.)
- Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War.* By W. TROTTER. (London: Ernest Benn. 1947. 270 pp. 8s. 6d.)

Education or Indoctrination. By MARY L. ALLEN. (Idaho: The Caxton Printers. 1955. 206 pp. \$4.00.)

Education and Society. Edited by SIR JOHN SARGENT. (London: Phoenix House. 1955. 176 pp. 7s. 6d.)

India, Democracy and Education. By JOSSLEYN HENNESSY. (Bombay, Calcutta, Madras: Orient Longmans. 1955. 338 pp. 15s.)

A Cultural History of Western Education. By R. FREEMAN BUTTS. (London: McGraw Book Company. 1955. 645 pp. 49s.)

The Psychological Basis of Education. By G. A. PEEL. (London: Oliver and Boyd. 303 pp. 20s.)

GENERALLY speaking, books on the psychological aspects of world affairs are nowadays based on empirical evidence to a greater extent than formerly. How far this trend is directly due to the efforts of UNESCO it would be difficult to say; but there can be little doubt that this organisation is slowly playing its part in encouraging the systematic collection of data from widely scattered parts of the world, thus greatly facilitating comparisons between and within nations. A stronger emphasis too is now placed on the historical and social backgrounds of the various educational systems or psychological processes studied; and methods that are objective and systematically controlled are being increasingly used in the collection of facts. Ideally, a still more strictly experimental approach would be preferable. However, at the moment the primary need in the study of world affairs by social scientists is for a steady and reliable amassing of facts. When sufficient facts are available, then will be the time for more controlled experiments; and then, let us hope, it will be possible to surmount the two major difficulties—first, expense and secondly keeping constant the necessary variables in widely differing cultures. Meanwhile, a knowledge of what everyone else is doing, and the armchair application of general principles to the results of the experiments and surveys already published, should make for a reasonable amount of co-ordination without too much needless duplication in the work.

The books here reviewed fall roughly into three broad categories, according to the nature of the material on which their conclusions are based. There are those dealing mainly with ideas, in which historical, political, and religious theories are criticised and discussed. There are those for which, like Dr. Mead's book, a vast quantity of data has been gathered, but second-hand data; that is, the material consists largely of written documents and films, and no attempt is made to approach the subjects of the

investigation. Lastly, there are the books recounting results of a more direct approach. In these the data may either have been collected in a relatively uncontrolled fashion, by ordinary observation; or, on the other hand, by more objective methods: by interview, questionnaire, by skilled observers in a standardised situation, or a combination of these techniques.

It is, of course, books in the last category which provide most interest for a psychological reviewer. However, far the most important book reviewed here is Dr. Mead's; partly on account of the subject-matter—attitudes in the USSR—and partly because of Dr. Mead's own skill and experience in anthropological analysis. She and her collaborators have attempted an interdisciplinary study of *Soviet Attitudes to Authority* based on books, newspapers, Communist party records, professional journals, films and so forth, published in the USSR mainly between 1930 and 1950. Additional information was obtained from interviews with recent emigrants and by "exploiting thoroughly" the knowledge and experience of those members of the research team who had, at one time or another, worked "within the Soviet Union or with representatives of the Soviet Union." Dr. Mead's analysis rests essentially on inferences concerning the interaction between, on the one hand, the official system of authority as stated in published records, and on the other, Soviet character in so far as this can be assessed from studies of pre-revolutionary Russians and from more up-to-date writings about "the ideal Bolshevik personality." The result is a competent and interesting book, which undoubtedly throws light on many official aspects of Soviet policy and behaviour which seem so incomprehensible to the West.

Dr. Mead describes at length the hold exercised by the Soviet State over its citizens, a hold based partly on the political system with its network of Party members, all concerned to justify and enforce the party line; partly on the methods used by the political police; and partly on the Russian character. Traditional Russian character, according to earlier authorities, showed "a need for strong external authority to control its violent impulses and swings of mood; a general, diffuse sense of guilt or sinfulness; and an assumption of the existence of good and evil in all individuals, and, in attitudes toward individuals, an expectation that friends could behave like enemies . . ." These character traits, typical of pre-revolutionary Russia, have, Dr. Mead suggests, remained though they have been somewhat modified by modern Soviet ideals and educational methods. They help us to understand both Soviet acceptance of a rigid, authoritarian State and the Soviet attitude to crime, where the emphasis is not on careful police work aimed

at discovering the real perpetrators of an offence, but rather on finding someone to accuse. Of particular interest here is the official Soviet expectation of what Freudians would call "ambivalence" in its citizens. While demanding a rigid and extreme standard of loyalty and devotion from individuals, the State nevertheless envisages the possibility of disloyalty in everyone; and indeed considers such disloyalty to be an integral part of human nature. Thus, every man or woman, while being a good Soviet citizen, is regarded at the same time as a potential enemy of the State. And, since everybody is potentially guilty of crimes against the State, anyone accused will *feel* guilty, whether in fact he is so or not.

Dr. Mead emphasises the marked contrast between the heroic, Soviet ideal of leadership and the nature of the real leadership. This she considers a basic weakness in the Soviet system. The ideal Soviet leader, as portrayed in numerous articles, school books, novels and the like, is a genial, understanding father-figure, who encourages hard work by example rather than by coercion, takes unlimited responsibility and has united within him "the capacity to organise masses and the capacity to look straight into the heart of the individual." On the other hand, the real leadership of the Soviet Union "seems to have inherited and developed, from sources of its own, a deep contempt for the mass of the people" and an attitude towards children which does not provide the necessary conditions for the kind of ideal character structure which is aimed at in the educational system and is generally honoured and revered.

At the end of her book Dr. Mead outlines possible developments in the Soviet Union which she considers are indicated by her anthropological analysis. This is the least convincing part of *Soviet Attitudes towards Authority*, and serves to emphasise the fact, often forgotten while reading it, that this analysis is based on written material and second-hand reports. Assuming that conditions remain more or less the same as when this book was written, namely, that there is Soviet belief in a continuing threat from the West, necessitating high expenditure on armaments; that the activities of the political police remain harsh and severe; and the same moral-political education in the schools continues, then Dr. Mead suggests that there are two main points of weakness in the Soviet system, both consequent on the contrast between the "officially expressed ideals of Bolshevism and the actual coercive terrorist police State." In the first place "recruitment of youth for positions of responsibility and leadership may be adversely affected by the inability of those who develop the desired strong individual conscience and high idealism to survive within the system of

political dishonesty . . .” Secondly, there may be a diminution of “enthusiasm and energy in the population” as a consequence of the existence of the political police, who are seen by the people as motivated by rewards and fear rather than by faith. Thus Dr. Mead draws a general picture of a “populace disillusioned regarding the hope of tangible rewards, subjected to terrorist pressure,” and becoming “steadily less responsive to positive motivation, more apathetic, and less able to participate with any enthusiasm in Soviet life.”

These suggestions surely constitute American wishful thinking of the most naive kind. With regard to the first point—the difficulty of recruiting youth to positions of leadership—although the contrast between ideals and practice may seem to a foreigner somewhat extreme in Soviet Russia, it must surely be remembered that throughout the ages there have always been glaring inconsistencies between both political and religious theories and practices, without there being any marked accompanying decline in recruitment to positions of authority. After all, even in the Western democracies it is acknowledged that behaviour necessary to success in politics or in business is sometimes at variance with the character training acquired at home, in church and in school. In Soviet Russia, as Dr. Mead points out, the ambitious individual has his trust in the party line to help him to rationalise any inconsistencies in the behaviour demanded of him. With regard to Dr. Mead’s second point—diminution in enthusiasm of the masses—this suggestion is, in the opinion of the present reviewer, as dangerous as it is misleading. First of all, it depends on the police system in the USSR remaining as severe as when Dr. Mead wrote her book; and there is, in fact, some evidence to suggest that, since the death of Stalin (and the preparation of Dr. Mead’s book) police methods are becoming less terrorist than before. Secondly, and more important however, it ignores a number of other factors which help to weld the Russians together. The most important of these are first, the complicated system of payments and rewards in Soviet industry which do more, in many cases, to provide incentives for the workers than do Western methods; and secondly, the very real memories that the Russians still cherish of the second world war.

No doubt the great majority of Russians, like the people in any other country, are concerned primarily with making a living for themselves and their families. To what extent they accept the official ideals and propaganda, and what mental reservations they cultivate, it is impossible to say. They are short of consumer goods partly because, as Dr. Mead points out, their economy is

geared to produce armaments in "self-defence," and partly because of difficulties in distribution which have not yet been solved. But there seems little doubt that conditions are slowly improving, that a great number of the Soviet people believe that they are working for the good of their country and for posterity; and, most important of all, memories of the German invasion of the Soviet Union in what Russians call "The Great Patriotic War" have welded them strongly together, and will do so for several generations yet to come. It is highly likely that any threat, real or imaginary, from the West will serve to make the Soviet people contemplate and, if necessary, endure the utmost hardships for the sake of their country (and, with it, the political system) for which they have already sacrificed so much.

Cousins and Strangers and *My Host Michel* provide a rather refreshing contrast to *Soviet Attitudes towards Authority*, consisting as they do of first-hand, impressionistic accounts of America and Germany respectively. Mr. Cole wrote a book about Germany just before the war; *My Host Michel* is a personal account of his experiences there just *after* the war. It contains some shrewd descriptions of typical Germans, and apt generalisations about "the German character." *Cousins and Strangers* is a more novel publication. It is an anthology, published by the Commonwealth Fund, of extracts chosen from informal reports on America written by Commonwealth scholars who visited that country between 1946 and 1952. Although at first sight it may run the risk of appearing superficial, in fact the opposite is the case, largely, no doubt, on account of the careful work of the editor, Mr. Gorley Putt, in selecting his material. This has been grouped in four main chapters: The American People, The Rewards of Travel, Academic Fields and the Universities, and American Life and Institutions. The whole book yields a spontaneous, broad and yet detailed view of American life that probably could not be achieved by any single writer. Of special interest to psychologists are items such as *Women and Children First*, in which one contributor refers to ". . . a femininity in the (American) atmosphere which a visitor can almost sniff on landing, and a 'monstrous regiment of women' which a foreigner ignores at his peril." Statements such as this provide psychoanalysts with considerable food for thought. This book should be read alike by those who do, and those who do not, contemplate a visit to the United States. Although it is not in any sense a scientific production, after reading *Cousins and Strangers* one cannot help but wish that Dr. Mead had sent one of her Russian-speaking colleagues to the Soviet Union for a short visit, if only to collect verisimilitude for her interesting study.

Last Letters from Stalingrad, recently translated from the German and published in England, is a very moving document. It also consists of selected extracts—from letters, to friends and relatives, written by German soldiers and officers trapped during the siege of that city. Some knew that they were trapped, some did not. A very short publisher's note gives the history of the thirty-nine letters, the only ones remaining out of seven sackful brought from Stalingrad by the last plane to leave before the German defeat. Unfortunately, the English translation lends a curious and rather tragic similarity of style to all the different correspondents, officers and men alike, which surely cannot be correct. It might, however, make an English reader a little doubtful of the letters' authenticity.

The subject-matter in these four books is second-hand, or based on ordinary observation, or, as in *Last Letters from Stalingrad*, speaks for itself. There are four others, however, which describe more direct and systematic methods of collecting and analysing data. They are *Without the Chrysanthemum and the Sword*, *Working-Class Anti-Semite*, *Colonial Students in Britain* and *The Study of Groups*.

Without the Chrysanthemum and the Sword describes a UNESCO inquiry, carried out in Japan in 1951 by a French sociologist (the author of the book) and a Dutch expert on Japanese civilisation. The purpose of the investigation was to study the attitudes of contemporary Japanese youth towards social problems.

The main part of the survey was based on a questionnaire given, with the co-operation of the National Public Opinion Research Institute, to a representative sample of 2,671 people. The conclusions that Stoetzel reaches are based on these results, combined where possible with information gleaned from interviews and supplemented by replies to a projective test. In addition, two other questionnaires were given to much smaller samples, and these results, where relevant, are incorporated into the main discussion.

The book starts with a brief description of the country of Japan and of Japanese life as it first strikes a Western sociologist. A very brief outline of Japan's history is given, and two chapters of the book are devoted to the place of youth in Japanese society and to the reforms carried out since the Second World War, reforms virtually enforced by the Occupying Power. The most important of these are briefly discussed: namely, the changes in the Imperial régime, in the law of the family, and in the school system and youth organisations. The main results are discussed

under the headings: Contacts with the World, Youth and Public Institutions, Private Relations, and the Personality of the Young. To give but one example: Stoetzel concludes that "the eyes of Japan are turned towards the outside world." 68 per cent. of the Japanese questioned hold the view that today foreign countries "can prejudice the Japanese way of life." Thus they are very much interested in international affairs. They readily acknowledge that a number of foreign countries "are ahead of Japan," and they admire especially those factors in Western countries that make for material power, particularly technological factors. Of interest also are habits and customs of Western culture considered by the Japanese to be undesirable imports; for example, too vivid dress and make-up, dancing and divorce.

Many of the opinions recorded in this survey, especially those which show a marked contrast between the older and younger people, should be extremely informative for UNESCO. Unfortunately, however, no direct comparisons were possible with other national groups; so that only very tentative conclusions can be drawn in absolute terms. Thus, to conclude, as the author does, that Japanese young people are markedly dependent and immature and show "a great deal of passivity and resignation" is virtually meaningless unless it can be demonstrated that they do, in fact, exhibit these characteristics to a greater extent than do the youth of other nations. However, the investigators are to be admired for having collected a great deal of interesting material in a short time and with the minimum of personnel. It is to be hoped that Mr. Stoetzel will be able to write further about this investigation, and to draw some more general conclusions from the material he has collected.

Working-Class Anti-Semite is a first-hand, detailed study of anti-Semitism in Bethnal Green. The author is a social psychologist and he was particularly interested in the personality characteristics associated with anti-Semitism. He has based his main conclusions on evidence obtained from interviews; on case-histories; and on the results of the Rorschach test. Unfortunately, Dr. Robb was unable to interview more than 108 people, among whom only nine proved to be extremely anti-Semitic and only eighteen extremely tolerant toward Jews. This means that the most interesting and extreme cases in his sample are very small in number. Nevertheless, some suggestive results have emerged. For example, Dr. Robb found that the degree of anti-Semitism was unrelated to whether or not a man is employed by Jews, to the number of his Jewish workmates, to whether or not he lived in a Jewish district, and to the social class of the neighbourhood where he lived. Neither was there any

relation between anti-Semitism and membership of a trade union. Affiliation with the Conservative Party seemed to show a slight positive relation; but the number of Conservatives in Bethnal Green (or at any rate in Dr. Robb's sample) was so small that these figures appear somewhat suspect. So much for anti-Semitism and the social characteristics assessed by Dr. Robb. When attitudes and personality traits are considered, however, the results seem more promising. A dislike of Jews is apparently related to general maladjustment as measured by the Rorschach test, to tendencies towards social isolation, to pessimistic attitudes that the individuals had about themselves and about the social groups to which they belonged, and to a hostile attitude towards authority in general. Detailed study of the more extreme cases suggested that among most anti-Semites a particular type of personality is observable, corresponding to that described by several previous investigators. It is depicted as "a narrow constricted personality," poorly organised, frequently displaying neurotic or even psychotic tendencies. People of this kind are very pessimistic, lack self-confidence, and tend to "project" the causes of their own failures on to other people. They are unrealistic and have very little insight into their personal problems.

Dr. Robb has discussed his results in the light of previous findings and theories, and, what is still more important, against a background of the social conditions and history of Bethnal Green itself. The sample he studied was small; and unfortunately all the ratings and assessments were made by him alone. This makes his conclusions less valid and reliable than might at first appear. But his book provides a good model for further work of this kind, and contains suggestive topics for further research.

Dr. Klein's book on *The Study of Groups* should prove a most useful text and reference work for students and research workers interested in this topic. From the methodological point of view, her own experiment, which she describes in the last chapter, is worthy of note.

PEP (Political and Economic Planning) is an "independent research body, financed from private sources. Its objects are to study questions on which public thought and discussion are needed, and to present both the facts themselves and the conclusions to which they point, in an objective and readable way." In *Colonial Students in Britain* PEP has certainly achieved its aims. By means of interviews and questionnaires the problems and reactions of a group of colonial students studying in Britain have been carefully collected and described. The results provide grounds for real understanding of the typical difficulties faced by such students—

difficulties in finding accommodation, in studying, and in making friends. Some of the problems arise from the students' own ignorance of British life and standards, some arise from British ignorance of the needs of the students. This report makes some excellent practical recommendations which, if sufficiently publicised and borne in mind by the appropriate British and colonial authorities, should help to make the lives of our student visitors easier and more profitable.

Turning now to books on "ideas," here, as usual, Freud tends to take pride of place. In the 1955 Anniversary Lecture given in honour of Freud, *Freud and the Crisis of Our Culture*, Lionel Trilling has given an excellent and succinct appreciation of Freud's work in the light of present-day issues. He discusses primarily the conflict between the individual and culture; traces the influences of Freud's own ideas on cultural changes, not an easy task; and ends by emphasising the importance of the self "apart from culture," as stressed in Freudian doctrine. Such emphasis is salutary in view of the popular notions of the deterministic nature of Freud's theories and the rigid effects that childhood experiences are supposed to have on later development.

Dr. Money-Kyrle, in *Psychoanalysis and Politics*, tries to apply directly Freudian theories of personality to political attitudes, with rather surprising success. The most interesting part of his book, for a layman, is the chapter on the analysis of political motives, where he contrasts the psychoanalytic notion of "normality" with that of the statistician and social psychologist, and gives an excellent description of the chief distinguishing characteristics of people who have undergone a successful analysis.

Dr. Lowry, in *Communism and Christ*, commits himself to the belief that every man needs a god to worship. Curiously and paradoxically enough, he invokes Freudian theory and modern psychiatry in support of this assumption. His argument seems to run something like this: "Maladjusted people suffer, or think that they suffer, from lack of love; they may show hate, but this is simply misplaced love; therefore they need to love, therefore it follows that all men need to love; which is simply another way of saying that all men need a god." There are many obvious fallacies in this argument. Above all, it implies, surely, a fundamental misunderstanding of up-to-date Freudian principles.

Multiple Loyalties was written by Dr. Harold Guetzkow especially for the Center for Research on World Political Institutions. Written from the behaviourist viewpoint, and therefore in direct contrast to the psychoanalytic approach, this pamphlet contains a number of hypotheses which should prove fruitful for

future research. Its main function is to stress the complexity of national loyalty as a psychological concept and the difficulties involved in its assessment and manipulation.

In *States and Mind* and *On Human Thinking* Mr. Balfour and Mr. Monsarrat have discussed psychological concepts and processes in relation to political theory without, however, sufficient reference to standard works in psychology. This is a pity, since both books contain a great deal of wisdom and historical knowledge.

It is good to see a third edition of *Instincts of the Herd*. This is still of interest to psychologists, and raises a number of pertinent questions in the field of world affairs.

A title such as *Education or Indoctrination* suggests to the unsuspecting reviewer an impartial and objective study, probably held under international auspices, of, say, the differences between "democratic" and "totalitarian" educational systems. However, this book turns out to be a highly partisan account of a provincial, educational furore in Pasadena in 1950. Although fairly thoroughly, but perhaps a little one-sidedly, documented, *Education or Indoctrination* has the air of being written at great speed and with considerable emotion; consequently, it is difficult to infer from reading it what actually happened.

It seems that many Pasadenian parents are not (or were not in 1950) in favour of progressive education. They wanted their children taught the three R's in the standard fashion, taught good manners and discipline, and American history and citizenship; and they (the parents) believed themselves "capable as a community of debating education methods on an even footing with the administration." They accepted "no inferior status for parents in counseling with school authorities on the education of (their) children." Such a declaration followed swiftly on attempts, under the leadership of an educational superintendent with the unfortunate name of Goslin, to introduce more progressive aims and methods into the school system, among them being "education of parents."

Throughout 1950 sides were taken with gusto in this struggle; innumerable educational bodies seem to have become involved; a great deal of publicity ensued—some, unfortunately, in a Communist newspaper—and the row reached such proportions that the words "Fascists" and "Communists" were being freely used by one side or the other.

A subsequent Senator's Investigating Committee cleared the less-progressive factions of any suspicion of Fascist intervention and at the same time cleared the more-progressive school system of any suspicion of harbouring "known subversives." Willard

Goslin, after a battle royal, resigned, and Pasadena settled back, to all intents and purposes, into its former state.

The most disquieting thing about Mrs. Allen's book (apart from the fact that she managed to find a publisher for it) is her suspicion of UNESCO, which she appears to see as a body planning world domination and therefore a direct threat to the Californian way of life. "The UNESCO programme," she writes "is based on the idea that the end justifies the means," and therefore, to Mrs. Allen, just as the "Red Victory" behind the Iron Curtain was due to Communist infiltration into schools, so UNESCO may be using such infiltration to "change society" and "prepare the child for membership . . . in the world community." This book shows a distressing lack of both knowledge and sense of proportion; and illustrates how the aims and methods of institutions such as UNESCO can, by ignorance and illogical thinking, be linked with local issues in a most misleading fashion. However, it must be judged, in the last resort, against a background of American democratic ideals. As Dr. Kandil points out, in his chapter in *Education and Society*, education in the United States is regarded essentially as a local and public responsibility, rather than as a purely governmental affair. Helped by the press, who have "discovered that education is news," the general public take a lively interest in their educational systems, and this interest is further stimulated by numerous public education associations, parent-teacher associations, women's clubs and so forth. California happens to be a State where extreme views are paramount. Progressive techniques, pursued fervently by educationists, and based almost entirely on the theories of John Dewey, have not, it seems, been outstandingly successful in instilling the rudiments of the three R's into the unwilling children of rather conservative parents. And the subsequent struggle and publicity are strictly in accordance with the American love of free speech and free-for-all. Seen in this way, it is theoretically desirable that *Education or Indoctrination* should find a publisher; in practice, this book represents democracy run riot.

In great contrast is *India, Democracy and Education* written by Mr. Josselyn Hennessy. Mr. Hennessy has spent many years in India travelling as foreign correspondent, economic and political commentator and as an official of the Government of India. In his book he has described the educational work of the Birla Trust in relation to the general problem of national education in India. He has considerable knowledge of Indian national education; of the economic, social and religious difficulties faced by Indian educationists; and his study of the work done by the Trust is based

on his own observations, and on those made by his wife, who lived, with their two children, for a considerable time in the Birla Trust schools as a member of the community.

Mr. Hennessy has caught the spirit of the Indian schools that he describes, and in his discussion of future possibilities for Indian education he holds a singularly balanced point of view. He has great understanding of small but vital practical problems, such as students' complaints about the food in hostels and the reasons and remedies for this, as well as a good grasp of the main controversies afoot in the educational world. India, as he notes, is in a curious stage of historical development, and whether she finally accepts democracy depends, Mr. Hennessy thinks, almost entirely on the present generation of her university and school teachers. So, taking into account all the difficulties of finance, inadequate accommodation, inadequate salaries and the like, he sets out in this book to take general stock of the situation and to arrive at workable recommendations for improving the educational system. *India, Democracy and Education* should be read not only by Indians, but by Western, especially American, educationists. They may disagree, and rightly, with Mr. Hennessy's desire to abolish competitive examinations, but they will find "data for a comparative study of conditions, aims and methods in their own countries," and reliable information combined with a truly liberal attitude.

Dr. Freeman Butts has brought out a second edition of *A Cultural History of Western Education*. This is a rather formidable tome for any student to contemplate, but the author hopes that it "may also be of value to all who are seriously concerned with the future of American public education." The scope of the book is limited to Europe and the United States, but in this new edition Dr. Butts has reorganised the material "in order to make more evident the interaction of culture and education." Of special interest is the chapter on twentieth-century America, which ends with a plea for "democracy" as one of the aims of college education. To enable students "to become liberally educated persons with high professional and vocational competence and an urgent sense of social responsibility for democracy should be the goal of higher education in the United States." This sounds a reasonable and laudable aspiration, but it is a pity that Dr. Butts has to mention it in a book on the cultural history of education. Sentences like this from the other side of the Atlantic sound nowadays too like propaganda. However, the book contains much interesting and essential information, and covers a tremendous amount of ground.

The Psychological Basis of Education by Dr. Peel should be of great value to teachers in training and all students of education. Dr. Peel begins by summarising the most recent theories of learning and relating these to problems in the class-room. He has written some excellent short chapters on individual differences, the structure of the mind, and on the emotional and intellectual development of children. He ends with a discussion of the reliability and validity of school examinations, a topic of importance to budding teachers. His book fills a gap in psychological writings for educationists.

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CHARLOTTE BANKS.

GEOGRAPHICAL ASPECTS

GENERAL

- Shifting Cultivation in Africa. The Zande System of Agriculture.* By PIERRE DE SCHLIPPE. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1956. xxxi and 304 pp. 24 maps and diagrams. 96 photographs. 42s.)
- World Sea Fisheries.* By ROBERT MORGAN. (London: Methuen. 1956. xiv and 307 pp. 61 maps and diagrams. 16 photographs. 30s.)
- The Sun, the Sea and Tomorrow.* By F. G. WALTON and HENRY CHAPIN. (London: Hurst and Blackett. 1955. 184 pp. 22 maps and diagrams. 15s.)
- Floods.* By WILLIAM G. HOYT and WALTER B. LANGBEIN. (Princeton University Press. London: Cumberlege. 1955. x and 469 pp. 51 maps and diagrams. 31 photographs. 60s.)
- Political Geography and the World Map.* By Y. M. GOBLET. (London: Philip. 1955. xviii and 292 pp. 15 maps. 7 photographs. 30s.)
- Handbook for Geography Teachers.* Edited by G. J. CONS. (London: Methuen. 1955. xxiii and 448 pp. 12s. 6d.)

REGIONAL STUDIES

- China's Changing Map.* By THEODORE SHABAD. (London: Methuen. 1956. x and 295 pp. 16 maps. 32s. 6d.)
- The Middle East.* By W. B. FISHER. Third Edition. (London: Methuen. 1956. 522 pp. 98 text maps and 2 folding maps. 35s.)
- Canada Looks Forward.* By GRACE LAUGHARNE. (London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1956. ix and 158 pp. 8 maps. 11s.)
- Malaya, Indonesia, Borneo, and the Philippines. A Geographical, Economic and Political Description of Malaya, the East Indies and the Philippines.* By CHARLES ROBEQUAIN. (London: Longmans. 1955. xi and 456 pp. 38 maps and diagrams. 39 photographs. 30s.)

Western Europe. By E. D. LABORDE. (London: The University of London Press. 1955. xii and 284 pp. 79 maps and diagrams. 80 photographs. 17s. 6d.)

Finland and Its Geography. Edited by RAYE A. PLATT. (New York: Duell, Sloane and Pearce. Boston: Little Brown. xxv and 510 pp. 117 maps and diagrams. 68 tables. 122 photographs. \$9.00.)

ATLASES

Oxford Regional Economic Atlas of the USSR and Eastern Europe. Prepared by the Economist Intelligence Unit and the Cartographic Department of the Clarendon Press. (Oxford: Clarendon Press. London: Cumberlege. 1956. viii and 184 pp. 45 maps. 24 pp. of gazetteer. 42s.)

Atlas of Economic Geography. By JOHANNES HUMLUM. (London: Meiklejohn. 1955. 127 pp. 15s.)

Our United States. Its History in Maps. By EDGAR B. WESLEY. (Chicago: Denoyer-Geppert. 1955. 96 pp. 42 coloured maps. 7 pp. index of historical names.)

GENERAL

SHIFTING cultivation is more widely practised in Africa, Asia and Latin America than is generally known and provides much research materials for anthropologists, sociologists and agronomists as well as for geographers. Mr. de Schlippe has studied it at first hand in his capacity as Senior Research Officer at the Yambio Experimental Station in Equatoria Province in what was, until recently, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. The title of his book, *Shifting Cultivation in Africa*, is somewhat misleading until his subtitle, *The Zande System of Agriculture*, is noted, but of the value of the book as a case study there can be no doubt.

The Zande district, i.e. the territory occupied by the Azande, lies in Central Africa immediately north of the Equator but falls under three separate political administrations, those of the Sudan, the Belgian Congo and French Equatorial Africa. Because of his official position, Mr. de Schlippe concentrated his attention on the Sudanese section of this territory and presents a detailed picture of the Azande way of life there. In this volume he is concerned with an analysis of the Azande system as the three parts of his book, "The Background of the System," "The Elements of the System" and "The Structure of the System," indicate, but he is fully aware of the necessity of applying such knowledge of African agriculture to present problems. In his Foreword he states "We

must find ways and means of adapting modern agriculture to the environment of the wet tropics or, which is the same thing, African agriculture to the economic and social demands of the modern world" (p. xv). He promises a second volume showing how he thinks this should be done.

Perhaps the most valuable aspect of this book is the emphasis which it places on the complexity of so-called primitive societies. The idea that peoples such as the Azande live simple, uncomplicated, uninhibited lives is widely held and is responsible for many of the errors which have been made by well-intentioned administrators in their efforts to "improve" both the social and economic conditions under which such people live. Thus *Shifting Cultivation in Africa* is addressed to two groups of readers. The first includes administrators, politicians, legislators and agricultural extension staff, the second anthropologists, agronomists and educationalists. Of the former Mr. de Schlippe admits that they "will hardly have time to read" the detailed aspects of his work, so he has added a section containing fifty-four pages of "notes," including references and explanatory comments, presumably for the benefit of the second group of readers. Nevertheless, it is to be hoped that this valuable study of the Azande and their agricultural system will be widely read.

During the first half of the twentieth century a wide range of literature, both scientific and popular, dealing with the sea and its resources has appeared. Since the end of the Second World War, sea food supplies have received increased attention largely because of rapidly expanding world population and its concomitant, the difficulty of feeding increasing numbers of people. It is surprising, therefore, that no comprehensive analysis of the world's sea fisheries had appeared until Dr. Morgan compiled the book under review here and thus filled an important gap in geographical literature. "One of the objects of this book is to give the reader a more accessible source of some important figures, and to isolate the most significant features and trends from the mass of detail in the official statistics" (p. vii). The author is to be congratulated on his successful sorting as well as on his balanced treatment of the various types of fishing and their world distribution.

World Sea Fisheries falls logically into three sections, "The Physical Environment," "Techniques and their World Distribution," and "Fisheries of the World's Regions"; logically because sea fishing probably evokes a closer response to conditions of the physical environment than does any other major economic activity. As the author shows, fish farming in the oceans is unlikely to be a successful enterprise because of limitations imposed on it by the

physical environment although, he cautiously admits, "nevertheless, the technique may develop as an economic proposition in some areas" (p. 286). Section Two, "Techniques and their World Distribution," is the largest part of the book, partly because it deals with methods of processing and transporting fish, and the growth of fishing communities and ports, as well as fishing methods. Finally, Dr. Morgan examines the major fishing areas on a regional basis emphasising the world-wide importance of this industry.

The authors of *The Sun, the Sea and Tomorrow* are also concerned with the resources of the sea. Messrs. Walton and Chapin claim that ". . . our purpose here is to chart the potentials of the ocean and to see what we may realistically expect it to yield in our search for a new world frontier" (pp. 17-18). They point out that "Our entire crop of sea food today is a mere fraction of 1 per cent. of the full measure of growth in the sea" (p. 25), i.e., in that sea ". . . where 90 per cent. of the world's possible food material is produced by nature" (p. 48). Furthermore, the oceans are a great reservoir of salts and other minerals, in dilute form, as well as a vast storehouse of potential energy. What they do not tell their readers is how these resources are to be exploited by man. In their last chapter, entitled "No Eldorado," they stress the need for further investigations into scientific methods of utilising the ". . . untapped frontier of infinite supply" (p. 176) and the desirability of international co-operation in this search. Rather surprisingly for two Americans, they assert that "If these answers do not come from the private initiative of society, then answers may well have to be found, whether we like it or not, in socialized research and development" (p. 175). Such is the measure of the desperate world situation in which the production of material supplies is lagging behind population growth.

Messrs. Hoyt and Langbein deal with a different set of problems connected with water in *Floods*. Their book is the most comprehensive treatment of these catastrophic phenomena so far published although its contents are largely restricted to incidents in the United States where "Hundreds of floods, small and great, occur annually . . . and will continue to occur" (p. 9). The United States is obviously not alone in having to face the problems of floods but two facts given by the authors will serve as criteria of the magnitude of the tasks which confront the Federal Government. First, "The total program (of flood control), including expended, authorized and projected sums, adds up to about 20,000,000,000 dollars" (p. 169) and second, "There are some 3,600 rivers, creeks, forks, runs, draws, washes, coulees, bayous, arroyos, inlets, and

hollows in the United States on which records of both stage and discharge are currently being collected, at about 6,500 locations" (p. 331).

Chapters One to Six analyse the causes, problems and life histories of floods and the damage, human adaptations, and protective measures caused by them. Because of the federal structure of the United States, control measures were of a piecemeal character, implemented until 1936 by State or local governments or by private initiative. As the authors point out "There is no specific provision for the control of floods, retardation of runoff, or prevention of erosion either in the Constitution of the United States or in amendments thereto" (p. 162). In this connection it is unfortunate that the boundaries of the forty-eight States bear little or no relation to drainage areas so that State governments have no powers to act outside their limits even where flood control cannot be effective because of conditions upstream. Hence the Federal Government, with the assistance of decisions of the Supreme Court, has assumed wide powers in connection with water control. This policy finds its expression in the concept of basin projects, and the United States is now divided into eleven major drainage regions (map facing p. 201) in each of which flood control is the function of the Federal Government through its various agencies such as the Bureau of Reclamation, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Department of Agriculture and the Corps of Engineers. Hence, Chapters Eight and Nine, "Our Present Flood-Control Policy" and "Basin Problems, Projects and Plans" are as interesting and valuable to water engineers and geographers as they are to political scientists.

Finally, reference to Chapter Ten, "Flood History," should be made. The authors believe that "... at least 10,000 floods could be documented" (p. 331) but they have compromised with a list "... of some 2,000 floods on 600 different waterways" (p. 331). This is a most valuable compilation; similar efforts in other countries, e.g., China and India, where floods also assume major importance, might well help in the analysis of problems which are by no means confined to the North American continent.

The late Dr. Y. M. Goblet achieved an international reputation through *The Twilight of Treaties* which first appeared in its English translation in 1936. He had completed the manuscript of *Political Geography and the World Map* in 1939, but its publication was delayed by the war which has also "... necessitated the recasting of some chapters and has subjected the whole book to a severe 'acid test'." This last book by Dr. Goblet does not achieve the

status of a definitive work in political geography, but it is a very valuable source of information and ideas not least because of the author's insight, and lucidity of style. He has read and travelled widely always using observation and analysis before producing his generalisations.

In common with most French geographers he long ago rejected the claims of environmental determinism. He sees political geography as "... that part of human geography which deals with those political complexes which have a territorial component. To those complexes it is as biology is to living things" (p. 17). "The simple elements of political geography are the earth, considered as political 'soil' or territory, and man as a political animal, the creator of States" (p. 19). Much of this book is, therefore, concerned with the evolution of States and their internal and external relationships. Perhaps the most interesting section of the whole book is Part Five, Chapter One, in which Dr. Goblet attempts a new classification of States based on a division into two major types, "intensive" and "extensive" States. "... the adjective 'intensive' applies to the State which, in its evolution, concentrates on the perfection of its optimum territory, whilst that of 'extensive' applies to the State which merely seeks to extend its domain usually at the expense of other States" (pp. 186-187). Of course, not all States fall precisely into one or the other of these two categories—there are modified forms of each—but it would be a useful exercise for a student of political geography to tabulate States according to Dr. Goblet's criteria.

Part Seven, Political Geography in the Making, is obviously a post-war addition to the pre-war manuscript. The first chapter in it discusses "The Great Political Regions" and Chapter Two analyses "The Political Map in the Twentieth Century." In both, emphasis is laid on the present polarisation of power in the world with perhaps too little attention being given to the "neutralist" Powers. Such is the rapidity of change in world affairs.

This is an entirely rewritten and greatly enlarged version of *A Handbook for Geography Teachers* by D. M. Forsaith published in 1982 and reflects much credit on the team of collaborators whose work has been skilfully directed by Mr. Cons. Roughly one-third of the book deals with methods and problems of teaching geography at various school levels and the remainder comprises a series of comprehensive bibliographies. The compilers have rendered a valuable service to teachers; they have also brought together a mass of information which should interest parents and teachers.

REGIONAL STUDIES

In *China's Changing Map*, the scene shifts from the wet tropics of Africa to the monsoon lands of Asia, from an area of shifting agriculture to one in which peasant farming has for long been the occupation of the vast majority of the people. Despite the unfortunate mistakes which Europeans have unwittingly made in Africa, they can claim with some justice that they have sought co-operation with the native peoples there whereas, in China, a social and economic revolution is being imposed on the largest single "national" group in the world.

Mr. Shabad's book is the story of what has happened since the Chinese People's Republic was established in 1949, since when "The Chinese revolution has remolded society and set up one of the most centralized, regimented states that country has ever known" (p. vii). Wisely, the author has not attempted a comprehensive treatment of the geography of China. Rather "political and economic changes since 1949 have been emphasised throughout the book" (p. vii). For this detailed analysis of post-war developments, all students of China and its affairs are deeply indebted to Mr. Shabad. His latest book will be criticised adversely for being a compendium rather than a treatise, for emphasising administrative units rather than geographical "regions" and for being "heavy reading." The reader should be warned against attempting to take *China's Changing Map* in one dose—it is a reference book, packed with up-to-date information, and should be used in that context.

Mr. Shabad is a pioneer among modern geographers in his use of newspapers and other periodicals for the compilation of information on parts of the world where normal sources are not available. "In his continuous research on economic geographic developments in the Soviet Union, the author is scanning regularly seventeen daily newspapers published in Moscow and in the Soviet republics, as well as magazines published in the geographic field" (p. 271). "It is this type of material, painstakingly gathered and collated over a number of years, that has furnished the basis for this volume" (p. 271). The results of this research are packed into 267 pages of print and illustrated by a series of small-scale maps. The latter are rather overcrowded with place names probably because the author wished to give the latest versions.

The publishers of *China's Changing Map* justly claim that "This is the first up-to-date geography of China under communism." It is divided into two parts. The first analyses general patterns, the physical setting, the political framework and the economic pattern; the second gives detailed accounts of thirteen "regions"

each of which consists of one or more administrative provinces. Throughout, the implications of the Five Year Plan are revealed and the results of the 1953 census are the main source of demographic statistical data. *China's Changing Map* is a welcome addition to the shelves of scholars and men of affairs.

The Middle East first appeared in 1950¹ and has now reached its third edition. It remains the best standard reference on the geography of this troubled part of the earth's surface and its author and publisher are to be congratulated on bringing out a revised edition in 1956 although the text must have gone to press before the unfortunate events of late 1956 had taken place. The first edition was written before December 1948 so that Dr. Fisher has had the opportunity of drawing attention to changes in political status and names of Israel and Jordan and also to bring his statistics up to date.

Miss Grace Laugharne has written one of the best books in the series which the Royal Institute of International Affairs is currently publishing. Her *Canada Looks Forward* is not only a stimulating study but also an excellent example of compression without loss of style—indeed it is no exaggeration to say that her latest book is a model which might well be copied by authors of similar works. Miss Laugharne is a Canadian and her country presents excellent examples of the changes which are taking place in our twentieth-century world, changes with which students of international affairs are not always familiar. While Canada is still only one of the Middle Powers, her influence in the world has grown well beyond what might have been expected of a country with only sixteen million people. "Despite her small population, the political maturity and growing economic strength of Canada have given her an increasing prestige in the councils of the free world" (p. 147) and it is worth recalling that *Canada Looks Forward* was published before Miss Laugharne's country had made a further mark in the Suez Canal controversy.

For long Canada has been considered as a primary producer, but Miss Laugharne shows that this is no longer the case although mining, agriculture and forestry are still the main sources of Canadian exports. Against this, however, more than a quarter of the working population are engaged in manufacturing industries, 1,500,000 against 800,000 in agriculture, and "This expansion of manufacturing is likely to continue, as indeed it is doing, for it is based on firm foundations" (p. 141). The future of Canada is therefore a bright one but there are difficulties still to be overcome.

¹ See *The Year Book of World Affairs*, 1952, "Geographical Aspects," p. 312.

"Clearly Canada depends very greatly on foreign trade, which accounts for over a fifth of her national income" (p. 36) but, in this field, the country has become increasingly dependent on the United States which took nearly 60 per cent. of her exports and was responsible for over 72 per cent. of her imports in 1954. "Hence Canadian exporters are in a constant state of apprehension and uncertainty about the conditions under which their goods will be admitted to the American market" (p. 39). Herein lies a key problem in the Canadian economy which, Miss Laugharne suggests, can be solved only by greater diversification of direction in foreign trade.

Again it may be a matter of some surprise to most non-Canadians to learn that ". . . well over 80 per cent. of the total investment in Canada since the war has been provided by Canadians, little more than 15 per cent. representing foreign investment" (p. 44). This is indeed a major achievement and provides one answer to those who have predicted Canada's economic absorption in the United States. Even more emphatic is the ability to spend ". . . over 40 per cent. of her budget, over 10 per cent. of her national income, and about as much per head of population as that of the United Kingdom" (p. 47) on defence. Such is the measure of prosperity and independence of this most important Dominion of the British Commonwealth.

The territory which forms the subject of Professor Robequain's *Malaya, Indonesia, Borneo and the Philippines* is in many ways as different from Canada as it is possible to imagine. Whereas the latter is the oldest British Dominion, Malaya is still a dependent territory, the Philippines had to wait until 1946 before they achieved independence while Indonesia did not become a federal republic until 1949. Furthermore, while inhabited Canada lies wholly within the temperate lands and is almost entirely populated by people of European descent, the East Indies are inter-tropical lands where white people are everywhere in a minority. It is not surprising, therefore, that political development has followed a different course in this insular group which lies between Asia and Australia.

Dr. Robequain is Professor of Tropical Geography in the University of Paris—in passing, it may be mentioned that no similar post exists in the United Kingdom in spite of British interests in the tropical world—and is well qualified to write this book by his first-hand knowledge of the area as well as by his familiarity with the relevant literature, in several languages. His statistical information is often restricted to pre-war conditions, but there can be no doubt as to the value of this work. His "General Features" (Part One) supplies an adequate coverage of the major

historical and geographical considerations and Part Two ("The Regions") gives detailed accounts of Malaya, Sumatra, Java, Borneo, Celebes, Eastern Indonesia and the Philippines. At the present juncture, however, Part Three ("Colonial Expansion and its Effects on the Economic System") and Part Four ("Colonial Achievement") are more interesting, because they represent the judgments of an impartial observer on the effects of colonialism. Under colonial administration, "The Malay world, which covers about 5.4 per cent. of the area of the lands within the tropics and contains about 12 per cent. of their population, had nearly a fourth (23 per cent.) of their total trade" (p. 298). Furthermore, Malaya and the East Indian archipelago are very important dollar earners. Their material progress is beyond dispute but, as Dr. Robequain says "... there is a never-ending controversy over the effects of European tutelage on the structure and equilibrium of native communities and on the happiness of the people" (p. 297).

In planning his *Western Europe* Dr. Laborde must have encountered a greater difficulty than any linguistic problem in his admirable translation of *Malaya, Indonesia, Borneo and the Philippines*. To produce a definition of Western Europe to satisfy everybody is probably impossible but to exclude the British Isles while including Italy and Scandinavia seems unjustifiable. It is true that a considerable number of textbooks on the British Isles already exist and that Dr. Laborde includes his home country in Chapter One ("General Survey, including the British Isles") but, in spite of Britain's uncertainties concerning full participation in European political and economic activities, it cannot be considered as anything but a component part of Western Europe. Indeed, the author must have had this in mind when he wrote "The fall of Germany and France has left her (Great Britain) without a rival for the leadership of Europe, a position which she has in fact held for a century and a half" (p. 57) and again, on the same page, "The most European of nations, as she has been termed . . .". Greater sympathy may be expressed for the author in the matter of Germany. "The inclusion of Germany . . . is open to some objection; but as the Rhineland is clearly within the limits of Western Europe, the rest of the country has been added for the sake of completeness" (p. v).

Dr. Laborde's eight chapters may be described as "straight" geographical description. Each begins with "Structure and Relief" or their equivalents and the chapters on selected countries deal with climate, vegetation, natural regions, communications, etc. In brief, *Western Europe* is a textbook, but nowhere does it contain any indication of the level of the readers for whom it is intended.

If a guess may be permitted, sixth formers and training college students were in the author's mind but hardly university students or the layman. If this deduction is correct then it is all the more misleading to use such facile generalisations as "Protestantism is the expression of the cold and misty north, Roman Catholicism of the warm, bright south" (p. 38) or "... the greater skill in seamanship bestowed on them by their island home" (p. 41). Even more important is the avoidance of factual errors. "... the valley is an asymmetrical dip between . . ." (p. 93) is meaningless, "Saint-Étienne has not altogether escaped the use of coal in its factories" (p. 95) is misleading and "The only industrial districts in France are situated on the northern coalfield and in southern Alsace" (p. 104) is just incomprehensible after what is stated on pp. 70-71 about Lorraine even if Paris and its suburbs are not recognised as an "industrial district."

Finland and its Geography, edited by Mr. R. A. Platt, is the first of a series of handbooks which the American Geographical Society, under contract with the Geographic Branch of the Office of Naval Research, has undertaken to prepare. It should be stated at once that, if the remainder of the series reaches the level of this first publication, it will be of great value not only to "the general intelligent reading public" (p. vii) but also to many students of geography and associated disciplines. *Finland and its Geography* is admirably organised and presented; it is also the most comprehensive collection of information on this small country to be published in English. In addition to 117 clearly drawn, informative maps, the book contains a "Pictorial Section" of 122 excellent photographs illustrating many aspects of the Finnish way of life and landscape.

Finland does not provide an easy environment for its four million inhabitants. "Of its total area, 71 per cent. is still in forest and its forest area is 7 per cent. of that of all Europe, although it covers only 3 per cent. of Europe's total land area" (p. xi). Yet the Finnish people have been able to maintain their political independence. What is much more remarkable is that they have been able to satisfy extortionate Russian demands for reparations. In the Armistice Agreement of September, 1944, Finland agreed to supply manufactured goods to the value of \$ 300 million to the Soviet Union and at 1938 prices. One third of these goods were to be machinery and equipment. By 1952, these and other reparations were completed, an achievement of which any country might well be proud but one which created terrible difficulties in the Finnish economy.

Mr. Platt, editor in chief of this series, with the help of Mr. L. J. Niemela, has made a major contribution to the literature on the geography of Europe. Two of his chapters, "The Disease Geography of Finland" by Dr. J. M. May and "Climate" in part by Professor F. K. Hare, are contributed by other authors but the great bulk of the book has been compiled by Mr. Platt. Every aspect of the country, from history to cartography, is fully covered. *Finland and its Geography* will remain a standard reference for a long time.

ATLASES

The publishers of *The USSR and Eastern Europe* state that "this is the first of a series of atlases entitled *The Oxford Regional Economic Atlases* which aims to enlarge on the information set out in the *Oxford Economic Atlas of the World*, and at the same time presents other aspects of the geography of important regions of the world." This series is indeed welcome and it should be stated that the present volume is the most valuable cartographic record in English of economic conditions in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe at the present time. The Economist Intelligence Unit and the Cartographic Department of the Clarendon Press have pooled their resources to produce an excellent atlas which will serve many others besides geographers.

Eastern Europe here includes East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania and Yugoslavia. By implication, therefore, the Soviet Union is excluded from Europe. This is a welcome point of view as there is no longer any meaning in the term "European Russia" as applied to Soviet territory west of the Urals. Furthermore, the fact that "It is intended that these countries of E. Europe should also be covered by the *Oxford Regional Economic Atlas of Europe*" (p. iii) underlines the transitional character of this region although it does not detract from its European associations.

All the major aspects of economic development in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are excellently represented in this atlas. As the total area stretches from the Pacific to the Elbe, much simplification has been necessary but the overall picture is always clear and numerous inset maps give details of the more important areas. In addition to all this, the atlas is easily handled, the maps are pleasing in appearance and are accompanied by pages of supplementary text while a gazetteer (pp. 110-184) gives references for some 5,500 place names.

Professor Humlum's *Atlas of Economic Geography* is an English version of a work which was first published in Copenhagen in 1936.

It was revised in 1944 and again in 1947 and now appears in a modified form inasmuch as the text, which was formerly incorporated with the maps in one volume, is to be published separately.

"The chief purpose of this Atlas is to provide a visual and statistical impression of many aspects of the economic geography of the world" (p. x). This aim is achieved by a series of world maps (on Olaf Kayser's equal-area projection, scale 1:225,000,000) showing production of and trade in the leading commodities. The normal procedure is to use two maps, on facing pages, one showing production, the other trade, in the selected commodities. Below each map is a series of inset maps showing conditions in important areas.

Professor Humlum reveals considerable ingenuity in his use of symbols to represent his statistics. He was faced with the difficulty involved in the great range of volume in both production and trade in individual commodities so he has devised a system of symbols, including circles and squares, for which he provides a code (p. viii) which must be used in interpreting the maps. At the same time, recent statistics are added to the maps in the most appropriate places to facilitate comparisons between areas. Wherever possible, figures of production and trade apply to one or more of the years 1950 to 1958.

It is clear from a study of this atlas that a tremendous amount of research has been necessary in its compilation. As it stands, the work is not complete—data for manufacturing industries are largely omitted for example—but it should be of great value to economists, businessmen and geographers.

The story of the evolution of the United States from a group of British colonies to one of the two Great Powers in the world in less than two hundred years is a fascinating study to which American historians have paid much attention. Their findings are recorded in many volumes which are all too infrequently studied, yet it is impossible to appreciate fully the dominance of the United States in world affairs without reference to the processes by which this position has been reached. Professor Wesley and his publishers have rendered a great service by compressing much historical information into easily assimilated map form in *Our United States. Its History in Maps*. He states that "The major purpose of this historical atlas is to promote a better understanding of the origins, growth, and development of the United States" (p. 4) and a careful perusal of this book will give the reader just that "better understanding." But the author is aware of the limitations of his readers in map-reading so he has prepared a series of "map

guides " consisting of explanatory or interpretative texts for each of the main maps.

Starting with the Age of Discovery, Professor Wesley brings the story of the United States down to the present time by using over forty carefully selected coloured maps. These are supplemented by black-and-white text maps where necessary and show both physical and political conditions. His publishers have given him the maximum assistance in the use of colours and excellent line work so that the maps are always legible yet contain considerable detail. At the same time, the distribution of emphasis on appropriate aspects, both historical and geographical, makes the interpretation of material possible. To quote but one example, the four maps on p. 52 showing " Growth of Population 1790-1940 " give more information on the demographic changes which have taken place in the United States and in a more readily understood form than could have been conveyed in several pages of text.

A year's residence in the United States has convinced the present writer of the need to appreciate two basic factors in the history of this great country. First is its size and productivity; second, and probably more important, is the tremendous speed of development in all aspects including economic, social and political matters. It is difficult to underestimate the role of America in world affairs, but it cannot be understood without reference to these two factors and a careful study of this atlas will facilitate the understanding of their importance. Accordingly, *Our United States. Its History in Maps* is to be highly recommended not only to the people of this country, as is implied in the use of " our " in the title, but to all those who wish to grasp the significance of the United States in this critical mid-twentieth century period.

London.

A. E. MOODIE.

Géographie de la circulation aérienne. By EUGÈNE PÉPIN. With a Preface by Dr. E. Warner. (Paris: Gallimard. 1956. 341 pp. Frs. 1,200).

The author of this book was for eight years the Principal Legal Adviser to, and Director of the Legal Bureau of, the International Civil Aviation Organisation and is at present Director of the Institute of International Air Law at the McGill University.

His long experience in this field and the extensive scope of his interest in this subject have enabled him to make good use of a vast quantity of material and to produce a highly interesting work dealing with many aspects of international civil aviation:

technical (Part One: development of aviation), legal (Part Two, Chap. 1: freedom of air navigation), geographical (Part Two, Chaps. 2-4: safety in air navigation; Part Three: geographical factors; Part Four, Chap. 2: discovery and exploitation of our planet) and economical (Part Three, *passim*; Part Four, Chap. 2, *passim*), as well as the social impact of aviation (Part Four, Chap. 1: contribution of aviation to the development of human relations).

Besides being a broad survey in human geography of a still largely virgin field, this book should also hold much interest for geographers from the standpoint of cartography, both in regard to maps for aviation and in regard to the actual and potential contributions of aviation to cartography. In particular, the description and explanation of the control of the airspace in the interest of aviation and of the infrastructure of civil aviation in general are distinguished by their great lucidity, further enhanced by many maps, sketches, diagrams and photographs. To any one interested in the multifarious aspects of the development, control and impact of civil aviation, this book provides a most useful groundwork.

London.

BIN CHENG.

INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS

NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

- Histoire des institutions.* By JACQUES ELLUL. Tome Premier: Institutions grecques, romaines, byzantines, francques (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1955. 792 pp. Frs. 1,660.)
- Histoire des institutions et des faits sociaux (X^e-XIX^e siècle).* By JEAN IMBERT, GÉRARD SAUTEL, MARGUERITE BOULET-SAUTEL. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1956. 404 pp. Frs. 980.)
- Droit constitutionnel et institutions politiques.* By MAURICE DUVERGER. Second Edition. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1956. 665 pp. Frs. 1,460.)
- Staatslehre im Umriss.* By OTTO KOELLREUTTER. (Göttingen: Göttinger Verlagsanstalt. 1955. 307 pp. DM 16.80.)
- Föderative Elemente im deutschen Staatsrecht seit 1648.* By ELLINOR VON PUTTKAMER. (Göttingen: Musterschmidt. 1955. 191 pp.)
- Federalism and Constitutional Change.* By WILLIAM S. LIVINGSTON. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, London: Cumberlege. 1956. 380 pp. 42s.)
- The Bill of Rights and What it Means Today.* By EDWARD DUMBAULD. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1957. 242 pp. \$8.75.)
- The American Presidency.* By CLINTON ROSSITER. With an Introduction by D. W. Brogan. (London: Hamish Hamilton. 1957. 175 pp. 16s.)
- The Two-Party System in the United States.* By WILLIAM GOODMAN. (Princeton: Nostrand, London: Macmillan. 1956. 649 pp. 45s.)
- Governments of Latin America.* By WILLIAM W. PIERSON and FEDERICO G. GIL. (London and New York: McGraw-Hill. 514 pp. 49s.)
- The New Japan. Government and Politics.* By HAROLD S. QUIGLEY and JOHN E. TURNER. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. London: Oxford University Press. 1956. 456 pp. 40s.)

- Governments of Greater European Powers.* By HERMAN FINER. (New York: Henry Holt. 1956. 931 and xciv pp. \$6.95.)
- European and Comparative Government.* By ROBERT G. NEUMANN. Second Edition. (London and New York: McGraw-Hill. 1955. 818 pp. 49s.)
- The Politics of Compromise. A Study of Parties and Cabinet Government in Sweden.* By DANKWART A. RUSTOW. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. London: Cumberlege. 1955. 257 pp. 40s.)
- La Yougoslavie socialiste.* By C. BOBROWSKI. With a Preface by Georges Vedel. (Paris: Armand Colin. 1956. 237 pp. Frs. 750.)
- Special Study on Social Conditions in Non-Self-Governing Territories.* United Nations Publication, Sales No.: 1956.VI.B.1. (London: H.M. Stationery Office. 1956. 172 pp. 12s. 6d.)
- Developments Towards Self-Government in the Caribbean.* A Symposium held under the Auspices of the Netherlands Universities Foundation for International Cooperation, at The Hague, September, 1954. (The Hague: van Hoeve. 1955. 285 pp. Fls. 7.00.)

REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS

- Our Three Nations: Wales, Scotland, England.* By GWYNFOR EVANS and Others. (Cardiff: Plaid Cymru. Glasgow: The Scottish National Party. London: Common Wealth. 1956. 79 pp. 2s. 6d.)
- The British Commonwealth of Nations.* By SIR IVOR JENNINGS. Third Edition. (London: Hutchinson's University Library. 1956. 175 pp. 10s. 6d.)
- Britain, Commonwealth and Empire, 1901-1955.* By PAUL KNAPLUND. (London: Hamish Hamilton. 1956. 541 pp. 35s. net.)
- "Commonwealth d'abord."* By YVES G. BRISSONNIÈRE. With a Preface by M. André Siegfried. (Paris: Domat Montchrestien. 1955. 372 pp.)
- Integrated Europe?* By MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY. (London and New York: Macmillan. 1955. 182 pp. 24s. 6d.)
- The Expanding Commonwealth.* By the HON. PATRICK MATTLAND, M.P. and Others. (London: Conservative Political Centre. 1956. 28 pp. 1s.)

- La Querelle de la C.E.D.* By JACQUES FAUVET and Others under the Direction of Raymond Aron and Daniel Lerner. (Paris: Armand Colin. 1956. 216 pp.)
- Die Auffassung der verschiedenen sozialistischen Parteien von den Problemen Europas.* By H. BUNG. (Saarbrücken: Karl Funk. 1956. 116 pp.)
- Le istituzioni internazionali di cooperazione europea.* By RICCARDO MONACO. (Milan: Giuffrè. 1956. 100 pp. Lire 600.)
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- Handbook of European Organisations.* By the Secretariat-General of the Council of Europe. (Strasbourg: Berger-Levrault. London: H. M. Stationery Office. 1956. 172 pp. 5s.)
- Western Co-operation. A Reference Handbook.* By the Central Office of Information. (London: H.M. Stationery Office. 1955. 128 pp. 5s.)
- Collective Defence in South East Asia.* By a Study Group of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. (London and New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1956. 197 pp. 12s. 6d.)
- Die kollektive Sicherheit.* By MANFRED LACHS. (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag. 1956. 56 pp. DM 2.00.)
- Sécurité collective en Europe. Conférence tenue à Varsovie du 3 au 6 avril 1955.* Edited by CEZARY BEREZOWSKI AND OTHERS, on behalf of the Académie Polonaise des Sciences. (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe. 1955. 495 pp.)
- Solov'yev: Prophet of Russian-Western Unity.* By EGBERT MUNZER. (London: Hollis & Carter. 1956. 154 pp. 12s. 6d.)

COMPREHENSIVE INSTITUTIONS

- Alternatives to the H-Bomb.* A Symposium by LEWIS MUMFORD and Others, organised by *The New Leader* magazine and edited by Anatole Shub. (Boston: Beacon Press. 1955. 124 pp. \$1.95.)
- Welfare of Nations.* By MICHELE FIORE. (New York: Philosophical Library. 1955. 708 pp. \$6.00.)
- Birth of a World People. Provisional Constitution of the Commonwealth of World Citizens.* With an Introduction by Hugh J. Schonfield. (London: Dennis Dobson. 1956. 59 pp. 8s. 6d.)

- Fédéralisme amphictyonique. Éléments de système et tendance internationale.* By DUSAN SIDJANSKI. (Lausanne: Rouge. 1956. 99 pp. Frs. 12.50.)
- The Social Thought of the World Council of Churches.* By EDWARD DUFF, S.J. (London: Longmans, Green. 1956. 339 pp. 25s.)
- Multiple Loyalties: Theoretical Approach to a Problem in International Organisation.* By HAROLD GUETZKOW. (Princeton: Centre for Research on World Political Institutions. 1955. 62 pp.)
- International Conflict and Collective Security.* By WILLARD N. HOGAN. (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press. 1955. 202 pp. \$3.50.)
- De la Sainte-Alliance au Pacte atlantique.* By FERNAND L'HUILLIER. (Neuchâtel: La Baconnière. Vol. I, 1954. 292 pp. Vol. II, 1955. 479 pp.)
- Swords Into Plowshares. The Problems and Progress of International Organisation.* By INIS L. CLAUDE, JR. (New York: Random House. 1956. 497 pp.)
- The Second Lesson. Seven Years at the United Nations.* By BERNARD MOORE. (London: Macmillan. 1957. 229 pp. 21s.)
- Basic Facts about the United Nations.* By the United Nations Department of Public Information. Twelfth Edition. (New York: United Nations. London: H.M. Stationery Office. 1956. 46 pp. 15c.)
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- La tutelle internationale et le problème des unions administratives.* By JANVIER MULENZI. With a Preface by Guy Malengreau. (Louvain and Paris: Nauwelaerts. 1955. 228 pp. B.Frs. 140.)
- A Sacred Trust. The Work of the United Nations for Dependent Peoples.* Second Revised Edition. United Nations Publication. (New York: United Nations. London: H.M. Stationery Office. 1956. 89 pp. 1s.)
- The Refugee and the World Community.* By GEORGE STOESSINGER. (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press. 1956. 289 pp. \$4.50.)
- The United Nations and The World Jewish Congress.* By NEHEMIAH ROBINSON. (New York: Institute of Jewish Affairs. World Jewish Congress. 1956. 285 pp.)
- New States and International Organisations.* By BENJAMIN AKZIN. (Paris: UNESCO. London: H.M. Stationery Office. 1955. 200 pp. 18s.)
- The United Nations and Pakistan.* By MUSHTAQ AHMAD. (Karachi: The Pakistan Institute of International Affairs. 1955. 162 pp.)
- The Arab Bloc in the United Nations.* By G. MOUSSA DIB. (Amsterdam: Djambatan. 1956. 128 pp.)
- Latin America in the United Nations.* By JOHN A. HOUSTON. With a Foreword by Ricardo J. Alfaro. (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 1956. 845 pp. \$2.75.)
- The United Nations: Reform, Replace or Supplement?* By LORD SALTER. (London: David Davies Memorial Institute. 1957. 19 pp. 2s. 6d.)
- Peace Through Disarmament and Charter Revision.* By GRENVILLE CLARK and LOUIS B. SOHN. (New Hampshire. 1956. 121 pp.)

NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

A significant landmark in the study of political institutions is the Decree of March 27, 1954, of the French Government, revising the structure of the law degree, *Licence en droit*, in French

Universities. In contrast to the law degree of universities in Anglo-American countries, which has a tendency of becoming more and more vocational, that on the Continent and in other countries following the Continental tradition has always attempted to encompass a wider section of the social horizon. For instance, in general a course on political economy has always been included in the first year of the *Licence*.

As Professor Duverger says, in the Preface to his work hereafter to be mentioned, the Decree of 1954, which came into force in November, 1955, has now opened the doors of the Laws Faculties in France to political science as well. The first-year course on constitutional law has now been altered to Constitutional Law and Political Institutions. The first three books here reported upon all belong to the *Thémis* series of legal, economic and political manuals prepared under the direction of Professor Duverger and published by Presses Universitaires de France to meet the needs of French law students studying under the new syllabus. They follow a general pattern of dividing the text into, on the one hand, the main exposition of the subject-matter, printed in one type, and on the other hand, sections printed in a smaller type containing additional material, followed, in regard to each topic, by a select bibliography for further reference. Judging by the three works included in this Report, this series fully maintains the high standard and usefulness of this type of textbook, of which there is a long tradition in France.

The change in the title of the French undergraduate course reflects a healthy and welcome shift in emphasis, dictated to some extent perhaps by bitter experience, from the study of constitutional texts to that of the law of political institutions in theory and practice, as well as the historical development and actual operation of such political institutions. In other words, it is now recognised that institutional structures are merely forms which may or may not correspond to the social facts which should give them substance. That both the lawyer and the sociologist will benefit from this interdisciplinary approach to political institutions is too obvious to require further elaboration.

In the first volume of his *Histoire des Institutions*, Professor Ellul has undertaken a formidable task in trying to present within the space of such a manual both a description and an analysis of the institutions of ancient Greece, Rome and the successors of Rome in the Mediterranean world. In point of time, it covers the period from about the tenth century B.C. to and including the establishment of the Carolingian Empire. The scan is thus wide, but never hurried or shallow. This succinct presentation of a penetrating panorama of the historical development of political institutions

through a span of some eighteen centuries constitutes, indeed, a most remarkable feat. One of the most valuable features of this work is doubtless the constant, but at the same time extremely circumspect, effort to unravel any thread of continuity which might have run through the various stages of this development. While, on the whole, one may notice, understandably, considerable stress being placed on legal institutions, those points on which emphasis has been put have been selected and discussed with such discernment and learning that one can only be grateful for their inclusion.

Acting presumably as a companion volume to the second part of Professor Ellul's work, *Histoire des Institutions et des Faits sociaux (X^e-XIX^e Siècle)* by Professors Imbert, Sautel and Boulet-Sautel, is what has sometime been called a source book, containing excerpts from official documents and other publications which are of relevance for the study of the political institutions of France during the period indicated.

The book in the *Thémis* series which specifically covers the new syllabus of that subject is Professor Duverger's *Droit constitutionnel et institutions politiques*. One of the main points of interest which it presents is the rather neat classification adopted by the author in Part One, dealing with the Elements of Political Régimes. These are (1) the authority of those who govern; (2) the choice of those who govern; (3) governmental structure; (4) limitation of the powers of those who govern. Under these four rubrics, the various issues which ordinarily require to be discussed fit in quite happily.

It would probably be difficult to say the same of the division in Part Two. There the Main Types of Political Régime are divided boldly into (1) classical democracies and (2) contemporary dictatorships. Examples of misfits in such a system include the placing of the political régimes of Latin America among the former; although, as the learned author says, "often the régimes of Latin America are of a mixed character, semi-democratic, semi-dictatorial; sometimes they are pure and simple dictatorships" (p. 819. Cf. also *infra*, *Governments of Latin America* by Pierson and Gil). Part Two in essence is a brief study in comparative government, while Part Three, which represents two-fifths of the whole book, deals with the political régime of France, beginning with a short historical introduction.

Bearing some resemblance to the above, is Professor Koellreutter's *Staatslehre im Umriss*. Part One deals with general principles, whilst Part Two tackles in turn, first, comparative government in the nineteenth century and, secondly, comparative government in the twentieth century. Considerable attention has been paid to governments in Asia and Africa, where the rise of

a third world force is not excluded. The need for a widening of the underlying basis of international law is mentioned and the importance of a minimum standard of subsistence is stressed. The role that Germany will be called upon to play in Europe is not forgotten, and the blame for the fact that the Eurasian Russia is now installed in the "Green Heart of Germany" is laid on the shoulders of the Anglo-Saxon Powers, especially President Roosevelt (pp. 282 *et seq.*)!

Föderative Elemente im deutschen Staatsrecht seit 1648 is a useful collection of documents and excerpts dating from the Peace Treaty of Osnabruck of October 14-24, 1648, to the Coblenz Resolutions of the Ministers-President of the *Länder* of the three western zones of Germany of July 10, 1948, showing the federal trait in the constitutional law of Germany during those three centuries. To it, Dr. von Puttkamer has contributed an interesting and extended Introduction.

As Professor Livingston says in his most stimulating *Federalism and Constitutional Change*, "federal governments and federal constitutions do not grow simply by accident. They arise in response to certain stimuli; a federal system is consciously adopted as a means of solving the problems represented by these stimuli" (p. 1). "Federal government is a form of political and constitutional organisation that unites into a single polity a number of diversified groups of component polities so that the personality and individuality of the component parts are largely preserved while creating in the new totality a separate and distinct political and constitutional unit" (p. 9).

In line with the tendency towards a sociological approach to the study of political institutions mentioned at the beginning of this Report, Professor Livingston rightly criticises that "students of federalism have been too much concerned with the documentary constitution and too little concerned with the processes of government which it presumably determines" (p. 303). "The essence of federalism," he says rightly, "lies not in the constitutional or institutional structure but in the society itself. Federal government is a device by which the federal qualities of the society are articulated and protected" (p. 2).

In this respect, it would seem that Professor Livingston finds, amongst others, two qualities to be of a crucial character. To put the matter negatively, there are two things which are incompatible with a true federal régime: (1) dictatorship or absolutism, (2) the absolute rule of a majority (pp. 308-314). For if federalism represents a compromise between the desire for unity and integration and the centrifugal tendencies of the diversified groups and

component parts of the federal entity, an essential problem of federalism is the protection of the component units against encroachment either by an authoritarian central government or by a narrow majority representing merely a section of the various parts.

This leads directly to the central theme of Professor Livingston's investigation. He has left aside the question of *de facto* amendments of federal constitutions and directed his attention mainly to the process of formal constitutional amendment. He examines in turn the constitutions of Canada, Australia, Switzerland, and the United States. Wisely, in the belief that substance is more important than form, he has also included in his investigation similar problems in constitutions of States which otherwise might not have been called federal. The result is a work of much scholarship and, what does not necessarily follow always therefrom, a great deal of good sense.

Constitutional amendments of a rather unusual type are the first ten amendments to the United States Constitution, without which the Constitution itself might not have been ratified by all the thirteen original states. They constitute the American Bill of Rights, of which the history and significance today form the object of a painstaking and affectionate study in Edward Dumbauld's *The Bill of Rights and What It Means Today*, following on his previous *The Declaration of Independence and What it Means*.

"The real significance of the Bill of Rights," the learned author reminds his readers, "is to be found, not in the history of the enshrined parchment, not in the doctrines of political philosophy which inspired our ancestors, but in the treatment that an unpopular victim can count on receiving in court today when hostile public officials are trying to make trouble for him. How much good do these much-vaunted prerogatives of American citizenship do for him in his time of travail"? (p. 58). Quoting the well-known words of Chief Justice Marshall in *McCulloch v. Maryland*, when speaking of the Bill of Rights, "We must never forget that it is a *constitution* that we are expounding . . . intended to endure for ages to come, and consequently to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs," the author says truly: "Because the evils against which a Bill of Rights affords protection vary from epoch to epoch, it must not be supposed that such protection is therefore valueless today. On the contrary, the remedy must be as flexible as the evil guarded against . . . Only in a dead language do words retain unaltered meaning from century to century. In like fashion new solutions must be sought and new remedies devised

when new problems emerge in the realm of constitutional liberty" (p. 154). The sounding of such a clarion call, authoritative, crystalline and yet warm, addressed and intelligible to every citizen, is particularly timely and compelling at this juncture of American and world history.

One of the most important things in constitutional government, Mr. Dumbauld reminds us, is to remember that governmental power is not unlimited (p. 144). The problem is always, therefore, how to limit it. As professor Rossiter points out in his most interesting study on *The American Presidency*, there was at the time of the founding of the American Union a current Whig assumption, which has been inherited by many, that legislative power was essentially popular, and executive power essentially monarchical in nature, or, shall one say, authoritarian (p. 66). In his work which traces, in a most readable form, the history, theory and practice of the office of the President of the United States, Professor Rossiter shows how in this case this assumption has not been proved correct. He comes to the conclusion: "It (the Presidency) strikes a felicitous balance between power and limitations . . . The quest of constitutional government is for the right balance of authority and restraint, and Americans may take some pride in the balance they have built into the Presidency. It provides a steady focus of leadership—of administration, Congress, and people. In a constitutional system compounded of diversity and antagonism, the Presidency looms up as the countervailing force of unity and harmony . . . The more Congress becomes, in Burke's phrase, 'a confused and scuffling bustle of local agency,' the more the President must become a clear beacon of national purpose" (pp. 162-163). Crowning Professor Rossiter's remarkable picture of the White House and some of its occupants is an illuminating Introduction contributed by Professor D. W. Brogan, which is a gem in itself.

Another saying of Edmund Burke, "Party divisions, whether on the whole operating for good or evil, are things inseparable from free government," serves as one of the mottoes in Professor Goodman's weighty study of *The Two-Party System in the United States*, in which the learned author gives a first-hand and highly detailed account of the status, bases, function, organisation and operation of the party system in America, ending with a section on suggested reforms. Professor Goodman does not content himself with a description of the surface features of the two colossi, but has striven to give as faithful and candid a picture as possible of their virtues and foibles.

In the search for an explanation of the two-party system in the

United States, Professor Goodman examines and discards in turn the mechanical-electoral explanations, the economic and social explanation, cultural homogeneity as an explanation and Anglo-Saxon political maturity as an explanation (pp. 29-39). In the end he chooses the "functional-pragmatic explanation": "The best conclusion would seem to be that the United States has the two-party system because it works according to our standards of a political system" (p. 39). This hardly affords an explanation. On the contrary, it merely adopts the customary attitude, which is so often taken with regard to numerous Anglo-Saxon institutions, that they defy any rational or theoretical explanation but they possess the most essential virtue: they work!

It is rightly said that the two-party system is not confined to the United States but is to be found in many Anglo-Saxon countries. There is one explanation of the two-party system in Anglo-Saxon countries very current on the Continent which, at the risk of seeming a little lighthearted, may perhaps be mentioned. The reason, it is said, consists in the fact that in Anglo-Saxon countries politics is regarded as a game, a game of football, for instance, and as such it cannot be properly played if there are more than two sides.

Like the majority of parables, there is probably more than a grain of truth in this. In fact, it is of interest to test its validity with some of the observations culled from Professor Goodman's own book. Thus, at one point, he significantly asks the rhetoric question: "Is politics to continue to be played as a game or is it to become a deadly business?" (p. 627). While economic factors will no doubt influence the answer to this question, the attitude of the players themselves is ultimately alone decisive. Here it would seem that both Anglo-Saxon political maturity and cultural homogeneity play their part. Without these qualities, the players themselves would never have understood the game and, what is more important than its written rules, its unwritten conventions. Still less would they have complied with them! Indeed the learned author himself had in another part of the book used the same simile. "The satisfactory operation of the rules of a political system depends upon acceptance of both the objectives and the means of attaining them. The fun of the game of baseball is winning within the rules of the game" (p. 22).

Another essential quality of sportsmanship which shows itself indispensable to the successful operation of a democratic régime becomes apparent from the following observation of the learned author: "The efficacy of this [two-party] system is particularly

apparent in the fact that the two parties do not engage in a life-and-death struggle with each other. In the aftermath of United States elections there is no fear that the losers will mount the barricades or that the winners will annihilate the losers. No one is going to be shot for losing and no one is going to be made dictator for winning. This acceptance, which seems so natural and logical as hardly to need comment, gives a considerable stability to all institutions " (p. 29).

That this acceptance, which is the keystone of a democratic institution and is too frequently taken for granted in countries of long democratic tradition, does not invariably exist in every body politic explains the frequent failure of democratic institutions to take root in countries without such a tradition to which they have been bodily transplanted. The masterly study of *Governments of Latin America* by Professor Pierson and Professor Gil affords a wealth of evidence to this effect. Directly relevant to the point which has been made above is the following astute observation: "Also distinctive of the Latin American party picture is the aggressive intolerance which is often the prevailing note, each party supporting a leader, a dogma, and considering all others its enemies. For the party in power, the opposition is often a group of corrupt and dangerous subversives, and it follows that for the latter, the ruling party is a government of tyrants. The unwillingness to accept the voters' verdict, what some writers have called lack of 'political sportsmanship,' is a defect which is found too frequently " (p. 816). It should, therefore, come as no surprise to find that in nearly all the Latin American countries, "the formal constitutions rarely correspond fully or coincide with the real and operative ones " (p. 149).

In their joint work, Professors Pierson and Gil have undertaken a penetrating yet sympathetic study of the political institutions of Latin America following a schematic arrangement divided according to topics and not into countries. The result is a most satisfying synoptic analysis, free from clustering irrelevancies. An especially interesting chapter, as perhaps is to be expected, is that dealing with dictators and revolutions. The *modus vivendi* evolved in certain Latin American countries between the precarious judiciary and the ever-changing executive is a particularly precious specimen of autochthonous political institutions from this part of the New World.

Woodrow Wilson has been quoted as saying: "Governments are what politicians make them " (Rossiter, *op. cit.*, p. 111). Of Latin American politicians, Professors Pierson and Gil say: "A good part of the citizenry in Latin America feels a certain

repugnance towards politics and often avoids participating directly in political affairs. To many people, politicians are a special breed of unscrupulous and tainted individuals, a class apart. The mud-slinging and intensity of political campaigns cause many able persons to refuse to run for political office and to shun all forms of political activity" (p. 316). But dare one adapt another aphorism and say a people have the politicians they deserve?

In this regard, Professors Quigley and Turner state, in their *The New Japan. Government and Politics*: "Democracy is a political condition in which participants recognise themselves as such and insist upon sharing equally in its benefits while accepting an obligation to maintain it by all means available to them" (p. 175).

This is true not only in Japan but also in Latin America and in fact everywhere. Of Japan, the learned authors report: "An exceptionally able Japanese editor has intimated that awareness of citizenship is lacking among the people of Japan: 'Paradoxically, the very mentality of the people which causes them to welcome democracy so readily without fully understanding its implications is in a sense an evidence of a feudalistic outlook on life which favors truckling to the times and fawning upon the powerful . . . What difference is there between the present attitude of enthusiasm for democracy on the part of the Japanese people and their previous sycophancy to militarism?' (*Nippon Times*, April 2, 1946)" (p. 175). In the words of Ozaki Yukio, Japan's grand old liberal, imported democracy, unlike motor-cars, is not automatically operative, though its tenets and agencies may, if freely taken as models by another people, affect the evolution of its political order (p. 3).

Bearing well in mind this reminder and this hope, the two learned authors, with great understanding, present a detailed survey of the constitutional structure of Japan since the Second World War, after having briefly examined the salient features and underlying forces of the pre-war régime.

The various works mentioned above covering the New World and the Far East happily supplement two excellent textbooks on governments in Europe. The one by Professor Finer on *Governments of Greater European Powers* is an entirely new work. The other by Professor Neumann is a second edition of his already well-known *European and Comparative Government*. The scope of these two works is largely identical. The four governments selected for treatment are those of the United Kingdom, France, Germany and the Soviet Union. In both cases, considerable

attention is given to the historical and social backgrounds of contemporary political institutions in those countries.

Relatively speaking the former presents a fuller treatment of the issues, but the latter in its comparative conciseness successfully manages not to lose any of the essentials. The former is enriched with a number of illustrations, diagrams and charts, in which American textbooks excel, and the great usefulness of which cannot be denied, although it may perhaps be permitted to wonder if one or two of the drawings, for instance, the representation of the instability of the French governmental edifice by the façade of what is presumably the French *Chambre des députés*, the old *Palais Bourbon*, perching on ten pieces of a broken column precariously superimposed one on the other (p. 272), may not have a subconscious and irrational effect surpassing what has in fact been intended. Professor Neumann's book has the advantage of a further section dealing with comparative government in general in its various aspects. Users of Professor Finer's book can, however, easily refer to his *Theory and Practice of Modern Government* a second edition of which appeared in 1949. All in all, each one of these two scholarly works will constitute an excellent choice for any student interested in this subject.

Proportional representation in France is generally regarded as the cause of her multiparty system and this in turn is often blamed as the mainspring of her governmental instability. How Sweden has been able to combine on the one hand proportional representation and a multiparty system with on the other hand a relatively stable government is the subject of a searching investigation by Professor Rustow in *The Politics of Compromise. A Study of Parties and Cabinet Government in Sweden*. In addition to the ethnic, religious and regional homogeneity of the population, and the continuous period of peace and increasing prosperity which the country has enjoyed since 1814, Professor Rustow finds to be of prime importance the readiness of Swedes to compromise in politics. "From earlier periods of oligarchic rule Swedish democracy has inherited traditions of intimacy, good manners, and mutual respect among parliamentary representatives; and these habits continue to temper the legislative process at a time when the more mechanical checks and balances have disappeared from the constitution" (p. 237). Can it be that in this respect for one's fellow men lies the essence of all democratic institutions?

Turning to the other end of Europe, mention must be made of an important contribution by Mr. C. Bobrowski on *La Yougoslavie socialiste*, in which the author traces developments in Yugoslavia since her break with the Cominform. He quickly dispels any

illusion that titoism represents a third way between marxism and capitalism and finds its significance in its being a conscious effort to adopt marxism to the particular conditions of a given country. Its importance for other countries, in his view, consists, therefore, not in the specific methods which the Yugoslavs may be using, but in its being an example of a new approach.

At the same time the author regards the Yugoslav experiment as an effort to accelerate the economic progress of an under-developed country and, as such, of interest to other countries striving for the same end. In this connection, the United Nations Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories, a body the constitutionality of which is the subject of much controversy, continues its good work in training its spotlight on non-self-governing territories. For several years now, besides the summaries and analyses of the information transmitted to the Secretary-General under Article 73 (e) of the Charter of the United Nations, by member States responsible for non-self-governing territories, the Committee has carried out special studies on the economic, social and educational conditions of these territories.

At its meeting in New York, 1955, it turned its attention once again to the social aspect, and a summary of its report transmitted to and approved by the General Assembly, together with those reports prepared for the Committee itself, is to be found in *Special Study on Social Conditions in Non-Self-Governing Territories*. In view of the controversy, between those members who are responsible for such territories and those who think that they have none to be responsible for except as backseat drivers on the Committee, over the question whether Article 73 (e) of the United Nations Charter covers also information relating to political conditions in those territories, it is of interest to observe that "the Committee saw considerable merit in a broad definition of social development . . . By this definition, social development is held to mean nothing less than the whole process of change and advancement in terms of the progressive well-being of the society and of the individual. Thus, social development is not to be regarded as merely the sum of development activities carried out by agencies usually grouped under the heading of social services, but as covering the whole of the economic, political, social and cultural fields" (pp. 1-2). On paper, at least, the apparent "have-nots" had their way and the whole scene presents a typical example of the *de facto* revision of the Charter of the United Nations (*cf.* this *Year Book*, Vol. 8 (1954), pp. 188-185). This political playlet will, however, take a most amusing turn were some of these apparent "have-nots" reminded that somewhere in their own country too there are large

pockets of undeclared non-self-governing territory! It is a comfort to reflect that, when that day comes, the inhabitants of these territories will also be able to come under the benevolent attention of this enlightened Committee.

But perhaps before that happens those territories which are now officially classified as non-self-governing will have already in name, if not in fact, or maybe both in name and in fact, gained one of their three possible objectives: integration, association or independence. Of this process, the West Indies provide a good illustration. *Developments Towards Self-Government in the Caribbean* is a symposium held under the auspices of the Netherlands Universities Foundation for International Cooperation at The Hague in September, 1954. It is a scholarly work which provides a valuable comparison of the different methods chosen by France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States in promoting self-government in that area. The great similarity in the problems involved makes the comparison all the more interesting. In the final discussion, a certain amount of consensus seems to exist that success of the various political experiments will depend ultimately on whether the present economic difficulties of the region are satisfactorily overcome.

REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS

In so far as British Caribbean territories are concerned, as Sir Ivor Jennings mentions in his most well-conceived survey of *The British Commonwealth of Nations*, now in its third edition, "money is now forthcoming from the Colonial Welfare and Development Fund, though much larger sums could be spent with advantage" (p. 168). With Sir Ivor's account of the integration of Wales and "the success of the Union with Scotland" (p. 17), the authors of the pamphlet, *Our Three Nations* may not, however, entirely concur. The theme they put forward is that both Wales and Scotland should be admitted independently to the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers.

If the two-party system in the English political scene has been likened to a game of football, it is to be hoped that one may, without being suspected of irreverence, suggest that this latest machinery of the Commonwealth of Nations bears some resemblance to the Conference of Headmasters. In his admirable book already cited above, written for the Hutchinson's University Library, Sir Ivor gives a stimulating account and vivid picture of this "free association" of independent member nations, a child of the British political genius. It is, as M. André Siegfried says in his Preface to Dr. Brissonnière's "*Commonwealth d'abord*," not a system, but a remarkable organism.

As such, both its structure and its meaning often baffle those who are not British. This is, however, certainly not true either of M. André Siegfried or of Dr. Brissonnière, and still less of Dr. Paul Knaplund who, in *British Commonwealth and Empire 1901-1955*, packs many years of experience gained in teaching this subject into a detailed account of the rapid evolution of this organism from Empire to Commonwealth during the last eventful half-century.

In contrast to a current of opinion extremely prevalent on the Continent now for many years, with which, on account of its title, "*Commonwealth d'abord*," his book might easily have been identified in error, Dr. Brissonnière has shown great perception and understanding in explaining to his readers why it would be unreasonable to expect the British to discard their evolutionary attitude towards any type of institution and abandon the tangible benefit and tradition of the Commonwealth in return for, to use Dr. Brissonnière's telling terminology, the French mutationist doctrine of political science and the unsure blessings of European federation.

In this regard, it is of interest to observe the same conclusion drawn by Dr. Florinsky in his *Integrated Europe?* hereafter to be further referred to. In his view, "No British government, of whatever political complexion, would embark on so doctrinaire and perilous a policy; and, if one did, it would not long remain in power . . . The British position on European integration, as I understand it, is both reasonable and consistent" (pp. 162-168).

Dr. Brissonnière's aim, however, is not limited to an explanation of the British attitude. He intends to make a constructive suggestion regarding Britain's future relation with Europe. He has in mind a type of relationship—"external association"—similar in nature to that which existed during the period 1921-1949 between the British Commonwealth and the antecedent of the present Republic of Ireland. It would seem that some such solution is in line with the policy advocated by the authors of the pamphlet, *The Expanding Commonwealth*, published by the Conservative Political Centre, who believe in economic co-operation by Britain and the Commonwealth with Continental European countries, but are of the view that Britain "cannot enter into a more intimate association with her European neighbours than with her Commonwealth kinsmen and partners" (p. 19).

An example of the French mutationist policy is provided by the sudden decision of the French Government, by the law of March 19, 1949, to integrate the French Antilles with Metropolitan France. As Professor Fauvel points out in the *Symposium on Developments Towards Self-Government in the Caribbean*, this

rather impetuous step was taken partly because of the fear felt by France, at the time, of possible American expansionism (p. 176).

In *La Querelle de la C.E.D.*, M. Girard and Professor Stoetzel, in their contribution on public opinion in France *vis-à-vis* the stillborn European Defence Community, give some interesting details concerning French public opinion which, at least to the extent revealed, may not have always been realised. One of their many Tables based on public opinion polls in France is as follows (p. 182):

	Feb. 1946	July 1947	Jan. 1953
	(in percentage)		
There is one country which wishes			
to dominate the world ..	68	79	78
This is the U.S.S.R.	26	36	22
This is the U.S.A.	25	29	15
Both the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.	12	13	80

These fluctuations in public opinion to some extent at least help to explain *l'affaire C.E.D.* In *La Querelle de la C.E.D.* the various social pathologists engaged in the post-mortem all agree that it promises to remain one of the eternal mysteries and controversies in French political history. There is some support for the view, however, that at the time when the French first launched the idea of the European Defence Community in 1950, they were still toying with the scheme of building and leading a third force in Europe in order to counteract the pressure both from East and West. By 1954 much of this *élan* was spent, the fear of Germany reasserted itself and, in the words of Professor Aron, "the National Assembly refused to ratify a scheme born of French initiative, denying it even the honours of a debate" (p. 17). But, as at the same time it was plain that the Anglo-American Powers would not bear an indefinite delay in the rearming of the Federal Republic, three months later to a day, the National Assembly bowed to the inevitable and approved the Paris Agreements! Posterity thus inherits an insoluble puzzle: which of the two schemes the French National Assembly would in fact have chosen if both the EDC and the Paris Agreements were presented to it at the same time?

The tendency of European Socialist Parties in general to fight shy of military integration (regarded as a form of international "opportunism") has been observed by Dr. Bung in his interesting Dissertation on *Die Auffassungen der verschiedenen sozialistischen Parteien von den Problemen Europas*. While, in principle, they are all pledged to European unification, they contend that the

solution of "basic" (i.e., social and economic) problems must precede the tackling of institutional questions. This is but the manifestation of a deep-rooted Socialist dogma which also finds expression in the faith in the effectiveness of State ownership and management. The aspirations of European Socialist Parties vary, however, according to their national exigencies and there is as yet no common programme. The position is probably well summed up by the prominent Dutch Socialist Jonkheer van der Goes van Naters in the phrase, "co-ordination rather than uniformity."

European integration, not only from the economic point of view, but also in the military and political spheres, is the subject of a searching and balanced scrutiny by Dr. Florinsky in *Integrated Europe?* with the accent on the question mark. The author prefaces his work with an examination into the wider causes that give impetus to the movement for European integration and terminates with some reflections on the result so far achieved and some of its repercussions. The book is written with an eye to the general public but it is far from the learned author to imagine that the public should be told only nice things, while reserving the unpleasant realities for club or common-room gossip among the initiated.

Professor Monaco's booklet on *Le istituzioni internazionali di cooperazione europea*, which consists of a course of lectures delivered at the University of Valladolid in 1955, deals, on the other hand, essentially with the legal aspect of the various international organisations for European co-operation. In the handbook on *Procedure of the Consultative Assembly* published by the Council of Europe, a detailed account is, moreover, given of the structure, mechanics and external relations of the Council of Europe and its Consultative Assembly with other international institutions.

The Council of Europe has, further, published the *Handbook of European Organisations*, which conveniently summarises the organisation and activities of the various regional institutions in Western Europe. Very similar in nature is *Western Co-operation. A Reference Handbook*, published by Her Majesty's Stationery Office for the Central Office of Information. The latter has, however, the advantage of containing some of the more important documents and -what may probably prove more valuable from the practical point of view—a fairly detailed index.

Attention may perhaps be switched for a moment from Western Europe to South-East Asia and mention made of a Report by a Chatham House Study Group on *Collective Defence in South East Asia. The Manila Treaty and Its Implications*. Maintaining the

tradition established in previous reports of a similar nature on regional arrangements on collective defence, the present one gives a workmanlike account of the general situation in South-East Asia, including the impact of the Bandung Conference, events leading to the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty signed at Manila on September 8, 1954, the steps taken for its implementation and its political effects. In conclusion a few words of wisdom on future Western policy in this area are offered. Finally, several documents relating to the subject of the report are conveniently reproduced as appendices.

From one collective defence arrangement to another. In *Die kollektive Sicherheit*, a contribution which Professor Lachs, of the University of Warsaw, made to the Conference on European Collective Security held at Warsaw in April, 1955, he points out that "the simultaneous existence of States with different political and social systems is an irrefutable historical fact" (p. 13). In a rather remarkable fashion, however, he sees as one of the most important results of the "experience of nearly forty years of co-existence between capitalism and socialism," the prohibition of aggressive wars and the resort to war as a means for the solution of international disputes (*ibid.*).

The whole proceedings of this Conference, except that part relating to Germany, have since been published by the Polish Academy of Sciences in *Sécurité collective en Europe*. This Conference was held hardly two months after the Soviet Union had, on February 10, 1955, presented to the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting at Berlin a scheme for the establishment of an European system of collective defence, which naturally became its dominant theme. It was attended by, besides delegates from many States in the Soviet orbit, a handful of participants from Belgium, Britain and France.

In the whole proceedings, Professor Eisenman from the University of Paris was one of the very, very few who struck a somewhat discordant note. It may be recalled that at the beginning of the present Report mention was made of the observation in *Governments of Latin America* by Professors Pierson and Gil on the causes of failure of democratic institutions in certain Latin American countries. One of them was said to be the "aggressive intolerance" of the various political parties (p. 316).

Similarly, on the third day of the Conference, Professor Eisenman, referring to the discussions which had so far taken place, wondered "whether it was an excellent psychological and moral preparation constantly to denounce, as it had been done with great force, one's future partners as, almost by nature, bad. If

those on the other side are totally so to say imperialists—aggressors because they live under the capitalist régime—governed by capitalist forces, can one really expect that they will take part seriously, really, in a system of peace? The alternative is as follows: either they are not as radically bad as one may imagine, or all hope of an understanding with them is illusory; there would then be only one thing to do, that is to be ready, when the opportune moment comes, to get rid of them and the evil which they represent” (pp. 331–332). Saying that his observation was intended to be bilateral in both directions, Professor Eisenman called for tolerance and the removal of mutual distrust.

From this point of view, Dr. Munzer’s posthumous publication, *Solovyev: Prophet of Russian-Western Unity*, becomes of especial interest. Solovyev, the Russian philosopher (1853–1900), was, as Dr. Munzer put it, “a Catholic by intellectual conviction and an Orthodox by all the inclinations of his heart” (p. 186). Solovyev’s relevance at this juncture is to be found in his belief in the *de jure* unity of the two Churches and his “violent repudiation of Slavophilism” (p. 137). In Dr. Munzer’s view, the lack of understanding and antagonism between East and West spring not so much from differences in their economic or political systems as from the schism between the strongly religious atheism of Slavophilism on the one hand and Christianity on the other. As the blurb on the jacket of the book suggests, the underlying but inarticulate assumption of the author was that no enduring peace would exist between Russia and the West, unless the former were brought back into the fold of a strong social Christianity and in this process, in the concluding words of Dr. Munzer, “Solovyev’s idea of total-unity will reveal entirely new traits and possibilities undreamed of now” (p. 154).

COMPREHENSIVE INSTITUTIONS

Meanwhile the two systems must coexist and not co-annihilate. In a symposium organised by *The New Leader* magazine, a number of well-known figures have offered explanations on coexistence (R. Niebuhr, N. Thomas) and suggested *Alternatives to the H-Bomb* (E. Rabinowitch, M. Karpovich, W. A. Harriman, C. Bowles, H. Kohn, Salvador de Madariaga, P. Rieff, L. Mumford).

At the same time, the theories and blueprints of a world system of welfare States have been carefully examined by Michele Fiore in *Welfare of Nations* and the Commonwealth of World Citizens have adopted a provisional Constitution which is reprinted in *Birth of A World People*, with an Introduction by Dr. H. J. Schonfield.

Thus, there may, after all, be ground to justify Dr. Sidjanski's sanguine observation of the existence of incipient traces of international federalism in his learned study on *Fédéralisme amphictyonique*. It is indeed much to be hoped that the author is also correct in his view that "the increase of the power of man is accomplished in the course of his evolution thanks to the incessant broadening of the conscience of man" (p. 92).

Father Duff in the Introduction to his scholarly study of *The Social Thought of the World Council of Churches* remarks, however, that "it has become a commonplace that civilisation is in danger because man's technical skills have outrun his moral controls, his spiritual development" (p. 2). He further observes: "Indeed many serious commentators have not hesitated to speak of a crisis of contemporary civilisation in moral terms, ascribing the root of present difficulties to man's refusal to submit to rules not of his own making and indicating the inescapable necessity of a *metanoia*, a profound change of heart, if mankind is to surmount its present problems" (pp. 5-6).

Therein lies the significance of this searching study which investigates the Ecumenical Movement's attitude towards the economic order, the political institutions and the international developments of our times. At the end of the book a summary of the achievements of the Ecumenical Movement is presented. It is not, as the author points out in the opening paragraph of the Introduction, a theological dissertation.

The author has most painstakingly examined the various primary and secondary sources. He is critical in his assessment, but always scrupulously fair and objective. One of the comments relates to the call by the World Council constituency for a recognition of the sovereignty of God in the ordering of international affairs by the acceptance of international law administered by supranational institutions. Discreetly the learned author observes in a footnote: "The warnings against utopian illusions regarding the United Nations sounded by the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs, the seeming innocence of the nature of international law in some World Council circles, the ignoring of the ideological factors affecting international tension, suggest that the difficulties are not universally obvious to the Ecumenical Community" (p. 266).

They are frequently not obvious to others as well. Dr. Sidjanski, in his book which has already been mentioned, is of the view that: "The nation is, at the present moment, the community which, expressing itself in a plurality of hierarchical institutions, incarnates the meeting point of the quasi-totality of the general

interest. But the totality of all aspects of the general interest can only be contained in the international world community, the central circle of potential integration of all legal circles. This statement is the expression of the moral primacy of international law " (p. 12).

The latter point must be regarded as pre-Charles de Visscher (*Théories et réalités en droit international public*, 1958). As regards the former point, it is of interest to see that the Centre for Research on World Political Institutions of the same University, which has now published an English translation of de Visscher, has directed its attention to some serious research on the question of loyalty. In this regard, Professor Guetzkow's *Multiple Loyalties: Theoretical Approach to a Problem in International Organisation*, in a sense merely a preliminary survey, augurs well of a fertile programme of investigation into a most important problem. One of Professor Guetzkow's observations may, however, be mentioned: "It is my belief that the actual existence of the supremacy of national loyalty is something of a fiction, perpetuated by the national leaders and groups who feel the conflict of loyalties " (p. 56).

One of the loyalties on the international level has been expressed as the principle of concern by Professor Hogan in his *International Conflict and Collective Security: The Principle of Concern in International Organisation*. The principle of concern in international relations is here opposed to the principle of neutrality, i.e., active and passive unconcern. The author examines in turn the acceptance of this principle in the League Covenant, its subsequent disintegration in the inter-war period and its reaffirmation in the Charter of the United Nations.

As used in this sense, there is little doubt that the principle of concern is a necessary mainspring of collective security. What is less certain, however, is whether the operation of this principle depends simply upon its acceptance or reaffirmation. In this regard, it should perhaps be remembered that the bad old principle of neutrality which it is called upon to replace was not purely an intellectual blind spot of the pre-1914 era which requires only the spirit of enlightenment to descend to cause it to evaporate. It itself succeeded an anterior version of the principle of concern, not because of any peculiar wickedness of the men of that generation, but because a time came when out of the prolonged international struggles only the fittest survived and none of them was particularly desirous of the unsolicited concern of others. *Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose!*

The history of international relations from 1815 to 1954 is presented with a great deal of charm by Professor L'Huillier in

his *De la Sainte-Alliance au Pacte atlantique*. The first volume covers the period 1815–1898, and the second volume 1898–1954. The learned author has avoided any detailed description of the military history of those years and devoted his attention to the main currents and undercurrents of international relations in Europe between those dates. The narrative is enlivened by many apt phrases and quotations from contemporary writings.

Under the title *Swords into Plowshares*, Mr. Inis L. Claude, Jr., examines *The Problems and Progress of International Organisation* from the Concert of Europe to the present day. He begins with a survey of the historical development of international organisation, then proceeds to examine a few of its constitutional problems (membership, regionalism, voting, administration, constitutional interpretation and development) and goes on to analyse some of the devices used by international organisation to achieve peace (peaceful settlement of disputes, collective security, disarmament, grand debate, trusteeship and functionalism), before presenting the reader with his thoughts on the future of world order.

On a more intimate and personal level, Mr. Bernard Moore, for many years the B.B.C.'s resident correspondent at the headquarters of the United Nations, in *The Second Lesson*, gives us interesting glimpses and anecdotes of his *Seven Years at the United Nations*, which is the subtitle of the book. One of the many points of value made in this book is the lucid explanation of the subjectivity of so-called "objective reporting" by someone who can hardly be better qualified. If only all those who claim that their mission is purely fact finding or fact recording can be equally aware of the extent to which their reports are capable of being charged with value-judgment!

Basic Facts about the United Nations, a pamphlet of forty-six pages, published by the United Nations Department of Public Information, is now in its twelfth edition, whilst the European Centre of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace continues to publish its annual French translation of the issue of *International Conciliation* dealing with the work of the General Assembly of the United Nations at its previous session. The latest in this series is *La dixième assemblée générale des Nations Unies*.

Indeed, any effort which has the effect of bringing the United Nations closer to the knowledge of the general public is to be welcomed. Considering that the United Nations has now almost achieved world universality, and, theoretically at least, any member State, except the "Big Five," may suddenly be confronted with so-to-speak a marching order from either the Security

Council, acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, or the "Big Five" acting in concert under its Article 106, it is almost a scandal how little even the ordinarily well-informed citizens of the various member States know about the United Nations.

United Nations for the Classroom, by attempting to bring the United Nations direct to the rising generation in the secondary schools, is, therefore, in this sense, much to be commended. In face of the dearth of suitable literature for this purpose, its authors have gallantly come forward to fill the breach and should for that reason deserve everyone's gratitude. It is precisely in recognition of the importance of the tasks which the authors have undertaken that one or two observations are here offered, not specifically made in respect of this book, but to books of this category in general, which it is hoped will not be regarded as ungracious.

In view of the often indelible effects which a first impression is likely to create, especially on the particular age group that such books are intended to serve, two things become of primordial importance. First, the information imparted, even for instance in such simple matters as the name of an international court (pp. 15-17; cf. pp. 33, 160), must be meticulously accurate.

Secondly, the whole impression which they create must be not only the truth and nothing but the truth, but it must also be the whole truth. Here, one may perhaps once again pray in aid Mr. Moore's journalistic experience. As Mr. Moore, in his *The Second Lesson* says, "I once amused myself by essaying an entirely objective report of an entirely imaginary death of Monsieur X, an entirely imaginary French (shall we say) politician and statesman." After having mercilessly dissected his own imaginary report of the imaginary death, he concluded: "That brief normal announcement of Mr. X's death contains no inaccuracies if we except the expression of opinion as to what is his outstanding achievement. Nevertheless the picture which the reader would have been given would have been totally inaccurate, for he would have been induced to visualise a dignified white-haired elder statesman, his duty done, peacefully ending his days, his loving wife by his deathbed," whereas in fact his public achievements were equivocal and his private life a scandal (pp. 28-25). Let no account of the institutions of today be like an anticipatory obituary in a newspaper office's morgue written in the style of Mr. Moore's imaginary announcement of the imaginary Monsieur X's death.

Professor Finer, in the Preface to his book addressed to undergraduates, states: "I have faith in, and I appeal directly to, the ability and diligence of the American student to read and think, when the material he needs is put before him methodically and limpidly, and when he himself is not written down as a mindless teen-ager" (p. x)! It may not perhaps be out of place here to speak up for the teen-agers and say that they would also not like being talked down to as toddlers and babies. And, if modern child psychology teaches any lesson, it is that the best way of handling toddlers and babies is to respect them as beings endowed with reason and intelligence.

The follies and errors of the men of yesterday and today may be avoided in future not by guarding them from the men of tomorrow, but only by telling and explaining the whole unsavoury truth to them. Unless we have given up faith in the ultimate ability of men to solve human problems, there is no reason to believe that they cannot take them. In any event, this is infinitely preferable to their becoming so thoroughly disillusioned later that they will lose faith utterly in themselves and in humanity.

Valuable indeed are thus the words of wisdom and of experience proffered by Gunnar Myrdal in *Realities and Illusions in Regard to Inter-Governmental Organisations*:

"It is my belief—both as a social scientist who is conditioned to put trust in truth and as a devoted internationalist who would wish to strengthen to the utmost the efficiency of our international organizations, such as they are in such a world as the one in which we are living—that it is now most important to dispel the illusory notions surrounding international organisations and to disseminate a realistic understanding of what they actually are and how they function in the field of political forces. There is an undue pessimism as there is an undue optimism: both are founded upon the same illusory notions and both contribute to frustrate the international organisations in their practical work. These irrational attitudes are nurtured by the obviously unwarranted pretensions of their constitutions, by a large part of the literature, by the propaganda of most internationalists, and, I am afraid I have to admit, by much of the publicity sponsored by the international organisations themselves. From this point of view, an analysis, bent solely on establishing the true facts—uncoloured by our hopes and our fears and carried out in the same pitiless spirit as when we are studying

life and death of individuals and all social and political formations—is an urgent service to be rendered by political science, if we do want to prevent the type of very deep demoralisation of international organisations which occurred in the years leading up to the outbreak of the Second World War” (pp. 11–12).

Let Mr. Myrdal’s L. T. Hobhouse Memorial Trust Lecture be the compulsory reading of everyone interested or engaged in the work of international organisations.

There is no doubt, however, that at the same time the authors of *United Nations for the Classroom* are absolutely right in stressing the importance of the social, technical and economic work of the United Nations and of the specialised agencies. Professor Guetzkow in his study on *Multiple Loyalties*, which has already been mentioned, finds there are seven “source-mechanisms” of loyalty which he groups under three headings: (A) Loyalties as means; (B) Loyalties as end values; and (C) Loyalties as conformity. In so far as the first group is concerned, it includes two forms of loyalties: (1) Loyalties which are attachments to objects serving as direct means to the citizens’ goals, and (2) loyalties which are generated by vicarious satisfaction which the citizen gains through identification with the object of loyalty (pp. 16–22, 59). To this extent, the functionalist approach to international organisation finds its justification.

In this field, there is probably little doubt that, in time, the International Atomic Energy Agency may be able to play an important role. An attractively produced little pamphlet, *The New Atomic Age*, published by the United Nations Department of Public Information, traces some of the steps so far covered and explains some of the promises in store in international co-operation in this sphere.

If it is permissible to have recourse to Gunnar Myrdal once again, it may be mentioned that his main thesis is “that, in our age, and with few exceptions, the international organisations are merely instruments for national policy” (p. 28), nothing more, nothing less. “Another general observation,” he says, “is the very clear inverse correlation between success in international co-operation and political significance. Indeed, the best method of reaching international agreement on an issue is most often to divest it so far as possible from political content by defining it closely and delimiting it narrowly, so that it becomes a question which has the appearance of being merely technical, and, in addition, to move it away from public gaze. Some of the international organisations where the governments have established a

pattern of co-ordinating their national policies in a particularly effective manner by multilateral agreements have also succeeded in going far in this direction" (pp. 18-19).

A telling example of Mr. Myrdal's observation is the field of international civil aviation. Here, ten years after the establishment of the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organisation, Captain Jacob Schenkman has written the first full-scale monograph on the history, organisation, structure, functions and activities of the International Civil Aviation Organisation, including a section on the interim organisation. It is a work written with great technical and scholastic competence, against a background of long practical experience.

The work of the ICAO shows clearly that it has a great deal of success in dealing with purely technical matters, for instance in the drawing up and the modification of the annexes to the Chicago Convention, annexes standardising various technical aspects of civil aeronautics so that international civil aviation becomes greatly facilitated.

But neither the Chicago Conference of 1944 nor the ICAO has made much headway in trying to bring about a satisfactory multilateral solution of the problems of scheduled international air transport, which is heavy with economic, military and generally political implications. It is at present governed essentially by bilateral arrangements, bypassing the ICAO. Indeed, when discussing international civil aviation in the inter-war period, Captain Schenkman observes that "civil aviation was a kind of an invisible weapon of imperialism as a communication means" (p. 23). Students of history, remembering the B.B.B. railway in the *Drang nach Osten* and the "Battle of Baghdad" as a whole at the turn of the century (see, for instance, L'Huillier in his *De la Sainte-Alliance au Pacte atlantique*, referred to in an earlier section of this Report, Vol. II, pp. 78 *et seq.*), will, however, have difficulty in agreeing to the author's supplementary statement that this "was not the case for example with railways." International politics remain the same, although their instruments vary.

Dr. Berkov's study of *The World Health Organisation*, as does also the above-mentioned work on the ICAO belongs to the series of *Études d'histoire économique, politique et sociale*, edited by M. J. Fremond, Director of the Graduate Institute of International Studies at Geneva, and Professor L'Huillier. In comparison, Dr. Berkov's book will probably have a wider appeal among students of institutions in that it is, as its subtitle indicates, a case study in decentralised international administration. As the learned author points out, while most specialised agencies have a system of regional

organisations, for instance, in the case of the ICAO, the World Health Organisation has a particularly advanced system of decentralised administration. He has studied it especially from this angle. Dr. Berkov combines thorough research with great acuteness in observation and his conclusions drawn from the experiment and experience of the WHO should be of interest to all who are interested in the problem of administration.

Indeed, it may be added that the need for regional action is sometimes so pressing that unless the world organisation is able to cope with it effectively, a splinter movement may well develop. The European Civil Aviation Conference established in 1955 to cope with the problems of European air transport on a regional basis, in view of the lack of success of a global solution, is a case in point. At its first session, the Conference expressed, however, a desire to enter into relationship with the ICAO and this was acceded to by the ICAO at the tenth session of its General Assembly.

While it is true that the Trusteeship system under the United Nations is part of the political framework of the United Nations, there is also much to be said for Father Mulenzi's impassioned appeal, in his *La tutelle internationale et le problème des unions administratives*, that "this field should be, as much as possible, depoliticised" (p. 121). That is to say, applying Gunnar Myrdal's formula quoted above, if it is intended that the job should be done properly and expeditiously. *A Sacred Trust*, published by the United Nations, describes *The Work of the United Nations for Dependent Peoples*, which is its subtitle. Father Mulenzi's special concern is, however, the question of administrative unions under the United Nations Trusteeship system. The learned author merely discusses the problem in general, without going into any specific case in detail or offering any practical solution, modestly disclaiming the necessary detachment for doing so (p. viii). His great sincerity and candour lend weight, however, to his study.

Another study of another problem which has directly affected its author is Dr. Stoessinger's *The Refugee and the World Community*, a problem which, the author rightly says, "would continue to exist until the inhumanity of man to man had been eradicated from the face of the earth" (p. 154), even though the International Refugee Organisation, established as a "non-permanent specialised agency" had to close its doors in 1952 because States, and the United States in particular, refused to contribute any more funds! The author dispassionately examines the work of various international agencies from the period of the League of Nations

to the present date in the relief of international refugees and devotes his concluding chapter to an analysis of the seesaw between politics and humanitarianism.

From specialised agencies to international non-governmental organisations. In view of the frequent comment that non-governmental organisations have often been far more eager to gain consultative status with the United Nations for the sake of their own prestige than to avail themselves of the facilities thus granted, the example of the World Jewish Congress in publishing a record of its activities in that capacity is one greatly to be recommended to all its fellow non-governmental organisations. This has been written by Mr. Robinson under the title *The United Nations and the World Jewish Congress*.

Turning finally to States, members of international institutions, attention should be drawn to an exceedingly interesting report on *New States and International Organisations* published jointly by UNESCO and the International Political Science Association at Paris. It has been written by Professor Akzin on the basis of his own research, aided by individual reports on the six countries concerned (India, Indonesia, Israel, Lebanon, Pakistan and the Philippines) by national *rapporteurs*. In the two concluding chapters, Professor Akzin shows great insight in analysing the attitudes of new States toward international organisations and in turn the impact of international organisations on developments in new States.

The national attitudes of some of the members of two of the most powerful blocs in the United Nations, the Arab-Asian and the Latin American, are examined in Mr. Mushtaq Ahmad's *the United Nations and Pakistan*, Dr. Moussa Dib's *The Arab Bloc in the United Nations* and Professor Houston's *Latin America in the United Nations*. The system of bloc voting in the United Nations and the practice of horse-trading which it has given rise to are too well known to be repeated here. They lend significance, however, to all these studies, which assist in the better understanding of these phenomena. Professor Houston's detailed study gains further interest by the inclusion of three tables based on special tabulations and analyses of the voting records in the General Assembly prepared by Mr. Thomas Hovet, Jr., under the direction of Professor W. Chamberlin.

In conclusion, the learned author further asks this very pertinent question: "If the General Assembly should become the true fulcrum of the United Nations, would the United States and other large powers be willing to continue to accord to twenty

Latin American States voting strength grossly disproportionate to their true political stature measured by such indices as military potential, industrial capacity, and *per capita* wealth? If not, what might they do about it, in view of the almost certain ability of the Latin Americans, together with other small powers, to forestall any Charter amendment of which they disapprove"? He warns: "The unfortunate consequences could easily be an increasing reluctance to utilise the United Nations as an instrument for the solution, pacific or otherwise, of important international problems" (p. 296).

Indeed, Lord Salter in the United Kingdom has also raised the same question, *The United Nations: Reform, Replace or Supplement?* In the United States, a more radical proposal for the reform of the United Nations has been put forward jointly by Mr. Grenville Clark and Professor L. B. Sohn, entitled *Peace Through Disarmament and Charter Revision*. The latter aims at the total disarmament of States, the establishment of a World Assembly with a system of weighted voting based on population and the setting up of an Executive Council responsible to and removable at will by the Assembly. There will of course be no power of veto on the part of individual States. Some of the difficulties that such a perfectionist plan would raise have been so decisively dealt with by Lord Salter that further comment seems hardly called for, except perhaps to ask whether it would not be simpler, at the same time as States are signing these blank cheques to this new world organisation, if they would also agree to their own immediate liquidation.

As regards Lord Salter's proposals, there are two outstanding points. First is the suggestion to enlarge the scope and functions of NATO so as to include within its orbit the discussion of political questions and disputes among its members. This would probably shift the legal basis of NATO from Article 51 of the Charter to its Chapter VIII and raise certain consequential difficulties. But it may well be argued that even a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII is entitled, as such, to rely on Article 51 concerning individual and collective self-defence.

Lord Salter's second proposal consists in an extension of the Acheson Plan. While "members will not regard themselves as bound to comply with any and every numerical majority of equal votes by unequal countries," they will, however, by formal resolution or by declaration, agree that they will "take account of the votes and will not act in defiance of them when, in their judgment, the voting shows a real preponderance of world opinion" (p. 14). If, in their judgment, there is no such preponderance,

then " action could be taken independently of the Assembly votes " (p. 15).

At this point, the words of the *British Commentary on the Charter of the United Nations* uttered in 1945 may fittingly be quoted:

"The successful working of the United Nations depends on the preservation of the unanimity of the Great Powers; not of course on all the details of policy, but on its broad principles. If this unanimity is seriously undermined no provision of the Charter is likely to be of much avail. In such a case the Members will resume their liberty of action " (Cmd. 6666, p. 17).

That moment of impasse was reached long ago. Is the borrowed time of the United Nations now also running out?

London.

BIN CHENG.

Yearbook of the United Nations 1954. (New York: United Nations. London: H. M. Stationery Office. 1955. 656 pp. 70s.)

Yearbook of the United Nations 1955. (New York: United Nations. London: H. M. Stationery Office. 1956. 556 pp. 70s.)

The activities of the United Nations and its Specialised Agencies have become so multifarious and diffuse that not even full-time students of international organisation can hope any longer to keep track of all the bustle in this exalted ant-heap. Thus, these international institutions become very much closed societies and as such laws unto themselves. Their senior international civil servants either completely dry up or deign to become articulate only in the charmed circle of those whom they can safely treat as fellow-conspirators in a common cause or vested interest. Others must be content to pay the price of their independence and inform themselves as best they can. The irony of their situation is that even they must largely rely on the summaries supplied by the very same civil servants whose activities they are supposed to subject to critical analysis.

This, however, cannot be helped and is not necessarily as serious a drawback as, on the surface, it may appear. To judge by the careful perusal of those sections of the work of the United Nations and its Specialised Agencies with which the reviewer is most familiar, the *UN Year Books 1954* and *1955* fully maintain the high standards set in earlier volumes of a perhaps somewhat colourless, but reliable presentation of the main issues and achievements as fall to be recorded. This is as much as, in reason, can be demanded. The *Year Book* is neither a substitute for the records of debates nor an annual inquest. It is a descriptive guide to the material. As such it is both invaluable and indispensable.

London.

G. S.

Second Report on the Review of the Charter of the United Nations.

By GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER. (London: International Law Association—Dubrovnik Conference. 1956. 122 pp. 7s. 6d.)

The International Law Association resolved at its Edinburgh Conference (1954), on the basis of Dr. Schwarzenberger's First Report and the observations made during the Conference, that the Committee on the Review of the Charter of the United Nations, recently renamed "Committee on the Charter of the United Nations," was to continue its work.

Dr. Schwarzenberger as Rapporteur of the International Committee (*Chairman*: Judge N. C. Boeg, *Deputy Rapporteur*: Mr. L. C. Green, and twenty-five other members) circulated in March, 1955, to all members of the Committee and the national branches a memorandum with a questionnaire attached in order to draw their attention to some of the central problems in connection with the review of the Charter and to co-ordinate their work.

The present Second Report contains a preface, a very well-classified list of amendments for the review of the Charter, of the Statute of the International Court of Justice and of the Statute of the International Law Commission, proposed by several national branches and individual members, as well as nine appendices with the Rapporteur's questionnaire, the replies of seven national branches and the resolution of the French branch.

The central and most important part of this excellent Report is to be found in Dr. Schwarzenberger's consolidated analysis of the various and in many respects contradictory standpoints expressed in these communications. Like the other works of its distinguished author, the Report is characterised by a highly objective and realistic approach to the possibilities of a greater international integration in the actual world conditions. As such it is an indispensable study document for everybody interested, not only in the review of the U.N. Charter, but also generally in present international realities.

London.

IVO LAPENNA.

The Trusteeship System of the United Nations. By CHARMIAN EDWARDS TOUSSAINT. The Library of World Affairs. Editors: G. W. KEETON and G. SCHWARZENBERGER. No. 33. (London: Stevens. 1956. xiv and 288 pp. 37s. 6d.)

THE chapters of the Charter of the United Nations dealing with Trusteeship and non-self-governing territories are the most carelessly drafted of a document in which generally i's are not dotted and t's are not crossed. It is notable that the subject of international supervision of the administration of dependent peoples, which was dealt with in one article of the Covenant of the League, occupies three chapters and twenty-two articles of the Charter. But the result has been a continuous wrangle between the administering Powers and the anti-colonial Powers about rights and obligations under the Charter. The wording is vague; and a phrase such as "States directly concerned"—who are to be consulted about the terms of Trusteeship—is a master-piece of imprecision, which has hitherto defied definition.

Mrs. Toussaint has done a valuable service in amplifying a thesis for the Doctorate of London University into a comprehensive study of the Trusteeship system. It can be said at once that it is a thorough piece of work, fully documented and excellently paragraphed. The historical introduction contains a clear statement of the extension of national to international accountability as well as of the deliberations at the San Francisco Conference. It is followed by two chapters on the scope and aims of the system, which expound the frustration of the original hopes. The main part of the book examines in detail the Trust agreements, the machinery of supervision, and the administration of the Trust territories. She sets out all the constitutional ambiguities, and shows how ten years of practice have affected and modified the original pattern. The last part of her book is concerned with Chapter XI of the Charter, which is the Declaration regarding non-self-governing territories and its controversial relation to the Trusteeship system.

The examination of the organs of the Trusteeship Council tends to be a little legalistic and involves some duplication. The same topic turns up under different heads. One broad lesson emerges in the matter of the international Trusteeship for dependent territories, as in the relations of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations. The original design of the Charter has been lost and has been corrected by circumstance. Thus the Trusteeship Council had no authority to examine the report of the Union of South Africa on the mandated territory of South-West Africa, but assumed it. Again it had no authority to draw up a statute of Jerusalem as a territory under international Trusteeship, but acted on the request of the Assembly. The choice of Italy, before she was a member of the United Nations, to be Trustee for Somalia, opened unforeseen problems. Mrs. Toussaint makes sensible suggestions for solving some major problems of the system, which have hitherto been evaded. The General Assembly should work out a guide to the general conditions which must be fulfilled before a Trusteeship is brought to an end, as the Council of the League of Nations did for terminating mandates. The International Court of Justice should be asked to give an advisory opinion on the meaning of "States directly concerned," who must be consulted about alteration of a Trusteeship.

Mrs. Toussaint makes some gentle but effective criticism of action of the Great Powers. The United States has treated her Trusteeship of the Pacific Islands—formerly a Japanese Mandate, and now a strategic trust territory—for purposes of national, and not of international, security. In particular, she has used the Islands

as a field for testing nuclear weapons. And resistance by the Colonial Powers to rendering an account of their administration, on the ground that these are matters of domestic jurisdiction, is not well founded. The question is whether, in view of the terms of Chapter 11 of the Charter, the territories are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction. We have noted one inaccuracy, where it is said that, when the Palestine Mandate terminated, *two* independent States emerged.

London.

NORMAN BENTWICH

The Council of Europe. By A. H. ROBERTSON. Library of World Affairs. Editors: G. W. KEETON and G. SCHWARZENBERGER. No. 82. (London: Stevens. 1956. xiii and 252 pp. £2 2s.)

This book has some of the qualities of a fairy tale. One of Mr. Robertson's themes—restated in a slightly exaggerated form—is that the Cinderella of European organisations is in the process of becoming a beautiful princess. He recognises that the achievements of the Council of Europe are, to say the least, limited; that it has "many critics both among politicians and in academic circles . . ." and ". . . that it plays no significant part in the process of European federation" (p. 211). Nevertheless he believes that there are "important things going on in Strasbourg" which rest ". . . not so much on the tangible achievements of the Council . . . as on the *intangible* factors inherent in the evolution of the new methods of international action" (p. xi). One may not be as convinced as the author that the Council has found its "glass slipper" and yet consider his book an extremely useful contribution to the study of international organisation.

This is a difficult subject. Without inside knowledge of the actual day to day work of an institution, one can scarcely have but a superficial understanding of its problems and achievements. Too close an association, on the other hand, almost unavoidably leads to "lack of objectivity and perspective." Although Mr. Robertson is an official of the Council of Europe he shows, on the whole, remarkable impartiality in his judgments, and the few passages which suffer from not being critical enough are largely made up for by his intimate knowledge of the Organisation. For he not only gives the reader an excellent analysis of the Statute as it has evolved since 1949, but he shows how it has been changed by practice and events, bringing, as it were, the two major institutions, the Consultative Assembly and the Committee of Ministers, to life. In fact, he stresses the evolutionary character of the Council of Europe which, he says "distinguishes it from most other international organisations" (p. 210). This evolutionary

character is due in the first place to the very vague and general terms of reference of the Council. No specific task being entrusted to it except "to achieve greater unity between its members" (Art. 1 a), it has constantly been seeking for jobs to do, one might almost say in order to justify its existence.

Mr. Robertson has described this groping for a function most convincingly in examining the political work of the Council, which he aptly divides into three periods. During the first years of its life the Council of Europe attempted—and failed—to create a "political authority with limited functions and real powers," in 1952–1953 it tried, without much more success, to establish a close link with the "Little Europe" of six; and since 1953 the Council has been attempting to set "the general framework of European policy." The author believes that in this last attempt the Council has found its real vocation and one of its most important functions. "The Consultative Assembly is"—he writes—"a unique forum of great value for the formulation and expression of European parliamentary opinion on the major political issues of the day" (p. 216). Such a statement seems—to the reviewer at least—over-optimistic. When one considers first how many political issues divide deeply European countries among themselves and secondly how little attention is paid to the Strasbourg discussions both by responsible statesmen and by the public at large. In certain circumstances there may be a coincidence of interests making possible generally acceptable statements of policy, but with a slight change in the international situation this degree of cohesion can disappear.

What Mr. Robertson calls the tangible achievements is probably still the most substantial contribution the Council has made to European cooperation, and although he considers them less important than the political activity referred to above, he provides us with a most useful summary of the conventions and joint programmes for cooperation in various fields which the Council has brought into existence. In all fairness to the author, it should be added, however, that these conventions could well have been drafted by a series of *ad hoc* conferences and that they are therefore not sufficient to justify the existence of a permanent international organisation.

In addition to the vagueness of aims as set forth in the Statute, there is another reason for the particular evolutionary character of the Council of Europe: the rivalry which exists between the Committee of Ministers and the Consultative Assembly. The book brings this out clearly by telling the story of the conflict between the representative governments, organised according to

the traditional pattern, unwilling to relinquish their sovereignty, and a parliamentary body of a quite original nature seeking to assert its authority. Obviously this authority would have been far greater if the mandate of the members of the Assembly had been more precise. The Statute says that they are "representatives of each Member." But whom exactly do they represent? For whom are they speaking? For their constituents at home, their party, their parliament, their government? . . . Most are now elected by their national parliaments, but some are still appointed by governments. This has always seemed to us a major weakness—an unavoidable result of compromise perhaps—but one which substantially reduces the weight of the Assembly's deliberations and resolutions. Although recognising the drawbacks of the lack of uniformity in the method of selection of members, Mr. Robertson does not explicitly draw the conclusion which seems evident, that this weakens considerably the authority of the Assembly. Many of the interesting points about the *sui generis* character of the Assembly would have deserved a greater development. It is stated, for instance, that at Strasbourg the ties of party are stronger than those of nationality (p. 48), but not a single illustration is given.

One of the difficulties of writing about an international organisation is to know where to draw the line between the analysis of real forces at work and the description of the institution itself. Any study which does not take into account the underlying political situation is bound to be superficial, yet its elements are so complex that they may lead an author far away from his original subject. To our mind, Mr. Robertson has remained a little too much on the descriptive side. The book would have gained had he placed the Council of Europe more squarely in its political context. Due credit should be given to the author, however, for constantly reminding us of the position the Council occupies in relation to the other international organisations.

The book contains a good short chapter on the Secretariat which will be read with interest by all students of international administration. One minor remark could be made, however. While Mr. Robertson says "no country should be regarded as having a 'right' to any particular post . . ." (p. 78) he does not comment on the fact that the two first Secretaries-General were French (Jacques-Camille Paris and Léon Marchal).

In spite of a number of shortcomings, perhaps more attributable to the nature of the subject than to the author, this book gives, with praiseworthy conciseness, an excellent idea of the functions and work of the Council of Europe.

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- International Trade 1955. The Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.* (Geneva: GATT/1956-2. 229 pp. \$1.50.)

Die Errichtung der Französisch-Saarländischen Währungsunion im Jahre 1947. By K. MARTIN. (Saarbrücken: Bock & Seip. 1955. 129 pp. F.Fr. 1,650.)

The European Coal and Steel Community. By H. L. MASON. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff; London: B. T. Batsford. 1955. 158 pp. 17s.)

La Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier. By D. VIGNES. (Liège: Georges Thone. 1956. 196 pp. B.Fr. 180.)

Probleme des Europäischen Zusammenschlusses. By H. KRAUS. (Würzburg: Holzner Verlag. 1956. 74 pp.)

THE place of Anzilotti as one of the few contemporary masters of international law is so securely established as to justify fully the decision of the *Società Italiana per l'Organizzazione Internazionale* to publish the Collected Works of this leading Italian international lawyer. The republication of Volume One of Anzilotti's *Corso di Diritto Internazionale* (third edition 1928) is the first fruit of this welcome effort. Like subsequent translations, it contains the supplement on the Lateran Treaties of 1929. In addition, this edition is enriched by a number of valuable notes made by the author in connection with the preparation of a new edition. Professor Balladore Pallieri's stimulating *Diritto Internazionale Pubblico*, which has now reached its seventh edition, is deservedly popular with both students and scholars. In spite of basic differences in method and tenets between the works of these distinguished Italian scholars, they show a remarkable continuity of thought which lends a specific and impressive stamp to the contemporary Italian doctrine of international law.

In the spacious tradition of Latin American writers on international law, but with a judicious detachment and an enviable catholicity of outlook, Professor Accioly presents the second edition of Volume I of his *Tratado de Direito Internacional Público*. It is noteworthy that volume has not deprived this stupendous work of the unity of thought which must go into the making of any treatise as distinct from a mere compendium, and that the learned author has found it possible to cope discerningly with the mounting torrent of literature. It is pleasing to note that Professor Accioly still adheres to what, in these days, sometimes looks like an old-fashioned principle of referring to literary efforts of others on grounds of intrinsic merit and not for what are too frequently painfully obvious extraneous and tactical reasons.

Although not yet in the same class as these magisterial works, the third edition of Dr. Sauer's *Grundlehre des Völkerrechts* justifies the confidence placed from the start in the self-denying labours of this upright and modest German scholar.¹ Further reflection and growing maturity are gradually transforming this work of youthful temerity into a well-tempered textbook. It is likely to stand its ground against the unwritten standard treatises which are still confidently expected from a generation of German international lawyers apparently otherwise preoccupied since 1945.

Professor Svarlien's *Introduction to the Law of Nations* is also written on a level which should admirably serve the purpose of initiating novices into the secrets of this craft. They could do worse than to supplement the perusal of this lively textbook with a careful study of the thoughtful selection of *Cases and Materials on International Law* by Professors Orfield and Re.²

Although not a textbook in the strict sense, the late Dr. Baty's *International Law in Twilight* touches on so many aspects of international law as to justify mentioning here, with sympathetic appreciation, this last work of a tragically lonely British exile in Japan. Even when it is difficult to agree with the erudite author, his directness and incisiveness of approach to the subject are impressive. It was a sad loss to British scholarship that an ill-rewarded sense of loyalty and faith in the permanence of the Anglo-Japanese alignment should have prevented Dr. Baty from gracing one of the Chairs for which he appeared predestined.

As is the custom in these Reports, the most important contributions to the various Annuals will be discussed under the relevant headings. Those reviewed are *L'Annuaire Français de Droit International* (*L'Annuaire Français*); *L'Annuaire Suisse de Droit International* (*L'Annuaire Suisse*); *The British Year Book of International Law* (*B.Y.I.L.*); *The Transactions of the Grotius Society* (*Grotius Transactions*); and the *Jahrbuch für Internationales Recht* (*Jahrbuch*). Similarly, the contributions to the *Liber Amicorum* in honour of Judge Bagge will be mentioned in their appropriate places.

1. HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

To obtain a proper understanding of medieval international law, the behaviour of the marginal States of the medieval State system is in many ways more instructive than that of those nearer to either the Emperor or the Holy See. Still, so much of medieval

¹ Cf. this *Year Book*, Vol. 3 (1949), p. 309, and 4 (1950), p. 358.

² An English edition is published in *The Library of World Affairs* (No. 31—1956). See below, pp. 398 *et seq.*

international law is but a secularised version of legal forms which were first developed in the relations between the Papacy and Christian lay powers that any piece of serious research on Church government during this era is likely to throw new light on the genesis of modern international law. In this respect, neither Mr. Runciman's *Eastern Schism* nor Dr. Ullmann's *Growth of Papal Government in the Middle Ages*, each a major contribution to its subject, disappoints the reader who comes to these mature works of scholarship with a vested interest of his own. The absorbing story of the final breach between the Western and Eastern Churches explains much, if not the whole, of our present world schism. Similarly, a careful study of Dr. Ullmann's erudite monograph is likely to put into perspective some of the fundamental notions of the international law then emerging. Finally, if anybody should be in need of guidance on the highest standards of scholarship which are attainable in any of the humanities, either of these profound works sets an enviable example.

Dr. Ten Haaf's *Deutschordensstaat und Deutschordensballeien* and Dr. Murawski's *Zwischen Tannenberg und Thorn* are highly informative case studies on the colonial expansion of the Teutonic Knights in the Slav world. Their existence may, it is hoped, encourage a timely piece of postgraduate research on the legal aspects and implications of these findings, with special emphasis on the treaties concluded by the *Orden* with other powers.

Similarly, Dr. Willan's *Early History of the Russia Company* is a boon to the historian of international law. The chapters on trade and diplomacy, the Randolph Embassy and the political relations between England and Russia during the second half of the sixteenth century are particularly instructive. The fact that the writer wears his learning lightly only increases the value of this searching study.

War and Peace in the Law of Islam by Dr. Khadduri is a welcome revised edition of a book first published in 1941. In its present form, it is an able analysis of Islamic legal doctrine and practice in the international field. The chapter on Treaties may even claim some topical significance. In the wake of Colonel Nasser's slightly premature termination of the Suez Canal Concession, it is reassuring to know that, by the Koran, even Egyptian Statesmen are supposed to "act uprightly" towards those who "act uprightly" by them. Yet, as Dr. Khadduri would be the first to point out, in a largely amoral world society, it would be as unfair to lay on Islam the blame for the apparently chronic unreliability of the precariously poised ruling cliques in most of

the Levantine States as it would be to charge Christianity with the lapses from grace of Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy.

Anybody who has ever wrestled with the original edition of Bodin's *Six Books of the Commonwealth* will congratulate Miss Tooley on the achievement of her translation and condensation. While, in the process, many of the illustrations of Bodin's theses had to be sacrificed, the basic argument of this classic emerges more clearly from this edition than from the actual text. In any case, chapters which are of primary interest to the international lawyer, that is to say, those on sovereignty, war and, in particular, the observance of treaties and alliances, are affected less than others by this necessarily drastic technique. The Editor's biographical sketch and synopsis of Bodin's argument greatly add to the usefulness of this admirable students' text.

Dr. Reibstein, whose earlier work on the beginnings of the more recent natural and international law has been appreciatively noticed in an earlier Report,³ now presents another impressive work on *Johannes Althusius*. This Calvinist and North German jurist of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries forms an important link between the Spanish and Protestant schools of natural law. Dr. Reibstein has certainly succeeded in providing a valuable reassessment of this original and fertile thinker.

Although it may appear a far cry from Althusius to Chief Justice Marshall, the latter's celebrated opinions bear eloquent witness to the connection between this stout positivist and the Protestant heritage of natural law. Rutherford's *Institutes of Natural Law* provide the missing link and already contain most of the devices which reduce natural law to innocuity. *The Marshall Reader*, published in honour of John Marshall's bicentenary, is an unassuming symposium of instructive essays on Marshall, including one by Mr. Dumbauld on Marshall's contribution to the judicial development of international law.

A thoughtful, if somewhat abstract essay by Mr. Landheer on "Sociological Aspects of International Law" in the *Jahrbuch* also deserves being mentioned. Similarly, the booklets by Mr. Rosenblum on *Law as a Political Instrument* and by Professor Wright on *Contemporary International Law: A Balance Sheet* contain a number of relevant and stimulating sociological observations.

2. FOUNDATIONS

In *Das Problem der Naturrechtslehre*, Professor Wolf has provided an overdue typology of natural law and successfully accomplished

³ See Vol. 5 (1951), p. 389.

this task on the basis of a probably unique acquaintance with the evolution of legal thought. In any future discussion of this perennial subject, knowledge of this masterly work will have to be taken for granted.

To have made Petrazhitzky's psychological theory of law accessible in English must have been a Herculean effort, for which Western lawyers are greatly indebted to Mr. Bubb and Professor Timasheff. Under the title *Law and Morality*, they have managed to condense into a reasonable text two of the major works of this independent pre-1914 Russian jurist. In particular, Petrazhitzky's ideas on the "science of legal policy" are still as timely as ever.

The problem of the philosophical basis of international law is Dr. Soder's concern. In *Die Idee der Volkerrechtsgemeinschaft*, he attacks it by way of an exposition of Vitoria's universalist concept of the realm of international law. It is doubtful whether secondary works of this type are still required. To judge by the eight pages of bibliography on Vitoria and international law, the time appears to have come to put greater emphasis on the apposite analysis of present-day world society. Still, these reflections are not meant to detract from Dr. Soder's earnest and diligently performed effort to bring Vitoria to the attention of those who may never set eyes on his original works.

This is also the appropriate place to draw attention to a revised and expanded version of Dr. Puig's *Les Principes du Droit International Public Américain*, the original Spanish edition of which was reviewed in an earlier volume of this *Year Book*.⁴

Source material which is invaluable for purposes of the inductive verification of traditional notions and the critical analysis of controversial contemporary hypotheses is coming forth in steadily increasing volume. Volume 6 of the *Reports of International Arbitral Awards*, published by the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, is as welcome as its predecessors and deserves the same unstinted praise.⁵ It contains the decisions of the British-United States Arbitral Tribunal under the Special Agreement of August 18, 1910, and of the Claims Commissions between the United States, Austria and Hungary and the United States and Panama.

Volume I of Series A of *Verträge der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* contains the original texts and German translations of eleven multilateral treaties to which Western Germany is a party. In addition, a Series B, devoted to bilateral treaties, is contemplated. The standards of production of this new handbook of treaties are exemplary.

⁴ Vol. 8 (1954), p. 334.

⁵ Cf., e.g., Vol. 9 (1955), p. 316.

The same is true of the Volume of *Fontes Juris Gentium* which is a digest of the decisions on questions of international law by West and East German superior courts. The period covered is that from 1945 to 1949 and the method of presentation adopted is that introduced by the Bruns Institute, Berlin, during the inter-war period. The German verbatim extracts from the judgments form an indispensable complement of the digests which are presented in their German originals and competent French and English translations. The system of cross-references and indexing adopted is both businesslike and ingenious.

The laurels for the most self-denying one-man effort in this field must, however, go to Dr. van Santen. His systematic survey of Netherlands practice during the period between 1840 and 1850 is a mine of information. If the editor has perhaps erred on the side of including too much material that is not strictly relevant in law, the diplomatic historian and student of international relations is the lucky gainer. Unfortunately, the fact that many of the texts are in Dutch is likely to limit severely the use of this remarkable repertory. Yet, synopses in English at the beginning of each chapter and translations into English of the headings of paragraphs assist in mitigating this self-imposed handicap.

The same regretful criticism applies to the Yugoslav register of treaties concluded between Serbia and other Powers from 1800 to 1918. Although the volume has an analytical index in French, this is hardly sufficient to encourage foreign scholars to use material which, to judge by the sources indicated, is in many cases practically inaccessible. It is time that international lawyers should seriously reconsider the problem of their *lingua franca*. They would be ill advised to rely on the fortuitous chance that the contributions of their countries to international practice will be translated into one of the world languages by foreign scholars in the way in which Dr. Shapiro has again performed this self-effacing task. The second volume of his excellent *Soviet Treaty Series*, which covers the period between 1929 and 1939, forms a worthy companion to its predecessor.⁶

The change in emphasis in the treatment of international law, which this type of source material and the hypertrophy of international institutions make possible, rightly encourages reflections on the present *Scope of International Law*. A remarkable paper under this title (*B.Y.I.L.*) by Dr. Jenks is full of constructive suggestions which call for sympathetic but critical sifting. A life-long association with international institutions is an inestimable asset. Inevitably, it has also its conditioning effect. This is not,

⁶ Cf. Vol. 6 (1952), p. 345.

however, the place for providing an analysis of the reactions of a distinguished international civil servant to the disturbing realities of international life. As the reviewer has expressed himself elsewhere on this subject,⁷ it would be repetitive to explain here the points of agreement and disagreement with Dr. Jenks's stimulating programme.

8. INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY

The growing number of studies on the place of sovereignty in contemporary international law offers reassuring evidence that the fashionable cliché on independence giving way to interdependence is wearing thin. In fact, for purposes of any serious analysis, it is necessary to distinguish between the overall relations between the two halves of our divided world, where political sovereignty reigns supreme; relations within each of these halves, where interdependence may stand for international co-operation on a footing of formal or functional equality or a purely hegemonial hierarchy of relations; and an unstable border-zone between the two sectors where even small Powers may be able to maintain a precarious type of both legal and political sovereignty.⁸

It is not surprising that lawyers in countries under the shadow of one of the world's hegemonial powers should become acutely conscious of these realities. Both Mr. Løchen's *Norway's Views on Sovereignty* and Professor Suontausta's *Souveraineté des États*, published in the enterprising Series *Jus Finlandiae*, are illustrations of this experience. Mr. Løchen's booklet is a primarily factual report prepared for Unesco as part of a more comprehensive series of national reports. If it had been feasible to expand the chapter on Norwegian Court Practice beyond the cases already reported in the *Annual Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases*, this would have greatly added to the value of this *précis*. As it is a somewhat dubious compliment to be listed under the heading of "Official Publications" (p. 101), it may be said in honour of the *Digest* that, with the exception of the contributions supplied to it by the Berlin Institute of International Law during the Appeasement Period,⁹ such a classification is perhaps somewhat unfair to this valuable source work. Professor Suontausta's book is of a different calibre. It is a detached and acute analysis of the place of sovereignty in post-1945 international law. By permitting himself the luxury of thinking for himself, this promising scholar has succeeded in writing a really worthwhile book.

⁷ "The Province of the Doctrine of International Law." 9 *Current Legal Problems* (1956), pp. 235 *et seq.*

⁸ See further "The Forms of Sovereignty." 10 *Current Legal Problems* (1957).

⁹ See further 60 *Harvard Law Review* (1947), p. 555, n. 29.

In this complex situation, in which, more than ever, the need for concrete thinking is paramount, a study on the meaning of non-intervention in the orbit of the United States is most timely. In a joint work on *Non-Intervention*, Professor and Mrs. Thomas have courageously attacked this fascinating subject. They have fully succeeded in analysing and systematising a stupendous amount of relevant material. It is not entirely surprising that they should have refrained from probing more deeply into so critical and symptomatic an issue as the intervention by "unknown" powers in Guatemala in 1954. However, the existence of powerful taboos, rather than excessive discretion on the part of two otherwise highly enterprising and discerning scholars, should be made responsible for this blind spot.

The relativity of the distinction between matters political and legal at any time, and the two-way traffic between international politics and law, is merely another facet of the Janus face of sovereignty in international affairs. In *Der Begriff des Politischen im Internationalen Recht*, Professor Wengler treats this problem in a stimulating manner. His aside on p. 82 (n. 48) is sufficiently startling in its exceptional character to be expressly mentioned. It amounts to an open breach of the unofficial, but firmly established, West German academic convention not to refer to the *sacrificia intellectus* of any reappointed teacher during the era of the Thousand Years' Reich.

If further evidence of the virility of sovereignty in its most negative form were required, the relative insignificance of international judicial institutions in the post-1945 period and the importance attached by States to the reservation of matters in their domestic jurisdiction would bear out this thesis. Professor Waldock's comprehensive and thorough re-examination of *The Plea of Domestic Jurisdiction before International Legal Tribunals* (B.Y.I.L.) is, therefore, most opportune.

In an international society in which sovereignty under international law is the privilege of the select few, aspirants to this exclusive circle have a natural tendency to prove that they have a "right" to admission. It is one of the functions of the principle of national self-determination to serve this end. Another handy purpose of this elastic notion is to justify claims to coveted territories which happen to be on the wrong side of one's own *de facto* or *de jure* frontiers. This aspect of the matter is likely to have been the one which prompted the Bonn Ministry for All-German Questions to lend its financial support to Dr. Decker's research on *Das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen* and to assist in the distribution of this work. In spite of this "functional"

background, Dr. Decker's analysis of the principle of self-determination as a dynamic working principle in international relations is a serious contribution to research. When, however, the author attempts to assess the significance of this principle on the level of international law, his arguments become as subjective and unconvincing as those of the legal exponents of any other ideology.

Combined with the assertion of a duty to recognise an effectively existing new entity as a subject of international law, the declaratory doctrine of recognition becomes the Siamese twin of the "right" to national self-determination. Actually, short of consent, acquiescence or estoppel, recognition under international law is purely discretionary. This is the reason why it is possible to adduce some evidence for any of the current doctrines on recognition. Compared with these somewhat unreal efforts, Dr. Charpentier's treatment of *La Reconnaissance Internationale et l'Evolution du Droit des Gens* is like the long-hoped-for breeze on a stifling summer afternoon. In a manner which the reviewer cannot but endorse,¹⁰ the author chooses as the starting point of his inquiry the question whether a situation is *opposable* to a subject of international law. If Professor Bastid candidly points out in her Preface that her formidable doctorant has not yet coped with all the implications of his thesis, this is not surprising. In particular, effectiveness of a situation as such does not create a title-deed to recognition, though acquiescence may. It is confidently predicted that this work will make redundant much of the past and current literature on this subject. Dr. Zellweger's matter-of-fact paper on *Die Völkerrechtliche Anerkennung nach Schweizerischer Staatenpraxis* (*Annuaire Suisse*) is a child of the same empirical spirit. Switzerland may pride herself on being one of the world's most law-abiding States, yet its practice conforms as little as that of most other States to the tenets of the hypothesis of recognition as a legal duty.

Once recognition is treated as a general device of international law by which otherwise not *opposable* situations can be made *opposable* to a subject of international law, the problem of the extraterritorial effects of foreign municipal law falls into its place. Dr. Adriaanse's balanced study on *Confiscation in Private International Law* is a concise and informed comparative analysis of court practice on this theoretically and practically important problem. Convincing evidence is lacking that the policies adopted in the various countries are based on actual rules of international

¹⁰ See further the reviewer's *Fundamental Principles of International Law* (Hague Academy of International Law, Vol. 87 (1955), Chapter 3).

law, sometimes thought to govern this matter, rather than discretionary considerations of reciprocity, comity and public policy. These conclusions will only be strengthened by a study of Professor Niederer's clear-headed paper on *Grenzfragen des Ordre Public in Fällen entschädigungsloser Konfiskation* (*Annuaire Suisse*) and Professor Gihl's helpful discussion, in *Liber Amicorum*, of two of the oil tanker cases which arose out of the Iranian expropriation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.

Perhaps the only fault, if fault it is, of Dr. O'Connell's excellent monograph on *The Law of State Succession* is that "implicit throughout this work have been certain jurisprudential notions" (p. 266) of an *a priori* character. While the writer deserves full credit for having made these assumptions articulate, it appears more than doubtful whether "the problems of State succession invite a strictly jurisprudential analysis" (p. 268). On the contrary, they appear to call for examination in the light of the empirically verified fundamental principles of international law.¹¹ It, then, appears that, short of consent, recognition, acquiescence and estoppel in particular cases, little evidence exists which allows the formulation of generally recognised rules of international customary law affirming duties of State succession. The material so diligently assembled from British practice by Dr. O'Connell does not appear to disprove this view. Nevertheless, disagreement on the interpretation of inductively verifiable judicial and diplomatic material cannot detract from admiration for an impressive piece of research. In future, this is likely to take its place side by side with the standard works on State succession by Professor Huber, the late Professor Keith and Dr. Feilchenfeld.

The status and position of individual subjects of international law (Austria, Formosa, Germany, Panama, the Saar, Trieste, Tunisia, Viet Nam and Viet-Minh) appear to be one of the chief concerns of the active band of contributors to the *Annuaire Français*. They have succeeded in assembling in an attractive form much information which is not easy to come by. Odd places like Tangier are in a similar category. It is not Professor Stuart's fault that, in the course of Morocco's movement towards independence, the second edition of his exhaustive work on the *International City of Tangier* has become the condign epitaph of a quaint experiment in international administration. Although now primarily of historical interest, this case study fills the gap which, until now, had to be negotiated with the aid of the relevant treaty

¹¹ See further *loc. cit.* in n. 10 above, pp. 195 *et seq.*, and the writer's *International Law*, Vol. 1 (3rd ed.), Chap. 10.

texts and Professor Stuart's own paper on this topic in this *Year Book*.¹²

As Dr. Bathurst's and Dr. Simpson's study on *Germany and the North Atlantic Community* forms the subject of a separate review,¹³ it suffices here to draw attention to two relevant documentary works. The Chatham House volume of *Documents on Germany under Occupation 1945-1954* is in the best tradition of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. In particular, the material illustrating the policy of the Russian occupation authorities in Germany is invaluable. Yet, however instructive, these matters are now past history. Western Germany's present international status is governed by the 1954 Treaties of London and Paris, together with those parts of the Bonn and Paris Agreements of 1952 which have survived the scrapping of the European Defence Community. In *Die Pariser Verträge*, Dr. Anders has conveniently assembled the German texts of both the basic and supplementary treaties.

4. STATE JURISDICTION

Important aspects of diplomatic immunity are ably discussed in the papers by M. Lyons on "Personal Immunities of Diplomatic Agents" (*B.Y.I.L.*), Mr. Lauterpacht on "The Codification of the Law of Diplomatic Immunity" (*Grotius Transactions*) and M. Louis-Lucas on "*L'Affaire de la Légation de Roumanie à Berne*" (*Annuaire Français*).

The topical issues of the immunities of military bases and personnel abroad have received thorough attention from Professor Flory ("*Les Bases Militaires à l'Étranger*"—*Annuaire Français*) and Dr. Barton ("Foreign Armed Forces: Qualified Jurisdictional Immunity"—*B.Y.I.L.*). In this context, Dr. Moussa's *Les Négociations Anglo-Egyptiennes de 1950-1951 sur Suez et le Soudan*, a detached essay in diplomatic history, may also be recommended.

The carefully selected bibliography on *Immunities in International Law* by Dr. van Essen and M. Tichelar forms Volume III of the valuable series of Bibliographies of the Library of the Peace Palace in The Hague and covers both traditional and more novel aspects of this subject.

In *Die Rechtsquellen des Internationalen Wassernutzungsrechts*, Professor Berber concentrates on the problem of the law-creating processes (to avoid the term *source* which, in this particular field, is even more misleading than in others) of international fluvial law. In view of the strange uses made of the doctrine of the

¹² Vol. 1 (1947), pp. 92 *et seq.*

¹³ See below, pp. 400-401.

abuse of rights in this field, but not in this field alone,¹⁴ a detached re-examination of this problem is timely. Its results are as revealing as might be expected. Inevitably, Professor Kraus and Professor Scheuner cover some of the same ground in their well-argued advisory opinions on some of the basic issues of freedom of navigation on the Rhine (*Rechtsfragen der Rheinschifffahrt*). The volume on *Die europäische Zusammenarbeit auf dem Gebiet des Verkehrs*, published by the *Institut für Europäische Politik und Wirtschaft*, covers the major aspects of European co-operation in the field of communications. A brief but useful synopsis of the evolution of functional internationalism in this sphere is followed by comprehensive systematic bibliographies.

The *Second Supplement* to Shawcross and Beaumont's *Air Law* is intended to bring this standard work up to October 31, 1955. In particular, it contains the texts of the Conventions on Damage caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface (1952) and amending the Warsaw Convention of 1929 (1955) as well as the new Conditions of Contract agreed on by the International Air Transport Association. Thus, the industrious quartet to whom we owe this leading work has again succeeded in making Beaumont-Shawcross the most up-to-date reference book in the field.

Professor Erler's *Grundprobleme des Internationalen Wirtschaftsrechts* is a learned and stimulating attempt to treat international economic law as the kind of specialised discipline which has been developed and taught in the University of London for more than a decade. It is encouraging to see that this example has been followed on the Continent. It is all to the good that, in the formative stage of this special branch of international law, Professor Erler is developing the subject very much on interesting lines of his own.¹⁵

The international law of taxation may be conceived as complementary to, or, as is done in London, as part of international economic law. In any case, the basic problems of economic and fiscal sovereignty, and the ways in which the exercise of sovereignty in these fields can be limited or excluded are practically identical. In *À la Recherche du Droit International Fiscal Commun*, Professor Chrétien displays appropriate scepticism towards any alleged rules of international customary law and general principles of law, by which, in the absence of treaties, fiscal sovereignty is supposed to be limited. From this sound

¹⁴ See further *l.c.* in n. 10 above, pp. 290 *et seq.*

¹⁵ For the University of London Syllabus in International Economic Law, *cf.* 4 *International Law Quarterly* (1951), pp. 305-306.

basis, the former *Rapporteur-Général* of the International Fiscal Association proceeds to an imaginative systematisation of the existing multilateral and bilateral conventions in this field.

With Volume IV to VI of the Series on *International Tax Agreements*, the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs continues an invaluable editorial task, on which due praise has been heaped in earlier Reports.¹⁶ These volumes bring the Series up to date. The helpful Tables in the *World Guide to International Tax Agreements* (Vol. V) provide reliable information until June 1, 1958.

Les Relations Fiscales entre la Suisse et les Pays-Bas by Mr. Beuchat and Mr. Dirksen and *Tax Relations between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Sweden* by Dr. Koch and Dr. Ekenberg are the two latest additions to the useful series on bilateral tax conventions which is published by the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation. As the specific techniques of this series have been explained in earlier Reports,¹⁷ it will suffice to state that, in every respect, these two booklets maintain the proud tradition established by the Bureau. The second Supplement to *Doppelbesteuerung* by Dr. Korn and Dr. Dietz¹⁸ contains the annotated text of the Double Taxation Convention of 1954 between Austria and Germany and a revised systematic index to this unassuming but useful collection of texts.

Payments agreements, and their interpretation, are lawyers' law *par excellence* in the field of international economic law. Dr. Wabnitz's cogently argued book on *Der Zwischenstaatliche Zahlungsverkehr auf der Grundlage internationaler Zahlungskommen* may be counted among those few contributions to the subject which measure up to the required, and necessarily high, standard of technical competence in this rarefied air.

Judge Pal's courageous stand in the Tokyo Trials has found its first literary expression in his monumental Dissenting Opinion.¹⁹ In the Tagore Law Lectures on *Crimes in International Relations*, delivered in 1951, Judge Pal presents his views on international criminal law in a more systematic form. The book should be made compulsory reading for any enthusiasts on the subject of International Criminal Law. Professor Dahm's penetrating analysis of the *Problematik der Völkerstrafrechts* is equally cautious and sceptical towards generalisations from somewhat unique situations

¹⁶ See Vols. 5 (1951), p. 396; 7 (1953), p. 2, and 8 (1954), p. 327.

¹⁷ See, for instance, Vol. 7 (1953), p. 393.

¹⁸ See Vol. 10 (1956), p. 336.

¹⁹ See Vol. 9 (1955), p. 381.

in favour of a movement in international customary law towards the creation of criminal sanctions. Subject to the vital reservation that any truly international criminal jurisdiction depends on consent,²⁰ Professor Siegert's attempt to explore the existence of principles of international criminal procedural law (*Grundlinien des Völkerstrafprozessrechts*) merits attention. Inevitably, the still-born draft conventions and *ad hoc* arrangements which provide the bulk of relevant illustrations and the absence of any scope for the application of these principles on the international level give a ghostly air of non-reality to any such undertaking, however valiant.

This Section may be concluded with at least a reference *en passant* to two valuable notes in the *British Year Book of International Law* by J.A.C.G. on *Political Offences and the Law of Extradition* and by Mr. Parry on *International Law and the Conscription of Non-nationals*. If, in relation to the right to conscript foreign nationals, the position under international customary law is inconclusive, the fault is not the writer's. In a state of open dissensus on this question between leading nations of the world, it must remain controversial whether the multitude of treaty clauses providing for exemption have come to be declaratory of a compulsory standard of international customary law.

5. OBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

(a) *Territory*¹ and the High Seas. Professor Andrassy's moderate presentation of Yugoslav views on the facts and events leading to the partition of the Territory of Trieste between Italy and Yugoslavia (*Die Triester Frage—Jahrbuch*) and Professor Wade's account of the treatment of ancient title by the World Court in *The Minquiers and Ecrehos Case* (*Grotius Transactions*) will repay reading.

In another instalment of the lucid series on *The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951–1954* (*B.Y.I.L.*), Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice deals with the impact on maritime law of the Judgment of the World Court in the *Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries* case. Similarly, Professor Böhmert continues his searching inquiries on *Meeresfreiheit und Schelfproklamationen* and, in this Volume of the *Jahrbuch*, examines critically the work of the International Law Commission on the subject of the Continental Shelf. As far as it goes, Mr. Baxter's well-documented paper on the *Passage of Ships through International Waterways in*

²⁰ See further 3 *Current Legal Problems* (1950), pp. 263 *et seq.*

¹ See also above under 3, pp. 376 *et seq.*

Time of War (B.Y.I.L.) is a reliable guide. On the ground of the controversy over the closure of the Suez Canal to Israeli ships still being unresolved, the author excluded this issue from examination. He might, however, have considered himself free to explore more closely the present status of the Kiel Canal or, in other words, the continued validity of the Peace Treaty of Versailles of 1919.

(b) *The Individual.* The recommendation made by the International Law Commission that the United Nations Division for the Development and Codification of International Law should produce a volume on the *Laws Concerning Nationality* was one of its activities which reconcile one to the Commission's existence. This collection of the relevant legislation of eighty-four countries and the multilateral treaties in the field must be labelled "indispensable." The same is true of the complementary Volume on *Laws concerning the Nationality of Ships*.

It was one of those misfortunes which occasionally befall scholars that the British Nationality Act, 1948, reduced Dr. Mervyn Jones's first edition of *British Nationality Law and Practice* soon after publication to a work of primarily historical character. Real effort, however, is hardly ever wasted. The labour which had gone into the book made Dr. Jones an expert in this complicated field of British statutory law. Thus, the revised edition has only benefited from all these preliminary efforts and constitutes a mature piece of attractively presented research.

A Supplement to the 1952 edition of the nationality laws of the Scandinavian States, published by the *Forschungsstelle Hamburg*, summarises the latest developments in the nationality laws of these countries, including Finland and Iceland. It is especially noteworthy that, in spite of separation from Denmark, Iceland has adapted its own nationality law to the fairly uniform nationality legislation of Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The Series *Geltende Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetze* is handy and useful. It may be hoped that it will be continued.

In *Der Stand der Menschenrechte im Völkerrecht*, Dr. Guradze re-examines the related issues of human rights and the international personality of the individual in a manner which is noticeably more impressed by already fading post-1945 fashions in the doctrinal field than the stern realities of this brave new world. Yet, so long as both sides agree not to be unduly dogmatic and to treat differences of interpretation of the existing material as questions of the evaluation of the available evidence, these largely hypothetical issues need not lead to any major dissension. In any case, the author deserves congratulation on having striven hard to cope with

some of the most difficult and basic problems of international law.

The actual significance of *Fundamental Rights in India* under the New Indian Constitution is the topic of a searching and instructive inquiry by Professor Gledhill. The various publications of the International Commission of Jurists, listed at the beginning of this Report,² also contain much otherwise inaccessible material on the place of the individual under the totalitarian régimes from Eastern Germany to Red China. It would, however, be unhealthy if these publications were to generate Western superiority and complacency complexes. Their study should, therefore, be supplemented by a careful perusal of the somewhat disconcerting Survey which the International Press Institute has made on *Government Pressures on the Press* in the more, and less, free parts of the "free world."

6. INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS

International loans are so central a topic of international economic law that a serious new study of this topic is bound to arouse a sympathetic response. Dr. van Hecke's *Problèmes Juridiques des Emprunts Internationaux* constitutes a competent re-examination of the problem. The basic issue of the character of loans as transactions of international or municipal law still appears to depend as much as ever³ on the subject or object character of the parties to international loans. Similarly, default by debtor States and attempts by creditors to insure themselves against contingencies of this kind are fairly constant phenomena.⁴ However, the writer's careful analysis of the practice of municipal courts on the various aspects of international loan contracts lends a character of its own to a thoughtful piece of research work.

The Calvo Clause, by which Latin American States have attempted to protect themselves against both warranted and unwarranted intervention by the home States of their foreign creditors and concessionaries, has long waited for monographic treatment. Professor Shea has seized this golden opportunity and, in a lively study of the problem in its diplomatic and legal aspects, made the best of it.

Acquiescence is a legal concept and general device the significance of which is easily underestimated. In Mr. Gibbon it has found at last its systematic exponent. His paper on "The Scope of Acquiescence in International Law" easily holds its own

² See above, p. 367.

³ See further the reviewer's *Die Kreuger-Anleihen*, 1931, pp. 9 et seq.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 30 et seq.

with most of the other contributions to this Volume of the *British Year Book of International Law*.

In a stimulating note on "The Exhaustion of Local Remedies" (*B.Y.I.L.*), Mr. Fawcett emphasises a distinction between substance and procedure which hardly has a place in international customary law. This is not, however, the occasion to join issue with this stimulating paper.⁵ Similarly, the arguments derived in Dr. Hortie's animated contribution to *Libor Amicorum* from the *Corfu Channel (Merits)* case (1949) in favour of a general *culpa* doctrine in the international law of tort appear to call for further discussion.⁶

The comparative survey of governmental emergency powers (*Das Staatsnotrecht*) in the laws of Belgium, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States is an impressive piece of team work. This publication by the Max Planck Institute, Heidelberg, is a major contribution to the still small literature on comparative public law. Further, this competent survey has its importance for the international law of tort. It assists in clarifying the element of public interest in internationally relevant acts of expropriation and the analysis of exculpating circumstances, such as necessity or the limits of legal possibility. The editor and the contributors wisely refrain from generalising from this interesting, but still too narrow premise, in favour of any governing general principle of law recognised by civilised nations.

7. WAR AND NEUTRALITY

In a world society in which the outlawry of force by means of international institutions is, at most, a qualified success, both war and neutrality still present realities of some potency. In these circumstances, it is understandable that a young international lawyer with Dr. Kotzsch's potentialities should have desired to reassess for himself the significance of *The Concept of War in Contemporary History and International Law*. The book is a discerning discussion of these basic issues.

It is also all to the good that the subject should prompt inquiries into the sociological background of war, for war is not a catastrophe of nature, but a breakdown of constructive politics. Thus, Dr. Landseer's summary of the group discussions held in the Grotius Seminarium in The Hague on *Some Sociological Aspects of the Phenomenon "War"* raises high expectations. It appears, however, that the members of the Seminar tend to equate sociology with social psychology. Moreover, they firmly divorce their brand

⁵ Cf. the writer's *International Law*, Vol. 1 (3rd ed.), Chap. 33.

⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, Chap. 35.

of sociology from the academic discipline of international relations, understood as the sociological study of international society. In this way, the treatment of the subject assumes a strange air of abstraction and unreality. It should not, however, be denied that this type of sociology has merits of its own. As it blurs rather than unmasks, it is likely to meet, if not with official approbation, then at least with condescending toleration. Sociology of this type is congenial to a society on the move from freedom to regimentation. This in itself is a significant symptom which would be worthy of sociological analysis.

The Korean war, variously described as an international or civil war, a war of aggression or an international police action, a war by proxy or aggression from within, confronts us with war in one of the shapes in which it has defied international organisation on the present level of integration. In Dr. Pfeffer's searching study on *Die Aktion der U.S.A. in Korea*, the emphasis lies on the interaction of events on the international and United States scenes.

As long as, in some contingencies, States still claim the right to resort to war, they are likely to admit the individual's claim to contract out of war service only as a narrowly defined exception to a jealously guarded general rule. The *Forschungsstelle Hamburg*, which has also sponsored Dr. Pfeffer's monograph, deserves thanks for having promoted Dr. Hecker's concise comparative study on the law relating to conscientious objectors in twenty-one countries.

Any major war in our age would probably be both nuclear and ideological. This situation raises in pointed form the question whether, in these circumstances, there is still any sense in worrying about the traditional rules of warfare. Neither Professor Kunz, in his vivid lecture course on *La Problematica Actual de las Leyes de la Guerra*, nor Mr. Dunbar, in his forthright paper on *The Legal Regulation of Modern Warfare (Grotius Transactions)*, can help being doubtful on the possibility of maintaining in future any continuity with the rules of old, regulating warfare between civilised nations. At the same time, both struggle manfully against the temptations of apocalyptic despair.

In order to maintain a balanced outlook on this somewhat alarming subject, a number of works under review may be helpful. Dr. Duclos's study on *Le Vatican et la Seconde Guerre Mondiale* admirably succeeds in presenting an impressive record of the humanitarian efforts made by the Vatican during the Second World War to mitigate avoidable horrors of modern war. In *Die Völkerrechtliche Stellung der Partisanen im Kriege*, Dr. Schmid ably

records and sympathetically analyses the never despairing attempts to cope constructively with the inherently intractable problem of the guerilla. Yet even the texts of the Geneva Red Cross Conventions of 1949 themselves, two German editions of which are now available and listed at the beginning of this Report,⁷ suffice to prove that even this barren soil will yield some harvest, however meagre. As is shown in the *Annual Report 1955* of the International Committee of the Red Cross, which is impressive in its modesty, fifty-two States are now parties to these Conventions.

Professor Wehberg's essay on *König Gustav Adolf und das Problem der Annexion besetzten feindlichen Gebietes (Liber Amicorum)* is of absorbing interest. The growth of the rule on the prohibition of the annexation of enemy territory *durante bello* is no exception to that of other rules of international law. If its genesis is traced inductively, the rule cannot help coming to life, and this approach is bound to lead to considerable advancement in existing knowledge of the subject.

The confusion which results from ignoring the fact of the extinction of the Third Reich by *debellatio* becomes evident from Mr. Roos's book *Zur Konfiskation privater deutscher Auslandsvermögen*. Then, the fiction that, because a state of war was supposed to have continued, the Occupation Powers were bound to apply in Germany Hague Convention IV of 1907 receives some semblance of plausibility. If, in addition, the rule of *res inter alios acta* is ignored, it is not difficult to derive from a number of instruments to which neither the Third Reich nor either of the two Germanies was ever a party a considerable amount of spurious international obligations on the part of the Occupation Powers towards Germany, and to claim that a good many of these have not been fulfilled. Mr. Roos's work on the confiscation of private German property abroad suffers from both these deficiencies, which appear congenital to the majority of West German literary efforts in the field of international law. At the same time, it would be unfair if this criticism were to obscure the fact that this monograph contains some interesting findings on the history of the rule on the protection of private property abroad. The book must, thus, be treated as a brief *pro domo* and calls for discriminating use.

Apparently, both Dr. Decker's⁸ and Mr. Roos's books are part of a legal propaganda offensive which, in strange repetition of the pattern of the inter-war period, West German official and semi-official quarters are launching on the Western world. Thus, by way of antidotes, Mr. Poliakov's *Harvest of Hate* and Mr.

⁷ See above, p. 368

⁸ See above, p. 377.

Harris's *Tyranny on Trial*, both factual studies of German war crimes and crimes against humanity—the one based on the criminals' own records and the other primarily on those of the Nuremberg International Tribunal—may still fulfil a salutary function.

Lord Kilmuir's Address on *Nuremberg in Retrospect* is valuable as embodying the reflections on the value of these war crime trials by a leading British lawyer who had himself been one of the makers of the London Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the British Deputy Chief Prosecutor at Nuremberg. Yet however necessary it was to arraign the worst offenders on the side of the defeated aggressors, it would be hypocritical to paint the picture as one of black and white. The title of *The Martyrdom and Heroism of the Women of East Germany* may be too sweeping. Yet, the accounts by survivors and eye-witnesses of the Russian advance into Silesia have a grim ring of truth about them. Still, how did it come to pass that the Red Army had occasion to invade German soil? He who soweth the wind . . .

As the uneasy passage on superior orders in Lord Kilmuir's Address shows, individual excesses by an unruly *soldateska* are not the real issue of war crimes. It is presented by crimes which are committed under superior orders. Professor Daube's cultured Inaugural Lecture on *The Defence of Superior Orders in Roman Law*, written in the best Jolowicz tradition, reveals the perennial element of this problem. It is that, at one and the same time, an individual is part of a military machine, but supposed to react as if he were a responsible individual in arms. To live up to this standard of conduct requires a fair amount of moral courage, intelligence and presence of mind. The average soldier, however, is neither a hero nor a coward, but the typical product of a mass society, and as such not fashioned to think for himself or to take action which singles him out from a protective anonymity.

The two volumes on *Soviet Military Law and Administration* by Professor Berman and Mr. Kerner demonstrate this point. Assuming that the Disciplinary Code of the Armed Forces of the USSR, apparently last reissued in 1950, is still in force, "the order of the commander shall be law for the subordinate. An order must be executed without reservation, exactly and promptly." Yet, this is merely one sample from a work of absorbing interest. Both the volume providing description and analysis and its companion volume containing the documentary evidence succeed in giving a vivid impression of the organisational aspects of the world's most colossal military apparatus.

The diplomatic background of the transition of the United States from neutrality in the face of totalitarian aggression to the

assumption of leadership in the coalition against the world triangle is well described in Professor Drummond's *Passing of American Neutrality 1937-1941*. The rights and duties of a neutral power in the position of Switzerland in air warfare is the subject of an informative paper in the *Jahrbuch*. In particular, Professor v. Waldkirch deals with the measures taken by Switzerland, including a systematic black-out of the whole of the country, against alleged breaches of Swiss neutrality by British night bombers on the way to North Italian industrial centres.

8. THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Future historians of the United Nations may record that the most noteworthy result of Article 109 of the Charter was not its avowed object, but the by-product of the evasive action taken by the General Assembly in accordance with the device: "Let our action be more work for the Secretariat." Volumes II and III of the *Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs* are further fruits of this not entirely negative policy. While Volume II deals with the Security Council, the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Action under Chapter Seven and Regional Arrangements, Volume III is concerned with the Chapters on International Economic and Social Co-operation and the Economic and Social Council. Volume II is a valuable complement to the *Repertory of the Practice of the Security Council, 1946-1951*⁹ and, owing to the importance of its subject-matter, likely to become the star volume of the series. Yet anybody who has had the doubtful privilege of wading through the mountains of paper heaped up by the Economic and Social Council to assess for himself the significance in United Nations practice of some of the loosely worded Articles in Chapter IX of the Charter, will not be inclined to rate Volume III lower than its more glamorous companion volume. The prodigious amount of unselfish team work by a bevy of harassed civil servants which must have gone into the making of these volumes deserves special and grateful acknowledgment.

To set out to explore the legal problems of the relation between an international institution which aims at universality and non-member States means becoming involved of necessity in some of the most fundamental problems of international law. Thus, Dr. Soder's choice of *Die Vereinten Nationen und die Nichtmitglieder* as the subject of his dissertation shows commendable courage. As, however, the reviewer found when he engaged in a similar inquiry

⁹ Cf. Vol. 10 (1956), p. 346

in relation to the League of Nations,¹⁰ the term *Völkerrechtsgemeinschaft* as used in the German literature on international law is a useless tool. It excels by being both bad law and bad sociology. Moreover, unless the various types of universality are clearly elaborated and distinguished, this term also tends to make confusion worse confounded. Dr. Soder's conclusions on duties which stem from the Charter of the United Nations and are binding on non-members is in keeping with a current fashion. Yet, unless claims to compliance by non-members with the Charter are based on consent, acquiescence, recognition or estoppel, any such argument appears to lead far outside existing international law.

The relative impotence of the Security Council in matters affecting international peace and security, and the correspondingly growing trend to explore the potentialities of the General Assembly in this field, have long waited for a commensurate study. In a comprehensive work on *Les Pouvoirs de l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies en Matière Politique et de Sécurité*, Dr. Brugière has admirably discharged this function. If doubts remain, they are connected with the constitutional limitations of an organ which, in this sphere, was intended to play second fiddle and, in any case, limited to powers of recommendation. In this connection, attention should also be drawn to Mr. Vallat's valuable paper on "Voting in the General Assembly of the United Nations" (*B.Y.I.L.*).

The jubilee volume of *Keesing's Archives* on *Zusammenschlüsse des Westens* serves to restore more quickly than any lengthy treatise a sense of the political realities behind the United Nations scene. The maps, arrows and other devices of an ingenious picture language ought to succeed in ramming into the most obtuse heads the elementary facts of our present system of power politics in disguise. How this reality looks if seen through the eyes of a Chairman of the Legal Commission of the United Nations General Assembly and a Law teacher in a People's Democracy becomes apparent from Professor Lachs's paper on *Le Traité de Varsovie du 14 mai 1955* (*Annuaire Français*).

Dr. Chowdhuri's *International Mandates and Trusteeship Systems* appears just at the right moment. Enough time has elapsed since the inauguration of the United Nations trusteeship system to make possible a comparative study which does not only cover the theory but also the practice of these two related forms of enlightened colonial government. This carefully written book,

¹⁰ Cf. the reviewer's *The League of Nations and World Order*, 1936, and further *Power Politics*, 1951, pp. 427 et seq.

which is the result of considerable research, is a weighty addition to the literature in this field.

Some of the most fruitful, but neglected, aspects of United Nations activities find due attention in *Gegenwartsprobleme der Vereinten Nationen*, a collection of realistic and constructive papers on current United Nations problems. The contributions made to this thoughtful little book by M. Poignant on the United Nations Technical Aid Programme and by Dr. Chossudovsky on the European Economic Commission may be singled out from others on more conventional, but by no means negligible, topics.

The tragedy of the refugee problem in the post-1945 world as well as the organisational shortcomings and achievements in coping with one of the major human legacies of the Second World War are worth recording for the benefit of posterity. In a *magnum opus* on *The International Refugee Organisation*, Professor Holborn has successfully struggled with this heavy task. She appears to agree with the view that it was the right thing to liquidate this temporary specialised agency when this was done. If "its techniques and organisation were no longer suitable to the task which remained after it had coped with the one and a half million refugees entrusted to it" (p. 571), it would perhaps have been more advisable to adapt the Organisation to changed conditions than to establish the entirely new bureau of the United Nations High Commissioner's Office for Refugees. Yet, in fact, this change-over had different reasons. It was meant as *capitis deminutio*. It was less embarrassing to starve a mere office of money and to ignore its requests and recommendations than to treat a specialised agency in this slightly contemptuous manner. Yet to go more fully into the reasons for, and circumstances of, the liquidation of this Organisation would have been difficult for anybody who was entrusted with the task of preparing a history of the Organisation in collaboration with a "veteran French diplomat" (p. 568) and in a manner which would not rule out the chance of the work being "issued under the auspices of the Liquidation Board of the International Refugee Organisation." Assignments of this type raise wider problems which cannot be pursued here. Whatever caustic footnotes and supplements may have to be added to any work in this category, Professor Holborn's work of love and skill is likely to remain the standard biography of the first casualty in the bereaved family of the Specialised Agencies.

The possibility of a conference on the review of the Charter of the United Nations being convened in the foreseeable future

has given some prominence to this topic. In "The Amending Procedure of Constitutions of International Organisations" (B.Y.I.L.), Dr. Schwelb elucidates the technical difficulties of revising the Charter. By way of contrast, the emphasis in the substantial volume by Messrs. Wilcox and Marcy on *Proposals for Changes in the United Nations* lies on matters of substance. The reader will find there a fair sampling of wisdom and folly in this tricky field. It is the merit of two lucid studies—the one by Dr. Martin and Mr. Edwards on *The Changing Charter* and the other a Report on the *Charter Review Conference* published by the Commission to Study the Organisation of Peace—to have poured the necessary amount of cold water on widespread illusions in connection with any such conference.

Some of the proposals contained in these balanced and constructive books and, in particular, the papers presented to the Commission to Study the Organisation of Peace will gain a new interest from the fact, that, meanwhile, the United Nations has come considerably nearer to a state of absolute universality. With a commendable sense of urgency, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has seized on this opportunity to explore *Some Implications of Expanding United Nations Membership*. While Professor Stein explores the effect of these changes on the various organs of the United Nations, Professor Sharp concentrates on their implications for the Secretariat and the budget of the Organisation. Both Memoranda are characterised by an impressive sureness of touch which is the fruit of close practical acquaintance with the issues and personalities involved. How important it is not to lose sight of this human aspect of international institutions becomes manifest from Mr. Green's lively paper on "The International Civil Servant, His Employer and His State" (*Grotius Transactions*).

Anybody who is in need of a refresher course on the latest developments in these major international economic organisations should consult the collection of lectures assembled in *Die grossen zwischenstaatlichen Wirtschaftsorganisationen*. This type of authoritative survey of the functions and problems of a number of related international institutions is most instructive. The Institute of International Economics of the *Handelshochschule* St. Gallen must be congratulated on its enterprise.

International Trade 1955, published by GATT, contains not only an informative analysis of recent changes in the structure and pattern of international trade, but also an important section on the principal activities of GATT during the year covered in this very readable volume.

Details on the legal aspects of the Currency Union between France and the Saar of 1947, now in the process of liquidation, will be found in a knowledgeable thesis by Dr. Martin on the *Französisch-Saarländische Währungsunion*.

In Professor Mason and Professor Vignes, the European Coal and Steel Community has found two other able expositors of this experiment in international economic administration on the highest level of international integration that, as yet, has been attained in the Western world. The establishment of the common market for coal and steel among the members of the Community and the intensification of relations between the Community and the United Kingdom fully justify both these studies.

Although there is necessarily a certain amount of overlap, it would be a mistake to think that the two monographs merely duplicate each other. While the strength of Professor Mason's study lies in the lively story of the reception of the Schuman Plan in Western Europe and the Community's operation from 1952 to 1954, Professor Vignes excels by his crystal-clear exposition of the economic and social devices employed by the Community to achieve its ends.

In a notable paper in *L'Annuaire Suisse*, Professor Freymond traces the growth of a practice in the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation to make "decisions" in the technical sense of the term. This is a reassuring symptom that a hastily improvised organisation has definitely found its feet. What all this means in the wider context of the integration of Europe is the theme of a detached synopsis by Professor Kraus on *Probleme des Europäischen Zusammenschlusses*.

London.

G. S.

Current Legal Problems, Vol. 9. Edited by G. W. KEETON and G. SCHWARZENBERGER on behalf of the Faculty of Laws, University College, London. (Stevens and Sons, Ltd., London. 1956. vii and 275 pp. 82s.)

THE new volume of this series opens with an address given to the Bentham Club by Mr. Justice Devlin upon the present relations between the courts and the executive. This ground is well trodden, but Sir Patrick emphasises a point usually overlooked, that the blame is not all on one side. In recent years the courts have tended more and more to follow a policy which in another connection would be called "appeasement"—and with the consequences which might be expected.

Of the twelve articles which follow eight deal primarily with problems of English law. The high standard of the series is well maintained, but limits of space impose upon a reviewer some selection in emphasis. Professor Powell ("Good Faith in Contracts") and Professor Glanville Williams ("Mens Rea and Vicarious Responsibility") both deal with problems which are of universal and fundamental significance. The value of the former article is greatly enhanced, as we might expect from the author, by comparisons drawn with Roman law, canon law, and modern systems. Professor Glanville Williams does not take his readers abroad, and he ends, no doubt rightly, with the pessimistic conclusion that "doctrines of strict and vicarious responsibility make the criminal law technical and uncertain."

The problem presented under the title "Obscenity and the Law" cannot be called fundamental, and Mr. Lloyd's article provides a lighter interlude among the more austere contributions. The target offered is a broad one, and a skilful critic has no difficulty in scoring effective hits. After exposing the clumsy flounderings of judges and magistrates on both sides of the Atlantic in their efforts to define the undefinable, Mr. Lloyd ends by approving the proposals put forward by the Society of Authors.

Mr. Payne's article on the "Interpretation of Statutes" makes a useful contribution to a debate which is as old as legislation itself, and it would be even more useful if he had extended his survey to a study of the same problem in continental Europe. The articles by Dr. Marshall ("Gifts in Favour of Sport and Recreation"), Dr. Ivamy ("Revision of the Sale of Goods Act"), and Mr. Scammell ("Security of Tenure under the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1954") are all limited to questions of English law. The first of these in effect offers a guide through the legal maze to would-be benefactors. Mrs. Korah, writing on "The Control of Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices," gives some useful comparisons with the practice of other countries.

To the reviewer a general survey of these articles suggests a reflection which might perhaps form the subject of a "problem" in a future volume. The time has surely come for a critical analysis of the peculiar Anglo-American doctrine of *stare decisis*. This is a relatively late intruder into our legal system, and in its strict form it has found no followers elsewhere. In the light of the maxim *securus judicat orbis terrarum* the doctrine may perhaps be regarded, like Palagianism, as an insular heresy. Its defenders claim that it gives both certainty and flexibility to English law. To such a claim the articles printed in this volume give a sufficient answer, abundantly emphasised by the vast

mass of our legal literature, which is now, with the exception of the American, the most bulky and cumbrous in the world. As Dr. Marshall remarks (p. 49) "it is notoriously difficult to find the *ratio decidendi* of any House of Lords decision," and the evil thus briefly indicated is cumulative. More than any other factor the principle of *stare decisis* has prevented the adoption of English law by countries which have decided to modernise their own systems.

In the remaining group of articles Professor Fitzgerald discusses "The Constitutional Future of Malta" in the light of the recent report of the Royal Commission, his own view being definitely opposed to "integration." Mr. Holland's survey of the question of "Freedom of the Press in the Commonwealth" makes it clear that in nearly all the dependent colonies and territories executive control over the Press goes much farther than it does at home. Dr. Bin Cheng's article on "Recent Developments in Air Law" falls into two parts. In the first, which to some readers may seem rather speculative, he takes us to the upper limits of the atmosphere (wherever that may be), and even beyond. Returning to earth he makes a critical analysis of the Warsaw Convention and its amending Protocol, not yet ratified by Great Britain.

The book ends with an article by Dr. Schwarzenberger of a more philosophical kind under the title of "The Province of the Doctrine of International Law," which does not easily lend itself to summary. His main plea is for "an inter-disciplinary approach" which will give full scope to the "Sociology of International Law," and he ends with a useful reminder of the constant need for "conscientious observance of the border line between *lex lata* and *lex ferenda*."

Alpes-Maritimes.

H. A. SMITH

Nationality and Statelessness in International Law. By P. WEIS. Library of World Affairs. Editors: G. W. KEETON and G. SCHWARZENBERGER. No. 28. (London: Stevens and Sons, Ltd. 1956. 388 pp. £3 8s.)

DOCTRINE and practice alike agree in stating that questions of nationality are primarily for municipal law to determine, which is nearly equivalent to saying that they are "matters of domestic jurisdiction." Beyond this real agreement does not go, although it is clear that there are many points at which the municipal law of any State may touch the interests of other States, and every such point of contact may be the starting point of an

international dispute. The study of these points of contact is the theme of Dr. Weis' book, which is described in a foreword by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht as "a happy combination of doctrinal analysis and a thorough presentation of legislative, judicial, and governmental practice."

If the reader sometimes finds the "doctrinal analysis" rather difficult to follow, the fault lies rather with the subject-matter than with the author. In practice every State has acted upon the basic principle that it has a free hand in questions of nationality, and the consequences are naturally chaotic. Not only do we still have the historic conflict between the *jus sanguinis* and the *jus soli*, but the ever-changing patterns of the modern world, both in social structure and in political groupings, are continually making confusion worse confounded. On the social side, for example, the feminists of many countries have now succeeded in abolishing the old rule, upon which there was nearly universal agreement, that a married woman took the nationality of her husband. Perhaps this development was inevitable, but it certainly does not make the task of the lawyer any easier. In some countries the problem is further complicated by such factors as racial discrimination or the abuses arising from the various forms of totalitarian politics.

In the political map of the world the last twenty years have been marked by the disappearance of several independent States and the emergence of new ones. On balance, the number of "Sovereign States" has increased, and almost every year adds to their number. In practice it is usually the newest members of the international community who are the most insistent upon their "sovereign" rights. The British Commonwealth, in which a bold attempt has been made to comprehend a number of kingdoms and republics, differing widely in everything except their former membership of the Empire, naturally presents further problems of its own. Whether these have been solved by the intricate British Nationality Act of 1948 remains to be seen. Here, as elsewhere, we find ourselves watching a moving picture.

The material which any writer upon this subject must attempt to study is only too abundant, and a tribute is due to the author for the patient labour which must have gone into his work. Every country has legislated upon nationality, and in addition there is an immense complex of treaty provisions, the index to which covers a page and a half of close print. To these we must add a large number of arbitral and judicial decisions, to which international tribunals of various kinds and the courts of every country have all made their contribution. As for the doctrinal

writers, whom Dr. Weis has evidently studied with care, they differ as much as might have been expected, and he rightly points out that some of them have fallen into the too common error of stating as law what they think ought to be the law.

His own approach to the problem is that of the scientific scholar whose first duty is to ascertain and set forth the facts as he finds them, and the results of such scientific study do not encourage undue optimism. The law of nations is dependent for its effectiveness, if not for its existence, upon a wide measure of general agreement, and upon the subject of nationality the area of genuine agreement is very small. Dr. Weis agrees with the International Law Commission in thinking that the ideal solution of the problem would be that in cases involving nationality individuals should have the right of direct access to international tribunals. Whether he is right or wrong he would be the first to agree that this solution is not likely to be found round the next corner.

Alpes-Maritimes.

H. A. S.

Cases and Materials on International Law. By L. B. ORFIELD and E. D. RE. Library of World Affairs. Editors: G. W. KEETON and G. SCHWARZENBERGER. No. 81. (London: Stevens and Sons, Ltd. 1956. xvi and 781 pp. £4 4s.)

THE merits of this large volume are so fully and so eloquently set forth in the Preface that even the most admiring reviewer could find little to add to what is there said. Its purpose, the editors tell us, is "to provide a flexible teaching tool for an introductory course on international law in law schools," and for this they claim to "have utilized a modern, enlightened approach." In this claim they have the warm support of a Foreword contributed by Professor W. T. Dean, who assures us that the student "cannot close this book at the end of the course on international law without at the same time preparing himself to be both a more skilful counselor and a more informed and alert citizen." To what extent these eulogies are justified can only be rightly judged by those who have practical experience of the "case method" technique now generally employed in American law schools. The book is offered as a "tool," and the best judge of a tool is usually the workman who makes use of it.

In his role of compère Professor Dean seems to have this in mind when he tells us that "foreign lawyers continue to marvel at the American practice of strait-jacketing international law in the case system of study," even when "the authors have

loosened the strings to include abundant 'materials' to cover those areas for which useful 'cases' do not exist." In the light of this warning a reviewer who happens to belong to this unenlightened class may well feel that his criticism is disarmed in advance. For this reason he will not presume to criticise the book as a "flexible tool," but perhaps it is permissible to offer some comments having their origin in a European background.

"Foreign lawyers" are agreed in thinking that the law of nations is truly international, both in its origin and in its sources. Some of them have even been known to write substantial books without citing a single American decision. If they "continue to marvel" at American methods of teaching, their amazement may be in part due to the implicit assumption which underlies this and other case-books, that the sources of the law are mainly American. In the present volume the Table of Cases does not classify the tribunals responsible for the decisions, but an analysis of five chapters reveals figures which indicate clearly the general principle of selection. The total number of decisions and awards reported in these chapters is ninety-two. Of these, fifty-one are decisions of American courts and seventeen are British. From other countries we are given one German, one French, and one Mexican. The international decisions and awards total twenty-one, mostly the awards of *ad hoc* arbitral tribunals. In the notes which follow each principal case the references to American cases and literature are in an overwhelming majority. Upon what ground the rather miscellaneous "materials" have been selected is not entirely clear, but here again the reader will note the extensive extracts from American statutes, together with liberal quotations from Hackworth and from various textbooks, usually American. In accordance with the strict technique of the case method the texts of the decisions and other documents are given without headnotes or explanation of any kind, and the editors refrain from expressing their own views upon any of the problems discussed.

The student whose reading is based upon this and similar books can hardly avoid forming the impression that the law of nations today is chiefly to be found in American cases and American literature, and perhaps this was what the editors intended. If so, the comments of "foreign lawyers," whose contribution to the subject would seem to be very small, may safely be disregarded.

Germany and the North Atlantic Community. By M. E. BATHURST and J. L. SIMPSON. The Library of World Affairs. Editors: G. W. Keeton and G. Schwarzenberger. No. 29. (London: Stevens. 1956. xi and 217 pp. 35s.)

THIS is a study of the legal position of Germany between September 18, 1944, when German territory in the west was first occupied, and November 16, 1955, when the Geneva Conference of the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union ended. The book is in four parts. The first is a short one, dealing with the period of belligerent occupation between the first invasion of German territory and the surrender of June 5, 1945. The second part, called "Military Government", starts with the assumption of "supreme authority" by the four Allies in the Berlin Declaration, and traces the establishment and then the breakdown of quadripartite government. The third deals with the Allied High Commission period from the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany on September 21, 1949, to the end of the occupation on May 5, 1955. The last part, assessing the place of the Federal Republic in the North Atlantic Community, discusses the Basic Law of the Republic, the relationship of the Republic with the three Western Powers, and the status of the Federal Republic in international law.

This was no light undertaking. There was a daunting mass of legal instruments of all kinds, an ever-changing pattern of political background, several institutions or situations entirely novel to international or constitutional law, and not least the persistent opposition between East and West, expressed in incompatible legal doctrine as much as by political decision. The existing legal literature, as varied in approach as it was copious in volume, could be only a mixed blessing. But the joint authors were equipped for their task—the one had been Legal Adviser to the United Kingdom High Commissioner for Germany, and the other had been in the Control Office for Germany and Austria—and they have done it well.

Obviously, to pack this survey into little more than two hundred pages, there had to be some severe limitations. Thus, to write only from the United Kingdom's point of view and with no attempt to discuss "action taken by France, the United States or other members of the North Atlantic Community, when not acting in concert with the United Kingdom," was a justifiable limitation making for clarity as well as compression. But to omit all but essential reference to the course of political events—though doubtless an inescapable limitation—meant that there must remain

large areas of unadorned section by section exposition of the provisions of treaties and laws: and no art can lend such writing elegance or ease. But where there is scope for discussion and argument—the question of the status of Germany whilst under military government, or of the Federal Republic in international law—the argument is sound, well sustained, and well written. Chapter 6, on the legal status of the occupying Powers and the treaty relations of Germany, is particularly interesting and rewarding to the international lawyer.

The authors having performed a remarkable feat of economy and compression, it would be churlish to suggest that it could have been fuller. But there must have arisen in these years innumerable narrow, but perhaps intricate questions about the application of these laws and treaties in ingenious or unforeseen contexts; questions which would illustrate and illuminate the legal principle as the rider does the theorem. Indeed the authors must have dealt with many such problems themselves. In the further more detailed studies which they promise us in their Preface—and which it is pleasant to notice are already beginning to appear—the authors will doubtless be able to make more use of these rich seams of material. In this handbook they have very clearly drawn for us the skeleton of the German question as a whole; we shall look forward to the more specialised monographs which will clothe it with flesh.

Cambridge.

R. Y. JENNINGS.

The British Commonwealth. The Development of its Laws and Constitutions. General Editor: G. W. KEETON. Vol. 1: *The United Kingdom.* Book One: England, Wales, Northern Ireland and Isle of Man. Contributors: G. W. KEETON, D. LLOYD, D. C. HOLLAND, F. H. NEWARK and L. A. SHERIDAN. (London: Stevens. 1955. xiv and 523 pp. £3 3s.). Book Two: Scotland and the Channel Islands. Contributors: T. B. SMITH and L. A. SHERIDAN. (London: Stevens. 1955. xi and 613 pp. £3 3s.).

WITH the publication of these two volumes a big step forward has been taken towards the completion of this series of works on the British Commonwealth, and a most helpful series it is to all who wish to acquire a sound knowledge of that unique association, The British Commonwealth. And those who do not share such a wish but who, nevertheless, do not hesitate to air views on the Commonwealth, would soon realise how erroneous some of their

views are if they made full use of the material supplied by Professor Keeton and his fellow contributors. Nevertheless, the present reviewer feels compelled to say that, in his opinion, Book One, dealing with England, Wales, Northern Ireland and the Isle of Man, could have given a more realistic idea of present-day conditions, *e.g.*, in England. Its failure to do so is partially due to the very inadequate treatment of the law governing the Welfare State now to be found in the United Kingdom. Since 1945, the United Kingdom has undergone a social, political and economic revolution which has wrought important changes in practically every aspect of everyday life. The present reviewer has serious doubts as to whether any reader who has no first-hand knowledge of conditions in the United Kingdom will gain more than a glimpse of the actual position: Book One is too much on traditional lines, and fails to give adequate consideration to important subjects. For example, to dispose of planning of land utilisation in eight pages is quite unrealistic, having regard to the great impact of the Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, and its associated Acts, on everyday life. And, further, the text is not always accurate. Thus, on p. 401 it is stated that "a sum was set aside as constituting the estimated total compensation payable" to landowners for loss of development right in their land. No sum was set aside.

Book Two dealing with Scotland and The Channel Islands is a valuable addition to legal literature, and fills a gap which had existed for far too long. At long last we have an authoritative book dealing with the laws of Scotland, and the scholarly exposition of Professor Smith is not only a real joy to read, but will make most English readers feel ashamed of their ignorance of the "other partner" in the 1707 Union. Until the publication of Professor Smith's contribution to the series it was perhaps excusable to be ignorant of conditions "north of the border." Now it is not.

One is grateful, too, to Professor Sheridan for his contribution dealing with legislative aspects of the Channel Islands. But, surely, the substantive and adjective law of the Islands, because it has little in common with English law, merited consideration for that very reason, and one disagrees with Professor Sheridan when he indicates (on p. 1143) that that was to some extent why he did not embark on such an investigation.

Reading the two volumes has given great pleasure to the present reviewer, and he sincerely thanks all the learned contributors for having stimulated and, on occasion, provoked him, and, above all, for enabling him to enlarge his knowledge of the

British Commonwealth. His experience will be shared by all who have the sense to acquire these two learned works.

London.

RICHARD C. FITZGERALD.

The Strange Career of Jim Crow. By C. VANN WOODWARD. (New York and London: Oxford University Press. x and 155 pp. 15s.)

Freedom is as Freedom Does. By CORLISS LAMONT. (New York: Horizon Press. 1956. xviii and 322 pp. \$3.95.)

Civil Liberties Docket. Published by the National Committee on Constitutional Rights and Liberties. (New York: National Lawyers Guild. Vol. 1, 1955-1956. \$5.)

THE period since the Second World War has shown that both on the international and on the municipal level problems of race relations and civil liberties, and their international concomitants of the under-privileged and the under-developed communities, are among the most pressing with which statesmen can be faced.

The phenomenon of McCarthyism and the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States replacing the doctrine of "separate but equal" with the equally difficult concept of "desegregation" have tended to throw particular emphasis on the problem as it exists in the United States. The reaction to the Supreme Court's decision has been so violent in some places and so tardy in others, that the outsider may be excused if he regards Jim Crowism as having its roots in the distant past of American history. It comes as somewhat of a shock, therefore, to be reminded by Professor Vann Woodward that the period of Negro discrimination effectively began in 1877 with the withdrawal of federal troops from the South, and that it was not until the end of the nineteenth century that the Negro was effectively disfranchised throughout the South, while the earliest example of "Jim Crow law" listed by the *Dictionary of American English* is dated 1904.

The Strange Career of Jim Crow traces the development of the inferior status imposed upon the Negro by segregation and the recent swing of the pendulum, in some places more erratically than in others, introduced as a result of the experiences of the War and the establishment of the United Nations.

The United States has played a major part in the activities of the United Nations and in the propaganda on behalf of human rights. For too long it has been possible for people to indicate the contrast between American theory and American practice,

but "the establishment of the United Nations and the bringing of the headquarters of the organisation to these shores suddenly threw open to the outside world a large window on American race practices. . . . To many of these people the Jim Crow code came as a complete shock." The trouble is, however, that the venom of the Cold War has produced an upsurge of nationalist security-mindedness that frowns upon liberalism and regards racial equality as the first step towards "Communism." Nevertheless, some presidential committees, some leading statesmen and a strong Supreme Court have withstood the popular panic and today, even in the deep South, the Negro finds himself being increasingly treated as an ordinary citizen, even though "segregation is still the rule and non-segregation the exception."

The Strange Career of Jim Crow appears to be coming to an end, and when its history is written it will be found that the law and those who stand for the dignity of the law will have played a major role. Among the latter will undoubtedly be Dr. Corliss Lamont and his Emergency Civil Liberties Committee and Bill of Rights Fund. In *Freedom is as Freedom Does* Dr. Lamont deals with the wider aspects of the problem, and Negro rights only appear as one part of a much larger whole. His survey of the present state of civil liberties is not a mere bill of indictment. Instead it is an analysis of a "general pattern of repression" which he regards as permeating the whole of American society.

After examining the activities of the Un-American Activities Committee, of Senator McCarthy and the Congressional inquiries, he goes on to explain how law has been used as a weapon of suppression through the medium of the loyalty-security programme, which is now in the process of being overhauled and liberalised, the campaign against "subversion" with its corollaries, the attack on academic freedom and the threat "Conform—or Lose Your Job." Despite the dark picture he paints, Dr. Lamont ends on a note of hope. He points out that 1955 saw decided improvement in the field of civil liberties with the decline of Senator McCarthy and many of the movements in which he played a major part. He feels, however, that there is a long way yet to go. While improvements in international relations will necessarily have moderating results in the domestic sphere, Dr. Lamont warns against ignoring some of the basic inner traits of the American way of life, a warning that can be applied equally well to any country with policies that others do not like.

However true it may be that "loyalty screening and the policing of political activities and associations by agencies of the Federal Government is so much taken for granted nowadays that we fail

to note the loss or curtailment of formerly well established rights and privileges," it cannot be denied that the tide has turned. That this is in fact true is amply illustrated by the *Civil Liberties Docket* published by the National Committee on Constitutional Rights and Liberties under the auspices of the National Lawyers Guild. This *Docket*, which is published five times a year, may be compared to an English *Digest*. It consists of summaries of all those cases in which counsel have raised issues of civil rights and liberties, and covers such matters as freedom of speech, freedom of religion, loyalty-security cases, including the *Leff Case* before the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation, from the decision in which UNESCO is appealing to the World Court, race relations, the Fifth Amendment, and the rest—in fact, every facet of human rights and civil liberties. This is a venture which, taken together with the *Year Book on Human Rights* of the United Nations, might well constitute indispensable raw material for any serious student of the subject.

London.

L. C. GREEN.

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- Argentine Upheaval.* By ARTHUR P. WHITAKER. (London: Atlantic Press. 1956. x and 179 pp. 18s.)
- The Asian-African Conference.* By GEORGE MCTURNAN KAHIN. (Cornell University Press. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege. 1956. vii and 88 pp. 16s.)
- Asia and Africa in the Modern World.* Edited by S. L. POPLAI. (Bombay and Calcutta: Asia Publishing House. 1956. viii and 218 pp. Rs. 5.00.)
- The Colour Curtain.* By RICHARD WRIGHT. (London: Dennis Dobson. 1956. 187 pp. 2s. 6d.)
- Pan-Africanism or Communism?* By GEORGE PADMORE. (London: Dennis Dobson. 1956. 468 pp. 25s.)
- South Africa without Prejudice.* By H. MACLEAN BATE. (London: Werner Laurie. 1956. 206 pp. 18s.)
- Black Power.* By RICHARD WRIGHT. (London: Dennis Dobson. 1956. 358 pp. 25s.)
- The Gold Coast in Transition.* By DAVID E. APTER. (Princeton University Press. London: Cumberlege. 1956. xiii and 355 pp. 40s.)
- Kenya's Opportunity.* By LORD ALTRINCHAM. (London: Faber and Faber. 1955. 308 pp. 25s.)
- Race and Politics in Kenya.* By ELSPETH HUXLEY AND MARGERY PERHAM. (London: Faber and Faber. 1955. 302 pp. 25s.)
- New from Africa.* By JOHN HATCH. (London: Dennis Dobson. 1956. 128 pp. 10s. 6d.)
- Africa in the Modern World.* Edited by C. W. STILLMAN. (Chicago University Press. London: Cambridge University Press. 1956. x and 341 pp. 45s.)
- Indian Foreign Policy 1947-1954.* By Dr. J. C. KUNDRA. (Groningen: J. B. Wolters. Bombay: Vora and Co. 1955. xi and 289 pp. Rs. 16.00.)

- India Today and Tomorrow.* By R. PALME DUTT. (London: Lawrence and Wishart. 1956. 217 pp. 12s. 6d.)
- Struggle for Asia.* By Sir FRANCIS LOW. (London: F. Muller. 1955. viii 239 pp. 15s.)
- Minority Problems in Southeast Asia.* By V. THOMPSON and R. ADLOFF. (Stanford University Press. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege. 1955. viii and 295 pp. 32s.)
- Transformation in Malaya.* By J. B. PERRY ROBINSON. (London: Secker and Warburg. 1956. 232 pp. 18s.)
- Burma in the Family of Nations.* By Dr. MAUNG MAUNG. (Amsterdam: Djambatan. 1956. xi and 236 pp. 22s. 6d.)
- Visa for Peking.* By A. DE SEGONZAC. (London: Heinemann. 1956. xiv and 205 pp. 21s.)
- Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia.* By O. LATTIMORE. (Leiden: E. J. Brill. 1956. x and 186 pp. Glds. 13.50.)
- Kazak Exodus.* By GODFREY LIAS. (London: Evans Brothers. 1956. 230 pp. 15s.)
- One Front across the World.* By DOUGLAS HYDE. (London: Heinemann. 1955. 270 pp. 18s.)
- Korea Tomorrow.* By KYUNG CHO CHUNG. (New York and London: The Macmillan Co. 1956. xxiv and 384 pp. \$5.95. 41s 6d.)

CONDITIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER

- The Bent World.* By J. V. L. CASSERLEY. (Oxford University Press. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege. 1955. viii and 238 pp. 21s.)
- A World in Revolution.* By SIDNEY LENS. (New York: F. A. Praeger. 1956. 250 pp. \$3.75.)
- Democracy and World Politics.* By LESTER B. PEARSON. (Princeton University Press. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege. 1956. 128 pp. 15s.)

THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

THE systematic study of international society requires a certain familiarity with sociology. The latest introductory textbook, *Einführung in die Soziologie*, edited by Professor Alfred Weber, illuminates all sides of this subject. Students of international relations should profit from reading the chapters on social structure, the process of civilisation, and the sphere of culture.

They should also consult a *Wörterbuch der Soziologie* edited by Dr. Bernsdorf and Professor F. Bülow. The entries under "disintegration and differentiation," "human relations," and, of course, "international relations" should be particularly noted. An excellent system of cross-reference is provided.

The exact meaning of the term "civilisation" is still undefined. To those wishing to apply themselves to the task of examining the standard of civilisation in international relations, the two volumes on *Man in Contemporary Society*, containing material from the writings of the most distinguished authors in this sphere, should serve as a source of inspiration. In these two volumes, which were prepared by the Contemporary Civilisation staff of Columbia University, there reappears an article by Ferdinand Tönnies on "Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft," and there are also highly stimulating contributions from Professors A. L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn on "general features of culture."

Several textbooks published in the United States, and one published in Austria deal with the central subject of international relations. Professor Quincy Wright's *The Study of International Relations* is expressly designed to give the beginner a sense of direction in a field of study which is getting more complicated every year. The author examines international relations as a condition, as a discipline, as an art and as a science. He then goes on to describe in more conventional terms some modes of practical and theoretical analysis before he concludes with a glimpse into the future in a chapter "towards a unified discipline of international relations."

The human element, rather than the State, provides the central theme of Dr. Blühdorn's work *Internationale Beziehungen*, an Austrian textbook. Explaining the nature of international relations primarily in terms of basic human instincts, the author devotes the whole of Part One to an investigation of the social role of the individual generally. In Part Two he goes into the relationship between the individual and the State, and it is only in Part Three that a conventional textbook order based on the analysis of inter-State relations and inter-State organisation is adopted. Thus, step by step, the author works his way up from the individual to the international level, and this gives the book a high degree of coherence.

Although Professors M. M. Ball and H. B. Killough, the one a political scientist, the other an economist, do not believe in *International Relations* as a self-contained discipline, they have in fact used a broadly sociological approach in writing their introductory textbook on the subject. There is just the right

balance between analysis and facts to enable the beginner to find his way and grasp the essentials. The arrangement of the material is along conventional lines. Chapters on the various elements of international relations (incorporating a novel feature on patterns of post-war economic dislocation) are followed by sections on international organisation and collective security. The last part of the book is devoted to a survey of the contemporary international scene.

To a reader of two other American textbooks, *Principles of International Politics*, by Professor Charles O. Lerche, and *World Politics in Transition*, by Professors Lenox A. Mills and C. H. McLaughlin, it becomes obvious how greatly the context of American courses in international relations can vary. Professor Lerche's book is analytical and very well balanced. It includes the discussion of the fundamental concepts, of international conflict and of its alternatives, and a statement of the major types of contemporary problems. It succeeds in avoiding both extremes of jumbling excessive facts or of rigidly concentrating on a focus of analysis which does not give full satisfaction. Professors Mills and McLaughlin present a much longer but less satisfying treatment. About two-thirds of their text are devoted to the discussion of "basic factors," arranged without any apparent general scheme or order of evaluation. The last third deals with the policies of the major Powers and with contemporary problems, containing factual accounts and opinions prevalent in the United States.

Mr. E. B. Haas and Mr. A. S. Whiting, in *The Dynamics of International Relations*, are trying to present a textbook containing both a novel type of analysis and a conventional presentation of basic facts. It is chiefly on account of the new emphasis placed on the role of individuals and groups of individuals in the policy-making process that places this book in a category apart from the humdrum textbook on international relations. Because of his attempt to formulate a scientific framework for analysis, Professor Gross' brilliant short outline of *Foreign Policy Analysis* similarly stands on its own. The author focuses on three basic concepts: ideology and objectives, elements of power (or factors, as the author prefers to call them), and actual policies. Much further elaboration will be required before the scheme can be applied to concrete policy analysis. Dr. Robert Oppenheimer's saying that "nothing is so practical as theory," constitutes the motto of Mr. W. Esslinger's essay on *Politics and Science*. The author convincingly argues that a science of politics and its application to political practice are indispensable for the adaptation of our

species to the atomic age. He disposes of some popular misconceptions about the impossibility of such a science and includes some practical recommendations for teaching and publications.

In the study of history, as in the field of international relations, the exact determination of method is an essential condition for work. In the *Use and Abuse of History*, a little book based on a series of lectures given by the learned author at Yale, Professor Geyl of Utrecht University goes into some problems concerning the philosophy and method of history. His thesis, which should be carefully noted by students of international relations, is that history provides an elucidation of the present and its problems by showing them in perspective. This was actually done by Professor C. J. H. Hayes of Columbia University and Mr. C. W. Cole of Amherst College, whose excellent *History of Europe since 1500* should serve as a means of seeing international relations in perspective and against the background of domestic events. The story is taken right up to 1955. For a detailed and scholarly case study of a particular period of international history the reader will be indebted to Professor Medlicott who, in his book on *Bismarck, Gladstone and the Concert of Europe*, shows how the idea of a Concert of Europe, favoured by Gladstone, was used by Bismarck as ideological cover behind which he realised his own ambition, the creation of the *Dreikaiserbund* of 1881.

The 1958 volume of the annual Chatham House publication *Survey of International Affairs*, edited by Mr. P. Calvocoressi, is divided into six regional sections, Mr. F. C. Jones contributing a chapter on the Far East, and Mr. George Pendle one on Latin America. The usefulness, for purposes of reference, of *Documents of International Affairs 1953*, the companion volume of the Chatham House *Survey*, is easily seen by glancing through extracts from a speech to the Hungarian National Assembly made by Mr. Imre Nagy, the newly appointed Prime Minister, on July 4, 1953 and, as if by contrast, extracts from a speech on economic reforms made by Mr. M. Rakosi, the party-secretary, on July 11, 1953. Both speeches clearly contain the seeds of future conflict.

A welcome addition to the number of periodicals appearing in this country is a *Bulletin of International Affairs* published by the Department of Extra-Mural Affairs of the University of Nottingham. It consists of a collection of source references for the student engaged in practical research. The present copy, covering the period January–April 1956, also carries two short articles.

ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Nationalism still remains a major moving force in the world, but it is rather doubtful whether many Westerners still require the demolition of its myth. Our lives are now preoccupied with ideologies, and Mr. Shafer, in his *Nationalism: Myth and Reality*, may appear to be ramming open doors when he demolishes several successive theories of nationalism. But he does it very well, and in order to divulge the underlying realities he follows up with a clear and concise account of the historical development of nationalism. His conclusion is rather speculative. If nationalism, being the outcome of certain historical conditions, is likely to be eliminated by their disappearance, it does not necessarily follow that it will give way to unity of mankind.

A collection of essays by logical positivists edited by Mr. P. Laslett under the title *Philosophy, Politics and Society* deals with several major problems of political theory and jurisprudence. Mr. J. Bowle, in *Minos or Minotaur*, tackles the fundamental problem of the control of power in international society and does not hesitate to affirm his beliefs in the accepted values of our society and in the idea of progress.

Many modern theories of human behaviour in general and of international relations in particular postulate the pursuit of power as a basic urge. Mr. Robert Strausz-Hupé in *Power and Community* warns us that, despite their superficial plausibility, these theories, like that of Machiavelli in his time, are historically conditioned and inadequate. Many other thinkers, ranging from theologians to socialist activists, agree that moral standards should be applied to international affairs. After a short spell of Marxism, which influenced his *Moral Man Immoral Society* (1932), Reinhold Niebuhr has concentrated on the application of the standards of the Gospels. The symposium dedicated to his thought concentrates mainly on religious and social themes, but explains also this evolution. N. M. Roy, the prominent late Indian ex-Communist, with an extensive record of revolutionary activities, but without Niebuhr's religious background, sought a solution in neo-humanism. In his two volumes on *Reason, Romanticism and Revolution*, which are rather confused, but in parts quite brilliant, the author has left us his idea of the evolution of modern secular thought from the *renaissance* right up to our times.

In his book on *Europe's Classical Balance of Power* Mr. E. Vose Gullick has produced the first extensive modern analysis of this basic concept. His treatment is both deeply scholarly and interesting, and he satisfies the reader by providing both a full theoretical discussion and its application to concrete diplomatic

history between 1812 and 1815. From the author's analysis the modern concept of collective security emerges not as a drastic departure from the balance of power system, but as its logical development from the operation of the balance by alliances, including two or three Powers alone, through the establishment of more numerous coalitions.

Herr P. Dürrenmatt, in *Der Kleinstaat und das Problem der Macht*, sets out to state the relative merits of the small State. Although this little book is well written, nothing startling or new emerges by way of conclusions. *Caesar the Beloved Enemy* is an original title for a book of essays dealing with the relationship between Church and State. Among these Mr. M. A. C. Warren on the "theology of imperialism" is stimulating. Among other minor actors of the stage of international society international labour movements have held a prominent place since the industrial revolution. The Yearbook of the *International Labour Movement 1956-1957* makes available up-to-date information of the organisation, history and major programmes of these movements. A history of the Socialist thought of the Labour movements in *The Second International*, as well as an account of that International itself, forms the subject of the second volume of a comprehensive series of volumes on the history of Socialist thought under the editorship of Professor G. D. H. Cole.

So far as the general public is concerned, the press is still the most important source of information on international affairs. Mr. Derrick Sington, himself a journalist of distinction, shows the international importance of *Freedom of Communication* and also describes some of the devices employed in various countries to control, restrict and extinguish this freedom. Dr. T. E. Kruglak, in his book *The Foreign Correspondents*, has undertaken the painstaking task of making a sociological analysis of the American corps of foreign correspondents stationed in Europe. Though there is little that is startling in the conclusions drawn by him, the book nevertheless is well worth while being read. Among State activities abroad, the securing of secret information ranks as one of the most important pursuits. The short German essay by Dr. Johannes Erasmus, *Der geheime Nachrichtendienst*, outlines the basic functions of espionage in war and peacetime. Mr. and Mrs. Petrov, in *the Empire of Fear*, allow us some insight into the working of the Russian intelligence service both at home and abroad. The interest of this book lies less in the novelty of some revelations than in what appears to be an authentic confirmation of the Western ideas on the world-wide organisation of Soviet espionage. A timely reminder of the exact historical

origins of the Soviet secret police is given in a highly competent article by Mr. E. J. Scott on the genesis of the notorious "Cheka" in *Soviet Affairs*, the first volume of a series of papers dealing with questions of modern history and contemporary international affairs, which is the special domain of study of the scholars at St. Antony's College, Oxford. The remaining articles maintain the exceptionally high standard set in Mr. Scott's paper. Herr Hans-Otto Meissner's book *The Man with Three Faces* was written in a slightly sensational vein. It relates the full story of the admittedly sensational exploits of Dr. Richard Sorge, the German Communist posing as a Nazi, who managed to obtain the confidence not only of the German ambassador in Tokyo, but also, both directly and indirectly, of circles close to the Japanese Prime Minister. The Sorge story is true, but much of the earlier romantic notions of secret service was based on pure imagination, as exemplified in Mr. B. Newman's successful debunking of the *Mata Hari* story.

The Schellenberg Memoirs contain considerable information on the Nazi secret service, including some fascinating spy stories. Walter Schellenberg, for some time head of the SD foreign service and typical "Nazi gentleman," does not succeed in his attempt at vindication; he appears as vain, egocentric and unscrupulous. The book is loose, undocumented and contains a number of contradictions.

While espionage activities are generally hidden from sight, propaganda, by its very nature, is public. From sources available to the United States Government, Mr. F. Bowen Evans has compiled a useful handbook on *Worldwide Communist Propaganda Activities* in 1954. The book is divided into several general and regional sections and is prefaced by a brief discussion of the ideological basis and the overhead organisation of this propaganda. *Target: The World*, edited by Mr. Evron M. Kirkpatrick, also produced under the auspices of the United States Government, deals with Communist propaganda activities during the year 1955. The first two chapters deal with the objectives and organisation of the Communist movement, while the two following chapters offer a brilliant review of Communist propaganda themes of 1955 in the light of major events as well as in terms of Communist tactical changes. Subsequent parts of the book deal analytically with communication media, Communist front organisations and regional propaganda.

Admiral Joy's *How Communists Negotiate* is a valuable addition to the 1951 World Peace Foundation symposium on *Negotiating with the Russians*. From his harassing experience as the

Senior United Nations delegate at the Korean Armistice Conference, the author concludes that successful negotiations with the Communists require great patience, a clear statement of objectives and adequate force in the background.

POWER POLITICS IN DISGUISE

Professor H. Bachmann, the Swiss economist, in *Europäische Standortsbestimmung in Politik und Wirtschaft*, attempts to assess the position of Europe in international society. As one would expect, the professor is much more at home when discussing economic questions than political ones, and his general conclusions contain nothing that is novel. *Western Democracies and World Problems* was the central subject of a conference of the Norwegian Nobel Institutes held in Oslo during the summer of 1955. A report on this conference rendered by Mr. Schou shows that leading international relations specialists took part and that there was a great deal of stimulating, but naturally inconclusive, discussion.

A History of British Politics from the Year 1900, recounted by Mr. N. P. Thomas, takes the reader from the age of the Marquess of Salisbury to that of Sir Anthony Eden. On the whole, this is a balanced account, very useful to students of British foreign policy wishing to acquire domestic background knowledge. British foreign policy receives commensurate treatment. For details on *British Foreign Policy since 1898* the student is referred to Mr. M. R. D. Foot's useful little book with that title in which the international policies of Great Britain are discussed against the background of home policy.

Lord Strang participated in the making of major British policies during a whole decade. His *Home and Abroad* is diplomatically reticent, but beautifully written. It recaptures the atmosphere of several important episodes, such as the Metrovick trials in Moscow, the Godesberg Conference, the Moscow negotiations in summer 1939 and the European Advisory Commission, and includes a vivid and sympathetic pen-portrait of the late Ernest Bevin.

During his quarter century editorship of *The Times*, Geoffrey Dawson was an important influence on British politics, prominent in the support for the establishment and for the policy of "appeasement." Sir Evelyn Wrench, from his intimate knowledge of both Dawson and Lord Northcliffe, his chief opponent, presents in *Geoffrey Dawson and Our Times* a generally sympathetic portrait. Whatever the verdict on Dawson as a politician, he emerges as a serious person concerned with the production of a paper to guide

the public and not to cater to its taste, as Northcliffe wanted him to do.

The background to one of the running sores of the Commonwealth is provided by Percy Arnold in *Cyprus Challenge*. The author was the editor of *Cyprus News* from 1942 to 1945 and presents an independent viewpoint, critical to the point of sarcasm of the shortcomings of the island's administration. Another of the seemingly perennial problems of British foreign policy, that of *Gibraltar*, is the subject of a book by Señor José Plá, who states the Spanish case from the point of view of a Spanish Liberal.

The first volume of General de Gaulle's *War Memoirs* and the companion volume of documents serve not only as supplementary historical sources on the period 1940-1942, but also explain to the reader the aloof personality of the general. De Gaulle's story of his stormy relations with the British is of particular interest, especially his witty account of the alternating periods of great friendliness and complete isolation according to the ups and down in his governmental relations.

Mr. Alexander Werth's sympathies, where France is concerned, lie with the radical reformers such as M. Mendès-France and the Communists, while the Americans and the pro-American French anti-Communists, such as the late Léon Blum, incur his hostility. This kind of bias distorts *France 1940-1955* to the point of allowing the author to state without any qualifications that the "cold war" started with the Hiroshima bombing! Many psychological insights make the reading of this long and loosely organised book well worth while.

Two contributions made by historians from Göttingen University form part of a general inquest on German history since 1871 conducted by that University. *Die Ära Tirpitz* by Professor W. Hubatsch traces the growing influence of naval policy on German foreign policy during that period, while *Die Daily-Telegraph Affaire* by Herr W. Schüssler is a 'detailed investigation into a particular episode in Germany's foreign relations which occurred in 1908. The rather vague and varying concept of *Mitteleuropa* is the subject of a book in English by Mr. H. C. Meyer. It is interesting to observe how many different meanings such a slogan could acquire in the course of German history right up to Hitler.

A decade or so apparently suffices for emotions to subside even on such an emotionally fraught subject as the German Nazis. Mr. T. L. Jarman has managed to outline in a short volume a lucid and objective story of *The Rise and Fall of Nazi Germany*, including a chapter on the positive sides of the Nazi régime. The

picture drawn by the author is likely to endure in its main outlines, but there is still a considerable need for closer analysis of many aspects of Hitler's foreign and, even more so, domestic policies. Herr U. Eichstadt's book *Von Dollfuss zu Hitler*, a thoroughly objective and detailed study of Austro-German relations between 1933 and 1938, answers that need where this particular subject is concerned. Apart from being a model piece of scholarly research in diplomatic history this book is also a specialised study of power politics in action. It incidentally also shows how the actual execution of a carefully prepared *coup d'état* in a country can be directed by telephone from the capital of another country, as was done by Göring in the case of Austria in March 1938.

The complex, closely connected stories of *The S.S.* and *The Gestapo* have been successfully disentangled by Mr. G. Reitlinger and Mr. E. Crankshaw in two scholarly, well-documented and readable books. The approach is historical and touches only lightly on broader sociological and psychological problems, such as analysis of terror or the ideology of the S.S. Both authors are illuminating on the struggles for power among Hitler's lieutenants.

Some widespread illusions about Nazi Germany still remain to be shattered. While Mr. Crankshaw demonstrates that, contrary to the stereotype of German thoroughness, the terror-organisation was in an incredible muddle, the Head of the Netherlands State Institution on War Documentation, Mr. L. de Jong, argues that the generally feared *German Fifth Column in the Second World War* was no more than the figment of wartime hysteria.

The controversy about the motives of those who took part in conspiracies to overthrow the Hitler régime is still unresolved in Germany. A large volume, *Die Vollmacht des Gewissens*, a symposium edited by the Europäische Publikation, Munich, vindicates the conspirators' case in mainly ethical terms. A smaller book, *Bewährung im Widerstand*, a symposium edited by Herr W. W. Schütz, seems to suggest that the way to regain both freedom and national unity for Germany is to adopt the theme of resistance to oppression against Hitler and apply it on the same moral basis in present-day conditions. In *Back into Power* Mr. Horne, *Daily Telegraph* correspondent in Bonn, gives an account of Western Germany's practical struggle to regain her former place and influence in international society during the years 1952-1954, a period notable for the failure of the European Defence Community. According to the author, Dr. Adenauer's ceaseless efforts towards political unity with the West were defeated by the continuous mistrust shown by various French governments.

By way of contrast, Mr. Horne also tells the story of the miraculous economic recovery of Western Germany.

The theme of German unification also runs through the pages of a book on *The Karlsruhe Trial* consisting of extracts of what is here described as the "white paper" and documentation published by the German Communist Party by way of commentary on the proceedings on the (then) proposed outlawry of that party. Appendix C, enumerating the former Nazi Party members now in the Bonn Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is both interesting and misleading, as it leaves out of account the anti-Hitler activities of at least some of those listed, as, for instance, those of Herr Hasso von Eitzdorf. A symposium edited by Professor Alfred Grosser, *Les Relations Internationales de l'Allemagne Occidentale*, deals with non-governmental relations, which are particularly important in the Federal Republic, since they had preceded the establishment of diplomatic channels and, in relations with Eastern Germany, still form a substitute for them. In his *Deutschland und die Weltpolitik im 20. Jahrhundert*, a collection of six reprints from various German periodicals, Professor Ludwig Dehio attempts to put the international function of Germany in its proper perspective.

Miss Wiskemann in her book *Germany's Eastern Neighbours* has endeavoured to be both factual and impartial, but her acceptance of the post-war changes has earned her the rebuke of being "diabolically unfair." Avoiding evaluation, Miss Wiskemann gives us the facts on what, in the broadest terms, may be called the current phase of the centuries-old German-Slav conflict.

Research students working on problems of Eastern Europe will be grateful to Miss D. Horna of the Mid-European Studies Center of the Free Europe Committee, New York, for the survey on *Current Research on Central and Eastern Europe* (outside Russia), which contains lists of work in progress and the names and addresses of authors. For each country there is a special section on foreign relations.

The details of one of the most reprehensible features of the Soviet system, adopted by the members of the Communist bloc, are brought together in *Forced Labor in the "People's Democracies,"* prepared by the Mid-European Study Center.

A comprehensive study of *Finland between East and West*, especially when presented in a concise and readable form, is particularly welcome at a time when problems of international status of East European countries are acute. Finland, which was in turn a dependency of Sweden and Russia, had to fight two defensive wars against Russia, suppress a Bolshevik revolution at home and resist Soviet diplomatic pressure after 1947, presents

a fascinating case of successful small power diplomacy, and Professor A. G. Mazour is to be congratulated on this work. Much less fortunate than Finland, Hungary, trying to tread the same independent path, never managed to succeed in this object. Admiral Horthy, for instance, Regent of Hungary from 1920 to 1944, whose *Memoirs* are an attempt to justify himself before history, relates how, by trying to desert the Germans at what he thought was an opportune moment in 1944, he merely invited a German invasion and the installation of the Fascist régime of Szallai. Hungary was subsequently attached to the Soviet bloc and had to wait for twelve years before she got a fleeting chance to declare her neutrality during the October Revolution of 1956. Once more Hungary was crushed, this time by the Soviet Union. In his little book on the *Hungarian Tragedy* Mr. Peter Fryer, who as former *Daily Worker* correspondent in Hungary was witness to those happenings, boldly asserts that both the form and spirit of government prevailing there between 1948 and 1956 was Stalinist, and not Communist, and that the Hungarian people, including the Communists, were fully justified in mounting the barricades.

The difficulties of impartiality on fatal clashes between two conflicting rights emerges clearly from Mr. G. F. Kirk's book *A Short History of the Middle East*. The scholarly spirit of this concise book, excellent on earlier history, disappears in the account of the Arab-Jewish conflict. Admittedly, the short chapter devoted to it could scarcely give justice to all the complexities, but while the picture of British and Arab policies is somewhat over-simplified and confused, the Jewish policies appear reduced to little more than terrorism and electoral pressures in the United States. No such difficulties beset the task of the historian of *Turkey*, Dr. G. Lewis. His short but comprehensive book deals mainly with history, but includes sections on major geographical, economic and social aspects of the country and a translation of the Turkish constitution. *Turkey in my Time* is the fitting title of the autobiography of a United States-educated, Turkish Liberal newspaper editor. Written in easy style this book makes interesting background reading. The author, a supporter of the Central Powers in the First World War, emerges as a strong critic of Allied, and particularly British policies towards defeated enemy States, both after the first and second wars. He is also very critical of the behaviour of the Great Powers at the San Francisco Conference of 1945.

Nationalists in the Middle East are anti-British, whatever their political convictions. In *Persian Oil* Mr. Elwell-Sutton builds his argument round the thesis that the British had offended the

susceptibilities of the Persians by social aloofness and by lack of understanding. In *The Crescent in Crisis* Mr. Faris and Mr. Husayn (a Palestine Christian and an Iraqi Moslem) interpret Britain's Middle Eastern policies in terms of her determination to maintain power. They attribute to her a full-fledged support for Zionism with complete disregard for Arab interests, and the encouragement of Pharaonic traditions in Egypt in order to disrupt the Arab world.

The imposing scope of American scholarship on Russia transpires from the symposium *Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought*. The thirty contributions dealing with general social and cultural themes are based on many detailed investigations in the several important centres of Russian research. While the American scholars include a leavening of Russian émigrés, the *Institute for the Study of the USSR* in Munich is exclusively composed of them. The pamphlet published by this Institute, *The Aims and Methods of Research on the USSR*, shows that its members are aware of their deficiencies in modern research equipment and of their basic anti-Soviet bias. At the same time, they are capable of drawing on their personal knowledge of Russia to prevent many likely blunders.

The problem of *Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought* cannot be decided either way. "The conservative colours of the old Russian régime" have been increasingly showing "through the fading revolutionary red of Soviet Marxian Communism," and the relation between the two requires a detailed investigation in every realm of thought. For the student of international relations the concluding part, dealing with Russian Messianism, deserves most attention. This subject has been analysed by E. Sarkisyanz in a full-scale book on *Russland und der Messianismus des Orients*. This comparative study of the "Messianic-chiliastic" aspects of the Russian *Weltanschauung* convincingly traces their influence on the twentieth-century revolutions.

Mr. Crankshaw's *Russia without Stalin* is a model of political reporting. The author has a thorough knowledge of the Soviet people and of the Russian language, real sympathy with his fellow-men, a keen eye and a pleasant style. This small book brings the Soviet Union closer to the reader's understanding than many much weightier treatments. The author's generalisations on the broader and more technical aspects of Soviet society, such as collectivisation and the industrial system, cannot, of course, be expected to provide fully expert guidance.

Selected Correspondence by Marx and Engels prepared by

the Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin Institute in Moscow provides some primary materials on the development of their ideas between 1848 and 1895. The method of selection based on "the utterances found in the works of Lenin and Stalin" greatly restricts the usefulness of the volume.

Mr. R. Schlesinger's selected readings on *The Nationalities Problem and Soviet Administration*, preceded by an extensive essay, enable us to follow the course of Soviet nationalities policies. Within the scope of a slender volume Mr. Schlesinger has amassed examples for the major phases, beginning with the establishment of central organisation, through the NEP and the collectivisation periods, to the last years of Stalin's life. An evaluation should not be based on considerations arising from the "cold war," but Mr. Schlesinger's verdict is insufficiently critical. In fact, the Soviet ideological basis has proved inept and has been ignored in practice.

Russian Holiday is an account of life in Russia as seen through the eyes of a group of British students. Mr. A. Chappelow (who also provides a large number of excellent photographs, all taken by himself) has no axe to grind, and the fair-mindedness with which he assesses the problems of the Russian people should be useful to students of Soviet Russia.

American scholars are gradually putting into perspective the Roosevelt and the Truman Administrations. Professor Freidel's inaugural lecture at Oxford on *Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal* stresses the trial and error nature of the experiment. The most strongly—and unjustly—criticised event in Roosevelt's foreign policy is the Yalta Conference. The symposium *The Meaning of Yalta* purports to explain and to vindicate Roosevelt. The account is meticulously accurate but pedestrian, and the evaluation gets lost in the mass of detail.

The second volume of President Truman's memoirs, *The Years of Trial and Hope*, provides material in support both of his enthusiasts and his critics. Mr. Truman's greatest achievements lay in the field of foreign policy: he decisively broke away with "isolationism" and determinedly engaged his country against Communism. Mr. Truman ended his term utterly unable to resolve the stalemate in Korea or the broader problems of coexistence, or to implement his "Point Four" on the proposed scale. Interesting light is shed on the marginal role of the United Nations in Truman's decisions on Korea, and on the American view on the lack of atomic co-operation with Britain after the war; Britain is accused of cornering more uranium than she could possibly use while the United States was running short of it.

Mr. John Mason Brown, a journalist, describes in vivid and penetrating essays the contemporary scene. *Through these Men* consists of pen-portraits of President Eisenhower, Mr. Adlai Stevenson, Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge, Judge Frankfurter, Dr. Robert Oppenheimer, and others. The strength of American leadership appears to lie in its openness; the protagonists sometimes stem from old élite families—like Roosevelt, Dulles or Stevenson—but are also recruited from the rank and file—Eisenhower or Truman—and sometimes include brilliant recent immigrants like Judge Frankfurter and Dr. Oppenheimer.

Notes and views of a middle-ranking professional American diplomatist posted in various parts of the world between 1903 and 1947 constitute the volume on *Ventures in Diplomacy* by Mr. W. Phillips.

Mr. Max Beloff's 1954 Albert Shaw Lectures on Diplomatic History, *Foreign Policy and the Democratic Process*, touch the fundamentals which are only too easily lost sight of in the bewildering profusion of American institutional analyses. Mr. Beloff traces the basic difficulty of American foreign policy to the intractability of the outer world with which the Americans have been suddenly confronted after more than a century of domestic successes and isolation. He notes the process of adjustment: the Americans are now vigorously pursuing the education of public opinion on foreign affairs; they are groping towards institutional changes, but have not yet determined the place of the military and of the atomic scientists or tackled the fundamental problem of transcending traditional national sovereignty in order to meet the problems of the atomic age.

In the great debate between the American idealists and realists further shots are fired on the idealist side. *Power Through Purpose*, by Mr. T. I. Cook and Mr. M. Moos, analyses the several bases suggested for American foreign policy—isolationism, individualism, legalism, national interest, and power politics—and finds them all wanting. The analysis is lucid and the criticism logical, but the subsequent attempt to assess the real basic purposes of American foreign policy does not succeed despite its many insights. Professor Tannenbaum's contention that the *American Tradition in Foreign Policy* rests upon the belief in a "co-ordinate State" is considerably less convincing. This belief, applied in the past to the Constitution and to the Pan-American Congress, does not mean that the Americans would submit to an international federal government acceptable also to the Communist States. Consequently the world-wide "co-ordinate State" would be one

based on the American way of life alone, i.e., imposed on its ideological opponents.

In two chapters of his book *An American Vista* Mr. Dean Acheson, former United States Secretary of State gives his own conclusions of the problem of democracy in foreign affairs and also examines some of the underlying tasks of United States foreign policy. As one would expect, the author has an exceedingly pleasing style, and even those chapters not dealing directly with international relations can be read with profit.

The Liberal Tradition in America by Mr. Louis Hartz interprets the development of American political and social thought in terms of de Tocqueville's penetrating remark that the American "has arrived at a state of democracy without having to endure a democratic revolution." The less liberal trends which have come into full evidence in our generation form the background of the case of Dr. Robert Oppenheimer. *A Nation's Security*, edited from the official transcript of evidence by Mr. Wharton, gives us some insight into the way in which these trends mingled with personal clashes among the scientists and with inter-service rivalries, leading to this *cause célèbre*.

In *Foreign Policy and Party Politics*, Professor Westerfield discusses the existing alternatives of partisanship, bipartisanship and Presidential initiative above party politics (which he calls extra-partisanship), in application to foreign policy issues from Pearl Harbour to Korea. The theoretical analysis is insufficient, but nevertheless the author sheds interesting light on the striking difference between the American treatment of European and of Far Eastern affairs. *American Legion and American Foreign Policy* acquaints us with the evolution of the Legion's policies on major issues, but scarcely illuminates the more complicated problems of the methods of pressure and of its effectiveness. This leading pressure group has been able to play an important part in American politics owing to its widespread membership and to its appeal to patriotism.

Professor Latourette's short exposition of *The American Record in the Far East 1945-1951* is an explanation of the Democratic Administration to its American critics. The short account is lucid and eminently fair though it inadequately recognises General MacArthur's role and insufficiently stresses the corruption and muddle in the Philippines. The General's own views have now been authoritatively expounded by his Chief of Intelligence, Major-General Willoughby and Mr. J. Chamberlain, in *MacArthur, 1941-1951; Victory in the Pacific*.

Mr. Chesly Manly, author of *The UN Record*, has a heavy

axe to grind about the role which the UN plays in United States foreign policy. In his view, the United Nations is of little use, even as a diplomatic platform. Behind the author's lengthy polemics and numerous illustrations one senses a decided bias against any American strategy other than that of "isolationism."

Revolutions south of the Rio Grande occur frequently, but they seldom produce spectacular changes in foreign policy. In *Argentine Upheaval* Professor A. P. Whitaker analyses events from the fall of Perón in September 1955 to the end of that year. He discusses the character and policies of the Lombardi and Aramburu governments (which succeeded Perón), and assesses the international implications of the change.

The Asian-African States, newly independent and eager to demonstrate their diplomatic sovereignty, are playing an increasingly important part in international affairs. *The Asian-African Conference*, held in Bandung in April 1955, was perhaps a milestone on the road of this development. Professor G. McTurnan Kahin, of Cornell University, has presented extracts of some of the main speeches made at that conference and also included its final communiqué. He himself contributes a brief analysis of the significance of the conference by way of introduction to this interesting collection of documents. *Asia and Africa in the Modern World* is an Indian handbook edited by Mr. S. L. Poplai, prepared as a background for the Bandung conference. It contains concise geographical, historical and economic notes on Asian and on some African countries. Mr. Richard Wright, the American Negro writer, viewed the Bandung conference mainly from the point of view of *The Colour Curtain* that divides many parts of the world. He describes some of the emotional reactions of Asians and Africans both inside and outside the conference hall, and regards the Bandung meeting as "the last call of Westernised Afro-Asians to the moral conscience of the world." Another Negro writer, the West Indian Mr. George Padmore, in *Pan-Africanism or Communism?* records the growth of the Pan-Africa and other Negro movements. He can see in Pan-Africanism a clear alternative to Communism, but, like Mr. Wright, he seems to think that speedy action is required to prevent a catastrophe in Africa.

The other side of the colour issue is brought out in Mr. H. Maclean Bate's *South Africa without Prejudice*, which is primarily a treatise on the policy pursued by the Nationalist Party of the Union, but deals also with current political questions, such as the position of South Africa in the United Nations and the problem of a possible republican form of government. The author's main thesis, however, consists in giving a justification of the policy of *apartheid*.

West and East Africa are the subject of several interesting books. Mr. Richard Wright's *Black Power* represents an informative account of the situation in the Gold Coast. The author's political premises are frankly stated, and it is perhaps because of this that Mr. Wright has not shied from drawing attention to the tremendous difficulties facing Dr. Nkrumah and the general poverty, ju-ju and tribalism still prevailing in parts of the country. In discussing *The Gold Coast in Transition* Mr. D. E. Apter broaches the delicate problem whether parliamentary democracy is suited to conditions there. Apart from treating this important subject the author also provides much valuable information concerning party organisation and performance, the position of the chiefs and other fundamental matters. The technical jargon employed is irritating at times. The late Lord Altrincham, in his interesting and readable report on *Kenya's Opportunity* maintains that a centralised parliamentary democracy with a universal franchise based on the British model will eventually lead to a single party dictatorship by the majority race. In the author's view the only practicable way of achieving racial equality is by a policy of separate development for the African, Asian and European population within the framework of a federal constitution. The original correspondence between Mrs. Elspeth Huxley, a European settler, and Miss Margery Perham, the Oxford scholar, on *Race and Politics in Kenya* have now been republished and reassessed without either of the two parties yielding a great deal of ground, though in some ways their views are now closer. *News from Africa* is an account of a seven-week journey through British Africa and South Africa undertaken by Mr. J. Hatch on behalf of the British Labour Party. In the nature of things it cannot, and does not claim to be, a deep analysis of the problems of Africa; it is intended merely to make the non-expert reader aware of the main problems and issues facing Africa today. *Africa in the Modern World*, by contrast, a symposium in three parts consisting of the Harris Foundations lectures given at the University of Chicago and edited by Mr. C. V. Stillman, conveys a very clear over-all picture of present-day Africa. Professor W. Arthur Lewis' contribution on the economic development of that continent and Mr. V. McKay's article on the role of Africa in world affairs should perhaps be singled out as being of special interest to students of international relations at both elementary and advanced levels.

Dr. Kundra's well-balanced account of *Indian Foreign Policy 1947-1954* is probably the first systematic treatment of this topic. Limiting himself to Indian relations with the Western world

(this term is widely interpreted here) the author enumerates the principal objects of Indian policy, examines its various problems and successive phases, and finally describes India's attitudes towards Western defence pacts, the United States and the Commonwealth. Although the author's political sympathies are apparent, this book must nevertheless be regarded as a sound piece of scholarly representation. Mr. R. Palme Dutt's *India Today and Tomorrow* brings up to date his previous longer book *India Today*. Continuing to accept Stalin as the leading authority on nationalism, Mr. Dutt must now appear just as outdated and futile to a Communist as to a non-Communist reader. In any event the future of Asia must depend on the interaction between the two Asian Powers now aspiring to leadership, India and China. This interaction and the position in the smaller Asian countries form the subject of an admirably short and lucid but somewhat elementary book by Sir Francis Low with the title *The Struggle for Asia*.

An important element in this struggle are the various *Minority Problems in Southeast Asia*. The authors of this book devote relatively little space to the Chinese, who have been the subject of studies by others (e.g., Dr. Purcell), but have collected useful data on Indian, indigenous and Christian groups, as well as on the "Buddhists v. Buddhists" struggle in Indo-China. In *Transformation in Malaya* Mr. J. B. Perry Robinson gives an account of the efforts of the British administration to promote the integration of the Chinese community—which wields enormous economic power—within the social structure of the now emerging Malayan Federation. The author considers that the new State will be immune to Communist penetration, and will change for the better the entire pattern of international relations of the area. *Burma in the Family of Nations* is a Burmese account, remarkably dispassionate and objective, of the achievement of the country's independence. The author, Dr. Maung, covers the period from the advent of the British to the post-war decade, and includes a useful selection of major diplomatic documents.

Visa for Peking, by the French journalist A. de Segonzac, gives a vivid, unpretentious and impartial picture of present-day China, based on the author's recent visit. The main feature which struck the author was the tremendous mobilisation of human energies in all runs of life. As for the country of origin of China's past conquerors, Professor Lattimore's *Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia* includes not only an authoritative analysis of Mongolian politics against their international background and a translation of the biography of the leader Sukebatur, but also

a somewhat controversial but stimulating short essay on satellite politics in general. *Kazak Exodus*, by Mr. G. Lias, relates the epic of 2,000 Kazaks, whose home is uncomfortably situated between the borders of the Soviet Union, Outer Mongolia and China, trekking across Sinkiang under conditions of incredible hardship to reach the frontier of Kashmir in search of safety from the Chinese Communists. Only a fraction of those who set out originally actually survived. *One Front across the World* by Mr. Douglas Hyde is similarly a story of human hardship. The author, a former Communist and now a devout Catholic, relates the story of the experiences made by the Catholic Columban Fathers during the war in Korea.

A comprehensive account of Korean politics, economics and culture is given by Mr. Kyung Cho Chung in his book *Korea Tomorrow*. As an introductory textbook it should serve the student of the Far Eastern area admirably.

CONDITIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Mr. J. V. Langmead Casserley examines the character of the Marxist challenge to the West and criticises Western secular civilisation for its inability to offer a constructive response. *The Bent World* can, he suggests, be straightened out by a revival of the Messianic spirit through the Christian Church.

Mr. Sidney Lens, an American trade union leader and journalist of distinctly "pinkish" views, has written a book on *A World in Revolution*, in which he discerns three different social forces: feudalism (mainly in the underdeveloped countries), capitalism and socialism. Among these there is, according to the author, a decided tendency for capitalism to supplant feudalism, and be supplanted by socialism in turn. Communism is dismissed as a fraudulent form of revolutionary activity. It is the author's thesis that anything which furthers the historical process analysed above will contribute towards a solution of the world's problems, including international problems.

Drawing from his vast political experience, Mr. Lester Pearson argues in *Democracy and World Politics* that, in the atomic age, the effective unit of international relations is no longer the nation-State, however large and powerful, but a coalition. He sees much promise in the General Assembly of the United Nations, which brings world problems "into a true focus," and reminds the governments that their policies must not end in a war.

The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers. By B. SCHWADRAN.
(London: Atlantic Press. 1956. 500 pp. 42s.)

WHILE this book was waiting its turn in the queue of books to be reviewed, the reviewer found himself several times in dire need of consulting it in order to obtain information not readily obtainable elsewhere or to check controversial facts and figures. As it is practically impossible to find anybody concerned with Near Eastern—or what, in accordance with a regrettable usage, Mr. Schwadran would call Middle Eastern—affairs who has not a bias of his own, it was perhaps not unnatural to assume that Mr. Schwadran's preferences were influenced decisively by his associations with the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, and the United States. It did not, however, take the reviewer long to disabuse his own mind of such unwarranted prejudices and rely increasingly on this volume as an invaluable guide to an intriguing, but seamy labyrinth of politics, strategy, economics, law, business and corruption which appears inevitably linked with "oil" and those who touch it, and not only in the "Middle" East.

London.

G. S.

The Annual Register of World Events. (London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1955. 505 pp. 105s.)

This near-bicentenarian has become such a reliable comforter in times of need that the reviewer feels great relief in being able to add Volume 197 to the lengthening row of its predecessors. Reading in this almanac drives home once again how fast events flow and how short memory is. The most remarkable feature of this British chronicle of world affairs is the high overall standard attained. The team gradually built up by the Editor is going from strength to strength and receives an enviable degree of cohesion from its inner ring, formed by a well-tried group of old Chatham House associates. The chapters on Greece and the Near East may claim particular interest. While the section on the United Nations excels by subtle touches of gentle humour, those on Western European Union and the Council of Europe might have gained from more forceful treatment. Similarly, the observations on *Euratom* (p. 161) appear to suffer from unnecessary anaemia. Still, these are but the deficiencies of the virtues of an outstanding team.

London.

G. S.

Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939. Edited by E. L. WOODWARD and R. BUTLER. First Series. Volume VI: 1919. (London: H.M. Stationery Office. 1956. 1074 pp. 105s.)

Second Series. Volume V: 1938. (London: H.M. Stationery Office. 1956. 908 pp. 95s.)

Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945. Editors-in-Chief: P. R. SWEET, M. LAMBERT, M. BAUMONT. Series D. Volume VII: August 9-September 3, 1939. (London: H.M. Stationery Office. 1956. 670 pp. 40s.)

Series D. Volume IX: March 18-June 22, 1940. (London: H.M. Stationery Office. 1956. 729 pp. 35s.)

The latest four volumes in the two complementary series of documents on British and German foreign policies from 1919 to 1940—both edited with a skill and devotion which command admiration—provide significant glimpses of the beginning and end of a somewhat unimaginative period of Western statesmanship.

For this very reason, bold thoughts and reflections, as, for instance, may be found in Mr. Butler's Letter of October 18, 1919, from Vienna, acquire increased stature: "The signs as I read them point to Germany's contention being right—*viz.*, that in the long run, with industry and self-sacrifice at home, with the power of expanding into Russia which is before her—she has in reality won the war. Will it be to Germany that we shall look to put down Bolshevism?" Yet, what was vision in 1919, was sheer wishful thinking in 1938.

From Sir H. Rumbold's reports from Berlin to Sir John Simon, it becomes evident that it was not the fault of Britain's diplomatic outposts in the field if illusions were harboured in London on the possibility of either taming or diverting the Nazi régime from expanding westward. As early as in April, 1938, the British Ambassador in Berlin proved his acumen also in another respect. He warned against placing undue hopes on the German military forces as an antidote to Hitler, for "sooner or later, especially if the President dies, the *Reichswehr* may be expected to throw in their lot with the present régime."

The culmination of it all in the outbreak of the Second World War is already well covered by earlier British, United States and Russian collections of documents. Still, to see the last days of peace from August 9 until September 3, 1939, through the eyes of those who coolly worked to destroy it has its own macabre fascination. The directive of December 21, 1937, by the Commander-in-Chief of the *Wehrmacht* must be read to be believed.

Although covering only one quarter of 1940, Volume IX of the German Documents is the most rewarding of all these four volumes. The Memorandum by v. Renthe-Fink on the future character of German-Danish relations, written in June, 1940, is a remarkable attempt at finding a "synthesis . . . between the formal preservation of Danish sovereignty and Germany's overall political interests in this country." It is an excellent illustration of perennial techniques of hegemonial rule. Occasionally, the grim tale of totalitarianism rampant is relieved by healthy touches of editorial humour. From this point of view, the editors could not have done better than print the, in itself completely insignificant, telegram sent from Doorn by William II to Hitler on the capitulation of France and Hitler's reply. Yet, the great value of these two volumes of German documents is that they convey a vivid picture of the robot-like application of Hitler's directive, as explained to his henchmen at the *Führer* Conference of August 22, 1939: "We are not concerned with having justice on our side, but solely with victory."

London.

G. S.

Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945. Editors-in-Chief: P. R. SWEET, M. LAMBERT, M. BAUMONT. Series D. Volume VI: The Last Months of Peace. March 16, 1939-August 8, 1939. (London: H. M. Stationery Office. 1956. 1145 pp. 50s.)

THE period covered in this volume is one of the most critical in the diplomatic history of the inter-war years. For one thing, war broke out only three weeks after its close; for another, it saw fundamental changes in the diplomatic relations among the Great Powers.

The German march into Prague (March 15, 1939) affected the Western Powers and the Soviet Union in different ways. While Soviet reserve towards the West was, if anything, increasing, Anglo-French policy underwent a radical reorientation, away from Germany towards the Soviet Union. Insofar as this is borne out in these documents, nothing new is revealed. Occasionally, however, one is allowed glimpses of "what might have been" if the policy of "appeasement" had continued. One document, for instance, contains a suggestion that Britain would have been prepared for a partial renunciation of the most-favoured-nation clause in the Balkans in favour of Germany.

The Anglo-German economic talks held in London in July (the Wohlthat talks) present the only slender evidence of any British attempt to re-establish closer contact. Questions like colonial condominium in Africa and special tariff arrangements for European agricultural countries—which appear to have lost none of their importance with the passage of time—were among the topics discussed during these talks.

Among the documents dealing with France, there is a German account of a conversation with the former French Premier, M. Étienne Flandin, who enjoyed a reputation of being pro-German. The Frenchman, it turned out, was highly critical and outspoken about German policy after Prague.

The main historical events of the period were the failure of the German attempt to link up with Japan against the Soviet Union, and the collapse of the Anglo-French efforts to enlist the aid of the latter against Germany. The two objects of this would-be encirclement, Germany and the Soviet Union, composed their differences, leaving Japan and the Western Powers in isolation.

These documents suggest that the diplomatic initiative for the German-Soviet *rapprochement* came from the German side, but that it was the Russians who proposed the exact form of the agreement. New light on the historical origin of the *rapprochement* may be provided by a record of talks between Göring, Mussolini and Ciano held in Rome on April 16, during which Göring announced his intention of asking Hitler to come to terms with the Soviet Union. Much of the driving force behind this German policy appears to have been provided by the professional diplomatists, who were eager for a settlement. Even Rudolf Nadolny, who had resigned from his post as German Ambassador in Moscow in 1934 in protest against Hitler's attitude towards the Soviet Union, tendered advice from the wings on the legal aspects of the *rapprochement*.

For a sound assessment of Soviet policy the men at the Wilhelmstrasse could well rely on the Moscow despatches of von Toppelskirch, the brilliant Embassy secretary working under von der Schulenburg. Five days after the German *coup* against Prague he reported as follows: "After the *Anschluss*, Litvinov proposed an international conference but transmitted no Note. This time the Soviet Government express their point of view by means of a Note, but in a manner which relieves them of the necessity for further moves, (for instance, the recall of the Soviet Ambassador to report)." On March 27 he commented: "The Soviets suspect the Western Powers of trying to divert German aggression towards Soviet Russia in order to rid themselves of this

danger. What is more, the Soviets wish to join the Concert of Europe and desire also a development which would preferably bring about a war between Germany, France and Britain, while they themselves can, to begin with, preserve freedom of action and further their own interests."

Unlike the Germans and the Russians, the Japanese lacked the world-wide diplomatic perspective vital in negotiations of this kind. Japan, furthermore, was tied down militarily in China and none too eager to be drawn into fresh conflicts, as is shown in a secret additional draft protocol to the proposed German-Japanese pact. The series of documents dealing with these negotiations is both interesting and tantalising, as it ends at the point where they are running into the counter-stream of the momentous German-Soviet negotiations.

In spite of the conclusion of the *patto d'acciaio* Italy played a subordinate part. Mussolini and Ciano were shocked by the German action in Prague, and warned the Germans not to expect Italian consent to a possible dismemberment of Yugoslavia, which they regarded as lying wholly within their own sphere. Ribbentrop had to issue instructions to his diplomatists to exercise extreme circumspection in dealing with matters touching Italy's sphere of influence, but Göring, in conversation with the Italians, was a good deal less reassuring on this point. The general attitude of the Germans towards Italy is best characterised by the distaste with which Weizsäcker, head of the Aussenamt, regarded an Italian offer to be helpful to the Germans in Poland. There was also the attempt to employ Signor Rosso, the Italian Ambassador in Moscow, as a mediator in initiating the proposed German-Soviet *rapprochement* in which Italy was to take no further part.

London.

F. PARKINSON.

STRATEGIC ASPECTS

THEORIES OF WAR

- Some Notes on the Evolution of Air Doctrine.* By BERNARD BRODIE. (*Brassey's Annual*. Chapter V. London: William Clowes; New York: Macmillan. 1955. 63s.)
- The Strategic Air Command, U.S. Air Force.* By AIR VICE-MARSHAL W. M. YOUL. (*Brassey's Annual*. Chapter X.)
- Science in War.* By R. COCKBURN. (*Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*: London. February, 1956. 10s.)
- Air Power.* By ASHER LEE. (London: Duckworth. 1955. 200 pp. 15s.)
- Britain and the Suez Canal.* By D. C. WATT. (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. August, 1956. 47 pp. 2s. 6d.)
- Suez Canal: Annual Returns of Shipping and Tonnage for the Years 1953-1955.* Foreign Office. (London: H. M. Stationery Office. 1956. 20 pp. 1s.)

MILITARY HISTORY

- The Fatal Decisions: Six Decisive Battles of the Second World War from the Viewpoint of the Vanquished.* Edited by SEYMOUR FREIDIN and WILLIAM RICHARDSON. (London: Michael Joseph. 1956. xii and 261 pp. 6 illustrations. 6 maps. 25s.)
- The War in Korea.* By MAJOR R. C. W. THOMAS. (London: Gale & Polden. 1954. 119 pp. 15 illustrations. 5 maps. 10s. 6d.)
- The Decisive Battles of the Western World.* Vol. III. By MAJOR GENERAL J. F. C. FULLER. (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode. 1956. xii and 666 pp. 48 maps and diagrams. 45s.)
- History of the Second World War: Grand Strategy, Vol. V.* By J. EHRLMAN. (London: H. M. Stationery Office. 1956. xvii and 684 pp. 9 illustrations. 9 maps. 42s.)
- The Direction of War.* By AIR VICE-MARSHAL E. J. KINGSTON-McCLOUGHRY. (London: Cape. 1955. 261 pp. 16s.)

THE following article takes the form of a critical sampling of some recent publications dealing with strategy and the history of war. The basis of selection is entirely arbitrary and no attempt has been made to include even all the works published during 1955 and 1956 which might legitimately be regarded as outstandingly important. In so far as any general pattern of comment is intended, the sampling has been made on the present writer's assumption that not enough thinking is being done in fundamental terms on what war is and with what *object* States undertake it. Obsessed by revolutionary changes in means there seems no longer any clear view as to ends. Hence today there is a tendency among writers either to become bogged down in the technics of war and speculation about future technics, or else to seek refuge in plain statements and narratives in which awkward questions of means and ends never come up for discussion.

THEORIES OF WAR

From this standpoint Brodie's article in *Brassey*, entitled "Some Notes on the Evolution of Air Doctrine" must be regarded as being in a different category to the remainder of publications listed above. For whereas it is ostensibly a re-examination of the theories of the Italian writer, Giulio Douhet, it in fact asks the extremely pertinent question, for what purposes is war today undertaken and to what extent can the usually suggested means be regarded as suitable for achieving such purposes? Bernard Brodie, the details of whose career are well known to the present writer, is the author of *Sea Power in the Machine Age* (1941) and *A Layman's Guide to Naval Strategy* (1942). He is one of the very few serious writers on strategy to be found either in Britain or America: serious in the sense that following the philosophical tradition evolved by Jomini, Clausewitz, Mahan, and Corbett, he insists on asking such fundamental questions as, "what is war?", "how is it related to national policy?" and "what may national Governments expect to achieve by employing it?" The great point made by Clausewitz was that unless some kind of theory of war is established, operative discussion between responsible political leaders and their military advisers as to the broader aspects of national policy must always be threatened with confusion and misinterpretation. We have only to recollect the comments of Graham Wallas, writing as a sociologist, on the *Report of the Dardanelles Commission* to realise the practical truth of this purely theoretical statement. In the past the precautions laid down by Clausewitz and those bringing the same philosophic temper to their

studies might be, and were indeed often, neglected by political and military leaders alike. Nevertheless there was always a philosophical and academic orthodoxy available for those prepared to avail themselves of it. The point made by Brodie in his *Brassey* article is that this orthodoxy has been upset, not so much by a new emphasis on ends as by a "wholly revolutionary" change in means.

Douhet's thesis (put forward between 1910 and 1930), writes Brodie, was that future wars would be won entirely by strategic bombing. Any expenditure on ground defence or on fighter aircraft for defence and escort was a wasteful diversion of effort. Command of the air must be won quickly, after which nothing much mattered. Ground forces would meanwhile remain locked in static combat, and have little decisive influence on the war.

All this, writes Brodie, was "wholly revolutionary" because it "turned upside down the old trite military axiom, derived from Jomini, that 'methods change but principles are unchanging.'" In other words Douhet ignored the relationship between national policy and strategic planning which the classical writers, Clausewitz, Jomini and Mahan, "regarded as axiomatic." Not only, writes Brodie, did most air staffs accept this new doctrine of war, but even Foch was indirectly led to an "unconscious development of the concept of war as an end in itself." In this, adds Brodie, he was merely typical of the Great War generals of both sides, the majority of whom seem to have become imbued with the idea that "war contains its own logic." Douhet, however, was able to go one better than this since his doctrine of mass bombing regardless of the political object was intended to avoid the mass casualties of the Western Front. Hence his advocacy of air frightfulness was shot through with a strong suggestion of economy in life, alias the old "principle" of "economy of force."

The Second World War, however, did not see his theories justified: mass bombing was only a contributory factor to victory, nor was morale as crushed by it as he had postulated. Nor did fighter defence prove useless either at sea, over armies, or over great cities. Armies, and navies as well, of course, moved about very vigorously in spite of air attack but with the despised help of air defence. In particular the Battle of Britain was an absolute defeat for Douhetism. Nevertheless with the appearance of the atom bomb Douhet's doctrine acquired a new meaning and in the view of some, a new validity, at least, adds Brodie, so long as the United States had all the bombs. But, asks Brodie, where are we today?

“Viewed in its true light aerial warfare admits of no defence, only offence. We must, therefore, resign ourselves to the offensive the enemy will inflict upon us, while striving to put all our resources to work to inflict even heavier ones upon him.” But, Brodie asks, after quoting this typical utterance of Douhet’s, will the enemy’s offensive, thus cheerfully accepted, be “a military pinprick or is it a total national disaster?” If the doctrine of the unfettered offensive is followed, then every war must be a total war, “ruled by a logic of its own and fought for nothing outside itself.”

“So long as the view persists in high military and political circles that *any* war which brings the Soviet Union and the United States into direct and open conflict *must* be total, so long will preparatory measures be adopted which ensure that the opening of hostilities does in fact precipitate total war.” (Note here the significance of the phrase “preparatory measures.”) We must, urges Brodie, rethink basic principles. “What are suitable political objects to be sought through military action in crisis situations, and what are suitable military measures for bringing them about? Above all, what are the available instrumentalities assuming that military action does not proceed beyond the suitable? If our strategic air force is a retaliatory force, as is often postulated, what kind of action will it retaliate against?” There Brodie leaves us, speculating uncomfortably on ends and means, asking ourselves what kind of a world, in the political sense, would the masters of the Strategic Air Command of the U.S. Air Force like to see emerging as a result of using this force as a “suitable military measure?”

As to the extent of its suitability in American eyes, we can at least discover something of America’s strategic dependence on it by the interesting fact given in the second *Brassey* article stated above, that since 1947 the Strategic Air Command has absorbed about three-quarters of the U.S. Air Force’s total budget. This article, the material for which was supplied to Air Vice-Marshal Youl from official U.S. sources, includes the remark that, “In the event of sudden aggression against the U.S. or her allies, the strategic bombers of the Command, operating from their home bases in other parts of the world, would immediately hurl simultaneous nuclear attacks against a number of selected vital targets located over a wide geographical area of the enemy’s homeland.”

Again, we are prompted to ask with Brodie, how much aggression and of what kind would it require to provoke a measure of retaliation so “total” and yet apparently so unrelated to any

particular object of national policy specifically and publicly defined?

After Brodie the fare becomes less exciting by *London Institute* standards, but far more enlightening as regards the general ruck of strategic thinking. Asher Lee, in *Air Power*, has only just avoided writing a very good book. After a couple of sober paragraphs in the introduction where a serious questioning of basic principles is apparently foreshadowed, he plunges headlong into a high-grade semi-technical exposition of air warfare. Nowhere is the reader invited to consider the questions, what is air power, what is its function, and how does it differ from land power and sea power? Instead he leads off with three very good chapters on Strategic Bombing, Air Attack on Communications, and Air Defence, after which a number of other matters are dealt with in a less interesting manner. The chapter on Naval Air Power (Chapter VIII) is particularly weak, since the author never troubles to attempt a definition of the term.

Nevertheless, he has many interesting things to tell us seriatim, and makes some very shrewd comments, as for instance in his concluding chapter where he draws attention to the likelihood and danger of Germany entering the ranks of the Powers capable of nuclear warfare. Ever so much of his factual information and discussion is vitiated by failure to put such elementary questions as, how many bombs, how many planes, how many men, and how big a proportion of national effort would have to be spent to ensure the success of this or that project? Failure to make the reader aware of these questions reduces many of his arguments to the pre-war level of discussion epitomised by the question "Can a battleship be sunk by bombs?", without taking into account the number of planes and bombs which might or might not be expendable on this particular tactical enterprise staged, under unspecified tactical conditions. Throughout, we continually have the feeling that the addition of a few marginal units of this or that, here or there, might make all the difference to the particular dictum.

It is not, however, in civilian circles alone that there is a lack of interest in fundamental questions. *The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution* for February, 1956, contains a review of *Brassey* covering over a page, in which Brodie's article is not even mentioned. Nevertheless the same issue of the *Journal* contains a penetrating address on "Science in War" by Dr. R. Cockburn in which the "logic of retaliation" as a fact in favour of international stability is shown to depend on a number of other

factors, including "technical parity over a wide range of essential techniques."

To the present writer it is clear that part of the task of the academic person in all these discussions should be to help towards a complete reframing of the very notion of war, in so far as this may today be necessary, by asking fundamental questions. It is not merely a question of debunking such trite phrases as "air power is superior to sea power" (which has about as much meaning as saying that meteorology is superior to hydrography) but rather of asking ourselves the even more fundamental question, "What is war?"

Can we any longer answer this question by saying, in the spirit of Clausewitz, that war is a form of inter-State relationship conducted by means other than diplomatic and economic? Can we any longer say, with Clausewitz, that the object of war is to compel the enemy to do our will, or more cautiously, with Cushman, that the object is to establish our own security?

If we can answer "yes" to these questions, then we can employ the whole Clausewitzian theory of national policy having certain aims for which appropriate military measures can be used, depending on the degree of national interest involved. To Clausewitz "real war" involving the pursuit of certain limited national objects was the likely norm for the future, "absolute war" of the total type having temporarily gone out with Napoleon. Yet to Clausewitz even "absolute" or "total" war, with the interest of the *people* actively engaged, was still likely to be a very abortive, wearisome and inconclusive affair, owing to the comparative weakness of the technical means employed, and the general superiority of the defence over the offence. Clausewitz's premise once being established, it was possible to evolve a theory of war in which the detailed application of "principles" could be extended to cover the tiniest military operations, so that what was clearly strategy merged into what was clearly tactics. For Clausewitz, it must be remembered, was only interested in establishing a theory of war in order to have a firm philosophical basis for what was really a book on military training. If interviewed by the equivalent of a modern newspaper correspondent, he would probably have said "What is the use of talking about military training if neither the politicians nor the generals know what the training is for?"

Much the same point was made by Lord Montgomery, speaking at the R.U.S.I. on October 10, 1956, when he complained that it was impossible to plan an effective strategy for NATO so long as

the political leaders of the NATO Powers were unable to define their overall political aims.

Today, we must, it seems, think carefully before we answer "yes" to Clausewitz's definition of the nature of war and nature of its aims. Why? Because changes in military technique have not only upset the concept of unchanging "principles," but have even threatened the original premise that war is an instrument of national policy designed to force the enemy to do our will. According to Douhet, and possibly even to those concerned with the creation and use of the Strategic Air Command of the U.S. Air Force, the principles of war have gone by the board in favour of one single method or measure, an all-out and devastating offensive unrelated to any clearly defined political aim. The old principles of war envisaged land (and also sea forces) striving by a variety of means to overcome each other, thus involving measures of both attack and defence. True, one side might be on the offensive all the time but there was still a chance for the defender to do some defending at the strategical level, while at the tactical level both attack and defence could be equally employed by either side according to local circumstances.

Even today, it may be claimed, such principles as those of "economy of force," "surprise" and "maintenance of the object" still have validity, because they do no more than state commonsense generalities of conduct. To Clausewitz, however, the application of these principles was governed by his general theory of war, according to which "real" war (so called) was what today we would call war fought for a limited *national* object and hence by limited *military* means, as in the case of Korea. In this it was always a matter of governments saying "this *national* object being of a limited order, we are only justified in making a *military* effort of such and such magnitude to achieve it. If we cannot achieve it at that price we had better stop fighting and obtain the best settlement possible by diplomatic means." Even "absolute" or total war, a reversion to the mass ideological wars of the French Revolution and Napoleonic period, was subject to practical limitations imposed by military technique. And this was to some extent true till as late as 1945—witness Hitler's invasion of Russia. Not even a war fought for "national socialism," "British way of life," "American idealism" and "Russian communism," with the maximum effort of every man, woman and child, that could be *remuneratively* employed, was quite sufficient to upset the Clausewitzian picture of popular absolute war as opposed to limited dynastic war.

There is admittedly some difficulty in making a direct

comparison between the ideological-cum-imperialistic wars of the period 1793-1815 with total war of today. Nevertheless for purposes of discussing the general theory of war the comparison seems sufficiently close.

What has upset the Clausewitzian picture is the atomic bomb, that is if indeed it has been upset. The atomic bomb and the various bombing and nuclear developments succeeding it have made nonsense, so it is claimed, of the so-called principles of war as envisaged in a complicated tactical and strategical setting of sea, air and land operations. For this has been substituted the immediate and full scale nuclear offensive, unrestricted by defensive considerations. Going further up the scale the nuclear weapons have also made nonsense of the Clausewitzian concept of only doing enough hurt to the enemy to compel him to do our will. The nuclear air offensive neither knows nor cares whether there is going to be any coherently governed enemy left in being. Maybe conquest will mean occupation with or without "liberation." If the enemy is no longer physically capable of doing our will, we ourselves will work our will in his own country in any way it pleases us, and of course at his expense, if he still has any assets available.

If all this is true then we must go one step further and say that we can no longer regard war merely as a continuation of national policy by means other than diplomatic ones, Clausewitz's famous phrase. Why? Because policy suggests a condition of State relationships, normally conducted by diplomatic (and today also by economic) means, having both a past and a future. States fight and are "friends" again: so it goes on, England and France, Sweden and Russia, Austria and Turkey, according to a traditional pattern. But if the means of destruction become so overwhelming as to blot out all notions of conventional warfare as a political process, and leave only annihilation of the enemy State, then it would seem that war implies bringing national policy to an end, so far as that particular enemy State is concerned. True the enemy people might be allowed to survive after severe nuclear punishment, but there would no longer be any normal restoration, still less continuity, of political relationship. Why? Because the destruction resulting from an unrestricted military offensive would have permanently altered the political situation. This, maybe, is what is meant by the notion of war having "a logic of its own," coupled with the notion of the military offensive as an end in itself so far as national policy is concerned.

Perhaps enough has now been said to show the imperative need for a new definition of what war is, and how war works as an

expression of the nation's will. Have the means really taken charge of the ends? Have governments really ceased to be able to regulate the military measures they employ? Has war at last become an end in itself, expressed in terms of an annihilating offensive? Must this offensive give no thought for the future face and shape of the victim? Must no thought be given for the incidental inconveniences arising from the enemy's own last-kick offensive, against which all defensive measures are a mere cowardly diversion of energy?

Suggestions for helping to formulate tentative answers to the questions asked above can be derived from a study of the remaining books given in the list at the head of this article.

The Chatham House publication on *Britain and the Suez Canal* is an excellent summary both of the political and legal situation and of the shipping situation at the actual date of writing. A powerful case is built up for regarding the Canal as soon likely to be inadequate for the continuous increase in traffic, not only as regards numbers of ships, but more particularly as regards the dimensions of individual ships. Here the *Annual Returns* published by the Stationery Office help to fill in the picture. The Chatham House monograph also gives a brilliant analysis of Britain's dependence on the Canal in terms of imports and exports, irrespective of the amount of actual British tonnage passing through the Canal in either direction. An effective contrast is also made between the most suitable economic and political means of dealing with the approaching "bottleneck" situation. This has the effect of showing that the most suitable political and economic solutions, so far as Britain is concerned, are in direct opposition to each other.

The Suez Canal problem is a sea power problem, a problem of how to use a particular passage between two seas to the best advantage, given various political, economic and technical difficulties. Sea power, power to use the sea, is something which is "exercised" continuously throughout the oceans of the world whether in peace or war. In war the pattern of "exercise" changes, but "use" goes on. A theory of war which fails to recognise this might well seem to be inadequate. War in the Suez Canal Zone, if conducted in a total manner, might well damage the Canal and incommode would-be users of it for some considerable time. One is tempted to think that the latest theories as to the definition of war were made by mere provincials so far as world-wide sea power and its world-wide usage are concerned.

Unfortunately the Chatham House author is a little uncertain as to the difference between commercial and naval uses of the

Canal when he writes, "Britain's economic interests in the Canal are even more important than her strategic interests, since the latter remain only potentially operative in peacetime and the former are always active." In a sense this is true. But in so far as British shipping may depend for its *general* safety on certain strategical dispositions, this is only some part of the truth. A naval force, having X strength, and based on Gibraltar and Malta may be regarded as sufficient for the Mediterranean, provided that it can be reinforced at Y days' notice by a force of Z strength stationed in the Indian Ocean. Conversely Z strength in the Indian Ocean may be adequate provided X amount of strength is available in the Mediterranean at Y days' notice. If the Canal is closed to British warships then it will take Y days plus to send ships from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean via the Cape. In fact it might be easier to send them direct from home. In any case the delay would be great, and a *greater total number* of ships would be required to ensure dual dispositions of the same value. If the Suez Canal is closed to British warships, the Mediterranean becomes a cul-de-sac for us as also does the Red Sea, and we are back where we were in Nelson's time, only worse, since permission to send warships through the Canal might be on a differential basis.

From this we conclude that a definition of war and a theory of war must be valid for the total situation in which those adopting it find themselves. Here Clausewitz and Jomini are no longer such useful guides, since they were not concerned with the "use" of the sea and hence with principles governing the "exercise" of sea power. It is to Corbett and Mahan that we must now turn, together with their distinguished pupil, Sir Herbert Richmond. These writers, if alive today, would probably have pointed out that sea power, i.e., the "use" of the sea for commercial and military purposes, is something quite different from land power and air power, having a different object and employing different instruments, and being, moreover, a continuous affair, covering both peace and war. If then the national interest demanded that measures be taken to ensure the continued use by British shipping of a particular focal area, such as the Suez Canal, then the best measures would be clearly those which took full account of the highly delicate nature of canal navigation. However much or however little force was used, it could scarcely be in the national interest to damage or destroy the canal system. In other words here is a case where the national interest may demand some kind of strategic action but where the national interest will certainly be best served by extreme circumspection in the methods used, even though the interest or object concerned has a very

high "limit." In no case, however, can Douhet help as a guide. Today the chief danger to British interests in the Middle East generally might be a lightning *coup* of strictly "limited" character, built up by "cold war" methods, and irretrievable on the British side except through a general war.

MILITARY HISTORY

Turning now to the three books listed on military history, we find some interesting contrasts of approach. *The Fatal Decisions*, so called, are the Battle of Britain (1940), the operations before Moscow (1941-1942), El Alamein (1942), Stalingrad (1942-1943), the allied invasion of France (1944), and the German Ardennes Offensive (1944-1945). Only in a restricted sense can any of these series of operations be called decisions, unless of course the word is used in a different sense. Certainly Hitler's decision not to allow a retreat from Stalingrad was in itself a fatal one. On the other hand his equally clear decision not to allow an immediate winter retreat from Moscow is admitted by the writer to have been amply justified.

Each of the six series of operations is described by a German general who held a responsible position in the German command concerned at the time. There is connecting commentary by another German general and an introduction by Cyril Falls. The descriptions are well written and well translated, the tone throughout is fair and unembittered. Just the right balance is struck between technical and popular exposition. Everything is made easy to understand and yet the exposition is always attractive and never a mere recital of details.

Much might be said by way of comment on the extent to which these accounts are exculpatory and also as to what extent Hitler saved or ruined his armies by personal intervention. Much also might be said about the whole theory and system of German Military Command as revealed. To the present writer, however, the book has a different immediate interest. If Douhetism is the truth then this is a book about events still in the strategic dark ages. Vast armies are engaged in "meaningful" conflicts, not static, as Douhet so confidently predicted, but in operations involving comparatively extensive movements; it is about a thousand miles to Stalingrad from Germany. More particularly the Battle of Britain is or was a complete refutation of the idea that air defence is a wasteful diversion of effort. All this, however, belongs to pre-nuclear warfare, and so perhaps to a real strategic dark ages, in which not only were the teachings of Clausewitz

valid as regards how operations of war should be conducted, but also his philosophic exposition of what war was and how it fitted in with national policy.

In another respect *The Fatal Decisions* represents out-of-date thinking, out of date from the British standpoint, ever since English professional soldiers began to intervene in the sixteenth-century wars of religion in France and the Low Countries. The German generals, including one General of the Air Force, all write as land-bound operators. All their power was derived from territory either occupied or threatened by the German Army, while even their air force depended for its range of action on the extent to which their army could hold advanced air fields. Everything came from within and they received no real nourishment from without. Hence El Alamein is presented as a purely land affair with a tiresome supply ditch to cross, instead of a gigantic "combined operation," involving Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and Pacific sea routes, as well as trans-African and trans-Atlantic air routes.

Major Thomas's account of *The War in Korea* is a useful narrative on a miniature scale in which Korean geographical and climatic conditions, as well as the enemy's tactics, equipment and transport system all find a place. It is a comprehensive and unpretentious work. Only when dealing with General MacArthur, and particularly with his dismissal, does the author find himself in difficulties. Even here, however, he strives within the limits of space allowed him to give a fair and understandable account of what happened.

The Korean War was a "limited war" in the orthodox Clausewitzian sense, that is as regards ends and means. It was also a limited war in the more particular meaning given to the term by Corbett, who tended to see combined operations overseas as a characteristic form of limited war waged by an island Power against a continental enemy. As Major Thomas clearly shows, the titular forces of the United Nations had almost complete air superiority and complete naval superiority. They could not only stop enemy coastal movements but also prevent seaborne aid from reaching the enemy across the Yellow Sea. Yet with all these advantages the United Nations did not exactly "win" the war even in the old-fashioned sense. Did they achieve by military measures the international political aims they sought? This is also doubtful. MacArthur was prevented by the U.S. Government, acting as executant of the United Nations, from carrying the bombing war into China and so attacking the enemy's main sources of supply. Political considerations caused political

interference. In other words the U.S.A. (regardless of the U.N.) had certain *national* aims in view and these seemed to be best served by exercising some measure of military restraint, and in particular by not adopting unlimited means for a clearly limited end. Yet the U.S. possessed nuclear bombs at the time. Presumably the broad national aspirations of the U.S. in the war were judged to be best served by being interpreted strictly in terms of the national interest. Possibly, therefore, there is still some relationship (as regards the formulation of a theory of war) between the national interest and the way in which war in the abstract and also its relationship to national policy are envisaged. Can the national interest idea help us to produce an amended doctrine capable of coping with the technical revolution in warfare?

General Fuller's *Decisive Battles of the Western World* is the third volume of this work and is "from the American Civil War to the end of the Second World War." The title of course is misleading. It is really a military history of the two World Wars, mainly the Second, with chapters giving fairly substantial accounts of the American Civil War, the Franco-Prussian War and the Russo-Japanese War.

Sherman, "The Attila of the American Continent," is shown as the general who in a civil war deliberately reintroduced terrorism as an instrument of policy into the warfare of so-called civilised States (pp. 84-85). Emphasis is given to the effect of the industrial revolution on "American Imperialism": the chapter on the Battle of Sedan in 1870 is a telling picture of military disintegration. Thereafter General Fuller ploughs through his formidable programme, using a host of secondary authorities and dispensing criticisms on military judgments with a sound and impartial eye. The book indeed is a great *tour de force* and about the best introduction to recent military history that a student might take up. Continuity is maintained, the narrative never flags and the balance is nicely held between the official histories and statements, the views of various military critics, and the views of General Fuller himself. Nimitz's contribution to the defeat of Japan is given proper emphasis and Pacific strategy is handled with an extremely sure touch. Nor is there any sense of gap or awkwardness as between the treatment of sea, air and land operations. The essentials of each alone and in combination are clearly shown and the treatment throughout is smooth, authoritative, and yet, where it seems necessary, caustic and severe. An astonishing amount of military information is conveyed to the reader in clear and almost casual form. At the same time his narrative is enriched with historical

and philosophical comments going far beyond the limits of ordinary military history.

Above all General Fuller is intensely interested in every political implication of what happens in the military field. He is a merciless critic of war for war's sake, derides Roosevelt's policy of "unconditional surrender", and criticises Churchill's attitude of subordinating long-term policy in the Balkans to that of killing Germans (pp. 545-546). Like so many writers both in America and in this country today he strongly deplores Roosevelt's concessions to Stalin, and Churchill's acquiescence in them, including, of course, the betrayal of the Poles. In General Fuller's opinion it was more important to build up a position against Russia in South-Eastern Europe, rather than to put the major allied effort into a western European campaign which clearly foreshadowed the substitution of Stalin for Hitler on the banks of the Elbe.

What has all this to do with a definition and theory of war? Surely this: that even if it is possible to destroy a particular State outright by a sudden overwhelming nuclear offensive, there will still be *some* people and *some* resources left in that State and there will still be its territory, even if large tracts of it have been temporarily devastated and also poisoned by infected dust. Other States, adjacent perhaps to the victim, may be interested in the territory, its resources and people. Are they to be allowed to interfere in it or are they also to be bombed flat if they try? In other words, every military victory so-called must have some political sequel and it is just as well to have an idea as to what sequel you would prefer before letting loose any particular brand of military action. If military action is something undertaken for its own sake, that is for the defeat of the enemy and nothing more, then it is difficult to see how such action can be reconciled with the national interest which is something continuous, historical and all-embracing, including within itself all military means to be employed.

Douhetism, moreover, envisages a neat surgical operation. If the enemy retaliates, one need not worry. It will soon be over. If secondary targets and even other States become involved, again one needn't worry. The offensive has a logic of its own. But perhaps it might not be like that. In fact nearly every authority of any reputation suggests that the mutual fear of America and Russia for each other is so great that neither will risk retaliation by the other and hence a position of stability has been reached—at least for the moment. Even if this situation of assumed stability continues, it will only justify a theory of war as a threat, to be countered by a threat of supposed equal violence. Meanwhile the old national interest may be pursued by cold war and small war

methods in a variety of ways in several different peripheral areas; that is areas outside the *assumed* bomb provoking line of the other side. Thus far has our inquiry into a possible new definition of war and its uses led us, with a strong hint that the old-fashioned notion of the national interest is not only a good formula for helping to find out why a State undertakes military action, but also for its decision as to precisely what kind of military means it would be most appropriate to take in order to achieve the desired national end. If no specific national, that is political, end is envisaged then it would seem that government, in the sense of a State having external relationships, no longer has any real meaning.

Illustrations of this theme can be gleaned from John Ehrman's Vol. V of the *Grand Strategy* series of the *History of the Second World War*. This volume covers the period August 1943 to August 1944, that is, from the First Quebec Conference to the Second Quebec Conference inclusive, and hence also covers the Allied Conferences held at Cairo and Teheran.

This is the history of war in the grand style, being (like all the volumes in this particular series of the War History) a richly detailed account of the higher direction of the war from the British and American Governments acting through the Combined Chiefs of Staff (British and U.S.), the British Chiefs of Staff, the (British) Joint Planning Staff (frequently referred to as "the Planners"), the (British) Joint Intelligence Staff, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (U.S.) and the various Supreme Allied Commanders, Allied Commanders-in-Chief and U.S. Commanders-in-Chief. Despite substantial accounts of the direction of the war against Japan, the volume is mainly concerned with the vast allied invasion of Europe, known as "Overlord," the complications and restrictions forced upon other allied theatres of war as result of its planning, together with the complications and restrictions in these theatres, arising out of its execution and subsequent exploitation.

The book is thus concerned with strategic planning at the very highest level. In this sense it might well be termed the history of Anglo-American relations during the period covered, since what other relations did the two governments have with each other which could in any way be comparable with these? Not only, however, is it a history but also a vast source book, proposals, reports, memoranda and counter-memoranda being reproduced word for word *in extenso* throughout. Nothing, so the reader would infer, is really withheld, at least at the *formal* official level, that is so far as "security" (still an active fact in 1956) has allowed. The same reader, however, after reading Air Vice-Marshal Kingston-McLoughry's *Direction of War*, will be inclined to use rather

different terms from "severe discussion" and "long discussion" when ruminating on the events described in Chapter VIII, "Preparation for 'Overlord'." Indeed the suavity of the author's narrative tends to mask the extent, not merely of Anglo-American disagreements, but also of disagreements between various strong-minded men, at all levels near the top, anxious to get their own way and not specially irked by anti-American or anti-British sentiments. Nor, in the inevitable absence of any substantial reference to the actual operations, is it possible for the reader to receive quite the sense of pressure and urgency necessary for a true appreciation of the planners' aims and anxieties. Hence in the reader's mind power to order action tends to become separated from responsibility for its execution, whereas there was in fact, as we well know, a very close connection between these two aspects of Anglo-American grand strategy.

Nevertheless, on the whole we are led to the conclusion that Anglo-American strategic planning was highly successful. The fact that it happened at all was due to a sufficient degree of command exercised over the sea and air routes necessary, an advantage entirely lacking to the leaders of Japan and Germany. Throughout the narrative two sets of ideas seem prominent. Politically, the view already expressed by less responsible writers, that Roosevelt and his advisers were less interested in the shape of post-war Europe than Churchill, seems to be confirmed, though it is much played down. With this went a fairly typical American predilection for doing things in a big way when once the pressure point had been decided upon. Hence to them, Churchill's anxieties about the future of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, and his own predilection for taking advantage of the situation by launching combined operations, seemed like a return to "old world" political intrigue. Similarly they sensed a refusal to face up to possible heavy casualties, this taking the form of a dispersion of effort in hazardous side-shows, reminiscent of the Dardanelles in the First War.

Churchill of course came of a race whose military leaders had always had to make bricks without straw, and hence had been compelled to exploit sea power so as to use their tiny forces to the best advantage, and always with an eye to weakening the ability of any great *land* power in Western Europe to deal a direct blow at Britain. Hence the method of going about things, a method based on a tradition of strategic thought starting with Adam de Moleyns and running through Raleigh, Bacon, Swift (*Conduct of the Allies*), Chatham, Israel Mauduit (*Considerations on the Present German War*), to Corbett. If combined operations now

included the air, so much the better. If for Western Europe, Europe as a whole be substituted as an area of British preoccupation with regard to future land power, so much more cogent were Churchill's demands for initiative in Northern Italy, South-Eastern Europe, and the Balkans. To the Americans the war seemed "total" in the sense that total resources were being employed and "unconditional surrender" sought. Afterwards there would be time enough to think whether to agriculturise Germany *à la* Henry Morgenthau or not. Meanwhile, so far as politics were concerned, it seemed wise to adopt the purely negative attitude of checking British desires both to keep Russia out of Central Europe and to re-establish the British Empire in the Far East and Pacific.

To the British, on the other hand, the war, though "total" in a far deeper sense than ever it could be to the Americans, was nevertheless a kind of relationship between States which was bound to have a political post-war sequel. When once, therefore, the most dangerous moment had passed, and the United States had been drawn into the war, it was necessary to watch every military move with a political eye, and so far as purely military action was concerned to use those methods which accorded with such well-established principles of war as "surprise" and "economy of force."

It may well be, as R. H. S. Crossman suggested,¹ that Roosevelt was particularly anxious to avoid President Wilson's mistakes, and hence was particularly careful not to make any *positive* proposals as to the political future of conquered and "liberated" territories. If so, "unconditional surrender" becomes an understandable attitude. Nevertheless his policy seems to have been shot through with quasi-Wilsonian ideas emanating from a common American tradition of assumed moral superiority.

Reflecting on this it is easy to see why on the whole Douhetism should have a stronger hold on American political and military leaders than on British. Given the new possibilities of nuclear warfare, strategy can be made to take on a more simplified form, that is of course provided the economic and technical resources are available, and in the case of America they are available. Gone, though not perhaps gone just yet, will be the need for those man wasting land forces, with their complicating political implications. With a superiority of nuclear weapons "peace through air

¹ *New Statesman and Nation*, May 7, 1949, review of *The White House Papers of Henry L. Hopkins*.

power" becomes an attractive proposition. Even with nuclear parity (if such a term may be used) it still has value.

To the British this can never be so, and still less now than ever before. With a politically changing and strategically weakened Commonwealth, Douhetism is mere madness. Crises, such as those presented by the Suez Canal, are not to be solved by dropping bombs, still less by an "air lift," like the Berlin episode. Even to boycott the Canal does not seem like "business," taking into account all the economic factors involved. On the other hand, there is no sign at the moment that Britain is so obsessed with the need for careful political handling of all international crises that a tendency to abandon all idea of the direct use of force has set in. Recent events suggest the contrary. Where the national interest is concerned the most appropriate means, as judged by the government of the day, must be used. Means, however, must always be supported by capacity. Politics as an art, and this applies especially to Britain, must always be the art of the possible.

The last book on the list, *The Direction of War*, by Air Vice-Marshal E. J. Kingston-McCloughry, covers much of the same ground as Erhman's *Grand Strategy* volume, though from an entirely different standpoint. It is a brilliantly written account of the British "High Command" system, mainly during the years 1939-1945 but with a valuable introductory survey. The great merit and special character of this book is that not only does it deal equally with the theory and practice of command systems, but illustrates the practical aspects with outspoken descriptions of the actual human personalities involved. Thus description and comment range from notions about the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Ministry of Defence to descriptions of the attitude adopted by Churchill, Eisenhower, Montgomery, Harris, Spaatz, Slim, Patton, Tedder, Leigh-Mallory, Portal, Mountbatten and many other wartime leaders. The lesson to be learnt here is that personality counts, and that it is important for those concerned with the direction of war to know the kind of personality possessed by any proposed candidate for a post in the High Command system. With this goes "a new emphasis required in international leadership." The book, however, though extremely revealing is in no sense a chronicle of scandals, the author is extremely urbane in all his revelations, his main conclusion being that in the Services strong characters get to the top and cannot be blamed for advocating their personal views, honestly held, with energy and persistence, and even with vehemence. Nevertheless the present

writer has heard the book described by some of the pundits as a bad book, chiefly for the above reason.

In scope the book is of special value to students of international relations in that it continues the examination of the British and Allied High Command system through the war years up to the present time, thus including British relations with NATO and SHAPE. The author was a member of committees set up to report on various projects for command reorganisation and thus had an opportunity to examine, from an official standpoint, all the principal commands set up by Britain and the United States during the war, including SHAEF, India, Middle East, South-East Asia (Mountbatten), and the Pacific Commands of Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur. Hence there is no artificial break off in the command story, which compared with other published descriptions is uniquely comprehensive.

Though his chief concern is inevitably with Service leadership, inter-Service rivalries, and Service "dogma," both national and international, Air Vice-Marshal Kingston-McCloughry has a good deal to say about "political direction," again both at the national and international level. Principally, moreover, he is concerned with machinery and the behaviour of men brought up in particular traditions when involved in machinery. So far as the main theme of this article is concerned one of his most important conclusions is that "It is the lack of an adequate inter-allied Political Direction and High Command organisation for dealing with cold war problems which is one of the greatest deficiencies in the present Allied military machine. The ideal is most difficult to achieve because, in general, cold war problems are local, certainly in the beginning, and concern one particular nation's interests, whether they are political, financial or commercial. In the respective national governments, the problems are adjusted to the trade rather than to the war departments. Therefore, Allied help in the support of the political and commercial interest of any nation in peacetime is always most difficult, especially as it would often be to the detriment of the national interests of the others. We also have nations who resent outside help until it is too late because they are afraid of losing or having to share the political and commercial benefits which accrue from the area concerned. Nevertheless, there is scope for the United Kingdom and the United States to get together and co-ordinate international plans for political and military action in the various areas where cold war is likely to develop."

These words are extremely valuable since they stress exactly those points of weakness in the NATO position which are

characteristic of the parties concerned and their international environment: a largish number of States (some very small and military weak); the local character of "cold war" crises; the inability of NATO, as such, to coerce, especially in peacetime. Add to these difficulties the vast allied organisational problems involved and the comparative weakness of the Political Direction, as direction, irrespective of the strength and energy of particular States, and the same conclusion can be drawn as that drawn by Lord Montgomery and mentioned earlier in this article.

Only by adequate Political Direction can any High Command system be set up capable of fulfilling the kind of strategic needs spoken of in general terms by British and American political leaders, since Political Direction means nothing more than having a clear idea as to the national interest and being prepared to pursue it within the reasonable limits of national power. In so far as it seems necessary, in the national interest, to make military preparations, they must be made with some clear end in view, both as to the occasion of their use and the method of their use. Political disagreement or confusion of thought as to the aims of national policy and the part played in such policy by the idea of war must inevitably result in weakness in the military field.

Air Vice-Marshal Kingston-McCloughry's book has for its "signature tune," printed on an otherwise blank page following the Preface the words: "*There is always a further horizon for the onward-looking man.*"

From the foregoing article it will be clear to the reader that the subject of national policy and its relation to strategic policy is being energetically and ably handled by a number of Service as well as civilian writers from a variety of standpoints. There seems to be no comparable writing on the political side except, of course, from Sir Winston Churchill. Maybe the politicians' feelings are more inhibited.

London.

BRIAN TUNSTALL.

A REPORT ON CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE *

- A Means of Grace.* By EDITH PARGETER. (London: Heinemann. 1956. 851 pp. 15s.)
- How Many Angels.* By CHARLES E. ISRAEL. (London: Macmillan. 1956. 330 pp. 13s. 6d.)
- The Game and the Ground.* By PETER VANSITTART. (London: Reinhardt. 1956. 187 pp. 12s. 6d.)
- Out of the Storm.* By RUSSELL BRADDON. (London: Hutchinson. 1956. 248 pp. 12s. 6d.)
- The Intruder.* By STORM JAMESON. (London: Macmillan. 1956. 286 pp. 18s. 6d.)
- The Moment of Choice.* By JACK LINDSAY. (London: Bodley Head. 1955. 386 pp. 12s. 6d.)
- After the 'Thirties. The Novel in Britain, and its Future.* By JACK LINDSAY. (London: Lawrence & Wishart. 1956. 239 pp. 15s.)
- The General.* By KARLLUDWIG OPITZ. Translated from the German by Constantine Fitzgibbon. (London: Frederick Muller. 1956. 151 pp. 10s. 6d.)
- Death in Rome.* By WOLFGANG KOEPPEN. Translated by Mervyn Savill. (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 1956. 217 pp. 18s. 6d.)
- The Great Temptation.* By HANS KADES. Translated from the German by E. E. Ashton. (London: Angus & Robertson. 1956. 317 pp. 12s. 6d.)
- Off Limits.* By HANS HABE. Translated from the German by Ewald Osers. (London: Harrap. 1956. 418 pp. 15s.)
- Open Book.* By VENYAMIN KAVERIN. Translated from the Russian by Brian Pearce. (London: Lawrence & Wishart. 1955. 687 pp. 12s. 6d.)
- The Fertile Plain.* By ESTHER SALAMAN. (London: Hogarth Press. 1956. 344 pp. 15s.)

* An account of books of general literature which may be of interest to the student of international relations.

- Train to Pakistan.* By KHUSHWANT SINGH. (London: Chatto & Windus. 1956. 207 pp. 12s. 6d.)
- The Room on the Roof.* By RUSKIN BOND. (London: Deutsch. 1956. 160 pp. 10s. 6d.)
- Ambush.* By JEAN HOUGRON. Translated from the French by Oliver Coburn and Eric Mosbacher. (London: Hurst & Blackett. 1956. 304 pp. 12s. 6d.)
- The Pillar of Salt.* By ALBERT MEMMI. Translated from the French by Edouard Roditi. (London: Elek. 1956. 354 pp. 16s.)
- The Last Flowers.* By MICHAEL BARRETT. (London: Longmans. 1956. 250 pp. 12s. 6d.)
- The Last Run South.* By ROBIN HISCOCK. (London: Longmans. 1956. 218 pp. 12s. 6d.)
- The Last Hurrah.* By EDWIN O'CONNOR. (London: Reinhardt. 1956. 373 pp. 18s.)
- Ten North Frederick.* By JOHN O'HARA. (London: Cresset Press. 401 pp. 16s.)
- Cat on a Hot Tin Roof.* By TENNESSEE WILLIAMS. (London: Secker & Warburg. 1956. 211 pp. 12s. 6d.)
- The Right to Read. The Battle against Censorship.* By PAUL BLANSHARD. (Boston: Beacon Press. 1955. 389 pp. \$8.50.)
- My Friend Henry Miller. An Intimate Biography.* By ALFRED PERLÈS. With a preface by Henry Miller. (London: Neville Spearman. 1955. 254 pp. 16s.)
- Shining Trouble.* By MERCEDES MACKAY. (London: Heinemann. 1956. 230 pp. 15s.)
- Youngblood.* By JOHN O. KILLENS. (London: Bodley Head. 1956. 566 pp. 18s.)
- The Newcomer.* By JOHN SYKES. (London: Hurst & Blackett. 1956. 192 pp. 11s. 6d.)
- A Trick of the Sun. A Tragi-Comedy.* By JOHN ST. JOHN. (London: Heinemann. 1956. 234 pp. 15s.)
- Red, Black, Blond and Olive. Studies in Four Civilizations: Zuñi, Haiti, Soviet Russia, Israel.* By EDMUND WILSON. London: W. H. Allen. 1956. 508 pp. 25s.)
- Where Monsoons Meet. The Story of Malaya in the form of an Anthology.* Edited by DONALD MOORE. (London: Harrap. 1956. 279 pp. 16s.)

- The Ambassador's Wife.* By SIR PHILIP GIBBS. (London: Hutchinson. 1956. 255 pp. 12s. 6d.)
- The Enormous Shadow.* By ROBERT HARLING. (London: Chatto & Windus. 1955. 288 pp. 12s. 6d.)
- Thin Ice.* By SIR COMPTON MACKENZIE. (London: Chatto & Windus. 1956. 224 pp. 13s. 6d.)
- The Undoubted Dead.* By JOCELYN DAVEY. (London: Chatto & Windus. 1956. 253 pp. 13s. 6d.)
- Scene of the Meeting.* By JOHN WILES. (London: Chatto & Windus. 1956. 314 pp. 15s.)
- Perimeter West.* By MAURICE ROWDON. (London: Heinemann. 1956. 208 pp. 16s.)
- The Lost Bay.* By MANES SPERBER. Translated by Constantine Fitzgibbon. (London: Deutsch. 1956. 304 pp. 15s.)
- House of Dolls.* By KATZERNIK 135688. Translated from the Hebrew by Moshe M. Kohn. (London: Muller. 1956. 240 pp. 18s. 6d.)
- Three Rivers to Glory.* By SIDNEY BUTTERWORTH. (London: Hutchinson. 1956. 224 pp. 10s. 6d.)
- The House on the Hill.* By CERRARE PAVESE. Translated from the Italian by W. J. Strachan. (London: Peter Owen. 1956. 102 pp. 14s. 6d.)
- Up Jenkins!* By RONALD HINGLEY. (London: Longmans. 1956. 220 pp. 12s. 6d.)
- Collected Poems.* By KATHLEEN RAINE. (London: Hamish Hamilton. 1956. 191 pp. 15s.)
- The Tree of Idleness, and other poems.* By LAWRENCE DURRELL. (London: Faber. 1955. 48 pp. 8s. 6d.)
- Tally Ho. A Poem in Three Parts.* By J. P. FLETCHER. (Aldington, Kent: The Hand and Flower Press. 1956. 90 pp. 10s. 6d.)
- Selected Poems.* By RANDALL JARRELL. (London: Faber. 1956. 228 pp. 15s.)
- Bernard Shaw. His Life, Work and Friends.* By ST JOHN ERVINE. (London: Constable. 1956. 640 pp. 50s.)
- A Study of George Orwell. The Man and his Works.* By CHRISTOPHER HOLLIS. (London: Hollis & Carter. 1956. 220 pp. 18s.)
- Dublin's Joyce.* By HUGH KENNER. (London: Chatto & Windus. 1955. 384 pp. 25s.)

Background With Chorus. By FRANK SWINNERTON. (London: Hutchinson. 1956. 286 pp. 18s.)

The Writer in a Changing Society. By J. B. PRIESTLY. Hermon Ould Memorial Lecture III. (Aldington, Kent: The Hand and Flower Press. 1956. 29 pp. 8s. 6d.)

SIDNEY Webb was a great reader of novels. He thought them valuable. He described them as "picturesque sociology." This was a compliment to the realistic fiction which was one of the notable intellectual achievements of the nineteenth century, in England, France, and Russia. Picturesque sociology is still important for the novel. There are some excellent writers at work who are revealing the curious stresses in our present-day social organisation; Mr. Angus Wilson and Mr. Kingsley Amis do not lack admirers.

But it has been one of the distinctions of some recent works of fiction that they sincerely reveal and record international politics to a far greater extent than ever before. This is what we should expect of imaginative literature during a quarter of a century when international affairs have penetrated the consciousness of more of the ordinary people in the world than ever before. And some of the reporting is remarkably authentic or (at least) quite plausible. We have almost finished with the Ruritanian romance, with its fanciful politics which were not intended to be deeply felt by the reader.

The last few months have seen several provocative works of fiction devoted to the exploration of the post-war situation in Europe and its problems. Edith Pargeter's *A Means of Grace* has been widely reviewed and has won some admiration. "Very little of this book is imaginary," she claims. She writes to demonstrate the links that exist between divided Europe, since human beings are, in fact, often emotionally involved with other human beings "on the other side." An English concert-singer visits an East European country where she has many friends. There her lover will not leave his native land because (according to the author) the exile gradually becomes the traitor and true patriotism in Eastern Europe involves coming to terms with the régime in order to liberalise it from inside. Events have increased the topicality of Miss Pargeter's book. Powerful and idealistic in tone, it is anti-political, in its way, although packed with political discussion, pleading for a human understanding of life beyond the "Iron Curtain" and for a confidence that there, too, are people deeply concerned with the triumph of justice and liberty. *How Many Angels* is the story of a Sudeten German, a distinguished

surgeon, who after the war is driven off to Germany with the other members of his community. For some time he undergoes various kinds of humiliation, political, physical, and moral. It is a quick-moving narrative, rather clumsily terrible at times. It has nothing of the "purpose" of Miss Pargeter's story, and one finishes the book without a sense of what anyone ought to do about it. Still, it is an unusual study of a particular kind of political refugee—the compassionate German who has been driven from his home in one of the countries formerly submerged by the Nazis.

Peter Vansittart's *The Game and the Ground* is a moving story of the attempted re-education of a group of refugee children "Somewhere in Europe." The children are close to savages, both in their virtues and vices; and the crust of civilisation is likely to break off them at any moment. The moral issues are candidly expressed, and sometimes the sense of responsibility among the handful of adults is agonising, especially with the intrusion of a former "party man," who cannot resist the temptation to work on the impressionable children. The old violence appeals to them and breaks out once again. *Out of the Storm* is in two parts: the first is a story of post-war political intrigue in Vienna; the second (more original) tells of the gradual adaptation of one of the emigrants, with her children, to a new life in Australia. A different kind of refugee problem is dealt with in Storm Jameson's novel, *The Intruder*. It is a study of hatred. A refugee boy, half-English, came from pre-war Germany to live with his uncle and aunt in Wales. To their son, slightly younger, he is an "intruder," and the jealousy aroused survives into their adult life. Gifted, handsome, attractive and cool, the "intruder" has it all his own way, nearly.

Among the efforts to describe the mood of post-war Britain, Jack Lindsay's novels must be regarded as some of the most serious, an antidote to the picaresque satires which have been popular. *The Moment of Choice* concludes a series of three novels (the others were *Betrayed Spring* and *Rising Tide*) in which some of the same characters reappear. Mr. Lindsay's world is peopled by the ordinary men and women of the West Riding of Yorkshire, and the subjects are love and political discussion—marriage and "the capitalist machine." There is warmth and sincerity about this longish story of the people of the mills. The principles which prompt him to write his "Marxist novels" are explained and expounded in his recent critical work, *After the 'Thirties*. The English critics of literature from the Marxist viewpoint have been interesting, but not particularly prominent or distinguished. Mr. Lindsay is lucid and pungent, though he spares no pains

to provoke and irritate and repeats over-familiar opinions (the novelist can only fulfil his task by throwing in his lot with the "organised working class"). But he is able to make some good points, or at least some thought-provoking ones. It is true, I think, that the treatment of Asia and Africa by modern English writers has been inadequate to their importance in the modern world; Mr. Lindsay's opinion is that "the books about the home-scene tend to be weaker than those dealing with the colonial issues, where the struggle of values is so much clearer." This is a book of some interest to English readers, not so much because of its own merits, but because it explains some of the limitations which are imposed upon creative writers in the Communist part of the world and (to be fair) something of the mood which has occasionally inspired them.

Several striking German novels have recently been translated into English, and perhaps give insight into aspects of the post-war mentality in Germany. Karl Ludwig Opitz's *The General* is a funny book, in the picaresque tradition, but it is also a sardonic one. The usual object of English satire on the military is Colonel Blimp. It is not so in German. But here the butt is not the common soldier, but the divisional commander. The fortunes of General von Puckhammer are followed through the defeat of Germany and his post-war retirement. This is a brilliant book, but the comedy is rather upsetting to an English reader. *Death in Rome* is not to be mistaken for a thriller. It is a study of the mind of a German war-criminal who, having escaped Nuremburg, comes from exile to Rome (his *corps diplomatique* car has an Arabic number-plate) in order to decide how to return to Germany. He is unrepentant; indeed, still obsessed by his past life as a Nazi leader. His meeting with his family, who in various ways have memories of the past, is the first since his escape. As his contacts grow, rage is followed inevitably by new blood-lust, madness and death. This is an unhappy book, and also a humourless one. *The Great Temptation* perhaps has more merit as a medical than a political story; it is full of information to those not of the profession. In post-war Germany a grateful ex-patient, whose life has been saved near Stalingrad by a skilful surgical operation amid the chaotic conditions of the time, remembers the face of the doctor and, having now become a *Landrat*, offers him a post in the local hospital. But the hero's medical studies have been interrupted by the war and he is, in fact, not fully qualified. His brilliance as a surgeon brings notoriety and hence exposure. Hans Habe's *Off Limits* is a study of Germany in defeat and also of the way the occupying forces react to the unnatural circumstances of life in the United

States zone. The author's own varied experiences, both during the war and afterwards with the American forces, have gone into this book. It is a rather tangled narrative of various groups of persons who try to live out their lives in the brutalising conditions which existed immediately after the defeat. It strikes me as impartial in tone.

The publication of a new series of translations of Russian novels has been begun by Lawrence & Wishart. If the titles are well chosen this could be an important literary enterprise, for not nearly enough of recent Russian literature has been made available in the English-speaking world. Venyamin Kaverin's *Open Book* appeared in Russia in 1953 and has now been well translated by Brian Pearce. This long novel tells the story of a young woman, Tanya Vlasenkova, who from being a servant-girl was able to qualify as a doctor and devoted herself to researches which led to the discovery of *crustosin*, apparently a Russian variant of penicillin. This is a very informative book, full of detail about one section of Russian professional life. Esther Salaman's *The Fertile Plain* is an instructive contrast to *Open Book*. It is a touching account of life in a Jewish family in the Ukraine up to the time of the 1917 Revolution.

Among the novels which describe the situation in disturbed parts of the world, I value highly Khushwant Singh's *Train to Pakistan*, a compassionate study of the life of a community of Sikhs and Muslims in a village on the frontier of the two new States. The two peoples have lived together peaceably for centuries, but in the modern world unforeseen and uncontrollable forces are at work to arouse enmity. Khushwant Singh is an excellent writer and he tells his story in an authentic and non-partisan way. Ruskin Bond's *The Room on the Roof*, a very short novel, describes the adventures and impressions of a lad of seventeen who runs away from the too-English life on the outskirts of an Indian city and "discovers" the Indian way of living. This sensitive and vivid piece of writing, slightly satirical at times, makes us look forward to something more substantial from the author. Jean Hougron's *Ambush* is a French novel, set in Indo-China. It is adventurous, rather in the manner of John Buchan, but it brings to life a wild country and an unfamiliar kind of existence. The "ambush" in which the hero's wife and son are killed is allegedly the work of the Viet-minh; his pursuit of his revenge, however, is directed against one man, his powerful personal enemy. Albert Memmi is a writer from Tunis. *The Pillar of Salt* (also translated from the French) gives a vivid and disquieting picture of North African life, recounting the childhood and adolescence of a young man (son

of a Jewish father and a Berber mother) during critical times for French, Arabs and Jews. This is a disillusioned, almost a tragic, book; it is written in the first person, and gives an impression of being intensely autobiographical. *The Last Flowers* follows rather the manner of the Ruritanian romance; but it is up to date, very, in some respects. The country is "Comarca" (in which it is easy to see some traits of Mexico); but amid the absurd Ruritanian politics (presidents come and go, conspiracies hatch, American money exerts its baneful influence, and so on), there is a worthwhile picture of the difficulties of the impoverished Indian population, whom the hero finds himself championing. *The Last Run South* is primarily an adventure-story, about the crew of an American tramp steamer who get into various troubles in Latin American ports.

The vigour of the modern American novel has given it a world-wide influence on the writing of serious fiction. And this has meant that the American scene, described with unparalleled intensity by the novelists, has become widely familiar abroad. Are the American novelists accepted outside America as giving a picture of American civilisation as authentic as (for example) Galsworthy was supposed, outside England, to give of dear old Edwardian England? Edwin O'Connor's *The Last Hurrah* is a good-humoured account of American municipal politics, immensely detailed. The tough political boss, now a septuagenarian, of an American city decides to seek re-election as mayor once more. His enemies, all the progressive forces, are determined to oust him. In *Ten North Frederick*, although the main character, Joe Chapin, also has political ambitions, John O'Hara's subject is really the social scene, in which money and sex are of equal importance with politics. This is another big novel, trying to build up a full panorama of American life, especially the peculiarities of its class-system (which was the theme of his early masterpiece, *Appointment in Samarra*). Tennessee Williams's latest play, *Cat on a Hot Tin Roof*, set in a plantation home in the Mississippi Delta, has been a popular success on the New York stage. Preoccupied with "a stripping of souls" within a family group, Mr. Williams attains the expression of the "human extremities of emotion" with a candour scarcely to be found in drama, written for public performance, since the seventeenth century. Such intensity of emotion, with all the barriers either down or broken, inspires a certain awe in the reader. The fact that some of the outstanding American authors seem to be obsessed with violence, physical and emotional, may lead some of those abroad who are unfamiliar with the American way of life to have a peculiar picture of it.

Imaginative writing of such vitality is an exportable commodity, especially such brilliant writings as those of William Faulkner, Hemingway, Tennessee Williams and Arthur Miller.

Paul Blanshard's thorough and balanced study of the workings of the literary censorship in America, *The Right to Read*, is an absorbing book. His sub-title, "The Battle against Censorship," does not mean that he has written merely a polemic against the surveillance, on political or moral grounds, of what the public is allowed to read. It is full of information, some of it very entertaining; moreover, it is hopeful, because he really believes that advances have been made in working out an intelligent and enlightened attitude to the problem. A difficult case in point (though Mr. Blanshard does not mention it) is that of Henry Miller, of whom a partial biography or volume of reminiscences has been written by Alfred Perlès (*My Friend Henry Miller*). Many of Henry Miller's works are still officially banned in Britain and the United States, though some are available in Paris and all (I am told) in Tokyo. Yet they have received the emphatic critical approval of Sir Herbert Read, T. S. Eliot, George Orwell, Cyril Connolly, and other reputable judges.

The colour-problem remains an inexhaustible subject for writers of fiction. In *Shining Trouble* Mrs. Mercedes Mackay sets her story amidst a minor gold-rush in central Africa in the 1980s. Fortunately she enlivens and vivifies her narrative with a good deal of humour. She has obviously observed closely and honestly and not too painfully. *Youngblood*, however, is a book that hurts, and its great length only increases the sense of anguish. It is set in the 1920s and 1930s in the deep South and its subject is the difficulty of the coloured peoples in retaining their dignity in a society ruled by the whites. It is full of indignation, of protest; but perhaps the message would have been more strongly felt if there were less of it. The idiomatic dialogue in this book is, to my ears, beautifully represented. The problems of the influx of coloured people into England is dealt with, rather sadly, by John Sykes in *The Newcomer*, and, rather comically, by John St. John in *A Trick of the Sun*. Mr. Sykes's newcomer is the usual East African student, of good family, in London. He leaves his hostel and tries to settle in a boarding-house, to face the not unexpected proportion of sympathy, indifference, and hostility. This is a profitable book to read. It is hard to say the same of *A Trick of the Sun*, for Mr. St. John's newcomer is the offspring of an English peer and a West African negro woman. His blood is blue as well as black. The complications and repercussions make an amusing tale. The moral is satirical rather than moving.

Edmund Wilson's important and unusual travel-book, *Red, Black, Blond and Olive*, has the sub-title "Studies in Four Civilizations: Zúñi, Haiti, Soviet Russia, Israel." The four parts were written at different dates; the account of Russia belongs to 1935. Naturally such an experienced and lively writer as Mr. Wilson produces a readable book, full of fascination especially about subjects or places little known. His account of Israel begins with a discussion of the linguistic and literary aspects of the Book of Genesis; the transition to a consideration of the modern State is perfectly natural and felicitous. *Where Monsoons Meet* is an anthology of descriptive passages about Malaya, from Raffles to the present day. There are some translations from native literature, but the bulk of the book consists of extracts from the narratives of European travellers, proconsuls, and followers of "King Rubber." The whole gives a composite picture of the country from the early nineteenth century onwards. It seems to be an excellent companion for the traveller and as pleasant an introduction as possible to the condition of a country suffering from racial divisions and grave economic and educational problems.

The widespread popular interest in international diplomacy has meant that diplomats have become "news" more than they have ever been before. They have also become fashionable figures in fiction. In *The Ambassador's Wife*, Sir Philip Gibbs, with that instinct for the topical which has helped him to produce so many readable and appropriate novels in the past, has written a tale of a British Ambassador in Moscow who marries a beautiful lady from Central Europe. She (as we must expect) turns out to be a Russian agent. Robert Harling's *The Enormous Shadow* is an exciting book about the world of Burgess, Maclean, Pontecorvo, and the betrayal of atomic secrets. It is also a serious study of what we imply by "treason" of that sort in the modern world. It seems to me to have very high merits in its own kind of intelligent thriller. Sir Compton Mackenzie has, in *Thin Ice*, written a distinguished work of literature; it is a sad tale of the lack of moral control which comes over a well-known public figure when he finds that his career has failed. It is a book full of sympathy, based upon an intimate knowledge of the changes of sensibility which have taken place during the last half-century. Jocelyn Davey's *The Undoubted Deed* represents a less serious world than *Thin Ice*. The British Embassy in Washington is the scene; international exchanges provide the plot, and (one may suppose) specimens of the *corps diplomatique* the characters. The mystery is solved by a philosophical Oxford don. It is all seen with a satiric eye for foibles of speech and character. This novel

must give great entertainment to those "in the know"; and it gives a good deal to the others.

There have been several notable war-novels recently, including some important translations into English. *Scene of the Meeting* is a story of the Resistance. In some unnamed country of Europe under totalitarian rule, a writer, Konstant, is compelled by circumstances to take sides with the Resistance party, which, in this case, is lead by a women, who rules with tyrannical energy her handful of followers holding out on a mountain. Konstant is a "liberal," who cannot remain apart from the issue, and the story gradually acquires a symbolic meaning. The struggle the book dramatises, we are told, "is going on everywhere today, in the minds of men—a struggle between two kinds of power, or two kinds of freedom." In spite of its symbolism and its efforts at contributing to political philosophy, *Scene of the Meeting* is an excellent novel. *Perimeter West* also rises superior to a tendency to become symbolical. An unnamed city, after severe bombardment, has been occupied by foreign forces and is still controlled by them from the outskirts. The loves and private intentions of ordinary human beings are now firmly fitted into a framework of circumstances outside their control.

Manes Sperber's *The Lost Bay* is the third of a trilogy of novels (the others were translated as *The Wind and the Flame* and *To Dusty Death*) describing the involvement of a group of characters with the Communist movement in Europe before the war. *The Lost Bay* is about guerilla warfare in Yugoslavia and Poland; an independant brigade is fighting against the Germans; but also against the Yugoslav partisans. This is the sort of book which really succeeds in illuminating the events of our age; it seems to have some genuine insight into the forces of nationalism with which the Communist movement has difficulty in allying itself. *House of Dolls* shocks and humiliates. It is said to be based upon an authentic diary. It tells the story of Daniella, a Jewish girl, who was forced from her home in Poland and passed from labour camps to one of the official houses of prostitution organized for their army by the Nazis. *Three Rivers to Glory* is a straightforward war-novel, an authentic account of life during the campaign in the Burmese jungles. *The House on the Hill*, translated from the Italian, is a subtle and important book. Cesare Pavese committed suicide in 1950 after having won a considerable reputation as a writer. The action of this novel takes place in Italy towards the end of the war. Turin is being bombed, the Germans have arrived, and civil war is beginning. Corrado, a schoolmaster with pacifist tendencies, escapes from

the disturbed city and meditates upon his detachment from the meaningless violence of events. This novel was the work of a distinguished mind, not content with any easy answers. Ronald Hingley's *Up Jenkins!* is an Orwellian vision of the future transposed into a hilarious key. Britain is divided politically into North (much the same as at present) and South (People's Britain, on totalitarian lines). The satire, not always very original, I am afraid, is directed against the police state, with its "Prescribed Reaction Tests," and so on. There is a Test Match between North and South; the latter team wins owing to the achievement of its supersonic fast bowler. The book has its moments of high comedy, and occasionally of suggestive seriousness.

Among several notable volumes of English poetry recently published has been the *Collected Poems* of Kathleen Raine, which is in fact a careful selection from the contents of her four previous volumes. She is a personal poet, concerned deeply with the quality of living; but it is her own experience, her own vision, which is the subject of her poems. With no pretensions to write about social forces beyond immediate and particular apprehension, she is a traditional poet, free from anxiety about "causes," but exhilarating in the clearness of her imagination. Lawrence Durrell's volume *The Tree of Idleness* is a collection of the poems of a cosmopolitan. His affection for the Eastern Mediterranean has found expression in prose as well as verse before now; his books on Corfu and Rhodes are delightful. His civilised and sophisticated poetry about places will be attractive to those readers who share something of his experience, and will be (like Byron's) splendidly evocative to those who do not. It is gay, ruminative, precise, and not over-difficult. There could be few poetic contrasts greater than that between Durrell and J. P. Fletcher, whose *Tally 300* has recently been published in full. Mr. Fletcher gained one of the Arts Council prizes for poetry awarded during the Festival of Britain. He wrote about the grim existence of a colliery town and the emotions of those who serve their sentence of life underground; squalor, fear, and degradation of spirit; yet not without "faith in the innate, though often cruelly-obiterated, nobleness of man." The complete poem cannot be regarded as more effective than the already-published part that won the prize. But it is a fuller working out of the themes, and it is a notable addition to English poetry, for it is one of the few important volumes published recently which should be read with pleasure by those who are not habitually readers of modern poetry. Here is a poet with unusual experiences to express and with the poetic energy to communicate his impressions intensely.

Randall Jarrell is an American poet of wider range than the other three I have mentioned; and his *Selected Poems*, recently published in England, have a good chance of being successful with the "general reader"—that is, the reader whose tastes have been determined by his reading of the older favourites and whose interest weakens when faced with obscurity. Mr. Jarrell wrote entertaining or moving "documentary poems" about the war and now he writes them about civilian life. He is closest to Browning of all our modern poets, and what he writes has something of the human interest of Browning's poetry, so that he reveals the flavour and quality of American life with more directness than better (or more complicated) poets. Mr. Jarrell is a poet who wants to be read; for he himself believes in poetry as something that is a natural part of man's being. "Human life without some form of poetry is not human life but animal existence" are his words.

During the last twelve months there have been published some important biographies of men of letters who have played their part in determining the intellectual atmosphere of our times. St John Ervine's life of Bernard Shaw has been expected for some time and has not disappointed expectations of its merits. It is a biography on the grand scale (610 pages), based upon forty years of friendship with Shaw. Mr. Ervine is a firm friend and an admirer, but he is not in the least taken in by Shaw's personality and his occasional antics. He expresses his pungent disagreement with many of his subject's ideas, political and social and moral. The year 1958 was the centenary of the birth of Shaw; yet so recently was he alive, and so brilliantly does he survive on the stage and on the printed page, that Mr. Ervine's hardly seems to be a typical centenary-biography. Christopher Hollis's *Study of George Orwell* is, of course, on a smaller scale than Mr. Ervine's book, but it is also a biography written by a friend who feels no necessity to approve the ideas expressed by his subject. Mr. Hollis was a fellow-pupil with Orwell (Eric Blair as he then was) at Eton, and he remained in contact with him during a good deal of his life. He gives a reasonable account of Orwell's motives for his sometimes extraordinary conduct and the sources of his ultimate success as a writer. Although written between November 1948 and February 1944, *Animal Farm* was not published (owing to its rejection by four publishers in succession) until 1945, about the time of the German surrender. It was an opportune moment, when disillusionment with Russian policy was beginning to be felt in Britain. Its enormous popularity and its circulation in many languages means that Orwell must, for better or worse, be regarded as one of the representative and

influential literary figures in the post-war world. Such a masterpiece of political satire has rarely been provided for the delight of its readers, and none has been more successful. The impression made by 1984 was second only to *Animal Farm*. Mr. Hollis's book on Orwell, though somewhat censorious of his ideas, is a necessary aid to the understanding of that remarkable writer.

The number of books about James Joyce has steadily increased; for, those who have come to admire him generally feel an impulse to make him accessible to the less fortunate. Hugh Kenner's book *Dublin's Joyce* has some claim to be the most comprehensive work yet available. It is full of entertainment for those who are addicts of Joyce and full of enlightenment for the beginner. Mr. Kenner sees Joyce as producing an exquisitely parodic picture of Dublin habits of thought and speech in his youth. Although an exile from Ireland all his adult life and more of a cosmopolitan than any other major writer in English in the twentieth century, Joyce is shown as never having escaped from his Dublin origins. He has been a literary influence throughout the civilised world; it is the paradox of Mr. Kenner's book to prove how local he also was.

Frank Swinnerton has been at close quarters with literature since the beginning of the twentieth century. The first volume of his reminiscences, *Background With Chorus*, is a delightful and valuable volume, modest, urbane, and highly informative. He has illuminated the literary history of his time by this careful chronicle of changes of mood and influence, fashion and reputation in the recent past, and prognostications of what we have come to feel now. And where do we stand? Mr. J. B. Priestley has told us in his lecture, *The Writer in a Changing Society*, without feeling any need to restrain his impulses to hit out. Is there not about many of the young now, he asks—

“an air of conformity, not an eager and zestful air, no suggestion of having enlisted in a crusade, but one that produces either a smooth, bland, faintly cynical manner, in the apprentice politician or official, or a somewhat loutish style of sullen acquiescence, found in some young novelists?”

In such circumstances the status of the writer is declining, he tells us, in a society in which *entertainment* (principally by screen and television personalities) has become the main interest of the new “middle” class, with its newly acquired security. We should, of course, support, to the utmost of our powers, the organisations which exist for the encouragement of the arts; but unfortunately the new “official” types who have climbed the ladder of power have also soon obtained the control even of these organisations.

Good committee-men have become the rulers of councils and societies and associations and corporations which dispense the official patronage of the arts; not the flaming enthusiasts. There are some brilliant passages in this lecture by Mr. Priestley. It is a tract for the times, indeed.

Belfast.

T. J. B. SPENCER.

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